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THE EXPOSITOR

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VOL. XV.

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"DEAD WORKS"

SHAKESPEARE'S Mark Antony tells the Roman crowd in the forum :

> "The evil that men do lives after them,
> The good is oft interred with their bones."

The work that a man does for others is sometimes "dead" in this sense ; it is left buried in oblivion. Gratitude is short-lived, and good actions may be passed over by posterity as if they had never been. But this is not the sense in which the author of *Πρὸς Ἑβραίους* speaks of *ἔργα νεκρά*. It is a phrase coined, or at any rate made current, by himself. There does not seem to be any direct parallel to it in rabbinic literature, and there is none in contemporary Jewish or Christian Greek literature, not even in the pages of Philo. The meaning has to be picked out from the context of the homily, but even this does not yield an unambiguous interpretation. Much depends, for example, on the answer given to the general question whether *Πρὸς Ἑβραίους* was or was not specially addressed to Christians of Jewish birth and sympathies.

The phrase occurs only twice. (*a*) In vi. 1 the elementary principles of the Christian religion are described as including, to begin with, *μετανοίας ἀπὸ νεκρῶν ἔργων καὶ πίστεως ἐπὶ θεόν*. In ix. 14, speaking (*b*) about the efficacy of the sacrifice of Christ, the writer declares : *τὸ αἷμα τοῦ Χριστοῦ . . . καθαριεῖ τὴν συνείδησιν ὑμῶν ἀπὸ νεκρῶν ἔργων εἰς τὸ λατρεύειν θεῷ ζῶντι*. There is no variant reading in either case. Tertullian (*de pudicitia* 20), in one of his rare

allusions to *Πρὸς Ἑβραίους*, does speak of "pœnitentiae ab operibus mortuorum," but this simply means that he took *νεκρῶν* in vi. 1 as a substantive instead of as an adjective; either he or the version which he followed was misled by the masculine *νεκρῶν* immediately below.

The second passage offers an easier starting-point for investigation than the first. There is an obvious allusion, in the metaphor, to the primitive religious feeling, shared by the Hebrews, that contact with a corpse "defiled" any one; to touch a dead body involved a pollution which disqualified for worship, till it was removed by a process of ritual atonement. As Chrysostom noted, this was in the writer's mind at ix. 14; *καλῶς εἶπεν ἀπὸ 'νεκρῶν' ἔργων, εἴ τις γὰρ ἥψατο τότε νεκροῦ ἐμιαίνετο.* In the Priestly Code, from which the author of Hebrews is arguing here, even contact with the dead body of the heifer temporarily rendered the sacrificing priest unclean (cf. Num. xix. 1 ff.), and a similar principle underlay the ritual for purifying soldiers after a battle (Num. xxxi. 19: "Encamp outside of the camp seven days, whoever has killed any person or touched the slain, purify yourselves"). So much is clear, at any rate. As the aim and effect of the sacrifice of Christ is to bring men into direct communion with God, the author of *Πρὸς Ἑβραίους* conceives this as a service or worship, a *λατρεύειν θεῷ ζῶντι*, which involves a purification of the inner conscience corresponding to the external purification required in the ritual of the Old Testament worship. In order to enter the Presence, stains have to be removed from the would-be worshipper; formerly, animal sacrifice availed *πρὸς τὴν τῆς σαρκὸς καθαρότητα*, but now the blood of Christ purifies *τὴν συνείδησιν*. What these stains are, under the Christian order, is plain from the context, e.g., from ix. 15 (*εἰς ἀπολύτρωσιν τῶν ἐπὶ τῇ πρώτῃ διαθήκῃ παραβάσεων*), from ix. 22 (*χωρὶς αἱματεκχυσίας οὐ*

γίνεται ἄφεσις), and from x. 22 (προσερχώμεθα . . . ἐρραντισμένοι τὰς καρδίας ἀπὸ συνειδήσεως πονηρᾶς); they are "sins" in the ordinary sense of the term. But why does not the author call them simply ἁμαρτίαι, παραβάσεις, ἀδικίαι, or ἀνομίαι, as he does elsewhere? If the phrase νεκρὰ ἔργα only occurred here, we might imagine that he used νεκρὰ to describe the polluting influence of human ἔργα, i.e., of the "bad" deeds which interrupt fellowship with God just as contact with a corpse hindered ritual access under the Old Testament order. But νεκρὰ ἔργα occurs elsewhere in his argument, and before admitting this interpretation, we must look into the other passage.

Here, the allusion has no ritual background. "Let us pass on to what is mature, leaving elementary Christian doctrine behind, instead of laying the foundation over again with repentance from dead works and faith in God" (vi. 1). The author evidently assumes that his readers are familiar with the meaning of ἔργα νεκρά. The decisive religious change which in one aspect is described as the cleansing of the conscience ἀπὸ νεκρῶν ἔργων is described from the human point of view as μετανοία ἀπὸ νεκρῶν ἔργων, and the positive aim is either λατρεύειν θεῷ ζῶντι or πίστις ἐπὶ θεόν. But the author has no occasion to define such "dead works." In fact, he usually employs ἔργα to denote divine actions or creations; with the partial exception of iv. 10 (κατέπαυσεν ἀπὸ τῶν ἔργων αὐτοῦ, ὥσπερ ἀπὸ τῶν ἰδίων ὁ θεός), this is his normal use of the term by itself. The only word which throws light by contrast upon ἔργα νεκρά is in x. 24, where Christians are bidden stir themselves up to love and good deeds (ἀγάπης καὶ καλῶν ἔργων)—brotherly love being the sphere and spirit for the exercise of moral activities in the Church (cf. vi. 10 τοῦ ἔργου ὑμῶν καὶ τῆς ἀγάπης). But even if νεκρὰ ἔργα were identified with the opposite of all this, with the

selfishness which connoted sins like immorality and greed and hatred, it would not follow that "dead works" had not a wider significance for the circle of *Πρὸς Ἑβραίους*, and we would still be left with the problem, why such *ἔργα* were known as *νεκρά*.

(i.) One suggestion on the latter point may be taken from the language of the contemporary Jewish saint who wrote 4th Esdras. In his lament over the state of sin and misery into which men have been plunged by the Fall, he wails (vii. 117 f.) :—

"What does it profit men to live for the present in grief and after death to look for punishment? O Adam, what have you done! The sin was yours, but the fall was not yours alone, it was ours also who have descended from you. For what does it profit us to have immortality promised us (immortale tempus), when we have committed deeds that are fatal (mortalia opera)?"

In viii. 31 ("quoniam nos et patres nostri [mor]talibus moribus egimus") *mortalia*, whatever Greek term it may represent, seems to carry the same religious idea, that sin dooms men to death. Does the author of *Πρὸς Ἑβραίους* use *ἔργα νεκρά* in this sense? The allusion in ii. 14–15 seems to support such an interpretation, for the dread of death which holds men in a state of abject bondage is a religious fear; it is the apprehension of a bad conscience overpowering those who have to die and after death to be judged (ix. 27 *ἀπόκειται τοῖς ἀνθρώποις ἅπαξ ἀποθανεῖν, μετὰ δὲ τοῦτο κρίσις*). Death, in the pregnant religious meaning of the term, is wielded by the devil, and the one escape from his tyranny is through the sacrifice of Christ, which breaks up that tyranny. This line of thought is not worked out in *Πρὸς Ἑβραίους*. It is one of the primitive Christian conceptions which lie off the argument, but the very incidental character of the allusion shows that both the writer

and the readers must have been familiar with it. *Ἔργα νεκρά* might therefore be the course of conduct belonging to the order of *θάνατος*, and consequently out of relation to the *θεὸς ζῶν*. It is not necessary to suppose that the author held the same views of Adam's sin as the author of 4th Esdras or St. Paul. *Ἔργα νεκρά* to him may not have been equivalent to the *mortales mores* or *mortalia opera* of the Jewish saint, and critics who advocate this general interpretation of the phrase differ in the shades of significance which they assign to it. Thus, Professor A. B. Davidson's notes simply argue that the *ἔργα* are called *νεκρά* "because being sinful they belong to the sphere of that which is separate from the living God, the sphere of death, and the man on whose conscience they lie feels that he belongs to this sphere, and hence when they are purified he can serve the living God." Pfleiderer, like most of the older editors who took this view, goes further; "dead works are works which cause death." This is over-precise, however. Calvin's definition—"*mortua opera* intellige vel quae mortem generant vel quae fructus sunt mortis. Nam quum animae vita sit nostra cum Deo coniunctio, qui alienati sunt per peccatum vere censentur mortui"—is mere sound. But in any case the patristic interpretation which bluntly identified *ἔργα νεκρά* with sinful deeds is on the whole justified; whatever is evil is *νεκρόν*, according to the author of *Πρὸς Ἑβραίους*, and it makes any *πίστις* or *λατρεύειν* impossible.

The adequacy of this interpretation may be tested by comparing it with its rival, which involves a special view of the readers of *Πρὸς Ἑβραίους*.

(ii.) The second theory regards *νεκρά* as "lifeless," devoid of the real principle of religious vitality. The main exponent, in English, of this view is Dr. Westcott, who argues that *ἔργα νεκρά* "are not vaguely sins which lead to death

but works devoid of that element which makes them truly works. They have the form but not the vital power of works. There is but one spring of life and all which does not flow from it is "dead." All acts of a man in himself, separated from God, are "dead works" (cf. John xv. 44 f.). The first step in faith is to give up the selfish life they represent. In *Πρὸς Ἑβραίους* these are "all the works corresponding with the Levitical system" from which the work of Christ in fulfilling the Law has withdrawn such elements of life as they once possessed. Consequently, in the Christian order, they have lost their provisional vitality; they are now *ἔργα νεκρά*, and have to be dropped as valueless. This interpretation regards the Church addressed in Hebrews as composed of Christians who had been born Jews and who had broken with the legal, ritual system in favour of a living faith and fellowship mediated by Jesus Christ. It is true, as Dean Alford admitted, that such a rendering of *νεκρόν* as 'devoid of life and power" does not necessarily imply the Jewish birth and sympathies of the readers, for *ἔργα νεκρά* might mean pretty much what the author of *Πρὸς Ἐφεσίους* meant by *τὰ ἔργα τὰ ἄκαρπα τοῦ σκότους* (v. 11), i.e. the very opposite of what is good and right and true, the antithesis of what is *εὐάρεστον τῷ κυρίῳ*. But nearly all who adopt this interpretation of *ἔργα νεκρά* in *Πρὸς Ἑβραίους* incline to lay stress upon a formal, ceremonial observance of the Jewish cultus, rather than on a vicious and worldly life such as pagans led. Thus Franz Delitzsch, after insisting that *ἔργα νεκρά* are actions "which have not their sense or motive power in a life from God . . . which have no power to act for good on the world without, nor to react for good on the doer himself, and are therefore fruitless," adds that they include "especially the *opus operatum* or pharisaical righteousness of the Jewish hypocrite." Similarly, to take one other recent case,

Zahn understands *νεκρά* as vain and empty; *ἔργα νεκρά* represent "the conduct which is apparently pious, so far as appearances go, but which lacks spirit and faith." Only, he continues, while the author of *Πρὸς Ἑβραίως* could not possibly have called the conscientious observance of the law by the name of *ἔργα νεκρά*, "he could speak thus of conduct in accordance with the form of legal piety, void of faith and without spiritual power." The common sins to which Jews and pagans were liable are not excluded, "but it was only among the Jews that these sins had become connected with the observance of a formal religion which was of such a nature that renunciation of sin could be called a renunciation of dead works" (*Introduction to the New Testament*,, English translation, vol. ii. p. 326). This conception of *ἔργα νεκρά* has been widely held, and presented with varying degrees of emphasis, but the unvarying characteristic of all its advocates is that they support the association of the phrase with a formal Judaism, from which it is assumed that the readers had had to be converted. Thus, one of the most recent expositors, Professor Marcus Dods, explains that "dead works are such as have no living connexion with the character but are done in mere compliance with the law and therefore accomplish nothing. They are like a dead fleece laid on a wolf, not a part of his life and growing out of him . . . Such repentance was especially necessary in Jewish Christians" (*Expositor's Greek Testament*, vol. iv. p. 294).

But were the readers Jewish Christians? Even if they were, even if they are supposed to belong to a Hellenistic type of Judaism, it would not necessarily rule out (i.), for two of the adherents of the Jewish Christian hypothesis, Professor A. B. Davidson and Dr. E. K. A. Riehm (*Der Lehrbegriff des Hebräerbriefes*, 1858, p. 568) strenuously deny that *ἔργα νεκρά* can possibly mean an external ob-

servance of the Jewish Law, and agree that the phrase must denote sinful actions. This seems a natural inference from the language of both passages. It is a strong thing to say that men have to repent *ἀπὸ νεκρῶν ἔργων* and to have their conscience purified *ἀπὸ νεκρῶν ἔργων*. Would it be natural, unless *ἔργα νεκρά* meant breaches of the moral code? No doubt, the defilement which interrupted the fellowship of the Jewish worshipper with his God was not invariably ethical; other things than sin disqualified for access to the Presence. But the context of a passage like ix. 14 and the very wording of it are too weighty to rest upon an identification of *ἔργα νεκρά* with the self-righteousness which was content to fulfil the prescribed ceremonial duties of Judaism. "For if the blood of goats and bulls and the ashes of a heifer, sprinkled on defiled persons, give them a holiness that bears on bodily purity, how much more shall the blood of Christ, who in the spirit of the eternal, offered himself as an unblemished sacrifice to God, cleanse your conscience from dead works to serve a living God?" How can the *ἔργα νεκρά* which thus stain the conscience and hinder communion be anything except moral offences? The cleansing of the conscience, which is the boon of Christ's sacrifice, is forgiveness issuing in fellowship, and sin is the sole obstacle to that consummation. It is conceivable, indeed, that the author of *Πρὸς Ἑβραίους* was addressing, and knew he was addressing, Jewish Christians who previous to their conversion had been working out a righteousness of their own, endeavouring to serve God in terms of their inherited Jewish piety. The Jewish Christian hypothesis might be put in this way, as an explanation of *ἔργα νεκρά*. The readers, on this view would have been strict, earnest Jews, like St. Paul, not formalists, and the allusion to this pre-Christian condition as *ἔργα νεκρά* in the light of what had happened in their

experience would then tally with the nineteenth century revival hymn, "Doing is a deadly thing, doing ends in death"—a paradox whose evangelical truth Mr. Mearns pointed out some years ago in the pages of the *Journal of Theological Studies* (vol. xii. pp. 613–619). They may have been seeking sincerely to win a satisfying relation to God, as St. Paul would have said, *ὡς ἐξ ἔργων*, knowing no better. But the Pauline antithesis of *πίστις* and *ἔργα* is absent from *Πρὸς Ἑβραίους*, and one reason for the widespread misconception of the latter's theology has been the tendency to read it more or less unconsciously in the light of the Pauline theology. The fact is, we know practically nothing about the religious position of the Church to which *Πρὸς Ἑβραίους* was addressed, except what may be inferred from one or two phrases like *ἀπὸ νεκρῶν ἔργων*, for the title is not original, and the readers are never addressed as Jews or Hebrews. Furthermore, the language of vi. 1 does not suggest a Jewish Christian audience any more than ix. 14. In view of vi. 6 it is impossible to explain *μετάνοια ἀπὸ νεκρῶν ἔργων* as a change of mind; the phrase implies more than an alteration of standpoint, as if the readers had suddenly come to see that "doing was a deadly thing," futile and dangerous, and that saving faith in Christ could alone avail. Their "repentance" was connected with *πίστις ἐπὶ θεόν*. They had passed from death into life, for the *ἔργα* of their pre-Christian existence were in the sphere of "death," while faith connoted life (as in x. 38); but *πίστις ἐπὶ θεόν* does not prove either that the persons addressed were Jewish Christians or that they had been pagans by birth. The alleged parallel in favour of the former, viz., Romansi v. 5, is not conclusive; it is all very well for St. Paul to say, *τῷ δὲ μὴ ἐργαζομένῳ, πιστεύοντι δὲ ἐπὶ τὸν δικαιοῦντα τὸν ἀσεβῆ, λογίζεται ἡ πίστις αὐτοῦ εἰς δικαιοσύνην*, but the author of *Πρὸς Ἑβραίους* does not think of *πίστις* and *ἔργα* as

St. Paul does, and it is one thing to speak of "faith in God," and another thing to speak of faith in God as *τὸν δικαιοῦντα τὸν ἀσεβῆ*. On the other side, 1 Thess. i. 9 is not decisive in favour of the view that *πίστις ἐπὶ θεόν* implies such faith in the existence and unity of God as would be a primary requisite for pagan converts; St. Paul does write, *ἐπεστρέψατε πρὸς τὸν θεὸν ἀπὸ τῶν εἰδώλων, δουλεύειν θεῷ ζῶντι καὶ ἀληθινῷ*, but it is the phrase *ἀπὸ τῶν εἰδώλων* and the well-known contrast between the living God and pagan idols which show that he is thinking of Christians who had been born outside Judaism. By itself *πρὸς τὸν θεόν* would not prove this. So far as *Πρὸς Ἑβραίους* is concerned, however, *πίστις ἐπὶ θεόν* would tally with such a hypothesis, particularly in view of a remark like xi. 6 (*πιστεῦσαι γὰρ δεῖ τὸν προσερχόμενον τῷ θεῷ ὅτι ἔστι*). Had the author been thinking of Jewish Christians only, when he wrote vi. 1, we might expect him to have spoken of faith in Christ. Those who have to explain how *πίστις ἐπὶ τὸν θεόν* could be spoken of as a rudimentary Christian truth which converted Jews needed to master, are obliged to interpret it as "trust in God," or to paraphrase it by "the full faith in Christ and the Gospel" (Bleek) or "faith in the declaration which God has made to men respecting His Son, the Saviour of the world" (Moses Stuart). It is not very satisfactory to read all this into the short phrase; the collocation of repentance and faith in God rather suggests the well-known programme of the Christian mission to pagans, which laid stress at the outset upon these two essentials. At the same time, it is hardly fair to argue that *πίστις ἐπὶ τὸν θεόν* could not be used of Jewish Christians by an author who, like the writer of *Πρὸς Ἑβραίους*, delights to find proof of such *πίστις* in Old Testament history. He might do that and at the same time freely hold that *πίστις ἐπὶ τὸν θεόν* had a richer and larger content in the revelation

of Jesus Christ. Even St. Paul, who argued that Abraham was a believing man, could say that faith came into full play with the coming of Christ : ἐλθούσης δὲ τῆς πίστεως (Gal. iii. 25), faith has come, and with it a new religious era in which faith for the first time has its full rights. Similarly, if the readers of *Πρὸς Ἑβραίους* had been Jews before they entered the Church, there is no reason why they could not be said to have needed a new foundation for their faith in God. But the fact is that the language of the writing does not yield, here or elsewhere, any decisive evidence for the pre-Christian character of the Church which the writer has in mind. He is not thinking either of Jewish or of non-Jewish Christians. His friends are members of the People or Household of God which has been in existence from the beginning. He is not conscious of any division between Jewish and non-Jewish Christians in the community, and his words are intended for members of the Church quite irrespective of their origin. When we ask whether he wrote to Jewish or to non-Jewish Christians, we are asking a question which was not present to his mind. Consequently, the fairest interpretation of a phrase like ἔργα νεκρά is one which applies to Christians as Christians, unless there is anything decisively opposed to it. As we have seen, such a general interpretation is possible, and exegetically there is nothing either in vi. 1 or in ix. 14 which necessitates an exclusively Jewish Christian sense.

The metaphorical use of νεκρός outside *Πρὸς Ἑβραίους* does not throw much light on the meaning of ἔργα νεκρά, unfortunately. " Useless because lifeless " is a natural sense of the term, as it occurs in James ii. 15–16 : " Suppose some brother or sister is ill-clad and short of daily food ; if any of you says to them, ' Depart in peace ! Get warm, get food,' without supplying their bodily needs, τί τὸ ὄφελος ; So faith, unless it has deeds, is dead in itself (νεκρά ἐστιν

καθ' ἑαυτήν). "Such faith, he adds (ver. 20), is dead—*νεκρά*, and *ἀργή* is a strongly supported variant. It is an idle, lifeless faith, because it cannot save its possessor. The same idea recurs in a remark of Epictetus (iii. 23, 28) about the fashionable philosophers of the age, who actually catered for an audience, instead of letting themselves be summoned, like physicians, to heal the diseases of men. Epictetus satirically represents one of these lecturers saying, "I advise you to come and hear that you are in a bad way, that you are attending to everything except what you should attend to, that you don't know what is good and what is bad, that you are unfortunate and unhappy." Then Epictetus adds—*κομψὴ παράκλησις. καὶ μὴν ἂν μὴ ταῦτα ἐμποιῇ ὁ τοῦ φιλοσόφου λόγος, νεκρός ἐστι καὶ αὐτος καὶ ὁ λέγων*. This metaphorical use of the adjective would tally with the second interpretation (ii.) which has been suggested for *ἔργα νεκρά*. It is certainly remarkable that the author of *Πρὸς Ἑβραίους* does use *νενεκρωμένος* in connexion with the thought of impotence and unproductiveness (xi. 12 *ἀφ' ἑνὸς ἐγενήθησαν, καὶ ταῦτα νενεκρωμένου*), while Marcus Aurelius employs the verb to denote principles that have lost their vitality and effectiveness (vii. 2: *τὰ δόγματα πῶς ἄλλως δύναται νεκρωθῆναι κ.τ.λ.*) and become, as we would say, worn out. Similarly the author of the Epistle of Barnabas (xii. 7) in paraphrasing Numbers xxi. 8–9 applies *νεκρός* to the brazen serpent in this sense: *αὐτὸς ὢν νεκρὸς δύναται ζωοποιῆσαι*—the wonder being that any "dead" object could impart life.

On the other hand, it is in the first sense (i.) suggested for the phrase in *Πρὸς Ἑβραίους* that the contemporary author of *Πρὸς Ἐφεσίους* probably uses *νεκρός* to describe the religious and moral plight of pagans prior to conversion; when he reminds them that they were at one time "dead in trespasses and sins" (*ὑμᾶς ὄντας νεκροὺς τοῖς παρα-*

πτώμασιν καὶ ταῖς ἁμαρτίαις ὑμῶν, ii. 1), he is speaking, as Dr. L. A. Muirhead observes (*The Terms Life and Death in the Old and New Testament*, p. 29), "from the point of view of a conscience acutely alive, aware that its sin has already set the death-power at work, and foreshadowing to itself an awful and inevitable end." The impulses of this so-called life, which obeyed the dictates of the lower nature and gave full play to the passions, is described as the sway of the Prince of the air over pagans—a partial parallel to the situation noted in Hebrews ii. 14. Such an existence is doomed; those addicted to it are νεκροί, judged by the standards of reality and God. To be "dead in trespasses and sins" might indeed mean no more than indifference and insensibility to God. "Such was my life," says St. Augustine remorsefully, as he reviews his vicious youth, "such was my life, but, my God, was it life?" (talis vita mea numquid vita erat, deus meus? *Confess.* iii. 2). The term νεκρός might be used by the author of Πρὸς Ἐφεσίους here for such a fatally callous existence, as though it deserved the name of death rather than life. When he quotes, later on, the line of an early Christian hymn—

> "Wake up, O sleeper, and rise from the dead" (v. 14),

he might be setting himself to do pretty much what Wordsworth hoped to do by means of his poetry, to

> "Arouse the sensual from their sleep
> Of death."

That a vicious life was no life at all but really death, was a commonplace of moralists. But "dead in trespasses and sins" denotes more than even a heightened form of this truth. The author of Πρὸς Ἐφεσίους, it is true, calls men themselves νεκροί, while the author of Πρὸς Ἑβραίους simply brands their actions with this title; yet when the former speaks of them as not only ἀπηλλοτριωμένοι τῆς

ζωῆς τοῦ θεοῦ but in process of ruin (*τὸν παλαιὸν ἄνθρωπον τὸν φθειρόμενον κατὰ τὰς ἐπιθυμίας τῆς ἀπάτης*), the prospective sense of "dead" here as in *Πρὸς Ἑβραίους* seems inevitable. In fact, the general idea is that of Wisd. Sol. i. 12 with its warning to Epicureans. Philo does suggest the other view. In explaining Genesis ii. 17 (*Legum allegor.* i. 33), he notes that there are two deaths; "the death of man is the severing of the soul from the body, but the death of the soul is the destruction of virtue and the admission of vice," and the latter is the punishment inflicted by God. The author of *Πρὸς Ἑβραίους* often reminds us of Philo. But not here, however. "Dead works," like "dead in trespasses and sins," expresses a deeper religious psychology than the Alexandrian philosopher ever fathomed, deeper than the similar view which led D. G. Rossetti to say of those who worked for money or for anything except love—

> "Through many years they toil; then on a day
> They die not—for their life was death—but cease."

True, but it is in the religious sense of "vital," rather than in the sense of "fruitless" or "vain" actions that Hermas employs the phrase to describe "the *δίψυχοι* and those who have the Lord on their lips, but not in their hearts . . . only their words are alive, *τὰ δὲ ἔργα αὐτῶν νεκρά ἐστιν*" (*Sim.* ix. 21, 2). They are bidden repent at once, i.e., of their idolatry and other sins, and such repentance endows them with life. Hermas is plainly using the language of *Πρὸς Ἑβραίους* just as in *Sim.* ix. 16, 3 he employs *νεκρός* to describe the unbaptized; *πρὶν γάρ, φησὶ, φόρεσαι τὸν ἄνθρωπον τὸ ὄνομα τοῦ υἱοῦ τοῦ θεοῦ νεκρός ἐστιν· ὅταν δὲ λάβῃ τὴν σφραγῖδα, ἀποτίθεται τὴν νέκρωσιν καὶ ἀναλαμβάνει τὴν ζωήν.* Hermas is interested in baptism as the sacrament of regeneration, and his use of *νεκρός* represents the interpretation (i.) already suggested of *νεκρά* in *Πρὸς Ἑβραίους*.

But whatever view be taken of ἔργα νεκρά, the exact associations of the phrase can hardly be reproduced for modern thought. Even the term ἔργα had a usage of its own in the primitive Christian and Jewish world. Deeds or actions were the expression of the personality. But, once done, they were regarded as semi-objective ; like the words or the name, they acquired a semi-independent rôle and were almost personified. Good deeds, for example, could be said to precede or to follow a man into the next world ; they could be stored up as a treasure for him or entered in a register. Conversely, evil deeds might be called fatal or νεκρά, as though they doomed a man, dragging him by invisible hands to the death which punished his transgressions. In this way ἔργα entered into the conception of moral conduct as determining a man's destiny, ἔργα for the pious Jew involving, of course, the loyal practice of the Torah. Such a use of ἔργα is still natural. We speak of a man's deeds as they stand out for others to notice, before or after death. Thus Shirley could sing,

> "Only the actions of the just
> Smell sweet and blossom in their dust,"

only, this usage generally denotes the effect of such actions upon the rest of mankind ; when deeds are viewed apart from the personality, it is as they have entered into the larger and wider life of the race rather than as connected still with the personality, and even in the case of the latter it is usually fame or gratitude which is uppermost in the mind of the writer. It is no longer so natural for the religious spirit to distinguish actions or deeds as it was for the primitive Christians ; our psychology has made us shy of a practice which tended to unreal abstractions, just as in the discussion of the atonement it often produced the impression of a war of attributes in the Deity.

When it is a question of ἔργα νεκρά, the standpoint

seems still more remote from the modern position, whatever view we take of the phrase. The one thing clear about it is that these ἔργα νεκρά were not habitual sins of the Christian; they were what a man had to break with, in order to become a Christian. When the author of Πρὸς Ἑβραίους declares that the blood of Christ purges the conscience "from dead works," he does not suggest that this is done repeatedly, as the disabilities in the way of worship were periodically removed under the Levitical code. The cleansing of the conscience is done once and for all. It is the introduction of the sinful man into the permanent relation of fellowship with God, a decisive and thorough-going alteration of his position. When he repents ἀπὸ νεκρῶν ἔργων, he recognises that he is morally responsible for them and that henceforth they are behind him. Such a repentance is an experience of the threshold. Only deliberate apostasy can undo it; and when members of the Christian community turn their backs upon the living God, there is no chance of a second repentance.

When the first religious experience of the Christian is a profound sense of sin, the feeling which led to the description of his evil past as ἔργα νεκρά becomes intelligible, even although the precise view of Πρὸς Ἑβραίους about the connexion of sin, death, and the devil is untenable. But if ἔργα νεκρά denotes a formal religion, there is less in modern life to suggest anything corresponding to the position of Christians who had suddenly awakened to the unsatisfactory results of religious life under the Torah. Perhaps one of the nearest analogies would be such an experience as Bunyan passed through, when for a time "he thought if he could but keep" the commandments "pretty well, he should have comfort." The idea that outward correctness of behaviour and even scrupulous attention to worship and prescribed forms of religion will bring peace to the soul,

may produce a course of conduct which can be called, in the light of Christian retrospect, *ἔργα νεκρά*. We tend, it is true, to speak of it as formal or mechanical rather than as dead. But the meaning is substantially the same. Those who cannot be contented with it are sensible of a vacancy in its discipline, a lack of inspiration and living interest, an ineffectiveness which eventually becomes intolerable. Occasionally, this may make people acquiesce, if they have not sufficient religious initiative, and such acquiescence may develop into hypocrisy and formalism. But even if *ἔργα νεκρά* in *Πρὸς Ἑβραίους* are referred to the praxis of Jewish legalism, this is not necessarily implied. The criticism conveyed in *νεκρά* is quite intelligible as a value-judgment upon the inability of such religious devotion to produce what Christians would regard as "life." "Christianity," as Jowett wrote in his essay on Conversion, "is not acquired as an art by long practice; it does not carve and polish human nature with a graving tool; it makes the whole man; first pouring out his soul before God, and then 'casting him in a mould.'" When this great discovery is made, the failure of the older system becomes plain. Instead of working away at oneself, the man realises that the beginning of life is a new relation to God. This is "life." It brings *ἔργα* of its own. As the author of *Πρὸς Ἑβραίους* puts it in his final prayer: "May the God of peace who brought up from the dead our Lord Jesus, the great shepherd of the sheep, with the blood of the eternal covenant, furnish you with everything for the doing of his will, creating in your lives by Jesus Christ what is acceptable in his own sight (*το εὐάρεστον ἐνώπιον αὐτοῦ*)." But these *ἔργα* are the expression and issue of the real life; and it is in contrast to them that the course of conduct which was once expected to produce religious fellowship with the living God is dismissed as *ἔργα νεκρά*, cold, lifeless, uninspiring.

The paradox of ἔργα νεκρά in this connexion is intelligible. What makes such an inadequate system all the more 'dead' to those who have broken through it into a vital religion, is that it resembles life. It has ἔργα, activities of its own, energies and interests. But, compared with the real life of the soul, they are νεκρά—at any rate they seem so now to those who from a deeper experience are able to appreciate the difference between hollowness and reality in religion. If the writer of Πρὸς Ἑβραίους intends by ἔργα νεκρά to remind his readers of their former religious position under the Jewish Torah, this may well be a point in his allusion. He would not deny that their pre-Christian religion was lacking in ἔργα. It imposed duties on its adherents and kept them busy. There had been sufficient to occupy their energies ethically and ceremonially; in fact, the trouble about Judaism was probably that it had too many ἔργα, not too few. But the writer does not pass this criticism on the old system. He and his readers—for the way in which the phrase occurs indicates that it was a familiar word in their circle—were content to look back upon it all as ἔργα νεκρά, ἔργα but—ἔργα νεκρά. The system itself had been strict and exacting. We have no reason to suppose that these Christians accused themselves of fulfilling its precepts half-heartedly or of having yielded to religious indifference, before the new faith broke in upon them. Only, as they looked round upon their Christian position towards God, they knew—and when they were in danger of forgetting, their mentor reminded them—that the old ἔργα could never have brought them into such a relation of access and intimacy. What they now enjoyed was "life"; before they had laid the foundation of this in the faith of Jesus Christ, they had been working away on wrong lines, and the name they gave to that futile attempt was ἔργα νεκρά.

JAMES MOFFATT.

WHO WERE THE SADDUCEES?

In an article published in The Expositor for February, 1917 (pp. 81–108), entitled *Pharisees and Sadducees*, the Rev. M. H. Segal has drawn a picture of the Sadducees in which he traverses the view, which has been gaining ground of late, as to the real character of this party. It need scarcely be said that anything from the pen of so well-equipped a Jewish scholar on such a subject merits serious consideration. I feel bound, however, to demur to Mr. Segal's general conclusions, and will endeavour to state my reasons for doing so in the following article. The issue is an all-important one. If the evidence regarding the character of the contemporary Jewish parties is misinterpreted, it will involve serious consequences for New Testament study. The whole perspective of the Jewish background will be put out of focus, and it will be impossible to gauge aright the many subtle links of connexion and allusion that have influenced and helped to determine the present form of much of the canonical Christian Literature.

I.

The view that the Sadducean Party had a real religious basis, and stood for the conservative element in the priesthood—a view first developed by Krochmal and Geiger—has received notable reinforcement recently in two important contributions: Rudolf Leszynsky's striking book *Die Sadduzäer* (Berlin, 1912), and Professor Jacob Z. Lauterbach's essay on *The Sadducees and Pharisees*, published in 1913.[1] On the other hand Dr. Gustav Hölscher, in his monograph *Der Sadduzäismus* (Leipzig, 1906), has argued

[1] In *Studies in Jewish Literature* (issued in honour of Professor Kaufman Kohler): Berlin, pp. 176–198. Most of the Essays in this volume are written in English.

that the Sadducees are to be regarded not as an organised party, with definite and positive beliefs, but as "the lax, the scoffers who make merry over the strict religious practice of the pious, as the infidels and godless." They were mainly recruited from rich Jews of the upper classes, who favoured the Roman Government, and occupied official positions under it. Their real interests were purely political, and were governed by a strong desire to uphold the existing *régime*; they merely used religious questions as a weapon against their deadly enemies, the Pharisees, who upheld a strongly religious view of life and wielded great influence over the masses of the people.

Mr. Segal's view agrees in fundamentals with Hölscher's. He says:

> If we examine carefully the whole course of the struggle between the two parties, as described by Josephus, we shall find that the Sadducees were throughout actuated by motives of an exclusively political nature. The Sadducees strove to secure for themselves the management of the affairs of the state, while the Pharisees were stoutly opposed to Sadducee rule.

And again:

> The chief, if not the only, interest of the Sadducees was of a political nature, and . . . their antagonism to the Pharisaic religious tendency was to them only of minor importance.

Further, we are told:

> The Sadducees . . . were secularists. Their aims were exclusively political. They regarded religion as of minor importance, and held that it must always be subordinated to the interests of the state. They would only observe of the national religion as much as, and no more than, was absolutely necessary to maintain their connexion with the people over whom they strove to rule. Hence, at the utmost, they would only observe the laws of the Pentateuch, but rejected the ordinances and regulations established by the traditions of the teachers and scribes (*Antiq.* xii. 10, 6, etc.). Thus, they were lax in the observance of Levitical purity, the Sabbath (Mishna, '*Erubin* vi. 2) and in other matters. But the rejection of tradition was not to them a matter of principle. They were quite ready to observe all the traditions of their opponents, and to conform

to their practices, if it served their political ends (*Antiq.* xviii. 1, 4). Their theological doctrines were strongly rationalistic and irreligious in character.

The Sadducees were the successors of the old Hellenising Party :

The parent of Sadduceeism was *Judean Hellenism.* The men who from the beginning of the Hasmonean age down to the destruction of the Temple, had carried on an unceasing struggle against the national religion and its recognised teachers, were no others than the heirs of the defeated and discredited followers of Jason, Menelaus, and Alcimus.

It is admitted that the Sadducees, " with all their indifference or antagonism to religion," yet " were often called upon to deal with religious problems." This happened when they were summoned to bear office in the state, and " had to administer the law as judges and priests." It was then that they resorted to the Pentateuch for guidance, and being incapable of " interpreting its all too brief, and frequently obscure, decisions," they were forced to fall back upon a crudely literal interpretation. Hence their exegesis was " shallow."

In spite, however, of this enforced scholastic activity, the Sadducees remained politicians, and always used political means for combating their opponents. It was only in the Roman period, when they had been deprived of opportunities for political and administrative activities, that we find them also engaging their opponents in religious controversies. . . . But the Sadducees did not enter into these religious disputations with a serious and reverent spirit, as befitted the sacred character of the subjects under discussion. Their object was mainly to poke fun at their opponents, to scoff and to rail at their over-scrupulousness. . . . The spirit of levity and cynicism displayed by the Sadducees in their religious disputations amply confirms our diagnosis of their character. They were materialists who looked upon religion with either indifference or contempt. They sought to banish all spirituality from the life of the individual and the nation, and regarded the material life as the be-all and end-all of existence.

Mr. Segal endeavours to justify this serious indictment

by appealing to the evidence of Josephus, the New Testament, and the Rabbinical sources. It will be our task in what follows to examine his arguments and to consider how far his interpretation of the evidence is just and cogent, or the reverse.

II.

It is impossible not to feel the presence throughout Mr. Segal's strictures of a certain hostility of tone, almost amounting to bitterness, against the Sadducees. This, no doubt, reflects the feeling of the later Rabbis, for whom "Sadducee" came to be a synonym for "Epicurean" or "freethinker." Even the earlier Rabbis (the Tannaim), who had some real knowledge of Sadduceeism, were animated by a spirit of fierce hostility towards the members of the sect. In fact the Sadducees have suffered the unfortunate fate that has overtaken some other parties in history; the pictures of them that have come down to us are mainly drawn by opponents. Jewish scholars have, with a certain amount of justice, protested against the application of the denunciations of certain Pharisees in the Synoptic Gospels to the whole Pharisaic Party indiscriminately, as unfair, and unwarranted. May we not protest, with equal justification, against similar treatment of the Sadducees? If prominent members of the Sadducean Party laid themselves open, at various times, by their conduct to the charge of worldliness, indifference to real religion, and unscrupulous political intrigue, it does not follow that such charges are valid against the whole Party. People whose motives are of the kind just described usually try to disguise their true character by attaching themselves to some respectable cause. Indeed, as Hölscher sees, if Sadduceeism stood for nothing else but anti-religious worldliness, based upon no positive principles, it could not have been an organised party at all. But, as

we shall see, such a view directly contradicts the evidence of the earliest sources.

Mr. Segal nowhere in his article gives any suggested explanation of the name "Sadducee." But there is no reason to suppose that he would object to the almost universally accepted view that the name means "Zadokite" (*Ṣaddûḳî*), and is formed from the expression "Sons of Zadok" (*bĕnê Ṣādôḳ*), a descriptive term of the priestly House which was descended from Zadok, and which held the High Priesthood down to the beginning of the Maccabean period. It is true that the latest Zadokite High Priests earned an evil reputation as Hellenisers, and that the High Priesthood passed from the "House of Zadok" to the Hasmoneans, and later to others. What, then, did the name "Zadokite" connote in the later period down to the destruction of the Temple in A.D. 70? According to Hölscher it was a sort of nickname given to their political opponents by the Pharisees, borrowed by the latter from an earlier age, the period of Antiochus Epiphanes, when the descendants of Zadok, who then filled the high-priestly office, had identified themselves with Hellenism in its most dangerous forms. It was thus intended to brand with ignominy a political party with similar tendencies of a later time. But "Zadokite" would be a singularly inappropriate term, whether given by opponents or not, to apply to a party which had no connexion with the priesthood. It must have denoted a party which had some essential connexion with the priesthood; otherwise its persistent use would be meaningless. Mr. Segal, it is true, does not say in so many words that the Sadducees had no connexion with the priesthood. But he emphasises their purely political character as a party, and implies that they had no real religious or ecclesiastical basis or principles. Now if Sadduceeism really were essentially priestly in character, and

had its stronghold among the priests, this view is incredible. The argument from the meaning of the name, so far as it goes, strongly supports the view, which can be reinforced on other grounds, that the Sadducean party was essentially priestly in character. No doubt Kohler is right when he defines "Sadducees" as the "name given to the party representing views and practices of the Law and interests of the Temple and priesthood directly opposite to those of the Pharisees." [1]

How far does the evidence of Josephus harmonise with the picture of the Sadducees drawn by Mr. Segal ? In a well-known passage in the 18th Book of the *Antiquities* (i. 2) the Jewish historian names as the three principal Jewish sects—he calls them three "sects of philosophy" (φιλοσοφίαι τρεῖς)—the Essenes, Sadducees, and Pharisees. Then follows a description of the tenets of each sect. Of the Sadducees, thus :

But the doctrine (ὁ λόγος) *of the Sadducees is that souls die with the bodies ; nor do they pretend to regard anything but what the Law enjoins on them ; for they think it virtue to dispute with the teachers of the philosophy which they follow, and their views are received by only a few, but those are of the highest rank. But they are able to do hardly anything so to speak, for when they become magistrates, as they are unwillingly and by force sometimes obliged to do, they addict themselves to the notions of the Pharisees, because the people would not otherwise put up with them.*

Here Josephus tells us that the Sadducees (*a*) rejected the resurrection-doctrine (that is what the first sentence probably means) ; (*b*) refused to be bound by anything outside the letter of the Law, and, unlike the Pharisees, exercised their private judgement about its interpretation ; in other words refused to put traditional interpretations or beliefs

[1] Article *Sadducees* in the *Jewish Encyclopædia*, x. 630.

on a level with Scripture as represented by the Pentateuch (this is the probable meaning of the sentence about "disputing" with their teachers); (*c*) formed a small aristocracy; (*d*) were reluctant to take public office in the magistracy because they were obliged by public opinion to conform their decisions with those of the Pharisees. This last assertion doubtless applies to the time when the influence of the Pharisees was all-powerful. At an earlier period the Sadducees had undoubtedly, exercised freely judicial functions, for we are told that they were particularly severe and rigorous in their administration of the Law, so much so, in fact, that the day when their collection of judge-made law was abolished was commemorated by a special festival (*Megillath Ta'anith* IV.).

In another passage (*Antiq.* xiii. x. 6), Josephus says:

The Pharisees have delivered to the people a great many traditional observances handed down from their fathers, which are not written in the laws of Moses, and for that reason it is that the Sadducees reject them, and say that we are to esteem those observances obligatory that are in the written word, but are not to observe what are derived from the traditions of our forefathers. And great disputes and differences have arisen concerning these things among them, as the Sadducees influence none but the rich, and have not the populace on their side, but the Pharisees have the multitude to back them.

In both these important passages it is to be noticed that Josephus emphasises the fact that the differences between Pharisees and Sadducees are matters of principle. We hear nothing of the alleged unscrupulous political character of the latter. They are represented rather as an organised party, with definite views of their own, whose principal interest is engaged in matters of practical religion.

One other important passage in Josephus remains to be noticed. It occurs in the *War*, Book II, 8, 14, and contrasts

the tenets and character of Pharisees and Sadducees:

The Pharisees are esteemed most skilful in the exact interpretation of their laws. . . . They ascribe all things to fate and God, and yet allow that to do what is right or the contrary is principally in men's own power, although fate co-operates in every action. They think also that all souls are immortal, but that the souls of good men only are removed into other bodies, while the souls of bad men are punished with eternal punishment. But the Sadducees . . . take away fate entirely, and suppose that God is not the cause of our doing or not doing what is bad, and they say that to do what is good or bad lies in men's own choice, and that the one or the other so belongs to every one that they may act as they please. They also take away belief in the immortality of the soul, and in punishment or rewards in Hades. Moreover the Pharisees are friendly to one another and cultivate concord for the general utility, but the behaviour of the Sadducees to one another is rather rude, and their intercourse with those of their own party is as bearish as if they were strangers to them.

What is meant here by the assertion that the Sadducees took away "fate" (εἱμαρμένη)? It is to be noticed that Josephus represents the question of εἱμαρμένη as a point of acute discussion between the two parties. Allowance, however, must be made for the fact that the historian is attempting to describe the Jewish parties in the manner of the Greek philosophical schools. But the discussion of abstract doctrines was not at all likely to be of primary interest to Jews. The questions in dispute would naturally assume to them a concrete form. Not improbably the controversy which Josephus represents as an abstract discussion on the question of "fate" was really concerned with prophecy and predestination. Events were predetermined, according to the Essenes, and the course of the world's history could be discerned by the study of prophecy.

The Pharisees attached great importance to prophecy, but insisted that man was a free moral agent. The Sadducees rejected this view of prophecy altogether. For them the only Scriptures which were binding were the Books of the Law. To assert, as Mr. Segal does on the basis of this passage in Josephus, that the Sadducees denied God's Providence, and held an irreligious view of the world, is surely unwarranted. If they accepted the Pentateuch in any sincere way this would be impossible. It is more legitimate to infer that what they denied was a particular view of Divine Providence which, pushed to excess, would lead to a nerveless fatalism. Their denial of εἱμαρμένη need not have meant—and probably did not mean—more than that

Man is man, and master of his fate.

The Sadducean point of view is well stated positively in Sirach xv. 11 ff.[1]

Say not: "From God is my transgression,"
For that which He hateth made He not.
Say not: "(It is) He that made me to stumble,"
For there is no need of evil men.
Evil and abomination doth the Lord hate,
And He doth not let it come nigh them that fear Him.
God created man from the beginning,
And placed him in the hand of his Yeṣer.[2]
If thou desirest thou canst keep the commandment,
And (it is) wisdom to do His good pleasure.
Poured out before thee (are) fire and water.
Stretch forth thine hand unto that which thou desirest.
Life and death are before man,
That which he desireth shall be given to him.

[1] Cited from the translation of the Hebrew Text in the Oxford *Corpus of the Apocrypha and Pseudepigrapha of the O.T.*, vol. i. 370 f.

[2] R.V. (based on the Greek text): *And left him in the hand of his own counsel.*

The last sentence in the Josephus-passage cited above contrasts the conduct of the Pharisees and Sadducees in their intercourse with one another, and with members of their own party. "The behaviour of the Sadducees to one another," we are told, "is rather boorish (ἀγριώστεροι) and their intercourse with those who agree with them (πρὸς τοὺς ὁμοίους) is harsh (ἀπηνεῖς) as if with strangers." The picture suggested is that of haughty and aloof aristocrats, who in their dealings with others assert their dignity and exclusiveness. No doubt the prominent members of the Sadducean party—the members of the high-priestly families—are in the Jewish historian's mind. Pride of birth and position was apt to manifest itself in them, as in other aristocracies, in an arrogant bearing. Such people would not be exactly popular. But who are meant by "those who agree with them," or as the expression may be rendered "those of their own party"? The most natural interpretation is that other priests, outside the small and exclusive circle of the high-priestly families, are referred to. These would constitute the main body of the Sadducean Party, and towards them their chiefs behaved as if they were strangers.

That some of these Sadducean members of the high-priestly families were men who did not hesitate to violate all the dictates of honesty and justice in their violent proceedings about tithes is clear from the evidence of Josephus and the Mishna (cf. Josephus, *Antiq.* xx. *c.* ix. 2; *c.* viii. 8; *Ma'aser Sheni* v. 6), but because these men happened to be members of the Sadducean Party, it does not follow that their practices in this particular faithfully reflect the principles and ideals of the Party to which they belonged. Nor is it justifiable to apply modern ideas of ethical consistency to such men, who belonged to the ancient world. Men of this sort could reconcile a fierce and revengeful temper

against opponents with a devotion and piety which were absolutely sincere as far as they went. Hölscher has called attention to the fact that many of the High Priests, or members of high-priestly families mentioned by Josephus in the *Antiquities* as Sadducees, are depicted in *the Jewish War* as pious men, devoted to the Law. He detects here a certain inconsistency and thinks that the historian has imported a certain amount of prejudice into the later work (the *Antiquities*), which is absent from the earlier book, the *War*; and he regards the designation of those men as "Sadducees" (i.e. "godless Epicureans") as unhistorical. Such a conclusion, to which Hölscher is driven by his theory, is surely enough to condemn the latter. When Josephus says categorically in the *Antiquities* (xx. 9, 1) that the younger Ananus, who for a short time occupied the office of High Priest, "was of the sect of the Sadducees" it is incredible that he should have deliberately invented such a statement, knowing it to be false. Yet in the *War* (iv. 5, 2) he pays a tribute to this man, declaring that

he was in various respects a very worthy and just man, and besides the grandeur of the nobility and dignity and honour which he had, he was a lover of equality even in regard to the meanest of the people; and he was a prodigious lover of liberty, and an admirer of democracy, and ever preferred the public welfare to his own advantage.

Such was one of the principle figures among the Sadducean high-priestly families in Jerusalem during the last decades before the destruction of the city by Titus. Nor did he stand alone, for his colleague and equal in rank, Jesus, is eulogised in terms of almost equal warmth. No doubt these two men were exceptional, in some respects, among the higher members of the Sadducean Party—they, apparently, exhibited none of the arrogance which was so typical of many members of their order. But the existence of such men

among the most prominent of the Sadducees is sufficient to shew that Sadduceeism was not incompatible with patriotism and piety of the highest kind.

It is, of course, true that the Sadducees engaged in political party strife, especially in the earlier period when both parties were striving to secure political control of the State. But this is no less true of the Pharisees. Josephus, with all his admiration of the latter, could yet describe them (the reference is to events in the reign of Herod) in such terms as these (*Antiq.* xvii. 2, 4):

Now there was a certain sect of Jews, who valued themselves highly upon the exact exegesis (or? *strict observance*, ἐπ' ἐξακριβώσει) *of the law of their fathers, and made men believe they were highly favoured by God, and had great influence over women. They are called Pharisees, and ventured even to oppose kings. They were a cunning set, and prompt to open fighting and mischief.*

It is probable that only a section of the Pharisaic party is referred to here (Josephus estimates their number at 6,000), but they seem to have been the strictest and most scrupulous section. And it is true, of course, that the heads of the Sadducean Party, right down to the last days of the existence of the Jewish State, continued to exercise their influence in public affairs on the side of caution in matters of state, especially in regard to the relations between the Jewish community in Palestine and the Roman Government. This was only natural on the part of men who occupied positions of dignity and wealth, and belonged to families of the highest rank. Nor was their policy of caution mistaken as events tragically shewed. If at times they succumbed to motives of political expediency at the expense of the interests of the national religion, this was not always the case, as the example of the younger Ananus clearly proves. And in any case it does not follow that the bulk

of the Sadducean Party abandoned their positive conservative principles in religion because of the defection of some of their leaders.

III.

When we turn to the New Testament it is noticeable how relatively small a part is, to all appearances, taken by the Sadducees. They are seldom mentioned by name, but when they are explicitly referred to they certainly do not appear as people who are without religious interest or principle. Certain of them come to John's baptism (Matt. iii. 7); they are mentioned as, with the Pharisees, demanding of Jesus "a sign from heaven," in relation to which our Lord warns His disciples to beware of the "leaven" (i.e. the teaching) of the Pharisees and Sadducees (Matt. xvi. 1–12). Then there is the famous question put to Him by "Sadducees which say there is no resurrection" about that doctrine, and His answer (Matt. xxii. 23–33), followed by a test-question from Pharisees (Matt. xxii. 34 ff.). Finally in Acts xxiii. the two parties are represented as plunging into dissension, at the instance of St. Paul, on the question of the resurrection-doctrine.

Now it is to be noticed that in all these passages the two parties are mentioned together, quite naturally, as embracing the two main organised bodies of Jewish religious thought and feeling; and when the New Testament writers wish to describe the Sadducees they instinctively define them in terms of religious controversy. It is a religious party that is in the writers' mind, a party that assumed a distinct and well-defined attitude towards certain religious questions. It is obvious that the high-priestly members of the Party are not specially thought of in this connexion. They were probably not present at such controversies, which would naturally be carried on by the less prominent members.

Where the former are referred to they are specified as "the chief priests" (Matt. xxvii. 20; Mark xv. 1 and often), who with the "scribes" and "elders" take the lead in acts of an official and public character. Doubtless these "chief priests" were as a rule Sadducees, but they did not embrace within their ranks the whole Sadducean Party, and, therefore, to designate them as "Sadducees" without further qualification would be as inexact as to speak of the Roman curia as "the catholic episcopate." In two passages in the *Acts* the "high priests" are explicitly brought into close connexion with the Sadducees, viz. in iv. 1, "the priests" (v.l. "high priests") and "the captain of the Temple, and the Sadducees," and in v. 17, "But the high priest rose up *and all they that were with him* (which is the sect of the Sadducees)." In both these passages the "high priests" (or "high priest") appear as the leaders of a party, which is the party of the Sadducees. The leaders and the party as a whole are carefully distinguished.

I believe that other references to the Sadducean priestly party (apart from the high-priestly families) occur in the New Testament, as I hope to shew in a subsequent article.[1] But meanwhile enough has been adduced to make clear that in the New Testament the Sadducean party as a whole must not be confused with the high-priestly members of it; and that it adopted and stood for a well-defined attitude primarily towards certain matters of religious controversy.

IV.

The evidence of the Rabbinical literature need not be pursued here in detail. Several of the more obscure passages

[1] Students of the New Testament should be on their guard against assuming that wherever "scribes" or "lawyers" are mentioned in it Pharisaic scribes are meant. In some cases Sadducees are undoubtedly referred to.

have been well discussed by Mr. Segal in the article referred to. One general remark may be made upon this evidence. The Sadducees are represented throughout as engaged in controversy with the Pharisees on matters of religious observance or the interpretation of the Law. Mr. Segal thinks that these discussions only serve to reveal the "shallowness" of the Sadducean exegesis of Scripture. The Sadducean arguments, according to him, are purely factitious and reveal no real interest in the questions at issue, but are merely used in order to score off opponents. Now this conclusion will hardly bear examination. It is clear, for instance, that the Sadducean contention about the reckoning of Pentecost, according to which the *terminus a quo* for the counting of the fifty days was "the day after Sabbath" literally interpreted (cf. Lev. xxiii. 15–16)—with the consequence that the Day of Pentecost would always fall on a Sunday—faithfully reflects the original view of Scripture and expresses the old tradition. Or, again, take the question of the "Erub, a Pharisaic device for evading the strict observance of the Law as given in Exodus xvi. 29; this was rejected by the Sadducees, who certainly had the letter of Scripture on their side.

Kohler (*Jewish Encyclopaedia* x. 632) well remarks:

> Especially in regard to the Temple practice did they [the Sadducees] hold older views, based upon claims of greater sanctity for the priesthood and of its sole dominion over the sanctuary.

He instances the case of the daily burnt-offerings which the Sadducees, with reference to the singular used in Numbers xxviii. 4 ("shalt thou offer" sing.) contended were to be offered by the High Priest at his own expense, whereas the Pharisees insisted that they were to be treated as a national sacrifice, at the cost of the Temple treasury to which all contributed. The Sadducees also maintained that the incense in the vessel

with which the High Priest entered the Holy of Holies on the day of Atonement was to be kindled outside, so that he might be wrapped in smoke when he entered within and met the Shekinah, according to Leviticus xvi. 2 (" for I will appear in the cloud upon the mercy-seat ") ; while the Pharisees, rejecting the claim to such supernatural vision on the part of the High Priest, insisted that the incense be kindled within (cf. T.B. *Yoma* 19*b*, 53*a*, etc.).

It is well known that the Sadducees opposed the popular customs connected with the libation of water drawn from the Pool of Siloam, and the accompanying processions, on the feast of Tabernacles. There was nothing to support these festivities in the text of the Law, and, no doubt, they appeared to the Temple-priesthood as an invasion of their rights of control.

* * * * *

In all these cases it is easy to see that the Sadducees were true to their inherited principles. They insisted on priestly privilege, especially in connexion with the Temple ; and they upheld the sole binding force of the written Torah. Not that they rejected tradition altogether ; they probably inherited a good deal of older tradition. Only they insisted that what was written in the Law, and that alone, was of eternal obligation. A tradition might be admirable in some ways, but it was destitute of the divine and eternal authority attaching to the written Torah. If its observance should involve an infringement of the letter of the written Law (e.g. the laws of the Sabbath) then it must give way to the Law. The Pharisees, on the other hand, put the oral tradition on a level with the written Law. Both were of equal authority, and in cases of apparent conflict between them, they must be harmonised by elaborate hermeneutic rules. These latter were entirely rejected by the Sadducees.

V.

As we have already remarked, it is a misfortune that no work has come down to us which gives unmistakably from the Sadducean side a positive statement of their own positions. These are mainly represented to us by opponents. Nevertheless there is some literature which it is probable sheds some friendly light upon the Sadducean point-of-view. The *Wisdom of Ben Sira* is usually taken to be a work of this kind, and 1 Maccabees may be another. The Book of Ben Sira does indeed set before us the scholastic orthodoxy of the earlier Soferîm or "Scribes," which the Sadducean Party among the priests inherited. It exalts the priesthood and the Temple, and in a section which has been preserved in the Hebrew text, pays a warm tribute to the "Sons of Zadok." Above all it places the written Torah in a place of unquestioned pre-eminence among the Scriptures. It is probably a mistake to say that the Sadducees "rejected" the prophetic and other Scriptures outside the Pentateuch. The truth is they regarded them as "Kabbālāh," i.e. mere tradition, much as the official Apocrypha is regarded in the thirty-nine articles of the Anglican Church. Any doctrine or position which could be proved from these non-Pentateuchal books, but which had no positive basis in the written Torah, would be rejected outright by them; the resurrection-doctrine is a case in point. But they would not hesitate to use these books to illustrate and enforce the Mosaic laws. On the other hand, the Pharisees would resolve the contradiction by exegetical means, by which they would find in the Torah itself the basis of the doctrine in question.[1]

It is a significant fact that Sadduceeism maintained itself

[1] Not improbably the later Scriptures contain work of Sadducean origin, e.g. Ps. cx., which may have been written originally in honour of Simon Maccabaeus, though later it was invested with a different significance, under Pharisaic influence.

in its age-long conflict with Phariseeism right down from the Maccabean period to the destruction of the Temple. This fact in itself testifies to its vitality, and makes it difficult, if not impossible, to accept the view that it was purely negative in character. When viewed in the light of historical development its true character becomes manifest. Inheriting the positive, though conservative, orthodoxy of the earlier Soferîm, represented by Sirach, it perpetuated a purely priestly tradition. For from the time of Ezra down to about 270 B.C. the interpretation of the Law, and teaching generally, were in the hands of priestly schools and scribes. Then, apparently, individuals from among the people (laymen) began to give themselves up to the study of the Law, and take a prominent part in teaching and interpretation, and when the Sanhedrin was organised (some time about 190 B.C.) these lay teachers became members of it. But the majority still consisted of priests, and it seems probable that a conflict arose between the two sections on the question how to adapt the Law practically to the changed circumstances of the times. The priestly members appear to have insisted that the prerogative of issuing temporary decrees for this purpose rested with them, on the basis of Deuteronomy xvii.; the lay members seem to have resisted this claim, and the conflict ended in a breach between the two sections, which became respectively the parties of the Sadducees and the Pharisees.[1] The latter, as we have seen, insisted upon the equal sanctity and binding character of the oral with the written Law.

Looked at in this way the respective positions of the two parties become clear and consistent. As time went on some modifications doubtless occurred on both sides. The conservative section of the Pharisees, represented by the school

[1] See, further, the present writer's article *Pharisees* in Hastings' *Dict. of Rel. and Ethics*, vol. ix.

of Shammai, seems certainly to have been influenced by Sadduceeism in upholding the older and simpler Halakah; while, on the other hand, the Sadducees were more and more influenced by public opinion to accept the more important of the Pharisaic traditions. It is not improbable that there grew up, too, within the ranks of the Sadducees different circles or schools of thought. It has even been maintained by Leszynsky that the Sadducees held a Messianic doctrine of their own, championing a priestly as against the prophetic and Pharisaic Messiah who was to spring from the House of David. But if so, it must not be assumed that their priestly Messiah was expected to fulfil the *rôle* of the Son of David of popular expectation. He was more probably thought of simply as the ideal priest-king who had already been embodied partially in the best representatives of the Hasmonean House.

I have not hitherto referred to the discovery by Schechter of documents emanating from a Zadokite sect.[1] The real character and origin of this work are at present too uncertain to found definite arguments upon it. But if, as several distinguished scholars [2] believe, it is of early origin, it sheds an illuminating light upon Sadduceeism. Leszynsky has no difficulty in demonstrating its Sadducean affinities, which he finds more particularly in the rejection of Pharisaic tradition, and the recognition of the written Torah as the only law-book. It also glorifies the priesthood, and gives expression to the expectation of a priestly Messiah "from Aaron and from Israel." But if it really is Sadducean, it must belong to a particular section, one of several, possibly, which may have developed at different times.

[1] *Documents of Jewish Sectaries*: vol i. *Fragments of a Zadokite Work* (Cambridge 1910).

[2] Including, besides Schechter, I Levi, Leszynsky, Charles, and G. Margoliouth.

Enough has been said, I hope, to make the readers of this article hesitate to subscribe to Mr. Segal's estimate of a movement and tendency which played, if not a glorious, at any rate a not undistinguished, part in the history of Judaism. Let us be just even to the Sadducees!

G. H. Box.

"ST. PAUL" IN THE "ENCYCLOPÆDIA OF RELIGION AND ETHICS"

Note.—It was not until the following paper was in the hands of the Editor that I became aware that Dr. Allan Menzies had died some time before. Although the fact of his death does not affect my judgment upon the article under discussion, I should naturally have expressed myself somewhat differently had I known of it when I was writing.—M. J.

The articles in the first eight volumes of Dr. Hastings' *Encyclopaedia of Religion and Ethics* were of such a uniformly high quality, and more particularly those which had for their subjects the outstanding personalities, the great leaders in the worlds of thought and religion, that I looked forward with the highest anticipation to the appearance of the ninth volume, in which presumably there would be found a contribution dealing with "St. Paul." That volume has now been published and does contain an article on "St. Paul," but I cannot honestly say that my fond hopes have been realised in any substantial degree. This is all the more strange seeing that the article in question is the work of two competent scholars, Dr. Allan Menzies, who was already well known as the author of a most suggestive study of St. Mark's Gospel, entitled "The Earliest Gospel" and as the editor of one of the most valuable of our learned periodicals, *The Review of Theology and Philosophy*, and the Rev. William Edie, of whom less is known by the reading public, but who has occupied positions of importance and responsibility in the University of St. Andrews and is evidently a person of standing in the world of learning. My first complaint in reference to the article is concerned with the particular form and method which the authors have adopted for giving expression to their conception of St.

Paul and his significance. In an *Encyclopaedia of Religion and Ethics* we naturally look for contributions which enable us to appreciate in a general way the character of the personality under discussion, to estimate the services rendered by him in the realm of ethics and religion, and to define the place he occupies in the history of the development of these correlated branches of knowledge. Taking this great and valuable publication as a whole it must be allowed that this object has been admirably fulfilled. A glance at the first volume only, in which the names of Aristotle, Philo (under Alexandrian Theology) and Augustine occur, will immediately confirm this statement. Nothing could be more helpful than the article on Aristotle by Professor Henry Jackson, with its subsections which treat of the writings, the philosophical system, metaphysics, psychology, science, ethics, politics, and rhetoric of the master, or than the Dean of St. Paul's article on Philo with its clear analysis of his conception of revelation, his principles of exegesis, his theology, his Logos doctrine, concluding with a careful estimate of Philo as a thinker. The three articles, viz., the two we have described and Mr. Warfield's on "Augustine" are perfect models of what such contributions ought to be. Each writer has given us a broad and statesmanlike view of his particular subject, and the reader is in a position to realise at a glance the significance of the three great names in the worlds of culture and religion.

Of this method of estimating the force of a personality or of appreciating his special contribution to the history of thought and religion there is hardly a trace in the article on "St. Paul." I take it that an Encyclopædia of this comprehensive character is intended primarily for two classes of readers, for the expert in any definite department of secular learning, be it anthropology, ethnology, philosophy,

mythology, science, economics, or ethics, who is also at the same time interested in religion and theology, and for the theological expert who is anxious to have ready at hand adequate information concerning a multitude of other subjects, without some knowledge of which theological study is apt to prove barren and unsatisfactory. Now this is what this publication supplies in the very great majority of its articles. The theologian and student of religions will find material which is admirable both in quality and quantity whereby he may acquire a wide acquaintance with practically every branch of knowledge outside of his own special line of study, while the non-theological expert, who is not devoid of interest in theology and its problems, will find his needs most efficiently catered for, except in one significant instance, viz., in the article on " St. Paul." It goes without saying that an article from the capable hands of Dr. Menzies and Mr. Edie is not without its excellences and that it contains much matter that is of high quality, but it is not congruous with the general aim of the Encyclopaedia, nor does it offer the reader what he has learnt to expect from it. What the student whose work is primarily concerned with subjects outside the realm of religion looks for in an article on " St. Paul " is a wide and comprehensive outlook upon the great Apostle as a man, a thinker, and as one of the most potent religious forces that the world has ever known, and this he will not find in the article in question. What he will find is a fairly complete and adequate account of St. Paul's life in all its stages, comprising his early days at Tarsus, his career as a persecutor, his conversion, the interval between the conversion and his public appearance as a Christian missionary, and the period of his missionary activity. In addition to the above there is furnished a general introduction to each one of the Pauline Epistles, which in every case is suggestive and helpful. It is true that the general reader

may by wading through these "introductions" acquire a somewhat blurred conception of what were the most characteristic ideas and doctrines of the Apostle and in what respects he modified or increased the volume of Christian thought, but there is no attempt to place the reader in possession of that generalisation and synthesis which it is only natural to expect in a publication of this particular type. In this respect the contribution affords a marked contrast to the excellent article on "St. Paul" in Hastings' *Dictionary of the Bible* by Professor Findlay, of which the synthesis of the Apostle's thought and teaching is the most valuable feature. Instead of this our authors have devoted a considerable amount of space to the discussion of St. Paul's visits to Jerusalem, the speech at Athens, the Apostle's missionary methods, and the integrity of 2 Corinthians, all of them points of interest to the theological student, but not at all what we hope to find in a work which is entitled an *Encyclopædia of Religion and Ethics*. As a help to a comparatively young theological aspirant who is preparing for an examination in the Acts and the Pauline Epistles this compilation is admirable and obviates the reading of a multitude of the current text-books on the subject, but as a contribution to the history of religion and ethics or as an exposition of the true personality and greatness of St. Paul it must be pronounced a sad failure.

And I have a further complaint to make. It is not only the particular form and method of presenting their views that are disappointing and unsatisfactory: the article contains a very substantial number of statements to which very serious objection must be taken, and the remainder of this paper will be devoted to the discussion of these debatable points. The outstanding feature of the article is that it in reality constitutes a veiled attack upon the historicity of the Acts rather than a scientific study of St. Paul. On

practically every page the Acts appears as a suspect document, and it is this particular view of the historical value of the book, or, to speak more correctly, of its lack of historical value, that gives tone and colour to the contribution. A very considerable proportion of the statements that are drawn from the Acts are introduced by a qualifying " if " or " may," as e.g., " *if* he proceeded to Jerusalem to sit at the feet of Gamaliel " ; " *if* he was at Jerusalem at the time of the death of Stephen " ; " In his persecution, which *may* have been carried on not only at Damascus but elsewhere " ; " Paul *is said* to have arrived at Lystra and Derbe," and the article as a whole is vitiated by querulous complaints of the inaccuracy of the Acts and its inconsistencies, many of them based on reasons of the flimsiest character.

It is also difficult to acquit our authors of the charge of showing a surprising lack of frankness and candour in their treatment of the Acts and its problems. This is particularly true of what they have said concerning the date and the authorship of the book.

The date of the Acts.

The question of the date is curtly settled by the bald and dogmatic statement that " the book as a whole belongs to the end of the first century " (p. 681), which presumably means between 90 and 100 B.C., without any further qualification or comment. Now this statement may represent the truth or it may not, but is it quite frank to conceal the fact that this date only commends itself to German opinion (I am not disparaging the opinion because it is German but because I believe it to be wrong) and that the great bulk of scholars in this country as well as several German scholars of note prefer a much earlier date, not later than 80 A.D., while Blass, Harnack, and Rackham are strongly in favour of placing the writing of the book before the death of St. Paul, i.e. between 65 and 67 A.D.

The authorship of the Acts.

In the matter of the authorship the article would seem to exhibit not only a distressing lack of candour but an actual perversion of the true facts, as the following extracts will show.

"It happened to the author of Acts, as to other historians of antiquity, that he found his work made easier by a document drawn up at the time by a companion of his hero."

"The author of Acts uses this work, as he used the Gospel of Mark or the Third Gospel, with the utmost skill, bringing it into his own style and his own vocabulary (see J. C. Hawkins, *Horae Synopticae*, and A Harnack, *Luke the Physician*) (p. 686).

It may be true that the author of the "we-sections" was not identical with the author of the book as a whole, but is it quite fair again to the reader to leave him without the slightest hint that there is a considerable and increasing body of opinion in favour of attributing the authorship of the whole book to the compiler of the "we-sections"? There is a reference to the admirable work of Sir John Hawkins and Harnack in the second extract, but it gives an entirely wrong impression of the real conclusions arrived at by these two scholars. What these maintain is not that the author of the Acts "used the travel-document with the utmost skill, as he used St. Mark's Gospel, bringing it into his own style and his own vocabulary," but that the author of this document was also the author of the whole book, which is an entirely different proposition from that attributed to them by the writers of this article.

Statements of this character are not of any very great importance as they affect the New Testament scholar who is possessed of sufficient knowledge to check them and to appraise their value, but from the point of view of the general reader they tend to give an entirely false impression

of the critical position as it stands, because he will naturally regard dogmatic statements in a standard Encyclopædia as representing the final truth, and not as, what they really are, the mere personal views of the writers.

The Jew and the Hellenist in St. Paul.

Again it would seem to me that the article looks upon St. Paul from an entirely wrong angle. It is Paul the Hellenist almost to the entire exclusion of Paul the Jew that is set before us by our authors. This tendency to ignore the fundamental Jewish side of the Apostle's character is discernible at the very outset. His life in Tarsus is described with considerable detail, and emphasis is laid upon his knowledge of Greek, his method of composition, which was not that of the rabbis of Palestine but of the preachers and soul-savers of Stoicism and Cynicism. We are told how he would learn to regard the "God-fearing" Gentiles with a liberal eye, how he would hear Stoic and Cynic doctrines at the street corners and so pick up their tricks of rhetoric, how he would take note of the religious rites of heathenism and would learn something of the principal god of Tarsus, Sandan, who was a dying and reviving deity. At Tarsus he would also learn to distinguish deities of two kinds of ranks, the supreme, passive god, and the subordinate, active god. The paragraph closes with the sentence, "There are many traces of the Gentile atmosphere in which Paul's early days were spent" (p. 691).

But of his training as a Jew proper we have only two brief statements. "If he proceeded to Jerusalem to sit at the feet of Gamaliel it was later, when the language (Greek) had been learned and all the life of a Greek town made thoroughly familiar to the boy."

"He was the child of a very strict Jewish home. He would be well exercised in the Greek Bible: he would be taken to the synagogue" (p. 681). Our authors sum up

their conclusions on this matter in the following words: "Of a Jewish training at Jerusalem it is harder to find traces in his work." "Of rabbinic method there is little trace in Paul."

The extracts we have quoted throw a very interesting light upon our authors' method of weighing and utilising evidence. There is a remarkable tone of certainty and finality in the passage which deals with Tarsus and its supposed influence upon the Apostle's early life, while the fact of his training at Jerusalem is qualified by a very strong *caveat*. And yet the evidence that St. Paul was a native of Tarsus and that he sat at the feet of Gamaliel comes from the Acts, and strangely enough from one of those speeches which, we are told, were "skilfully conceived by the author for the various situations" (p. 692). On what principle is the statement in Acts xxii. 3, "born in Tarsus of Cilicia," accepted without the slightest cavil while the statement which comes from identically the same verse "but brought up in this city at the feet of Gamaliel" is regarded as being more than questionable? There is not a word in the Pauline Epistles to lead us to believe that the Apostle was born and bred at Tarsus, although there is no sound reason for disputing this fact, and the name Tarsus is never once mentioned in them. Our sole authority for accepting Tarsus as the birthplace of St. Paul is the Acts, and what our authors have built upon this assumption is mere conjecture for which there is not a particle of direct evidence. It would appear that the evidence of the Acts, and even of the speeches contained in it, is perfectly sound and trustworthy when it suits our authors' purpose and is suspect only when it militates against their own private predilections.

As a matter of fact the statement that there are few traces of a Jewish training at Jerusalem or of rabbinic method to

be found in St. Paul's writings is an utter travesty of the truth, and there is a complete lack of balance and proportion in the passage which treats of the Hellenist and Jew in St. Paul.

If there is one thing more certain than another it is that the very foundation of the Apostle's nature and character was the Jew in him, the Pharisaic, Rabbinic Jew. No one has done more than Sir William Ramsay to exalt the Hellenistic side of St. Paul's character, so that his deliberately expressed opinion on this matter will carry more than ordinary weight. He writes as follows:

"I have repeatedly asserted that the Jewish nature and character was the strongest and most fundamental part of Paul's endowment" (Expositor VIII. ii. p. 290).

"I have frequently said that the Jewish side of Paul's nature was the foundation on which his whole character was built up and the strongest and most determining part of his mind" (u. s. p. 291).

It would require a whole article to illustrate adequately the essential wrongness of our authors' statements on this point, and I must be content with formulating briefly those features in St. Paul's teaching and method which indicate clearly his training as a Pharisaic Jew and show traces of rabbinical influence. His doctrine of creation, of sin and the fall of man, of the law, of righteousness, his eschatology, psychology, his use of the Old Testament both in the matter of quotation and interpretation, his fondness for old Hebrew legends, these are one and all a direct inheritance from Pharisaic and Rabbinic Judaism. Strip the Pauline Epistles of the elements that are fundamentally Jewish in their origin and character and there is practically nothing left. And further, whenever the Apostle indulges in a backward glance at his pre-Christian career it is his life in Judaism that leaps to the surface and there is not a trace of

the Hellenist to be detected in any of his autobiographical reflections. (Cf. 2 Cor. xi. 22; Phil. iii. 3–11.)

St. Paul's Missionary procedure.

Much is made by our authors again of the alleged inaccuracy of the Acts and of its inconsistency with the Epistles in the matter of St. Paul's method of procedure as a missionary. The problem is stated in this form. The rejection of the Gospel by the Jews and its transference to the Gentiles is represented in the Acts as being in accordance with the divine decree and a fulfilment of Old Testament prophecy, and is frequently declared by St. Paul to be so. St. Paul's own view of the situation is, however, quite different, and he believed that Israel turned away from the Gospel in order that the Gentiles might accept it and that when the fullness of the Gentiles had come in Israel would come in too (pp. 684–5). But even if this were true it is not a matter of grave importance. It is allowed that St. Paul did make his first appeal to the Jewish community in the Hellenistic cities that he visited and that the Gospel was ignominiously rejected by the Jews as a whole, and also that this particular method of procedure was probably inherited by the Apostle from Barnabas and the other earlier missionaries. The facts as recorded in the Acts are, therefore, correct, so that the difference between the Acts and the Epistles on this point, if it exists, is merely in the explanation and the reason why. But it is extremely questionable whether there is even a difference in the matter of explanation. The rejection of Israel and the admission of the Gentiles are declared by the Apostle himself in Romans ix. 25–29 to have been foretold by Hosea (ii. 23; i. 10) and by Isaiah (x. 22, 23), while in Romans xi. 8 he quotes the very words of Isaiah which in the Acts he is represented to have made use of in his address to the Jews in Rome (Acts xxviii. 26 f.) It is difficult, therefore, to see where the alleged

difference between the Acts and the Epistles comes in, seeing that in the Epistles, in the Old Testament quotations cited by the Apostle himself, both the rejection of the Gospel by the Jews and its acceptance by the Gentiles are represented as having been decreed by God and foretold in Hebrew prophecy.

There are several other statements in the course of the article, of less importance possibly than those we have considered, which call for comment.

a. The alleged martrydom of St. John the Apostle.

On page 638 we read, "The martyrdom of James is reported in Acts, and that of John will have taken place at the same time and not mentioned for reasons into which we need not inquire." Now this positive pronouncement, which cuts at the roots of the literature associated with the name of St. John the Apostle and, if true, disposes absolutely of the strongest and best authenticated tradition of early Christianity, is made on the strength of an alleged quotation from Papias found in a writer of the fifth century, Philip of Side, to the effect that John the Divine and James his brother had been slain by the Jews and presumably, therefore, had suffered martyrdom together. The authenticity and meaning of this alleged quotation from Papias constitute one of the most problematic difficulties with which criticism has to deal. That it must be taken into account in weighing the evidence for or against the traditional authorship of the Fourth Gospel is beyond doubt, but it is much too early to accept it as proving beyond all question that St. John the Apostle had suffered martyrdom many years before that Gospel could possibly have been written. An authority of the greatest eminence, the late Dr. Swete, writes as follows concerning it: "It is certainly strange that early Christian tradition is without a vestige of any other reference to the martyrdom of the Apostle John, and that writers like

Eusebius, who had access to the work of Papias, are silent about it. On the whole, then, it is precarious to use this piece of evidence until further light is thrown upon it" (*Journal of Theological Studies*, vol. xvii. p. 378). F. Spitta, in the *Z.N.T.W.* 1910, pp. 40 ff., where the subject is treated most exhaustively, goes much further than Dr. Swete in casting doubts upon the authenticity of this otherwise unsupported tradition and is inclined to look upon it merely as a mare's nest. Our contributors might do well to follow somewhat more closely the wise caution of these two scholars and pause before they pronounce so definitely in favour of the historical truth of Philip of Side's quotation.

b. The Apostolic Decrees.

In dealing with another matter which has been the source of sonsiderable discussion and controversy the following statement occurs:

"Paul says nothing of what is so prominent in Acts—the regulations laid down at Jerusalem as to the extent of the observance of the Jewish Law on the part of Gentile Christians; and he not only does not mention here any such feature of his visit to Jerusalem; he mentions it nowhere in his Epistles, not even in discussing with the Corinthians the use by Christians of meat offered to idols, and we are driven to conclude that no such conditions as Acts speaks of were laid down for Paul's acceptance. They were very likely laid down on another occasion, for some particular Church or Churches; the wide-ranging controversy which has recently sprung up about them does not concern the history of Paul" (p. 684).

It is easy enough to dismiss the subject in this airy and dogmatic manner, but as a matter of fact both the subject itself and the controversy concerning it have everything to do with St. Paul. If the true text of the *Apostolic Decrees* is that found in D (Codex Bezae) where πνικτῶν is omitted,

the substance of them is no longer a food-law, but a simple demand of the Christian Church that the Gentile section of it should observe the ordinary rules of morality and abstain from idolatry, murder, and fornication. In that case St. Paul's silence on the point when he is discussing the question of meat offered to idols with the Corinthians is perfectly intelligible, as the " decrees " were in no sense a food law, and were, therefore, not to the point. And further, if the Epistle to the Galatians was written before the Council at Jerusalem, as many scholars now assert, the apparent inconsistency at this point between the Acts and St. Paul's own statements in that Epistle disappears. I may perhaps be allowed to refer to an article of mine in the EXPOSITOR, VIII. v. pp. 242 ff., where the problem is fully discussed, but I have said enough here to show, at any rate, that there is no justification for the very positive statement with which the foregoing extract closes.

c. St. Paul's Speech at Athens (p. 687).

In reading the article one is forcibly struck by the attraction which every new theory seems to possess for our authors. It is the newness of the theory that is apparently of importance and not its validity or force. Thus the passage in which St. Paul's speech at Athens is discussed is simply a résumé of the views expressed in Norden's interesting monograph, *Agnostos Theos*. There is undoubtedly much that is most suggestive in Norden's exposition, but it is forgotten that a German scholar is almost invariably obsessed by the one aspect of the question which interests him at the moment and is entirely unconscious that there may be other standpoints besides his own from which the problem may be viewed. Norden explains the speech as being an utterance placed in the mouth of St. Paul such as was customary in that age in the mouth of the missionary of monotheism, whether Jew, Greek, or Christian. The

reference to the inscription on the altar, "to the Unknown God," was supplied by the writer of Acts as a text for the Apostle's address, which consists largely of the sentiments of Stoicism and is furnished with a quotation from a Stoic poet. And further, the address is dependent upon Apollonius of Tyana, who visited Athens before the date of the writing of the Acts and praised the city for its religiousness for the same reason that Paul did, viz., because altars are erected there to unknown gods. As instances of similar addresses in favour of monotheism Norden adduces a speech from *Poimandres*, an *Ode of Solomon*, and pieces from the *Preaching of Peter* and the *Preaching of Barnabas*. There is no attempt in the article to criticise Norden's estimate of the speech, although the authors must have been well aware that it is open to objection at many points. Dr. Menzies must have been familiar with Dr. H. A. A. Kennedy's review of *Agnostos Theos* which appeared in his own periodical *The Review of Theology and Philosophy*, vol. viii. pp. 705 ff., and in which that consummate scholar shows that the literature quoted by Norden as having influenced the writer of the Acts in the composition of the speech might just as easily be itself influenced by the speech, and that it requires more cogent evidence than Norden has produced to establish the theory of a normal type of missionary sermon uniting the ancient *Θεολογοί* to Jewish and Christian preachers. And further, Dr. Menzies must have known something of Harnack's work, *Die Rede des Paulus in Athen* (a review of this appears in vol. ix. pp. 146 ff. of the above periodical), in which he (to use a familiar expression) "makes hay" of many of the positions assumed by Norden and proves conclusively that the resemblances between the situations of Apollonius and St. Paul are nothing like so close as Norden asserts them to be.

d. St. Paul's second visit to Derbe and Lystra (p. 685).

Speaking of the missionary tour which St. Paul undertook with Silas, our authors write, "While Paul goes through Syria and Cilicia, his old mission field, and is said to have arrived at Derbe and Lystra also, as if he had not intended to visit these towns. Nor is anything said of his former stay in them. Evidently another hand furnished the account of the journey." Now the structure of the passage in the Acts on which the above extract is based gives not the slightest foundation for the last three statements contained in it.

The following are the salient verses in the narrative of the Acts: xv. 36, "And after some days Paul said unto Barnabas, 'Let us return now and visit the brethren in every city, wherever we proclaimed the word of the Lord, and see how they fare.'"

xv. 40, "And Paul chose Silas and went forth, being commended by the brethren to the grace of the Lord. And he went through Syria and Cilicia, confirming the brethren.

xvi. 1, "And he came also to Derbe and to Lystra."

xvi. 6, "And they went through the region of Phrygia and Galatia, having been forbidden of the Holy Ghost to speak the word in Asia."

Now the only factors in this narrative which give countenance to the statements we have criticised are the omission of the words "confirming the churches" and the insertion of the particle "also" in xvi. 1. But it is perfectly clear that the journey or journeys described in these verses are governed by the general intention expressed in xv. 36, viz., that they were to visit the brethren in every city, wherever they had proclaimed the word of the Lord. The mention of Lystra and Derbe is only a detail showing how that intention was fulfilled. The writer has already in xv. 40 explained how the particular purpose of the journey was

carried out, i.e., by "confirming the churches," and there was no necessity to repeat this statement when he came to tell of the visit to Derbe and Lystra. The break in the account at xvi. 1 and the insertion of the word "also" simply indicate the fact that at this point the Apostle had crossed the border into another province, the province of Galatia. There is, therefore, here no ground for assuming that the writer of the narrative was not aware that St. Paul had visited these cities during an earlier tour, as we know from the Acts to have been the case. In the verses we have quoted we have a complete account of the tour, in all its stages, as it had been planned; a journey through Syria and Cilicia, and through two regions in the province of Galatia, that in which Derbe and Lystra were situated and the Phrygian region of the same province, which contained Iconium and Antioch, thus covering the whole area of the so-called First Missionary Journey.

Several other passages might be adduced to illustrate the general flimsiness of the grounds upon which the consistent depreciation of the historical value of the Acts are based, but I must not trespass further upon the Editor's indulgence. It is very instructive to compare Dr. Kirsopp Lake's article on the "Acts of the Apostles" in Hastings' *Dictionary of the Bible* with the article under discussion. No one would dream of charging Dr. Lake with undue conservatism, and yet our two contributors might well take his essay as a model of how to arrive at a just estimate of the Acts as a historical document. He fully realises all the difficulties of the problem and has taken them all into account, but his reasoned conclusions are expressed in words of rare sanity and wisdom.

"The author was sometimes inaccurate and not always well informed, but it is hard to see that he makes mistakes which would be impossible to one who had, indeed, been

with St. Paul at times but not during the greater part of his career, and had collected information from the Apostle and others as opportunity had served. On the other hand, the argument from the literary affinities between the "we-clauses" and the rest of the Acts remains unshaken: and until some further analysis succeeds in showing why it should be thought that the "we-clauses" have been taken from a source not written by the redactor himself, the traditional view that Luke, the companion of St. Paul, was the author of the whole work is the most reasonable one."

To sum up, I can find no better words to describe the general character of the article in the *Encyclopædia of Religion and Ethics* than those which are used by the authors themselves with reference to the "we" document in the Acts.

"The writer shows little perception of Paul's great character or of the features of his thought which were to work so powerfully in the world in later times" (p. 686).

MAURICE JONES.

THE "FIVE BOOKS" OF MATTHEW AGAINST THE JEWS.

Dr. Rendel Harris is unfailing in his supply of interesting new data interestingly, sometimes even romantically, interpreted. One of his most recent lines of inquiry is that of collections of "Testimonies," i.e., chains of proof-texts which are transmitted from one Christian writer against the Jews to another down through the second and third centuries. Dr. Harris would carry back the fundamental Christian *Book of Testimonies* to a period so remote as to antedate all the extant writings of the New Testament. Not only Mark, our earliest evangelist, but even the writer of 1 Peter, and Paul himself, according to Dr. Harris, would have borrowed their proof-texts from this primitive Christian collection.[1] In short "the original author of the *Book of Testimonies* was Matthew the Apostle." What antiquity (and in this case "antiquity" means Papias with those whom he represents and those who follow him) has to say about Matthew having composed the *logia* in the Hebrew tongue has real reference (Dr. Harris believes) not to a "Hebrew," or Aramaic, original for our Matthew, nor to a "Second Source," from which our Matthew and Luke have borrowed the collection of discourses they employ to supplement the story of Mark. Dr. Harris is now convinced (though previously he had rejected it) by a theory advocated in 1894 by an anonymous writer on *The Oracles ascribed to Matthew by Papias of Hierapolis*, and subsequently supported by Professor Burkitt in his *Gospel History and its Transmission*. Papias referred to nothing else, Dr. Harris now holds, than the *Book of Testimonies*.

[1] *Testimonies*, Pt. I., 1916.

This is one of the cases in which we are compelled to believe that the romantic interest of Dr. Harris' interpretation of his data far outstrips its validity. Neither the books of *Testimonies against the Jews* of Cyprian and Gregory of Nyssa, nor their predecessors of the age of Justin's *Dialogue* and the *Dialogue of Jason and Papiscus*, nor even still earlier collections gave rise to the scriptural arguments of Paul and the apostolic age. It is more nearly the opposite which is true. 1 Peter is not uninfluenced by Romans, Hebrews rests on Paul, and Mark as well as Matthew unquestionably borrows some of his quotations from the Second Source. This known dependence is a better explanation of the coincidences than the conjectural work. It is a great overstraining of the evidence to seek to prove the existence of a particular *Book of Testimonies* from such loans as these, or from such dependence on proof-texts in current oral circulation, as when Paul in 1 Corinthians xv. 25–28 builds his argument on a combination of Psalm viii. 6 with Psalm cx. 1, repeats the combination in Ephesians i. 20–22, and finally transmits it for full elaboration to the author of Hebrews ii. 5–vii. 25.

Even more violent is the attempt to secure evidence for the *Book of Testimonies* from the statement of Papias as to the source of those *logia of the Lord* which he had made it his task to interpret. If they were not the "commandments delivered by the Lord to the faith, and derived from the truth itself," sayings of Jesus on which Papias sought light from the "living and abiding voice" of authentic tradition, then we are at a loss for a connexion between his preface (*προοίμιον*), and the work itself. If his interpretation (*ἐξήγησις*) of the *logia* is not intended to meet the irresponsible talk of "those who have so very much to say" and to refute the teachers of "alien commandments," like Basilides, with his twenty-four books of

ἐξηγήτικα on the Gospels,[1] then his apparent coincidence with his "colleague" (ἕταιρος) Polycarp is strangely misleading; for Polycarp also warns against the false teachers who "pervert the oracles of the Lord (τὰ λόγια τοῦ Κυρίου) to their own lusts," and Polycarp also urges his readers to forsake "the vain talk of the many" and Polycarp also bids his readers avoid the false teachings, and "turn to the word handed down to us from the beginning." Perhaps Irenaeus, too, who studied Papias and who called himself a disciple of Polycarp, may throw some light on what Papias meant by λόγια τοῦ Κυρίου and their true and false "interpretation" when he also denounces the heretics as "perverting (ραδιουργοῦντες) the oracles of the Lord (τὰ λόγια Κυρίου), becoming bad exegetes of things nobly spoken."

It is indeed high time some attention were paid to the protest of Zahn,[2] and the much earlier protest of Hilgenfeld [3] against putting Papias on the rack to extort testimony he cannot and will not give. Surely even great scholars must temporarily have lost their faculty of historical imagination when they discover mysterious references to unknown writings in the simple statement (not purporting at all to be a "tradition") of a Greek ecclesiastic of the period of Justin (*ca.* 150 A.D.) concerning the work of "Matthew." Papias merely says that the precepts, or oracles (λόγια), of the Lord which he proposes to interpret will be found in the well known Gospel which all Christians then received as *the* Apostolic Gospel *par excellence.* He adds that even in this case (as well as the preaching of Peter translated by Mark) the *logia* were (of course) in translation. How can any scholar familiar with the use of Matthew

[1] He seems, however, like Marcion, to have used only the Antiochian Gospel of Luke.

[2] *Einleitung*, § 54.

[3] *Einleitung*, pp. 53–65 and 456–7.

from Ignatius to Justin, and aware also of the absolute ignorance of all the fathers, whether in that age or subsequent ages, of any other writing of Matthew than our own first Gospel (which all assume to be translated), imagine that Papias would go anywhere else for "the sacred oracles of the Lord"; or that if he really had spoken of another writing by Matthew the innumerable early borrowers from his pages would not have rung all conceivable changes upon the statement? In reality "the famous λόγια of which Papias speaks" are not a book at all. They are "the commandments (ἐντολαί) delivered by the Lord to the faith" which Papias set himself to interpret with aid of properly authenticated tradition. Like every other church writer of his time he takes for granted that "Matthew compiled them"; of course "in the Hebrew tongue" spoken by Jesus and the Apostles. This, and the fact that Matthew had found no such authorized translator as Mark, Peter's ἑρμηνευτής, makes Papias' own "translations" (ἑρμηνείαι) necessary. The fact that the Gospel of Matthew presents these "commandments" in a narrative framework makes no more difference to the interest of Papias and his age than it does to Paul when he declares that τὰ λόγια τοῦ θεοῦ were entrusted to Israel.[1] These also in the Five Books of Moses are contained in a narrative framework. Both Paul and Papias disregard the framework because what they (and their readers) are concerned with is "the oracles." And both are quite justified; for to lawgiver and evangelist alike it is the *torah* (literally "teaching") the "commandment delivered" (cf. Matt. xxviii. 20) which is the main concern.

We cannot therefore for a moment admit the reasoning of Dr. Harris when he tries to identify his supposed *Book of Testimonies* with "the famous Λόγια of which Papias

[1] Rom. iii. 2.

speaks." But we are deeply interested in his data; for among them are some which throw new and important light upon the early history of the Gospels, and of Matthew in particular.

Among the obscurer medieval writings to which Dr. Harris introduces the reader is a paper MS. of the sixteenth century in the monastery of Iveron on Mount Athos "filled with all kinds of theological extracts." Dr. Lambros, who catalogues it, ascribes it to "Matthew a monk" (*Ματθαίου μονάχου*) and calls it "an anonymous compend in five books against the Jews" (*Συγγραφὴ κατὰ Ἰουδαίων ἀνεπίγραφος· ἐν λόγοις έ.*). Both description and ascription appear to go no further back than Lambros himself; for both the first book and the whole treatise are said to be "anonymous" (*ἀνεπίγραφος*). What seems to be Lambros' ground for his ascription of the work to "Monk Matthew" will appear presently. The first book (*λόγος ά*) has four chapters (*κεφ. ά, β′ γ′, δ′*) of much the same sort of "testimonies" as Cyprian and Gregory of Nyssa, and Dr. Harris finds among the succeeding four books many chapters which remind him strongly of the writings of the second century apologists against the Jews. But who is "Matthew the Monk"? and why does Dr. Lambros call this very miscellaneous five-volume treatise a treatise "against the Jews" and attribute it to this entirely unknown personage?

Apparently because of the following verses prefixed to one of its sections:[1]

> Ματθαῖος εἴργει τῶν Ἰουδαίων θράσος
> Ὥσπερ χαλινοῖς πέντε φίμωσας λόγοις·
> Οστις δὲ τούτων τὴν ἐπίρρητον πλανην

[1] Which section is meant by Dr. Harris in the words "the section we have been discussing" (p. 109) is not easy to discover.

Πλάνην ἀτέχνως, ἐξελέγξει τῷ λόγῳ
Ἄρδην ἁπάσας συγκαθεῖλεν αἱρέσεις.
Μήτηρ γὰρ αὐτῶν ἡ θευκτὸνων ἔρις.[1]

Dr. Harris is quite justified in saying that the author of these verses was "not a monk lauding a monk." He appropriately compares the verses in which the second century "Elder" quoted by Irenaeus attacks the πλάνη of the Gnostic Marcus,[2] and pronounces the style, while similar, as "somewhat superior." It is perfectly certain that "the person who wrote them really thought he was honouring a person of distinction, and that he was doing it in a distinguished manner." But was he really intending this honour for the Apostle Matthew? Dr. Harris thinks this cannot reasonably be doubted; and we fully agree with him. He takes pains to show that not merely the style but the ideas embodied are those of the second century. It is a commonplace with the *malleoli hereticorum* from Justin to Epiphanius that "The strife of the deicide people (the Jews) is the mother of all the heresies," as the closing line maintains; for the Jewish heresies are by common consent represented as giving rise to the Christian. On the other hand, this "can hardly be the product of an unknown monk's reflections at some late period in the Church's history. . . . The versifier of our MS. depends upon the stratum of Christian thought represented by Hegesippus" (160–170 A.D.).

Whether, then, it be Lambros (as we suspect), or some much earlier scribe, who takes the ancient verses as applying to the unknown author of the Athos MS., the coat is in

[1] Matthew curbs the audacity of the Jews
Checking them in five books as it were with bridles.
Now whoever the infamous error of these
(Pure error it is) shall in argument refute
Destroys at a stroke all the heresies together;
For the mother of these is the strife of the deicide people.

[2] *Haer* I. xv. 6;

reality many sizes too large. The Matthew originally meant is no other than Matthew the Apostle and Evangelist, as Dr. Harris clearly sees.

But why imagine the verses as framed to fit any other writing than the Gospel which every apologist of the second century—yes, and of later times—regards as written with especial reference to the Jews ? For the Palestinian origin of the Gospel of Matthew was an even more generally accepted belief in ancient than in modern times ; and if any one be in doubt as to the evangelist's sentiments regarding unconverted Judaism let him read Matthew xxiii. 1–33. Why indeed should Lambros, or anybody else, invent an unknown "*Monk* Matthew" to be honoured by these verses, except that the Gospel of Matthew is not divided into "five books" whereas the Athos MS.—and we may add Irenaeus' treatise *Against all Heresies*, and Hegesippus' *Memorabilia*, and Papias' *Exegesis*, and the Psalms of David, and the Law of Moses, besides an indefinite number of other treatises Jewish and Christian—is composed "in five books" ?

Dr. Harris thinks he has found reason to believe that the original *Book of Testimonies* was in five books. We must give his argument entire, italics and all, to do it justice :

> Our author, as he appears in his latest dress (i.e., the Athos MS.), is divided into *five books*. We remember that Papias wrote *five books* on the *Dominical Oracles* ; now whatever these Oracles were, sayings of Jesus or words of the Prophets about Jesus, *five books of commentary imply five books of underlying text*. Is it a mere coincidence that we find five such books extant in the Athos MS. ? and ascribed to Matthew ?
>
> In the conjunction of an author named Matthew with five such books, have we not gone a long way towards establishing Prof. Burkitt's conjecture that the *Book of Testimonies* is the missing *Dominical Oracles* written by Matthew and commented on by Papias ?

The skeptically disposed may be inclined to point out that nothing in the world is less "missing" than "the Dominical Oracles commented on by Papias," whereas the alleged five-volume *Book of Testimonies* is still very decidedly "missing." It might also be pointed out that it does not yet appear that anybody of higher authority than Dr. Lambros ascribes the Athos MS. to "Matthew," and even he does not mean the Apostle. In view of some weaknesses such as these in Dr. Harris' logic it might be pardonable to ignore the italics in which he emphasizes the declaration "*five books of commentary imply five books of underlying text*," and to answer his question as to coincidence by a reference to the frequency of the adoption of this favourite division.

If the skeptically inclined should venture thus to disregard the argument from the five books of Papias' commentaries, they would in our judgment be wrong. True, the five books of commentary do not *necessarily* imply five books of underlying text; but they do make it so probable, that *the presence of corroboratory evidence* would go far to establish the case. Now in spite of the great industry of Dr. Harris in search of evidence for a five-volume Matthaean *Book of Testimonies*, still circulating within the recollection of the men of Papias' time (*ca.* 145), and not in Aramaic (or Hebrew ?) only but also in Greek (!), the result must be pronounced disappointing in the extreme. To begin with the alleged evidences are to say the least highly precarious. On the division into five books Dr. Harris cites *nothing* save that the Mount Athos MS. has five books, and two of these are very hard to bring within the definition of "testimonies." But even if such a work had been attributed to the Apostle Matthew by Papias, whose *Exegesis* was the chief storehouse for all later inquirers as to Gospel origins, it is simply incredible that *everybody* should have

understood him to be speaking of the perfectly well known Gospel of Matthew, and *nobody* understood that he had reference to a great unknown work by the same Apostle. Are we to understand, then, that Papias in citing his authority for the "commandments delivered by the Lord to the faith" made no mention of that standard apostolic Gospel which every Christian writer since the time of Ignatius (112 A.D.) regards as a systematic "compend of the Lord's words" (*σύνταξις τῶν κυριακῶν λόγων*, var. *λογίων*),[1] and which his earlier contemporary in the *Teaching of the Twelve* quotes as "*the* Gospel"?[2]

Fortunately the corroboratory evidence which Dr. Harris vainly labours to supply for the supposititious Matthean *Book of Testimonies* lies ready to our hand in the case of the well known Gospel. It is no new discovery which is so well brought out by Sir J. C. Hawkins in his admirable contribution to the volume of *Oxford Studies in the Synoptic Problem* (1911) edited by Professor Sanday, where he speaks of

> the fact that the special formula about Jesus ending His discourses, which Matthew subjoins to his five most important bodies of sayings (vii. 28; xi. 1; xiii. 53; xix. 1; xxvi. 1), has in this one case (the first) a substantial (though not verbal)[3] parallel in Luke vii. 1: "After He had ended all His sayings in the ears of the people."[4]

The colophon, marked by striking peculiarities of grammatical form,[5] is well known, and the fact is recognised in such standard commentaries as Allen's in the "International" series that it is one of the many phrases which

[1] Papias fragment. Papias is contrasting the work which Peter in his discourses *πρὸς τὴν χρείαν* did *not* undertake, with the work of so me other Apostle who (we must assume) *did* undertake it.

[2] Διδ. xv. Ἐλέγχετε *ὡς ἔχετε ἐν τῷ εὐαγγελίῳ*.

[3] In the B text it is verbal.

[4] *Op. cit.* p. 121.

[5] The Semiticism *καὶ ἐγένετο* with which the formula begins is elsewhere avoided by Matthew and (usually) by Mark. It appears in a Markan paragraph in Matthew ix. 10. Elsewhere only in the colophon. See *Hor. Synopt.* 2nd ed., p. 137.

our first evangelist borrows from the Second Source and stereotypes into a formula. As Allen properly notes it is only the first of the five great discourses (or *Peregs* to use the felicitous expression of Sir J. C. Hawkins) which is derived (in the main) from a corresponding discourse of the Second Source, the other four being built up on a Markan basis.

But critics hitherto have overlooked the fact that the colophon is not so much a rounding-off of the preceding discourse, as *a link by which the narrative which follows is coupled on*. For this reason the chapter divisions of the modern versions make it begin chapters xi., xix., and xxvi. In other words the evangelist in framing his work had in mind not merely the five great discourses which supremely characterise his work as indeed a *σύνταξις τῶν κυριάκῶν λόγων* (or *λογίων*), and which stand in line with his final word of command "teaching them *to observe all things whatsoever I have commanded you*"; he had also in mind the introductory *narrative* which in every case appropriately leads up to the discourse and furnishes its historical setting, precisely as with the successive "codes" of the Pentateuch. The first of these narrative introductions (Matt. iii.–iv.) cannot, of course, be coupled to the preceding by the formula

Now it came to pass when Jesus had ended these words, etc.,

because there are no preceding utterances of Jesus. Per contra the last occurrence (xxvi. 1) leads over to a narrative Epilogue (xxvi.–xxviii.) which relates the departure of Jesus to His heavenly throne, as the Prologue (cc. i.–ii.) had related His advent. The fifth colophon therefore takes the appropriately variant form.

Now it came to pass when Jesus had finished *all* these words.

It closes the *fifth book* of the Doings and Sayings of Jesus, and leads over to the story of His passion and resurrection which constitutes the Epilogue.

What, then, may we conclude as to the evangelist's structural plan? Had he, or had he not in mind a compend of the Lord's commandments (*σύνταξις τῶν κυριακῶν λόγων*) under the already established division of "things said and things done"?[1] Was it, or was it not, his intention to give his work this symmetrical, typically Jewish form of a five-fold *torah* of Jesus, a double pentad of the sayings and doings of the ministry, preceded by a Prologue describing His Davidic birth and Infancy, and closed by an Epilogue relating the Passion and Resurrection?

The answer to this question can only be given after careful and patient study of the editorial groupings effected by the evangelist in his material. It may, however, be of interest in the discussion to which the reader's attention is now invited to know that the present writer, long before the verses from the Mount Athos MS. had come to his knowledge, had laid down as the fundamental fact in the study of the editorial treatment of evangelic material in our First Gospel, that its author intentionally constructed it upon just this plan of "five books," which to writers of the second century might well appear as the great apostolic "refutation of the Jews."

B. W. Bacon.

ST. MARK'S ANTICIPATIONS.

The second evangelist is admittedly our best authority for the chronological order of the gospel story, but it is quite obvious that other interests also have helped to determine the arrangement of his material. Sometimes he groups incidents according to their import, as with the five altercations of ii. 1–iii. 6 and also possibly with the

[1] So Papias *ἡ λεχθέντα ἢ πραχθέντα*; cf. Acts. i. 1. *ποιεῖν τε καὶ διδάσκειν*, and Mark vi. 30, *ὅσα ἐποίησαν καὶ ὅσα ἐδίδαξαν*.

somewhat similar incidents of xi. 27–xii. 40. Once at least (ix. 41–50) sayings are apparently grouped, not by their bearing upon one subject or because they are steps in one line of thought, but in virtue of a more external method of association, some word or phrase in each saying forming a link to the preceding saying, while some other word or phrase links it to the succeeding one, a method which looks like a mnemonic device. But Mark has also many instances of another method of arrangement which has not received the attention it deserves. He often, apparently for the sake of local unity of interest, not only narrates events before their time but makes use of anticipatory summaries which, in a sentence or two, comprise considerable periods of time; and then, sometimes quite abruptly, he resumes the story at a point much earlier than that to which he has just brought us.

Several of these cases are quite obvious. In the account of the Sabbath at Capernaum (i. 21–34) the evangelist suddenly breaks off between the synagogue and Peter's house to tell us that "the report of Him went out straightway everywhere into all the region of Galilee round about," an effect which could not have taken place until after the close of the Sabbath, the remainder of whose story is yet untold. And this makes it probable that we should regard verse 27 also as an anticipation; for though only one unclean spirit is spoken of in verse 23 the people say, "With authority He commandeth even the unclean *spirits*," for which they had no occasion until, after the Sabbath sunset, He "cast out many devils" (ver. 34). We see here a tendency to give completeness to an incident by relating in immediate sequence events which chronologically should be separated from it by other incidents: in this case there seems to be a precipitancy to give the deed at once its full tale of glory.

Another obvious case is i. 39. "And He went into their

synagogues throughout all Galilee, preaching and casting out devils," which seems to be a summary covering practically the whole of the Galilæan ministry. It is difficult to take it otherwise, for if so, why should He omit Nazareth, the visit to which is not recounted until vi. 1–6 ? And then also, if this verse is not anticipatory, the disciples were sent out to evangelize places which He had already visited. The account, too, of the visit to Gennesaret (vi. 53–55), an important region of Galilee, reads as though He had not been there before : the people, we are told, recognised (ἐπιγνόντες) Him, a term which seems to imply rather the identification of one of whom they had heard than the reappearance after a short interval of a figure already well known to them.

And if i. 39 is an anticipation taking us up to the end of the Galilæan ministry, the passage which follows (i. 40–45) and tells us of the healing of a leper may continue this anticipation and so belong to the last stage of the Galilæan ministry. In support of this suggestion we note the very emphatic injunction to silence, which has its parallels in the last two healings of the northern ministry, those of the deaf man in Decapolis and of the blind man at Bethsaida (vii. 36 and viii. 26, of which see variant readings). We have thus an explanation of the otherwise difficult plea, "If thou wilt, thou canst make me clean," for it is fairly obvious that towards the end of His work in Galilee Jesus limited His healing activities, which the unspirituality of the people magnified to the hindrance of His spiritual work, the injunction to silence being itself one means to this limitation.

Perhaps the most obvious case of anticipation followed by abrupt return to an earlier point of time is to be found in iv. 33–41. Verses 33 and 34 are the account of a period of teaching : they themselves follow the record of what can hardly have been spoken on one occasion, for in verse

10 Jesus is alone with His disciples, while in verses 26–32 we are, in view of verses 33 and 34, evidently intended to understand that the multitude is with Him again. And then, immediately after the account of what extended over an indefinite period of time, we are told, "And on that day, when even was come, He saith unto them, etc." Of course, in this case, as in others, the possibility of later insertions must not be precluded, but it is impossible here to estimate the probability of this or other hypotheses.

The existence of cases in which this method of anticipation is by the immediate context shown to have been used warrants us in applying it where the proof is more remote. The account of the healing of the withered hand (iii. 1–6) concludes with, "And the Pharisees went out, and straightway with the Herodians took counsel against Him, how they might destroy Him." The incident upon which the plot follows is probably itself early: we are told, "They watched Him, whether He would heal on the Sabbath day; that they might accuse Him," and doubt as to His action under these circumstances could have existed only in the very early days of His ministry. It may be suggested that no real doubt existed but that the aim of those who watched was to obtain definite and actionable evidence; but this does not accord with what we are told of the words and anger and grief of Jesus: He does not speak to them as to men already committed to irreconcilable enmity, but as to men in the very act of so committing themselves: He hoped for something other than their silence at His question. So that the early placing of the occasion is most probably chronologically correct. But it is exceedingly difficult to think that the ominous collaboration of Pharisee and Herodian against Jesus, however directly and inevitably it may have followed from this, took place immediately in point of time and before many of the events subsequently

narrated. In the first place, the Herodians' part would be to move Herod against Jesus, but it is not until vi. 14 that we are told, "king Herod heard; for His name had become known." That it was not until the end of the Galilæan ministry [1] that this collaboration became dangerous is hinted by the fact that His public work in that country closes with the warning, "Take heed, beware of the leaven of the Pharisees and of the leaven of Herod" (viii. 15). We have also to give weight to the two appearances of scribes from Jerusalem (iii. 22 and vii. 1). Now it is on all counts probable that the local Pharisees of Galilee would in the first instance have recourse to the prestige of Jerusalem for support against Jesus before making common cause with a party like that of the Herodians from whom they were divided by very strong political and religious interests. In iii. 6 Mark is, therefore, probably forestalling the yet far-off result of that Sabbath's work.

The six verses (iii. 7–12) following the passage just dealt with read like another anticipatory summary. The expression with regard to the unclean spirits, "Whensoever they beheld Him" (v. 11), makes it evident that these verses refer to a period rather than to an occasion; and we can hardly help connecting verse 9 with iv. 1: the "little boat" was evidently not required as a means of escape to another place, and therefore it was most probably for use as a rostrum. This account of Jesus' popularity may have been introduced here partly to justify the mention of the Herodians, who might be stirred to action by the possibility of a popular movement but hardly by the doubtful infringement of the Sabbath.

[1] Menzies (*The Earliest Gospel*, p. 93) places it later still, i.e. in the last days at Jerusalem, but it is difficult to avoid the conclusion that danger from this combination was one of the factors that determined the close of the Galilean ministry.

We find a somewhat similar case in x. 41–45. For several reasons it is probable that the indignation of the ten against James and John for the presumption of their request for precedence in the kingdom of God did not at once show itself and become the occasion of Jesus' rebuke. Mark merely says, "When the ten heard it": Luke (xxii. 24–27) tells us in the account of the last supper, "And there arose also a contention among them, which of them is accounted to be greatest," and then appends a saying of Jesus so similar to that of Mark x. 42–45*a* that it is hardly possible to doubt that the same incident lies behind both. But Luke generally shows great respect for the order of Mark and probably would not have changed it without good reason, which in this case appears to have been access to an authority which he considered preferable—at least no other reason is obvious—and had Luke here been using Mark it is difficult to understand why he should have omitted the last clause of Mark x. 45. This omission is not, of course, completely explained by the hypothesis of a non-Marcan authority and, unless we resort to the hazardous supposition of pure inadvertence, we seem left to conclude that Luke considered this saying as covered by or identical with the words at the last supper, "This cup is the new covenant in my blood, even that which is poured out for you," which, in view of the vital connexion between the passover, the liberation from Egypt and the old covenant, were equivalent to saying that He gave "His life a ransom for many." In any case we cannot but agree with Burkitt (*The Gospel History*, p. 140) that these latter words suggest rather the "last tragic night" than the journey to Jerusalem. So that if we regard Mark x. 41–45 as another of his anticipations the two evangelists are in substantial agreement. Mark, wishing to complete the incident of James and John's request, adds immediately the sequel, which did not take

place until considerably later, while Luke, more interested in the story of the last supper, relates in its chronological place so much of the incident as belongs there, omitting the earlier and provocative request of the sons of Zebedee.

Another probable case is that of iii. 22–30. If we compare this incident with that of vii. 1–13 we can hardly avoid the conclusion that the latter is earlier in point of time. After asserting that Jesus was in collaboration with the prince of the devils the scribes from Jerusalem might have urged the matter of washings to the people in support of their calumny but they would hardly have made it an occasion of direct approach to One whom they had already publicly and in His presence accused of such sinister partnership. On the other hand the question about the washing was one that might easily have preceded and contributed to the animus of the accusation of casting out devils by Beelzebub. It is noticeable, too, that Mark's words, " And the scribes which came down from Jerusalem said, etc." (iii. 22), speak of these men as familiar figures in the story though they have not been mentioned before. It may have been this that induced Luke to introduce them into the earliest recorded altercation with the religious authorities, the cure of the paralytic (Luke v. 17). Now if we compare Mark iii. 22 with vii. 1, it is safe to say that if they were presented as separate fragments of one work to anyone who had not read the gospel before, he would have no hesitation whatever in saying that the latter was an earlier part of the work than the former. It is fairly clear then that Mark, to complete the progress of calumny, added to the pronouncement of the friends or relatives of Jesus that He was beside Himself that of the scribes from Jerusalem to the effect that He had Beelzebub, etc., and in so doing anticipated the historic order of his story.

The consideration of these two passages, especially in

view of the comparison between the way in which the scribes are introduced in iii. 22 and vii. 1 respectively, implies that Mark drew them from a written source in which they stood in the reverse order to that in which he uses them. Both these passages have for other reasons been considered to be insertions later than the general body of the gospel, but, as we have seen, the position of the former at least (Mark iii. 22–30) is quite in accord with Mark's method. But additional evidence that Mark is here using a written source may be found by comparing his account of the calumny and Jesus' reply with that of Matthew and Luke (Matt. xii. 22–32 ; Luke xi. 14–23) : both the latter preface the calumny by the healing of a dumb demoniac and insert in the same relative place the challenge, " By whom do your sons cast them out ? " and the warning, " He that is not with me is against me, etc.," and both when concurring with Mark in matter agree in differences of language. What explanation can there be of this except that Matthew and Luke are here making direct use of a source which also lies behind Mark's account ? With regard to Mark vii. 1–23 evidence of this nature is lacking : Matthew alone (xv. 1–20) reproduces the incident in full, Luke having the merest reminiscence of it in xi. 41, but the former shows differences of arrangement and additional matter which may be due to the possession of the source from which Mark draws.

In this connexion we may also note that, whatever the origin, Mark is probably responsible for appending at this point the saying with regard to the unpardonable sin. It would hardly occur to an author reporting a short speech spoken at one time, after having a few sentences earlier given the occasion, to reiterate it as is done in verse 30 ; but if he found unattached the saying of verses 28–29 with a note of the occasion added, it would be quite natural to one of Mark's method to append it here. And we note that

while Matthew follows Mark in this, Luke has some reason for not doing so. It is inherently probable that the calumny was repeated on more than one occasion as part of a campaign of opposition. The two statements, "He hath Beelzebub," and, "By the prince of the devils casteth he out devils," may well have been made on separate occasions; indeed, Mark iii. 23–26 are a reply to the latter, verses 28–29 to the former, which was probably added by Mark (Matthew and Luke agree in confining themselves to the latter) in order to prepare for verses 28–30. Possibly the question, "By whom do your sons cast them out?" (Matt. xii. 27–28; Luke xi. 19–20) was Jesus' answer on some other similar occasion, for it does not seem to have been His manner to multiply arguments; and the same may be said of Mark iii. 27. It seems probable, therefore, that here also Mark is compressing an extended series of events. If this is so, and the saying about the unpardonable sin was spoken after repeated attacks, we get a more intelligible setting for the extreme solemnity of the words and a better understanding of what called for them.

ix. 36–37 is another possible case of anticipation forestalling the account of the blessing of the children (x. 13–16) in order to complete the teaching upon humility. If this is so, and after, "And they brought unto Him little children that He should touch them: and the disciples rebuked them" (x. 13) we read together with the words of verses 14–15 those of ix. 37, "Whosoever shall receive one such little child in my name receiveth me: and whosoever receiveth me, receiveth not me but him that sent me," the latter certainly gain in power as compared with their present position.

Probably the most remarkable though one of the least apparent of these anticipations occurs in viii. 27–ix. 1. The whole of this passage evidently does not refer to one

single occasion: in verse 27 Jesus is travelling with none but the twelve, for in verse 30, "He charged them that they should tell no man of him": in verse 34, "He called unto him the multitude with his disciples," which clearly demands a setting other than the foregoing (for this verse cf. Luke xiv. 25–27). But if we take the passage (viii. 31–ix. 1) as, in Mark's manner, an anticipatory epitome reaching to a time considerably later than the incident from which it starts, we shall find in it a summary of Jesus' teaching up to and including the eschatological discourse (Mark xiii.) and thus giving an appropriate completeness to the story that begins with the confession of Him as Messiah. And this view greatly simplifies the subsequent story. The first question that arises is this, If verses 31–33, "And he began to teach them, that the Son of man must suffer many things, etc.," describe what did not follow immediately upon the confession of Peter, when was this teaching given? We may note in passing that in ix. 10 we find the disciples questioning "what the rising again from the dead should mean," and it is clear that the writer of these words could hardly have intended his readers to understand that Jesus had already spoken "openly" of His death and resurrection. We find two more records of the prediction of suffering, ix. 31 and x. 33–34. But it is difficult to avoid the conclusion that the former is also an anticipatory summary closing the story of the transfiguration and the cure of the lunatic boy. In ix. 30 we are told, "They passed through (παρεπορεύοντο διὰ) Galilee": in verse 33 we are at Capernaum, probably one of the first places to be reached by any one approaching Galilee from Cæsarea Philippi with the intent of travelling through it southwards, so that here we have a reversion to an earlier point than that to which verse 30 takes us. And this being so, we are probably intended to take verse 31 merely as an indication of the

main theme of Jesus' teaching after the confession that He was the Christ. It may be objected that we are told that His journey through Galilee was incognito because He wished to give undivided attention to the instruction of His disciples as to His coming sufferings, but this is not necessarily the meaning of ix. 31, which may be understood to tell us that He journeyed incognito because of a danger which, as appeared afterward, He apprehended, but to which He was not prepared to surrender Himself in Galilee (cf. Luke xiii. 31–33). But it is also to be noted that the wording of x. 32, "and they were in the way, going up to Jerusalem," is not very definite in point of time and might conceivably be carried back to any part of the final journey to Jerusalem. However this may be, the suggestion is strong that the event described in viii. 31–32*a* is the same as that described in x. 32–34, i.e., the explicit prediction of suffering given for the first time on the road to Jerusalem. In the latter passage we are told that Jesus, after going on for a time alone, resumed the company of the disciples and "began to tell them the things that were to happen unto him," where both the word "began" and the mental stress of His solitary leading as reflected in the amazement and fear of His followers suggest that it was a critical occasion and not the repetition of a lesson already twice given. Evidently now for the first time "He spake the saying openly." There had been earlier hints of dark possibilities, as in His comment on the death of the Baptist (ix. 11-13). To the interval between the confession of His Christhood and the prediction of His suffering probably also belongs the saying of ii. 19–20, "Can the sons of the bride chamber, etc." If, as seems very probable, there is a Messianic allusion here (vide H. A. A. Kennedy in Expositor, Feb. 1916, pp. 103–4) it could hardly belong to any other time than one after the disciples had recognised Jesus as the Messiah but before

their minds were puzzled or saddened by theprediction of His death, and such a time did not exist unless there was a considerable interval between verses 30 and 31 of chapter viii.

That the three separately given predictions of Mark viii. 31, ix. 31, x. 33–34, are accounts of one and the same occurrence appears probable also from its recorded reception by the disciples. In each case it is not understood. In the first account Peter rebukes his Master : in the second " they understood not the saying, and were afraid to ask Him " : after the third James and John need to be told, " Ye know not what ye ask." If these were different occasions, one would expect the later teaching to be modified in view of this repeated lack of comprehension, whereas it is only in the first case that we are told " He spake the saying openly," and only in the first case is the misunderstanding followed by further teaching. So that if these accounts refer to three occasions we are given the impression that the second prediction left the disciples more at a loss than the first, and that what Jesus on the first occasion said in correction of their misunderstanding left them only the more uncomprehending.

It need hardly be pointed out that this identification of the three recorded predictions of suffering does in itself make the gospel story more intelligible. It has another and unexpected advantage. In Mark x. we are told that the prediction of suffering was followed by the request of James and John for the two chief places in the glory of their Master. How came they to think they could supplant the primacy of Peter ? The answer is clear if we find in viii. 31 another account of the same prediction, for there it is followed by the objection of Peter and our Lord's open rebuke of him. And it seems that James and John considering Peter to have thus forfeited his precedence seized the opportunity of pressing their claims.

On this understanding Mark viii. 34–ix. 1 belongs to a very late period both of the public and private teaching of Jesus. It is evidently a collection of sayings spoken on different occasions. Verse 34 is spoken to the multitudes, probably as Luke implies (Luke xiv. 25–27) at a time of great outward popularity, the superficiality of which Jesus saw and challenged. Verses 35–37 were possibly spoken on the same occasion, but, according to Luke, Q's equivalents of Mark viii. 34 and 35 were not conjoined (Luke xiv. 27 and xvii. 33). Verse 38 is most probably to be understood as spoken to the disciples alone, for though it may be urged that the "Son of man" is not explicitly identified with the Speaker yet such a unique relationship between the two is certainly implied as would hardly be intelligible to any but those who had acknowledged Jesus as the Christ. And in the case of this verse both Matthew and Luke agree in separating Q's equivalent from its Marcan context (Matt. x. 33; Luke xii. 9): it has also a close relationship to Mark xiii. 26–27, as also Mark ix. 1 has to Mark xiii. 30. In fact it seems as though we have in these two verses some of the primitive material lying behind Mark xiii.

We have already noted the possibility that Mark ix. 36–37 is an anticipation belonging in point of time to the incident related in x. 13–16, and we are now in a position to discuss the possibility that ix. 35 also is an anticipation of x. 43–44. Of the whole incident of Mark ix. 33 ff., Dr. M'Neile, in comment on Matthew's equivalent of Mark x. 35–45, says, "The possibility must be recognised that they are doublets of the same account," but to accept this would involve a rather serious and apparently unaccountable inaccuracy on the part of Mark, and at the same time would attribute to him or his authority more dramatic invention than we are accustomed to grant. The fact that the two passages are each preceded by an account of the prediction of suffer-

ing, which, as we have seen, are themselves probably doublets, might at first sight seem to strengthen the possibility to which Dr. M'Neile refers, but we have also seen that there is in ix. 33 a return to a period earlier than that to which ix. 30–32 takes us and therefore an indication that we have here something which is not parallel to that which with no such break follows the prediction of x. 33-34. Nor can we overcome the difficulty which the word "Capernaum" sets against this possibility by bringing the whole incident of Mark x. 35–45 back to that city, for Luke's placing of the saying of verses 41–45*a* and other considerations have induced us rather to place the words in question later than Mark's setting. It is therefore simpler to regard Mark ix. 33–34 as correctly placed and ix. 35 as, in Mark's manner, an anticipatory addition of Jesus' later teaching on the subject, and to see in this verse alone, or rather the latter part of it (which is omitted by D and 𝔏), a doublet of x. 43–44. If this is accepted, and we read Mark ix. 33–34 as giving an account of the complete incident, it gains in impressiveness: there is really no need to add anything: when the disciples discover that in the presence of the Master they are ashamed to speak of that for which they had contended among themselves their own silence is His adequate utterance. We have no reason to believe that the evangelists or their authorities were capable of inventions of this sort: it is much easier to look upon it as an account of an incident other than that of x. 35–40; but it is not difficult to understand that for purposes of edification the lesson of the latter would be appended to it together with that of ix. 36–37, which, as we have seen, was also probably borrowed from another occasion, to complete the teaching of the incident.

The foregoing passages are those in which this method of the evangelist seems most patent and in which the recog-

nition of it helps to make the recorded events more intelligible. But the writer cannot hope to have done more than indicate a field that would repay the efforts of those who are better able to exploit it.

It only remains to note that the existence of these anticipations are precisely what we might expect from Papias' account of the work of Mark. We are told that Mark's source was Peter's teaching as given in adaptation to the needs of his hearers. It is very unlikely that the whole story contained in the second Gospel was given on one occasion, and the Elder's words, as Papias reports them, undoubtedly imply that it was not. But if only a portion of the story was given, it is almost inevitable that the incidents would be selected in the interests of creating a complete impression rather than of chronological accuracy, and their relation to the rest of the story would be given in just such anticipatory summaries as we have noted. And Mark, the same authority tells us, "made it his one care not to omit anything he heard," an adequate justification of the inclusion in a continuous narrative of these anachronisms and repetitions, even though he might be well aware of their nature. And it is, of course, also possible that Mark, even when not under the direct influence of his memory in the matter, may have occasionally adopted the same method of arrangement in preference to the purely chronological; for what was good for Peter's hearers would be, though to a less degree, good for Mark's readers. And these considerations also justify the Elder as describing our most chronological gospel as having been written *οὐ μέντοι τάξει*.

A. T. Cadoux.

PALESTINE AND THE RESTORATION OF ISRAEL: A STUDY IN PROPHECY.

RECENT events in Palestine have stirred us all deeply. The day is coming, we hope, when the land will be set free from Turkish misrule and oppression. As a prelude to the deliverance we hail with thankfulness the victory which has transferred Jerusalem to Christian hands. It is only fair, however, to remember that since 1547 the Turkish guardians of the Holy Sepulchre and the Church of the Nativity have observed a benevolent, neutral policy, and allowed unhindered access to the Holy Places; they have even done their best to keep the peace between enthusiastic pilgrims. Nevertheless, as Christians we feel that the Holy Places ought to be in Christian custody, for their associations are dear to every Christian heart; and we count it a blessed privilege to kneel and worship at the shrines which have been hallowed by Christian devotion from the earliest days. At the same time, while Christian sentiment can never cease to be drawn to Palestine, Christian faith is concerned with safe-guarding the facts rather than the sites of the Gospel; our religion is entirely independent of the Holy Places; no religious principle commits us to the aim of becoming the possessors of the Holy Land.

Equally strong, perhaps even stronger, is the Jewish interest in Palestine; and that too is much in our minds to-day. At first sight it looks as if the Jews were committed to a religious aspiration which is no concern of Christianity; the possession of the land of their fathers was promised in

the Law, and again and again by the Prophets. "Sound the great horn for our freedom; lift up the ensign to gather our exiles, and gather us from the four corners of the earth"; "And to Jerusalem, thy city, return in mercy . . . rebuild it soon in our days as an everlasting building, and speedily set up therein the throne of David" (Benedictions x., xiv.): such has been the age-long cry of the Synagogue, and many believe that an answer may be discerned in what is happening under our very eyes. The hope of witnessing a literal fulfilment of prophecy works like a spell upon the popular imagination. During the last few years there has been a remarkable increase in the number of Jews who have settled in Palestine; that is felt to be significant.[1] Then there is the movement known as Zionism, which has lately gathered force in Jewish circles, and attracted a good deal of attention outside. In the early stages it aimed at a spiritual and nationalist revival; it has now superadded a political object, the setting up of an independent Jewish state in Palestine. Many Christians as well as Jews think that Zionism receives its weightiest sanction from certain prophecies in the Old Testament. Is there any truth in this wide-spread notion? We must try to clear our minds on the subject.

Undoubtedly one of the notes most constantly heard in prophecy of the exile period and after is the promise of Israel's restoration to the land of their forefathers. The scattered members of the race are to be brought home from all the places where they live in banishment. "I will assemble the outcasts of Israel, and gather together the dispersed of Judah" has become the standing expression of

[1] The latest statistics available (1910) for the Sinjak of Jerusalem give 251,332 Moslems, 44,389 Christians, 39,866 Jews. Out of a population of about 700,000 in Palestine proper, the Jews number some 78,000, about a ninth of the whole.

this hope [1]; and the same prospect is held out in the recurring phrase, "I will turn thy captivity." [2] The heathen nations are to furnish an honourable escort for the journey (Isa. xiv. 2, xlix. 22 f., lx. 4, 9, lxvi. 12, 20); then the scattered exiles are to be established once more in their native country, while the wealth of the nations pours in to repair the ruins (Isa. xiv. 1, lx. 5, lxi. 6). The city will be built again upon its own mound, and the palace reinhabited (Jer. xxx. 18 f.); the cheerful sounds of social life will be heard once more, the districts of Benjamin and Judah peopled again: "for I will bring back the captivity of the land" (Jer. xxxii. 15, xxxiii. 10 f.). Jerusalem becomes the central shrine of the true religion: "they shall worship the Lord in the holy mountain"; "they shall come and sing in the height of Zion, and flow together unto the goodness of the Lord" (Isa. xxvii. 13; Jer. xxxi. 12). And not only Jews, but the nations of the world shall repair to Jerusalem to receive instruction, to keep the Jewish feasts and to offer the Jewish sacrifices (Isa. ii. 2 f.; Micah iv. 1–3; Isa. lxvi. 23; Zech. xiv. 16; Ps. lxxxvi. 9). And over this restored community is to reign the righteous offshoot of David's race (Jer. xxiii. 5 f., xxxiii. 15, cf. Isa. xi. 1–9); the old division between North and South will be forgotten: "one king shall be king to them all, and they shall all have one shepherd" (Ez. xxxvii. 21–24). An era of peace and union and righteous living has dawned at last: "their soul shall be as a watered garden"; "my sanctuary shall be in the midst of them for evermore" (Jer. xxxi. 12; Ez. xxxvii. 28).[3]

[1] Deut. xxx. 4; Isa. xi. 11, 12, 16, xliii. 5 f., lvi. 8, cf. xxvii. 13; Jer. xxiii. 3, xxix. 14, xxxi. 8, 10; Ez. xi. 17, xx. 41 f., xxviii. 25, xxxiv. 13, xxxvi. 24, xxxvii. 21, xxxix. 27; Micah ii. 12, iv. 6, cf. vii. 12 and Hosea xi. 11; Zeph. iii. 20; Zech. x. 10.

[2] Deut. xxx. 3; Jer. xxix. 14, xxx. 3, 18, xxxi. 23, xxxii. 44, xxxiii. 7, 11, 26; Zeph. iii. 20.

[3] See further Jer. xii. 15, xvi. 14 f. = xxiii. 7 f., xxx. 18–22, xxxi. 4, 24; Ez. xx. 42, xxxiv. 14 f.; Zech. viii. 1–3.

It is evident at once that the prophets, while they contemplate a literal return of Israel to Canaan, mingle an ideal element with their accounts of what is to happen. They have at heart indeed the entirely practical aim of a transformation in the outward fortunes of their people, but they catch sight of a larger plan and wider issues. For they are absorbed all the time in the thoughts of God ; it is the Divine purpose which they seek to impress upon their people, together with Israel's contribution towards the Divine result. And this purpose is the preservation of the true faith in spite of all that threatened it, the extension and the triumph of the religion of the one true God (Isa. xlii. 6, xlix. 6), the exhibition of Yahweh's moral rule of the world, in short, as we should say, the establishment of the kingdom of God.

Such is the ideal : and the prophets clothe it in a form determined by the conditions prevailing at the time. To think or speak in the abstract was quite contrary to their habit ; they think in concrete symbols ; they make use of figurative language ; they describe the destiny of Israel in the terms of the dispensation under which they lived. At the time the bulk of the Israelite race were scattered and in exile ; so they must be gathered and brought home. The heathen world was hostile ; so the nations must be chastised or even annihilated. Babylon will be overthrown like Sodom and Gomorrah, *because* Yahweh pledges His word to set Israel in their own land (Isa. xiii., xiv. 1). Ammon, Moab, Edom, the Philistines, will be punished for their enmity towards Israel, Tyre and Egypt for their pride and self-deification (Ez. xxv. 3, 8, 12, 15, xxviii. 2 ff., xxix. 3). " I will make a full end of all the nations " we read in Jeremiah and Zephaniah (Jer. xxx. 11, xlvi. 28 ; Zeph. iii. 19 emended, cf. Isa. li. 23). Otherwise two alternatives remain open to the heathen : conversion to Judaism, or slavery to the Jews in Palestine (Isa. xiv. 2, lx. 10–12).

The restoration, then, is to take place under the conditions of the time; and, we notice further, in the immediate future. The old era is drawing to a close, and a new one is shortly to begin. Yahweh is about to intervene. The Day of the Lord is at hand, it is near and hasteth greatly (Joel ii. 1; Zeph. i. 14). According to Jeremiah the exile is to last seventy years, according to Ezekiel forty years (Jer. xxix. 10, cf. xxv. 11, 12; Ez. iv. 6, cf. xxix. 12); in the Second Isaiah Cyrus is on his way to Babylon, the fall of the city is imminent, and *then* for the release of the Jewish captives, the second exodus, with the resettlement of Canaan as its triumphant finish! (Isa. xl. 10, 11, xlii. 15, 16, xliii. 5–7, xliv. 24–28, xlviii. 20, 21).

Now we may take it as certain that when the prophets spoke of the return to Palestine they meant what they said. No doubt they used imaginative figures to portray the splendours of the new Jerusalem and the fertility of the resettled land; but they anticipated an actual restoration under the conditions with which they were familiar. The fulfilment would correspond with their expectations. And similarly with the time of the fulfilment; it was, they said, near at hand. When they mention years they use round numbers, 70 or 40, so that they do not insist upon exact dates; but the events which pass before their minds are charged with moral meaning; a conflict of opposing principles is going to be waged; there can be no question about the issue; the final decision is sure, and *therefore*, say the prophets, it is near.

We have now arrived at the point where we are confronted with the difficulty which we wish to face, and, if possible, to penetrate. As a matter of fact the course of history did not follow the lines anticipated by the prophets. To some extent, indeed, the hopes of Jeremiah, Ezekiel, and the Second Isaiah were fulfilled: a certain number of Jews

returned to Palestine after the occupation of Babylon by Cyrus in 538 B.C.; Jerusalem was raised again from its ruins, and the temple was rebuilt, and became for some 600 years the main sanctuary of the Jewish faith. But bitter disillusionment was in store for the handful which came back in the Persian times; it was a miserable remnant which struggled on in Jerusalem, waiting for the homage of the heathen, the splendid fortune, the moral triumphs which the prophets had described. Indeed the fulfilment had so far failed that the more religious minds devoted themselves to the re-interpretation of the prophecies, and in time developed an elaborate system of apocalypse, which grew out of an attempt to deal with this very problem of the non-fulfilment of prophecy.

Are we, then, still to expect a fulfilment? Is there still to be a gathering of the dispersed of Israel, and a general return to the Holy Land? Now, as we have seen, this gathering and return are connected with the annihilation of the heathen, or with the alternatives of submission and slavery. Once back in Palestine, the restored Israelites, according to a prophecy embodied in Isaiah xi., "shall fly down upon the Philistine ridge on the west; together they shall spoil the children of the east; they shall put forth their hand upon Edom and Moab; and the children of Ammon shall obey them" (Isa. xi. 14). If there is to be a fulfilment of the prophecies of restoration, there must be a fulfilment of the prophecies of vengeance. The two go together. We have no right to pick and choose among the prophecies, and decide that only those shall be fulfilled which are agreeable to modern taste. Can we imagine that Jerusalem is destined to become the centre of the world's worship, and that all the nations are to flock thither to offer the legal sacrifices, while the Jews act as the priestly caste, and the Gentiles assist as laity (Isa. lxi. 6)?

One shrinks from drawing attention to this *reductio ad absurdum* of the prophets' message, such dishonour does it bring upon their noble passion and lofty faith. Long ago it was seen that a literal interpretation is impossible; so another device was adopted, and it became the fashion to allegorise the prophetic language, and to treat Zion, Jerusalem, Israel as representing the Christian Church, Babylon, Egypt, the Philistines as figures for the hostile world, and the land of Canaan as a symbol for spiritual privileges. But it is incredible that prophecy was written in this artificial style, as a kind of disguised Christianity; such a method of exegesis is historically false, no matter how venerable it may be, or rooted in popular usage. When the prophets declare that Babylon shall be overthrown, and Israel restored, and Jerusalem become the centre of the true religion, they mean exactly what they say.

Our argument thus compels us to draw a distinction between the form and the substance of the prophets' ideals. The form naturally was determined by the circumstances which prevailed at the time when they wrote. Those circumstances have passed away; the ideals alone remain. It is true that the prophets watch with a keen eye the actual facts before them, but always their vision is fixed upon moral and religious ends. They are convinced, and they declare it with inspired certainty, that Israel will be preserved to keep alive and make known the religion of the one true God; Yahweh has a purpose in history and Israel a destiny to accomplish; in the inevitable conflict Yahweh's cause will be victorious, and His moral rule displayed so that all must recognise it; and in the end His kingdom will be established.

Such we may take to be the substance of the prophetic ideals. So far as it was necessary for the survival of the faith, Israel must be, and was, preserved, and in part restored

to its native land; so far the fulfilment of prophecy has corresponded with the form. But the large content of the ideal, the issue of the true religion, has nothing to do with the return of the Jews to Palestine, and even if such a return should take place, it can have no meaning in the spiritual sense; God's redemptive purpose of mankind is independent of such an event.

We have seen, then, that the form into which the prophets cast their hopes for the future belongs to the conditions of their day; it can only be fulfilled if it were possible for those conditions to be reproduced. On the other hand, the substance of the prophetic ideal requires for its fulfilment another and a wider dispensation.

It is not perhaps sufficiently realised that the transition from the national creed of Judaism to the universal gospel of Christianity was accomplished in the name of the Jewish religion, and by adherents of the Jewish faith.[1] Their task was to follow the path which the prophets had pointed out, and to shew whither it led. When Jesus Christ started His disciples on their career of witness, He bade them begin with Jerusalem, then go into all Judea and Samaria, and thence to the uttermost part of the earth (Acts i. 8). There was to be no breach with the past, but rather a coherent advance from Jerusalem into all lands, from prophecy to fulfilment. On the other hand, when He dealt with the national aspects of religion, He announced the destruction, not the restoration, of Jerusalem.[2] He contemplated the expansion rather than the permanence of the existing order, a *Civitas Dei* confined to no one race or country. In the constitution of the kingdom which He came to found there is no most favoured nation clause. That kingdom is broad-based upon

[1] Hamilton, *The People of God*, ii. p. 58.

[2] G. A. Smith, *Jerusalem*, ii. pp. 545 ff. See Mt. xxiii. 38, xxiv. 2; Mk. xiii. 1 ff.; Lk. xxi. 5; Jn. ii. 19.

the Fatherhood of God and the brotherhood of man united in a society of believers through the Spirit of its Founder. The Gospel makes it clear that God no longer deals with mankind on the principle of nationality.

St. Paul grasps this Gospel truth with his usual insight into the spiritual meaning of the Old Testament. He faces the problem boldly in the parable of the olive tree with its natural and grafted branches (Rom. xi.). The Church of God, the olive tree, is one continuous body from Abraham to Christ: this carries with it the weighty consequence that the Christian Church inherits the privileges of the Jewish. Some of the natural branches have been cut off: some of the Jews, through want of faith in the expansion of their own religion, have forfeited their place of privilege; on the other hand branches of a wild olive tree have been grafted into the ancient stock: Gentile Christians have become members of the one continuous Church of God. Gentiles must beware lest they lose their privileges; and for the Jews—what is the prospect in store for them? When the fulness of the Gentiles be come in, all Israel shall be saved (Rom. xi. 25 f.). But it will be on the condition of faith in Jesus as the Messiah. St. Paul says nothing about a restoration to the land of Canaan. He looks back to the covenant made with the fathers: it still holds good, for the gifts and calling of God are not repented of. One of the articles of that covenant was the promise of Canaan: "to thy seed," Abraham was told, "will I give this land." But St. Paul is significantly silent upon that point. The covenant stands for spiritual privileges, and the apostle contemplates no other. Abraham has now become the heir of the world; all who are of the faith constitute the seed of faithful Abraham. The distinction between Jew and Gentile will remain to the end; "but there is no distinction of any other kind, no difference of privileges; and all the privileges are

spiritual.",[1] St. Paul, we may believe, was familiar with the current Jewish expectation of a universal restoration of Israel, and the establishment of a temporal Jewish kingdom with its centre in an earthly Jerusalem ; but he widens and spiritualises the whole conception. As Christians we inherit his teaching ; to stop short of it is to arrest the development of Israel's religion.

For different reasons, to some extent for the same reasons, both Jews and Christians are drawn to Palestine by the strongest attractions. But religion is independent of the Holy Places ; it has nothing to do with the possession of the Holy Land. The expectation of the prophets which we have been considering is not yet realised in its full extent : the Gospel and the doctrine of the Apostles shew us how the fulfilment will come about.

G. A. Cooke.

THE CHRIST THAT PAUL PREACHED.

"The monumental Introduction of the Epistle to the Romans"—it is thus that W. Bousset speaks of the seven opening verses of the Epistle—is, from the formal point of view, merely the Address of the Epistle. In primary purpose and fundamental structure it does not differ from the Addresses of Paul's other Epistles. But even in the Addresses of his Epistles Paul does not confine himself to the simple repetition of a formula. Here too he writes at his ease and shows himself very much the master of his form.

It is Paul's custom to expand one or another of the essential elements of the Address of his Epistles as circumstances suggested, and thus to impart to it in each several instance a specific character. The Address of the Epistle to the Romans is the extreme example of this expansion. Paul is approach-

[1] A. B. Davidson, *Old Testament Prophecy*, p. 498.

ing in it a church which he had not visited, and to which he apparently felt himself somewhat of a stranger. He naturally begins with some words adapted to justify his writing to it, especially as an authoritative teacher of Christian truth. In doing this he is led to describe briefly the Gospel which had been committed to him, and that particularly with regard to its contents.

There is very strikingly illustrated here a peculiarity of Paul's style, which has been called " going off at a word." His particular purpose is to represent himself as one authoritatively appointed to teach the Gospel of God. But he is more interested in the Gospel than he is in himself ; and he no sooner mentions the Gospel than off he goes on a tangent to describe it. In describing it, he naturally tells us particularly what its contents are. Its contents, however, were for him summed up in Christ. No sooner does he mention Christ than off he goes again on a tangent to describe Christ. Thus it comes about that this passage, formally only the Address of the Epistle, becomes actually a great Christological deliverance, one of the chief sources of our knowledge of Paul's conception of Christ. It presents itself to our view like one of those nests of Chinese boxes ; the outer encasement is the Address of the Epistle ; within that fits neatly Paul's justification of his addressing the Romans as an authoritative teacher of the Gospel ; within that a description of the Gospel committed to him ; and within that a great declaration of who and what Jesus Christ is, as the contents of this Gospel.

The manner in which Paul approaches this great declaration concerning Christ lends it a very special interest. What we are given is not merely how Paul thought of Christ, but how Paul preached Christ. It is the content of " the Gospel of God," the Gospel to which he as " a called apostle " had been " separated," which he outlines in these pregnant

words. This is how Paul preached Christ to the faith of men as he went up and down the world " serving God in his spirit in the Gospel of His Son." We have no abstract theologoumena here, categories of speculative thought appropriate only to the closet. We have the great facts about Jesus which made the Gospel that Paul preached the power of God unto salvation to every one that believed. Nowhere else do we get a more direct description of specifically the Christ that Paul preached.

The direct description of the Christ that Paul preached is given us, of course, in the third and fourth verses. But the wider setting in which these verses are embedded cannot be neglected in seeking to get at their significance. In this wider setting the particular aspect in which Christ is presented is that of " Lord." It is as " Lord " that Paul is thinking of Jesus when he describes himself in the opening words of the Address—in the very first item of his commendation of himself to the Romans—as " the slave of Christ Jesus." " Slave " is the correlate of " Lord," and the relation must be taken at its height. When Paul calls himself the slave of Christ Jesus, he is calling Christ Jesus his Lord in the most complete sense which can be ascribed to that word (cf. Rom. xvi. 8, Col. iii. 4). He is declaring that he recognises in Christ Jesus one over against whom he has no rights, whose property he is, body and soul, to be disposed of as He will. This is not because he abases himself. It is because he exalts Christ. It is because Christ is thought of by him as one whose right it is to rule, and to rule with no limit to His right.

How Paul thought of Christ as Lord comes out, however, with most startling clearness in the closing words of the Address. There he couples " the Lord Jesus Christ " with " God our Father " as the common source from which he seeks in prayer the divine gifts of grace and peace for the

Romans. We must renounce enervating glossing here too. Paul is not thinking of the Lord Jesus Christ as only the channel through which grace and peace come from God our Father to men ; nor is he thinking of the Lord Jesus Christ as only the channel through which his prayer finds its way to God our Father. His prayer for these blessings for the Romans is offered up to God our Father and the Lord Jesus Christ together, as the conjoint object addressed in his petition. So far as this Bousset's remark is just : " Prayer to God in Christ is for Pauline Christianity too a false formula ; adoration of the Kyrios stands in the Pauline communities side by side with adoration of God in unreconciled reality."

Only, we must go further. Paul couples God our Father and the Lord Jesus Christ in his prayer on a complete equality. They are, for the purposes of the prayer, for the purposes of the bestowment of grace and peace, one to him. Christ is so highly exalted in his sight that, looking up to Him through the immense stretches which separate Him from the plane of human life, " the forms of God and Christ," as Bousset puts it, " are brought to the eye of faith into close conjunction." He should have said that they completely coalesce. It is only half the truth—though it is half the truth—to say that, with Paul, " the object of religious faith, as of religious worship, presents itself in a singular, thoroughgoing dualism." The other half of the truth is that this dualism resolves itself into a complete unity. The two, God our Father and the Lord Jesus Christ, are steadily recognised as two, and are statedly spoken of by the distinguishing designations of " God " and " Lord." But they are equally steadily envisaged as one, and are statedly combined as the common object of every religious aspiration and the common source of every spiritual blessing. It is no accident that they are united in our present passage under

the government of the single preposition, "from,"—"Grace to you and peace from God our Father and the Lord Jesus Christ." This is normal with Paul. God our Father and the Lord Jesus Christ are not to him two objects of worship, two sources of blessing, but one object of worship, one source of blessing. Does he not tell us plainly that we who have one God the Father and one Lord Jesus Christ yet know perfectly well that there is no God but one (1 Cor. viii. 4, 6)?

Paul is writing the Address of his Epistle to the Romans, then, with his mind fixed on the divine dignity of Christ. It is this divine Christ who, he must be understood to be telling his readers, constitutes the substance of his Gospel-proclamation. He does not leave us, however, merely to infer this. He openly declares it. The Gospel he preaches, he says, concerns precisely "the Son of God . . . Jesus Christ our Lord." He expressly says, then, that he presents Christ in his preaching as "our Lord." It was the divine Christ that he preached, the Christ that the eye of faith could not distinguish from God, who was addressed in common with God in prayer, and was looked to in common with God as the source of all spiritual blessings. Paul does not speak of Christ here, however, merely as "our Lord." He gives Him the two designations: "the Son of God . . . Jesus Christ our Lord." The second designation obviously is explanatory of the first. Not as if it were the more current or the more intelligible designation. It may, or it may not, have been both the one and the other; but that is not the point here. The point here is that it is the more intimate, the more appealing designation. It is the designation which tells what Christ is to us. He is our Lord, He to whom we go in prayer, He to whom we look for blessings, He to whom all our religious emotions turn, on whom all our hopes are set—for this life and for that to come. Paul tells the Romans that this is the Christ that he preaches, their and

his Lord whom both they and he reverence and worship and love and trust in. This is, of course, what he mainly wishes to say to them ; and it is up to this that all else that he says of the Christ that he preaches leads.

The other designation—" the Son of God "—which Paul prefixes to this in his fundamental declaration concerning the Christ that he preached, supplies the basis for this. It does not tell us what Christ is to us, but what Christ is in Himself. In Himself He is the Son of God ; and it is only because He is the Son of God in Himself, that He can be and is our Lord. The Lordship of Christ is rooted by Paul, in other words, not in any adventitious circumstances connected with His historical manifestation ; not in any powers or dignities conferred on Him or acquired by Him ; but fundamentally in His metaphysical nature. The designation " Son of God " is a metaphysical designation and tells us what He is in His being of being. And what it tells us that Christ is in His being of being is that He is just what God is. It is undeniable—and Bousset, for example, does not deny it,—that, from the earliest days of Christianity on, (in Bousset's words) " Son of God was equivalent simply to equal with God " (Mark iv. 61–63 ; John x. 31–39).

That Paul meant scarcely so much as this, Bousset to be sure would fain have us believe. He does not dream, of course, of supposing Paul to mean nothing more than that Jesus had been elevated into the relation of Sonship to God because of His moral uniqueness, or of His community of will with God. He is compelled to allow that " the Son of God appears in Paul as a supramundane Being standing in close metaphysical relation with God." But he would have us understand that, however close He stands to God, He is not, in Paul's view, quite equal with God. Paul, he suggests, has seized on this term to help him through the frightful problem of conceiving of this second divine Being consist-

ently with his monotheism. Christ is not quite God to him, but only the Son of God. Of such refinements, however, Paul knows nothing. With him too the maxim rules that whatever the father is, that the son is also: every father begets his son in his own likeness. The Son of God is necessarily to him just God, and he does not scruple to declare this Son of God all that God is (Phil. ii. 6; Col. ii. 9) and even to give Him the supreme name of "God over all" (Rom. ix. 5).

This is fundamentally, then, how Paul preached Christ—as the Son of God in this supereminent sense, and therefore our divine Lord on whom we absolutely depend and to whom we owe absolute obedience. But this was not all that he was accustomed to preach concerning Christ. Paul preached the historical Jesus as well as the eternal Son of God. And between these two designations—Son of God, our Lord Jesus Christ—he inserts two clauses which tell us how he preached the historical Jesus. All that he taught about Christ was thrown up against the background of His deity: He is the Son of God, our Lord. But who is this that is thus so fervently declared to be the Son of God and our Lord? It is in the two clauses which are now to occupy our attention that Paul tells us.

If we reduce what he tells us to its lowest terms it amounts just to this: Paul preached the historical Christ as the promised Messiah and as the very Son of God. But he declares Christ to be the promised Messiah and the very Son of God in language so pregnant, so packed with implications, as to carry us into the heart of the great problem of the two-natured person of Christ. The exact terms in which he describes Christ as the promised Messiah and the very Son of God are these: "Who became of the seed of David according to the flesh, who was marked out as the Son of God in power according to the Spirit of holiness by the resurrection

of the dead." This in brief is the account which Paul gives of the historical Christ whom he preached.

Of course there is a temporal succession suggested in the declarations of the two clauses. They so far give us not only a description of the historical Christ, but the life-history of the Christ that Paul preached. Jesus Christ became of the seed of David at His birth and by His birth. He was marked out as the Son of God in power only at His resurrection and by His resurrection. But it was not to indicate this temporal succession that Paul sets the two declarations side by side. It emerges merely as the incidental, or we may say even the accidental, result of their collocation. The relation in which Paul sets the two declarations to one another is a logical rather than a temporal one: it is the relation of climax. His purpose is to exalt Jesus Christ. He wishes to say the great things about Him. And the two greatest things he has to say about Him in His historical manifestation are these—that He became of the seed of David according to the flesh, that He was marked out as the Son of God in power according to the Spirit of holiness by the resurrection of the dead.

Both of these declarations, we say, are made for the purpose of extolling Christ: the former just as truly as the latter. That Christ came as the Messiah belongs to His glory: and the particular terms in which His Messiahship is intimated are chosen in order to enhance His glory. The word "came," "became" is correlated with the "promised afore" of the preceding verse. This is He, Paul says, whom all the prophets did before signify, and who at length came —even as they signified—of the seed of David. There is doubtless an intimation of the pre-existence of Christ here also, as J. B. Lightfoot properly instructs us: He who was always the Son of God now "became" of the seed of David. But this lies somewhat apart from the main current of

thought. The heart of the declaration resides in the great words, " Of the seed of David." For these are great words. In declaring the Messiahship of Jesus Paul adduces His royal dignity. And he adduces it because he is thinking of the majesty of the Messiahship. We must beware, then, of reading this clause depreciatingly, as if Paul were making a concession in it: " He came, no doubt, . . . He came, indeed, . . . of the seed of David, but. . . ." Paul never for an instant thought of the Messiahship of Jesus as a thing to be apologised for. The relation of the second clause to the first is not that of opposition, but of climax; and it contains only so much of contrast as is intrinsic in a climax. The connexion would be better expressed by an " and " than by a " but "; or, if by a " but," not by an " indeed . . . but," but by a " not only . . . but." Even the Messiahship, inexpressibly glorious as it is, does not exhaust the glory of Christ. He had a glory greater than even this. This was but the beginning of His glory. But it was the beginning of His glory. He came into the world as the promised Messiah, and He went out of the world as the demonstrated Son of God. In these two things is summed up the majesty of His historical manifestation.

It is not intended to say that when He went out of the world, He left His Messiahship behind Him. The relation of the second clause to the first is not that of supersession but that of superposition. Paul passes from one glory to another, but he is as far as possible from suggesting that the one glory extinguished the other. The resurrection of Christ had no tendency to abolish His Messiahship, and the exalted Christ remains " of the seed of David." There is no reason to doubt that Paul would have exhorted his readers when he wrote these words with all the fervour with which he did later to " remember Jesus Christ, risen from the dead, of the seed of David " (2 Tim. ii. 8). " According to my Gospel,"

he adds there, as an intimation that it was as " of the seed of David " that he was accustomed to preach Jesus Christ, whether as on earth as here, or as in heaven as there. It is the exalted Jesus that proclaims Himself in the Apocalypse " the root and the offspring of David " (Rev. xxii. 16, v. 5), and in whose hands " the key of David " is found (iii. 7).

And as it is not intimated that Christ ceased to be " of the seed of David " when He rose from the dead, neither is it intimated that He then first became the Son of God. He was already the Son of God when and before He became of the seed of David : and He did not cease to be the Son of God on and by becoming of the seed of David. It was rather just because He was the Son of God that He became of the seed of David, to become which, in the great sense of the prophetic announcements and of His own accomplishment, He was qualified only by being the Son of God. Therefore Paul does not say He was made the Son of God by the resurrection of the dead. He says he was defined, marked out, as the Son of God by the resurrection of the dead. His resurrection from the dead was well adapted to mark Him out as the Son of God : scarcely to make Him the Son of God. Consider but what the Son of God in Paul's usage means ; and precisely what the resurrection was and did. It was a thing which was quite appropriate to happen to the Son of God ; and, happening, could bear strong witness to Him as such : but how could it make one the Son of God ?

We might possibly say, no doubt, with a tolerable meaning, that Christ was installed, even constituted, " Son of God in power " by the resurrection of the dead—if we could see our way to construe the words " in power " thus directly with " the Son of God." That too would imply that He was already the Son of God before He rose from the dead,—only then in weakness : what He had been all along in weakness He now was constituted in power. This

construction, however, though not impossible, is hardly natural. And it imposes a sense on the preceding clause of which it itself gives no suggestion, and which it is reluctant to receive. To say, "of the seed of David" is not to say weakness; it is to say majesty. It is quite certain, indeed, that the assertion "who was made of the seed of David" cannot be read concessively, preparing the way for the celebration of Christ's glory in the succeeding clause. It stands rather in parallelism with the clause that follows it, asserting with it the supreme glory of Christ.

In any case the two clauses do not express two essentially different modes of being through which Christ successively passed. We could think at most only of two successive stages of manifestation of the Son of God. At most we could see in it a declaration that He who always was and continues always to be the Son of God was manifested to men first as the Son of David, and then, after His resurrection, as also the exalted Lord. He always was in the essence of His being the Son of God: this Son of God became of the seed of David and was installed as—what He always was—the Son of God, though now in His proper power, by the resurrection of the dead. It is assuredly wrong, however, to press even so far the idea of temporal succession. Temporal succession was not what it was in Paul's mind to emphasise, and is not the ruling idea of his assertion. The ruling idea of his assertion is the celebration of the glory of Christ. We think of temporal succession only because of the mention of the resurrection, which, in point of fact, cuts our Lord's life-manifestation into two sections. But Paul is not adducing the resurrection because it cuts our Lord's life-manifestation into two sections; but because of the demonstration it brought of the dignity of His person. It is quite indifferent to his declaration when the resurrection took place. He is not adducing it as the producing cause of

a change in our Lord's mode of being. In point of fact it did not produce a change in our Lord's mode of being, although it stood at the opening of a new stage of His life-history. What it did, and what Paul adduces it here as doing, was that it brought out into plain view who and what Christ really was. This, says Paul, is the Christ I preach—He who came of the seed of David, He who was marked out in power as the Son of God, by the resurrection of the dead. His thought of Christ runs in the two moulds—His Messiahship, His resurrection. But he is not particularly concerned here with the temporal relations of these two facts.

Paul does not, however, say of Christ merely that He became of the seed of David and was marked out as the Son of God in power by the resurrection of the dead. He introduces a qualifying phrase into each clause. He says that He became of the seed of David " according to the flesh," and that He was marked out as the Son of God in power " according to the Spirit of holiness " by the resurrection of the dead. What is the nature of the qualifications made by these phrases ?

It is obvious at once that they are not temporal qualifications. Paul does not mean to say, in effect, that our Lord was Messiah only during His earthly manifestation, and became the Son of God only on and by means of His resurrection. It has already appeared that Paul did not think of the Messiahship of our Lord only in connexion with His earthly manifestation, or of His Sonship to God only in connexion with His post-resurrection existence. And the qualifying phrases themselves are ill-adapted to express this temporal distinction. Even if we could twist the phrase " according to the flesh " into meaning " according to His human manifestation " and violently make that do duty as a temporal definition, the parallel phrase " according to the Spirit of holiness " utterly refuses to yield to any treatment

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which could make it mean, "according to His heavenly manifestation." And nothing could be more monstrous than to represent precisely the resurrection as in the case of Christ the producing cause of—the source out of which proceeds—a condition of existence which could be properly characterised as distinctively "spiritual." Exactly what the resurrection did was to bring it about that His subsequent mode of existence should continue to be, like the precedent, "fleshly"; to assimilate His post-resurrection to His pre-resurrection mode of existence in the matter of the constitution of His person. And if we fall back on the ethical contrast of the terms, that could only mean that Christ should be supposed to be represented as imperfectly holy in His earthly stage of existence, and as only on His resurrection attaining to complete holiness (cf. 1 Cor. xv. 44, 46). It is very certain that Paul did not mean that (1 Cor. v. 21).

It is clear enough, then, that Paul cannot by any possibility have intended to represent Christ as in His pre-resurrection and His post-resurrection modes of being differing in any way which can be naturally expressed by the contrasting terms "flesh" and "spirit." Least of all can he be supposed to have intended this distinction in the sense of the ethical contrast between these terms. But a further word may be pardoned as to this. That it is precisely this ethical contrast that Paul intends has been insisted on under cover of the adjunct "of holiness" attached here to "spirit." The contrast, it is said, is not between "flesh" and "spirit," but between "flesh" and "spirit of holiness"; and what is intended is to represent Christ, who on earth was merely "Christ according to the flesh"—the "flesh of sin" of course, it is added, that is "the flesh which was in the grasp of sin"—to have been, "after and in consequence of the resurrection," "set free from 'the likeness of (weak and

sinful) flesh.' " Through the resurrection, in other words, Christ has for the first time become the holy Son of God, free from entanglement with sin-cursed flesh ; and, having thus saved Himself, is qualified, we suppose, now to save others, by bringing them through the same experience of resurrection to the same holiness. We have obviously wandered here sufficiently far from the declarations of the Apostle ; and we have landed in a *reductio ad absurdum* of this whole system of interpretation. Paul is not here distinguishing times and contrasting two successive modes of our Lord's being. He is distinguishing elements in the constitution of our Lord's person, by virtue of which He is at one and the same time both the Messiah and the Son of God. He became of the seed of David with respect to the flesh, and by the resurrection of the dead was mightily proven to be also the Son of God with respect to the Spirit of holiness.

It ought to go without saying that by these two elements in the constitution of our Lord's person, the flesh and the spirit of holiness, by virtue of which He is at once of the seed of David and the Son of God, are not intended the two constituent elements, flesh and spirit, which go to make up common humanity. It is impossible that Paul should have represented our Lord as the Messiah only by virtue of His bodily nature ; and it is absurd to suppose him to suggest that His Sonship to God was proved by His resurrection to reside in His mental nature or even in His ethical purity—to say nothing now of supposing him to assert that He was made by the resurrection into the Son of God, or into " the Son of God in power " with respect to His mental nature here described as holy. How the resurrection—which was in itself just the resumption of the body—of all things, could be thought of as constituting our Lord's mental nature the Son of God passes imagination ; and if it be conceivable that it might at least prove that He was the Son of God, it

remains hidden how it could be so emphatically asserted that it was only with reference to His mental nature, in sharp contrast with His bodily, thus recovered to Him, that this was proved concerning Him precisely by His resurrection. Is Paul's real purpose here to guard men from supposing that our Lord's bodily nature, though recovered to Him in this great act, the resurrection, entered into His Sonship to God ? There is no reason discoverable in the context why this distinction between our Lord's bodily and mental natures should be so strongly stressed here. It is clearly an artificial distinction imposed on the passage.

When Paul tells us of the Christ which he preached that He was made of the seed of David " according to the flesh," he quite certainly has the whole of His humanity in mind. And in introducing this limitation, " according to the flesh," into his declaration that Christ was " made of the seed of David," he intimates not obscurely that there was another side—not aspect but element—of His being besides His humanity, in which He was not made of the seed of David, but was something other and higher. If he had said nothing more than just these words : " He was made of the seed of David according to the flesh," this intimation would still have been express ; though we might have been left to speculation to determine what other element could have entered into His being, and what He must have been according to that element. He has not left us, however, to this speculation, but has plainly told us that the Christ he preached was not merely made of the seed of David according to the flesh, but was also marked out as the Son of God, in power, according to the Spirit of holiness by the resurrection of the dead. Since the " according to the flesh " includes all His humanity, the " according to the Spirit of holiness " which is set in contrast with it, and according to which He is declared to be the Son of God, must be sought outside of His

humanity. What the nature of this element of His being in which He is superior to humanity is, is already clear from the fact that according to it He is the Son of God. Son of God is, as we have already seen, a metaphysical designation asserting equality with God. It is a divine name. To say that Christ is, according to the Spirit of holiness, the Son of God, is to say that the Spirit of holiness is a designation of His divine nature. Paul's whole assertion therefore amounts to saying that, in one element of His being, the Christ that he preached was man, in another God. Looked at from the point of view of His human nature He was the Messiah—" of the seed of David." Looked at from the point of view of His divine nature, He was the Son of God. Looked at in His composite personality, He was both the Messiah and the Son of God, because in Him were united both He that came of the seed of David according to the flesh and He who was marked out as the Son of God in power according to the Spirit of holiness by the resurrection of the dead.

We may be somewhat puzzled by the designation of the divine nature of Christ as " the Spirit of holiness." But not only is it plain from its relation to its contrast, " the flesh," and to its correlate, " the Son of God," that it is His divine nature which is so designated, but this is made superabundantly clear from the closely parallel passage, Rom. ix. 5. There, in enumerating the glories of Israel, the Apostle comes to his climax in this great declaration,—that from Israel Christ came. But there, no more than here, will he allow that it was the whole Christ who came—as said there from the stock of Israel, as said here from the seed of David. He adds there too at once the limitation, " as concerns the flesh,"—just as he adds it here. Thus he intimates with emphasis that something more is to be said, if we are to give a complete account of Christ's being ; there was something about Him in which He did not come from Israel, and in

which He is more than " flesh." What this something is, Paul adds in the great words, " God over all." He who was from Israel according to the flesh is, on the other side of His being, in which He is not from Israel and not " flesh," nothing other than " God over all." In our present passage, the phrase, " Spirit of holiness " takes the place of " God over all " in the other. Clearly Paul means the same thing by them both.

This being very clear, what interests us most is the emphasis which Paul throws on holiness in his designation of the divine nature of Christ. The simple word " Spirit " might have been ambiguous : when " the Spirit of holiness " is spoken of, the divine nature is expressly named. No doubt, Paul might have used the adjective, " holy," instead of the genitive of the substantive, " of holiness " ; and have said " the Holy Spirit." Had he done so, he would have as expressly intimated deity as in his actual phrase. But he would have left open the possibility of being misunderstood as speaking of that distinct Holy Spirit to which this designation is commonly applied. The relation in which the divine nature which he attributes to Christ stands to the Holy Spirit was in Paul's mind no doubt very close ; as close as the relation between " God " and " Lord " whom he constantly treats as, though two, yet also one. Not only does he identify the activities of the two (e.g. Rom. viii. 9 ff.) ; but also, in some high sense, he identifies them themselves. He can make use, for example, of such a startling expression as " the Lord is the Spirit " (2 Cor. iii. 17). Nevertheless it is perfectly clear that " the Lord " and " the Spirit " are not one person to Paul, and the distinguishing employment of the designations " the Spirit," " the Holy Spirit " is spread broadcast over his pages. Even in immediate connexion with his declaration that " the Lord is the Spirit," he can speak with the utmost naturalness not only of " the

Spirit of the Lord," but also of "the Lord of the Spirit" (2 Cor. iii. 17 f.). What is of especial importance to note in our present connexion is that he is not speaking of an endowment of Christ either from or with the Holy Spirit; although he would be the last to doubt that He who was made of the seed of David according to the flesh was plenarily endowed both from and with the Spirit. He is speaking of that divine Spirit which is the complement in the constitution of Christ's person of the human nature according to which He was the Messiah, and by virtue of which He was not merely the Messiah, but also the very Son of God. This Spirit he calls distinguishingly the Spirit of holiness, the Spirit the very characteristic of which is holiness. He is speaking not of an acquired holiness but of an intrinsic holiness; not, then, of a holiness which had been conferred at the time of or attained by means of the resurrection from the dead; but of a holiness which had always been the very quality of Christ's being. He is not representing Christ as having first been after a fleshly fashion the son of David and afterwards becoming by or at the resurrection from the dead, after a spiritual fashion, the holy Son of God. He is representing Him as being in his very nature essentially and therefore always and in every mode of His manifestation holy. Bousset is quite right when he declares that there is no reference in the phrase "Spirit of holiness" to the preservation of His holiness by Christ in His earthly manifestation, but that it is a metaphysical designation describing according to its intrinsic quality an element in the constitution of Christ's person from the beginning. This is the characteristic of the Christ Paul preached; as truly His characteristic as that He was the Messiah. Evidently in Paul's thought of deity holiness held a prominent place. When he wishes to distinguish Spirit from spirit, it is enough for him that he may designate Spirit as divine, to define it

as that Spirit the fundamental characteristic of which is that it is holy.

It belongs to the very essence of the conception of Christ as Paul preached Him, therefore, that He was of two natures, human and divine. He could not preach Him at once as of the seed of David and as the Son of God without so preaching Him. It never entered Paul's mind that the Son of God could become a mere man, or that a mere man could become the Son of God. We may say that the conception of the two natures is unthinkable to us. That is our own concern. That a single nature could be at once or successively God and man, man and God, was what was unthinkable to Paul. In his view, when we say God and man we say two natures ; when we put a hyphen between them and say God-man, we do not merge them one in the other but join the two together. That this was Paul's mode of thinking of Jesus, Bousset, for example, does not dream of denying. What Bousset is unwilling to admit is that the divine element in his two-natured Christ was conceived by Paul as completely divine. Two metaphysical entities, he says, combined themselves for Paul in the person of Christ : one of these was a human, the other a divine nature : and Paul, along with the whole Christian community of his day, worshipped this two-natured Christ, though he (not they) ranked Him in his thought of His higher nature below the God over all.

The trouble with this construction is that Paul himself gives a different account of the matter. The point of Paul's designation of Christ as the Son of God is, not to subordinate Him to God, as Bousset affirms, but to equalise Him with God. He knows no difference in dignity between his God and his Lord ; to both alike, or rather to both in common, he offers his prayers ; from both alike and both together he expects all spiritual blessings (Rom. i. 7). He roundly calls Christ, by virtue of His higher nature, by the supreme

name of " God over all " (Rom. ix. 5). These things cannot be obscured by pointing to expressions in which he ascribes to the Divine-human Christ a relation of subordination to God in His saving work. Paul does not fail to distinguish between what Christ is in the higher element of His being, and what He became when, becoming poor that we might be made rich, He assumed for His work's sake the position of a servant in the world. Nor does he permit the one set of facts to crowd the other out of his mind. It is no accident that all that he says about the historical two-natured Christ in our present passage is inserted between His two divine designations of the Son of God and Lord ; that the Christ that he preached he describes precisely as " the Son of God—who was made of the seed of David according to the flesh, who was marked out as the Son of God in power according to the Spirit of holiness by the resurrection of the dead—Jesus Christ our Lord." He who is defined as on the human side of David, on the divine side the Son of God, this two-natured person, is declared to be from the point of view of God, His own Son, and—as all sons are—like Him in essential nature ; from the point of view of man, our supreme Lord, whose we are and whom we obey. Ascription of proper deity could not be made more complete ; whether we look at Him from the point of view of God or from the point of view of man, He is God. But what Paul preached concerning this divine Being belonged to His earthly manifestation : He was made of the seed of David, He was marked out as God's Son. The conception of the two natures is not with Paul a negligible speculation attached to his Gospel. He preached Jesus. And he preached of Jesus that He was the Messiah. But the Messiah that he preached was no merely human Messiah. He was the Son of God who was made of the seed of David. And He was demonstrated to be what He really was by His resurrection from the dead.

This was the Jesus that Paul preached: this and none other.

BENJAMIN B. WARFIELD.

A PROPHET'S APOLOGIA.

(EZEK. i. 1–3.)

And it came to pass in the thirtieth year, in the fourth month, on the fifth day of the month, as I was in the midst of the captivity by the river Chebar, when the heavens were opened, that I saw visions from God. On the fifth day of the month (it was the fifth year of the captivity of King Jehoiachin) the word of JEHOVAH came verily (הָיֹה הָיָה) unto Ezekiel, son of Buzi, the priest in the land of the Chaldeans by the river Chebar; and there came upon him (עליו; "upon me," עלי; a few MSS.) there the hand of JEHOVAH.

PERHAPS no passage of the Old Testament has had its text more persistently assailed of late years than the first three verses of Ezekiel. These suspicions have not been without a *prima facie* justification. The passage at first sight seems to contain some remarkable redundancies. Date and place of the prophet's visions are stated with particularity in verse 1 and again with variation of the particulars in verses 2 and 3. Moreover, there is a lack of consistency in style. The prophet himself speaks in the first person in verse 1, but he is referred to in the third person in verses 2, 3 (M.T.). Finally we have in verse 1 the puzzling date "in the thirtieth year," and in verse 3 the idiomatic expression היה היה, inf. abs. with the perfect, "it surely came." This expression is pronounced by Professor Toy (*Ezekiel*, S.B.O.T., 1899), to be "impossible" in this passage.

In the face of these difficulties, real or apparent, textual critics have used the knife, yet without agreement as to the portion of the text which ought to be cut out. Thus Toy keeps verse 1 and the last clause of verse 3, rejecting verse 2 and the rest of verse 3 as a gloss, while Cornill (*Ezechiel*,

1886) rejects verse 1 and retains verses 2, 3 somewhat emended. Kraetzschmar (*Ezechiel*, 1900, page 3) asserts the existence of two separate recensions of the book of Ezekiel, which are blended in this passage. Thus has the text of Ezekiel i. 1–3 been turned into a Doubting Castle.

But (to use Bunyan's language again) there is a key which (I am persuaded) will open every lock of doubt. The passage is marked by a *consistent emphasis* which runs through all three verses and culminates in the phrase היה היה ("came expressly" E.V.) of verse 3. We might vary the rendering to "came verily" or "came indeed," but in any case we find here not a mere passing record, but an emphatic assertion by the prophet of his prophetic commission in the face of challenge and denial: "The word of JEHOVAH came indeed to Ezekiel, the son of Buzi, the priest." [1]

That there was cause for such a defensive assertion of Ezekiel's prophetic right is clear from other passages of his book. Thus in ii. 4, 5 JEHOVAH gives the prophet his warrant, but warns him at the same time that it will not be accepted with any readiness by the people. "Thou shalt say unto them, Thus saith the Lord JEHOVAH. And they, whether they will hear, or whether they will forbear, yet shall know (*i.e.*, shall come to know) that there *hath been* a prophet in the midst of them." [2] The words suggest

[1] The attempt to throw doubt on the reading היה היה by appeal to the Versions fails. The inf. abs. is represented in LXX by the *καί* of the rendering *καὶ ἐγένετο*, "it even came" or "it also came," for *καί* cannot be taken as the simple copula here. A similar inf. abs. is translated by *καί* in Ezekiel xx. 32 (".It shall not come to pass at all"). The statement that the Targum disagrees with the M.T. is simply perverse. Targum has: "The word of prophecy . . . was with Ezekiel . . . in the land of Israel; it came *a second time* and spake with him in the province of the land of the Chaldeans." Why this *second time*, unless the Targumist is playing on the double היה of M.T.? (I translate from de Lagarde's edition, which agrees with the ordinary text in giving this Midrashic turn. I hope to discuss the critical point more fully in another place.—W.E.B.).

[2] For "that there hath been (היה) a prophet in the midst of them" (M.T.), LXX has *ὅτι προφήτης εἶ σὺ ἐν μέσῳ αὐτῶν*, which seems to be a

the possibility that Ezekiel will be generally acknowledged as a prophet only *after his death*.

But there was a special reason why Ezekiel's mission should be questioned, though Isaiah's (or Jeremiah's) was acknowledged. The (supposed) defiling touch of the heathen was on the son of Buzi. As St. Paul, the Apostle of the Gentiles, had to defend his office, so it was with Ezekiel, the Prophet among the Gentiles. The Jews of the sixth century B.C. could hardly believe that the spirit of JEHOVAH would work in a polluted heathen land. Their religion was restricted by local limits. Even as late as our Lord's own day the Elders of the Jews could utter the confident challenge, "Search and see that out of (semi-heathen) Galilee ariseth (*or* will arise) no prophet" (John vii. 52). Still later we may see in the rendering of the Targum quoted in note 1 above a distinct trace of the idea that a Prophet must receive his call to prophecy in the land of Israel.

The *Apologia* of Ezekiel in i. 1–3 consists of two parts. *First*, he solemnly asseverates that he did receive a prophet's commission, aye, in the heathen land of Chaldea, difficult as it was for his fellow-countrymen to believe it. A merely general statement to this effect will not serve his purpose. He gives the day of the month—and repeats it; he makes a statement of place—and reiterates his words. Tacitly he cites witnesses to support his claim: was he not *in the midst of the captivity* when he received his call? The prophet is as one under examination and cross-examination. He signs his claim (as it were) with a full description of himself, "Ezekiel, the son of Buzi, the priest." So this statement may be summed up somewhat as follows: "On

free and weak rendering of M.T. Cornill, however, takes it as evidence for אתה and corrects M.T. accordingly. But in any case the impersonal reading is the more vigorous, and also the more likely to be the original; *cf.* John i. 26; G. Jahn (*Ezechiel*, 1905) retains היה.

the fifth day, yes, on the fifth, by the river Chebar—by the Gentile river Chebar, I say, the call came. And I was not alone ; I have witnesses ; I was in the midst of the captives ; they knew how I sat there *astonied among them seven days.*"[1]

If the first part of Ezekiel's *Apologia* is assertive, the second is argumentative. The prophet lays stress on the fact that the call came to one who was already set apart for the service of JEHOVAH. He gives his own name and his father's name and describes himself as a priest. This perhaps by itself means only that he was of priestly descent. But he had a further qualification. He was thirty years of age when the call came to him. It was the age at which the sons of Kohath were allowed to enter upon their most sacred service (Num. iv. 1–4). This coincidence may appear trivial to a western mind, but no coincidence of number is unimportant in eastern religion. Ezekiel records that as a consecrated person and at a consecrated age he saw "visions from God." A further argument is hinted at in these words. The contents of these visions, as they are described from verse 4 onwards, supply of themselves moral testimony to the truth of Ezekiel's claim. (But to deal with the visions themselves lies outside the aim of this article.)

If the view be accepted that Ezekiel is on the defensive in the superscription of his book, then the criticisms which have been passed on the M.T. of Ezekiel i. 1–3 lose their appearance of reasonableness. We are no longer forced to condemn either verse 1 or verses 2, 3*a* as a gloss. The two passages partly repeat each other, but there is a good reason for such repetition. Moreover, each passage supplements the other and so cannot be cut out without loss.

Ezekiel i. 1–3, though it appears to be disconnected in style and glossed, follows in fact a strictly logical order.

[1] Ezek. iii. 15.

Ezekiel, who has to defend his status as a prophet, prefixes an attesting document (an *affidavit*) to the book containing his prophecies. Verse 1 contains the body of the document with a statement showing who the witnesses were and giving a private date taken from Ezekiel's own life. Verse 2 follows with the official Jewish date. Finally comes verse 3 with the prophet's signature giving his name, his family, and his rank, together with a postscript ("and the hand of JEHOVAH came upon me there") which confirms the main assertion ("I saw visions from God").

V. 1. And it came to pass in the thirtieth year, in the fourth month, on the fifth day of the month, as I was in the midst of the captivity by the river Chebar, when the heavens were opened, that I saw visions from God.

Ezekiel asserts that he had seen "visions from God." He claims to be acknowledged as a prophet on the ground that he has had the experiences of a Seer. But such a statement lies open to the challenge, *When and where?* No claim in merely general terms to have seen visions could give effective support to his claim to be a Prophet. But Ezekiel's statement is definite in time and place and circumstance. He tells us that he was granted visions in his thirtieth year the year in which a man's faculties were reckoned by the Hebrew law to attain to ripeness for the most sacred work (Num. iv. 3). Further, the Prophet records the month and the day. It was that well-remembered day, the fifth of the fourth month, on which a cyclonic storm burst upon river and land.[1] Ezekiel was in the midst of his fellow-

[1] With the expression, "When the heavens were opened" *cf.* ver. 4, "Behold, a whirlwind came out of the north." A vivid account of such a storm is given in General Chesney's *Narrative of the Euphrates Expedition* (edition of 1868, pp. 251 ff.). "Dense masses of black clouds, streaked with orange, red, and yellow, appeared coming up from the W.S.W. and approaching us with fearful velocity." One of the two British steamers was overwhelmed with most of her crew. "Barely twenty-five minutes saw the beginning, progress, and termination of this fearful hurricane. . . . [It] swept across the river only, extending but very little above

captives, and endured the cyclone with them, and they were his witnesses that a strange thing happened to him. On that occasion he had fallen into a trance and remained "astonied" among them (Ezek. iii. 15). At such a time and under such circumstances and among such witnesses had he seen visions and received his commission from JEHOVAH.

V. 2. On the fifth day of the month (it was the fifth year of the captivity of King Jehoiachin). . . .

For such an asseveration (*affidavit*) Ezekiel is not content to give a merely private date. He desires to assure his fellow-Jews, and so he adds the official Jewish date. This must be given by the year of Jehoiachin, who was still king by legal succession (2 Kings xxiv. 6). There is no real redundancy in the statement of date in verses 1, 2. The one expression common to both verses ("on the fifth day") serves only to link the two together.

V. 3 (continued from *v.* 2). . . . The word of JEHOVAH came verily unto Ezekiel, the son of Buzi, the priest in the land of the Chaldeans by the river Chebar, and there came upon him (*or* upon me) there the hand of JEHOVAH.

The form of the sentence is to be carefully noted. It is not descriptive (as in Hos. i. 1, "The word that came to Hosea"; *cf.* Joel i. 1; Amos i. 1), but assertive, "The word came." In Ezekiel i. 3 the emphatic form with the inf. abs. (הָיֹה הָיָה) is no less appropriate than the simple tense in Hosea i. 1. Toy's assertion that the inf. abs. is "impossible" shows that he has misread the passage.

A signature in full (or its equivalent) should be appended to such a claim as the prophet makes, and accordingly he gives the full description of himself which follows, "Ezekiel

and below the spot where the steamers were." Some such remarkable phenomenon as this formed no doubt the background of Ezekiel's vision. The heavens opened and the awful chariot rushed forth on its straight path and came where the prophet was,

—the son of Buzi—the priest." Certainly these words cannot be spared from the text, though C. H. Toy wishes to omit the whole of 3*a* as a gloss.

If the voice of defence is heard in the prophet's description of himself, a sound of defiance rings through the words which follow, "in the land of the Chaldeans by the river Chebar." He meets the Jewish prejudice that the spirit of JEHOVAH could *not* work in a heathen land with the assertion that such a prejudice is contrary to his own experience. "By the river Chebar" he saw visions (verse 1); "by the river Chebar" the interpreting word came to him (verse 3*a*), and there came upon him *there*—the adverb is emphatic—the compelling power of JEHOVAH (verse 3*b*). (The LXX, not seeing the emphasis, have naturally omitted the adverb as otiose.) Ezekiel glories in being JEHOVAH'S prophet to Israel even *among the heathen*. He magnifies his office.

He does not do this without cause: he has in fact to deal with the situation revealed by such a passage as Ezekiel xi. 15. The Chaldeans applied against Judah the principle of "Divide et impera." When they carried Jehoiachin and his fellow-exiles to Babylon and set up Zedekiah as king in Judah, they not only weakened the Jewish nation but also divided it. Henceforth there were adherents of Jehoiachin and adherents of Zedekiah. On the religious side the schism was even worse. In Judah there was a party which exulted in the possession of the Temple of Jerusalem, and set at nought the exiles in Babylon, who had lost their access to the sanctuary. To these last the inhabitants of Jerusalem said in mockery, "Be ye far from JEHOVAH: to us (only) is the land given for a possession." Probably the remnant in Judaea believed themselves to be rewarded for their righteousness by their continuance in the land, while they held that Jehoiachin and his companions owed their exile to their sin. It was to meet such opinions

that Jeremiah, Ezekiel's contemporary, was given the vision of the good and bad figs (Jer. xxiv. 1 ff.). Jeremiah bore the message, "Like these good figs, so will I acknowledge for good the captives of Judah whom I have sent into the land of the Chaldeans . . . but I will deliver up Zedekiah . . . and the residue of Jerusalem . . . to be a reproach and a proverb . . . in all the places whither I shall drive them." Ezekiel for his part assured his fellow-captives that they were not "far from JEHOVAH" in the spiritual sense of the words, for JEHOVAH Himself had said, "Whereas I have removed them far off among the nations . . . yet have I been to them a sanctuary for a little while in the countries where they are come" (Ezek. xi. 16). Ezekiel as he contemplated the captivity by the river Chebar "saw no temple therein," but he received the assurance that the LORD Himself was "the temple thereof" (*cf.* Rev. xxi. 22).

Ezekiel had a message of salvation to give to his exiled flock, but he had first to assert himself as an approved messenger, and to set forth his qualifications. The parallel with St. Paul will occur at once to the reader. The broken style of the prophet's introduction to his book is sufficiently explained by the circumstances of his mission. Passages of St. Paul's Epistles show similar roughnesses of style under similar provocation. It is unnecessary and therefore unreasonable to imagine glosses in a passage in which one simple explanation converts each difficulty into an elucidation. The details fit the scheme one by one—the "strange" date, *in the thirtieth year* (verse 1); the repetition of the statement of place, *by the river Chebar* (verses 1, 3); the supplementary statement of date, *in the fifth year of Jehoiachin's captivity* (verse 2); the use of the emphatic inf. abs. (היה היה, verse 3); the employment of the third person (verse 3*a*), and of the emphatic adverb *there*, at which the

LXX stumbled (verse 3*b*). All are in place if Ezekiel i. 1-3 be indeed the Prophet's *Apologia* for his prophecies.

W. Emery Barnes.

UNFERMENTED WINE IN THE LORD'S SUPPER:

An Examination of Dr. Tisdall's Position.

No one reading Dr. Tisdall's article in the Expositor for October could fail to be impressed by the writer's earnestness, or to sympathise with the purpose that underlies his argument. At the same time there is, it seems to us, a need of caution, a necessity for weighing well all that is involved in his arguments and the conclusions to which he would lead his readers. Dr. Tisdall is not satisfied with the conclusions at which the committee appointed by the Archbishop of Canterbury to consider the question have arrived in regard to the use of unfermented wine in Holy Communion. He is not quite convinced that the conclusion in their Report, that in the Institution of the Sacrament our Lord used alcoholic wine is correct. Further, he doubts the relevancy of the conclusion even should it be correct.

Without distinctly declaring that the scholars whom the Archbishop deputed to report on the question were mistaken in their conclusion, Dr. Tisdall implies that he thinks it not only possible but perhaps not unlikely that they were. Our present object is to examine the validity of the arguments he adduces in support of his attitude. The first of these which we shall consider is derived from the fact that in no one of the four accounts of the Last Supper is the word οἶνος, "wine," used, but either ποτήριον, "cup," or, as in the passage which he quotes at the head of his article, γέννημα τῆς αμπέλου, "the fruit of the vine." In bringing forward this argument, Dr. Tisdall appears to have

forgotten on the one hand the close connexion in which the Lord's Supper stood to the Jewish Passover in its Institution, and on the other the fact that all the terms used in regard to the Supper are translations of words which have a technical force in regard to the Passover. In the celebration of the Passover, there are four cups of wine drunk at different periods of the feast. It was the fourth of these, "the Cup of Benediction," which our Lord consecrated to initiate the Christian Passover. The Greek word ποτήριον used in the Institution of the Lord's Supper is merely a translation of the Hebrew term used in regard to the Passover. The other phrase, "the fruit of the vine," occurs in the benediction pronounced at the drinking of each "cup," "Blessed be Thou, oh God, who hast created the fruit of the vine." Thus the terms employed have nothing to do with the material used, but simply exhibit the close connexion subsisting between the Jewish and the Christian Passover. Whatever was the kind of wine used in the Passover that was the wine used by our Lord in the Institution of the Supper.

Following out this fact, Dr. Tisdall adduces the practice of certain modern Jews. I am aware that some of the more advanced Jews do not use fermented wine. I have heard more than one reason assigned for this, but none quite authoritative. This, however, I can say, that such is not the usage of orthodox Jews in Palestine. While resident in that country I attended the Passover Feast at the house of a Jew with whom I read the Talmud. There was no question of the wine used on that occasion being alcoholic, the smell was enough to prove that. If there had been any doubt the hilarious sounds of singing that proceeded from the Jewish houses, as I passed homeward through the moonlit streets, would have confirmed the evidence of the sense of smell. When I declined to partake of the wine I was asked if I

would prefer cognac! I asked my host afterwards if unfermented wine could be used at the Passover. His answer was: "Unfermented wine? but that would not be wine." This last disposes of any suggestion that unfermented wine was used in the Passover, or was ever thought of.

The customs of the Palestinian Jews may be regarded as having only an indirect importance in regard to the question of the kind of wine used at the Lord's Supper in the early church. There is, however, a passage in St. Paul's first Epistle to the Corinthians which has a very direct bearing on it. The Apostle, in speaking of certain irregularities which had sprung up in the celebration of the ordinance, says (xi. 21), "One is hungry and another is drunken" (μεθύει). I am aware that an effort is made by those who support the view as to the liquid element in the Lord's Supper favoured by Dr. Tisdall to assert that the word ought to be translated "satisfied" or "over-satisfied" with food, in order that it should be a proper antithesis to "hungry" (πεινᾷ). It is sufficient to answer that in all the other passages in which this word occurs in the New Testament it always applies to repletion with wine. In the Septuagint in every case where the word is used in prose it has the meaning of "drunken"; thus it is used of Noah (Gen. ix. 21), of Nabal of Carmel (1 Sam. xxv. 36), of Elah the son of Baasha (1 Kings xvi. 9). The passage before us is sad and simple prose.

Some of Dr. Tisdall's subordinate arguments it is difficult to treat with the gravity that his earnest use of them deserves. Thus his supposition that as the Passover was connected with the season of unleavened bread, therefore unfermented wine must have been used. In advancing such an argument surely Dr. Tisdall must observe that he is neglecting the obvious fact that *wine* is not *bread*. It must be remembered

that the Jewish ceremonial Law and its distinctions were not founded on science. We know that the fermentation in leaven is the same in essence as vinous fermentation, but the Levitical Law does not recognise this.

His contention from Isaiah xvi. 10, "No treader shall tread out wine (*yayin*) in the presses" is, "that here *yayin* is applied to the juice of the grape before fermentation" is still more difficult to treat seriously. It is merely a case of the common rhetorical figure *prolepsis*. If Dr. Tisdall will turn to Isaiah xxviii. 28, he will find a similar *prolepsis* applied to corn: "Bread (*lehem*) is bruised, because he will not be ever threshing it." Here the grain that is to be made into bread is spoken of as if the process were already completed, just as the grape juice was called wine. Still more—can we avoid calling it—absurd, is it to introduce the dream of Pharaoh's butler. The events in dreams do not occur according to physical possibilities.

Having thus disposed of all Dr. Tisdall's arguments against the accuracy of the conclusion that our Lord used fermented wine when He instituted the ordinance of the supper, the relevancy falls now to be considered. He argues that to settle what was the custom of the early Church, while highly interesting, it is merely interesting in an antiquarian sense, and has little or no bearing on the question before us, which he contends is one of moral expediency. His contention that the Church has the right to alter her statement of doctrine, her methods of government, the ritual arrangements of her ordinances as a Scotch Presbyterian I admit freely. The case before us is different. We have to do not with any arrangements of the Church but with an ordinance of the Lord Himself. Indeed it is to this fact that the Communion of the Lord's Supper owes its special sanctity. St. Paul in the account he gives of the Institution lays stress on what the Lord did. Our Lord, who knew the

end from the beginning, chose wine as the most suitable symbol for His blood. He might have chosen water. That was easily accessible ; the disciples had been guided to the upper room by a man bearing a water-pot.

There are warnings in the history of the Church which ought to induce caution in interfering with any institution that can claim the direct sanction of the Lord. The marriage relationship was instituted by the Creator in Eden, ratified by the Lord when He proclaimed its indissoluble nature, and sanctified by His presence at the marriage at Cana of Galilee. Some good men, notwithstanding, impressed with the licentiousness of society, proclaimed absolute celibacy as the true position of the Christian who would live the higher life. Although the Apostle Paul in the Pastoral Epistles enjoined that the bishops, presbyters and deacons should be married men, should be the husband of one wife, the Roman Catholic branch of the Church forbade the clergy to marry with results which it would take us too far afield to specify. Such as are curious may see some of these in Dr. Hay Fleming's pages on the state of matters in Scotland in the period immediately preceding the Reformation.

Another instance may be taken, which may be regarded as more appropriate, as it has been referred to by Dr. Tisdall, and as it is connected with the ordinance before us,—the habit of receiving the Sacrament kneeling on the altar steps. In the case of the Anglican Church this practice is a survival, as it seems to me, of Romanist beliefs and ritual. While the feeling of reverent emotion with which one naturally partakes of the sacred symbols might not inappropriately express itself in receiving the bread and the wine kneeling, yet it paved the way for the idolatry of the Mass. Christ instituted the Eucharist as a simple feast ; this simplicity appears to have induced in the Corinthian Church certain unseemly practices. To prevent these it was hedged about

with various observances; these in turn gave birth to the doctrine of Transubstantiation and the worship of the Host, in which a piece of bread was adored as God.

When anyone attempts to improve on God's way he falls into error. The intentions of the innovator may be most laudable, but the results, however little foreseen, may be most deplorable. The foolishness of God is wiser than the wisdom of men.

It is not quite clear whether the reason of Dr. Tisdall's objection to the use of alcoholic wine in the Lord's Supper is that drunkenness is so prevalent among us that sheer horror of the vice ought to exclude anything with alcohol in it from this sacred feast; or because there are some like J. B. Gough who cannot taste wine without risk to their souls. The logic of the former of these applied to another vice nearly as prevalent and much more destructive leads naturally to absolute celibacy of all Christians. As to the latter, the cases of those whose whole system has been so ruined by alcoholism as to be in the state in which Gough was, are, we are persuaded, far fewer than some would make us suppose. These would be reduced to yet smaller numbers were a light wine introduced. Even if it were mixed with water it would not matter; this would probably be the case with the wine at the original Institution: only let it not be fortified with brandy. Those who would be liable to become victims of the depraved appetite re-awakened by a sip of diluted claret would be very few. Shall the whole community of Christ be deprived of the privilege of partaking of the ordinance as our Lord instituted it for the sake of an insignificant minority who have ruined their nervous systems? Shall all mankind dwell in holes and caves of the earth because of a few ophthalmic patients who cannot bear the sunlight? With regard to the ophthalmics, we say, let them wear smoked glasses. As to the victims of

alcoholism, let them pass the cup ; they will be in no worse case than the Romanist laity, they for more than a millennium have communicated only in one kind.

J. E. H. Thomson.

THE OUTLOOK OF THE FOURTH GOSPEL.

On two previous occasions in this Journal (April 1914 and December 1917) we have been permitted to consider more or less in detail the eschatological and apocalyptic teaching of our Lord as it is recorded in the Synoptic Gospels, and then it was with the intention of emphasising its ethical character. It seems only fitting that we should now in due course direct our attention to the outlook of the Fourth Gospel.

At the outset we must define very briefly our attitude to this, the most modern of the Gospels alike in date and thought. Whether it be prior in time or not to the Epistle of Barnabas, it is of very different calibre. Yet we regard it likewise as primarily an Apology, a defence *adversus Judaeos*, although it follows to a considerable extent the general outline of the *Memorabilia* of the Lord Jesus to which later on the term Gospel was applied. But the work possessed also an evidential character for Christian readers, as is clearly stated at its close (xx. 31), while at the same time supplementing, transposing, and it may be correcting synoptic material. Moreover, from various passages we deem it reasonable to entertain the opinion that the author utilised as well as was familiar with already collected (Matthean) or current *Testimonia* from the Scriptures which the Jews were also ready to search (v. 39 ; cf. iii. 17 ; vi. 45 ; vii. 38 ; x. 34 ; xi. 50 ; xii. 14 f. ; 38 ff. ; xiii. 18 ; xv. 25 ; xix. 24, 28, 36 f.). Further, as regards the problem of authorship, we are well content to leave this religious genius, whose work is his

monument, unnamed. Whether he be identified with John the Presbyter, " the disciple whom Jesus loved," the host at the Supper, or the rich young ruler converted, is really quite immaterial for the due appreciation of the permanent value of his writing, which apparently is best dated soon after the dawning of the second century. Few scholars now hold to the identification of the author with John, the son of Zebedee, although that has been accepted from the days of Irenaeus until modern times. The mind of the evangelist has admittedly assimilated the story of the incarnate Lord as related in the synoptic narratives. But he has done more than that : Jewish by birth, and Hellenistic in his environment, he has placed in the mouth of the Word become flesh teaching and interpretation which would indeed have been probably unintelligible to the first hearers and followers of Jesus, but which reflected a spiritual development coloured by his own experimentally based belief and by that of other Christians of his time and type.

I. The Main Conceptions.

The outlook of the Gospel " according to John " is, on the whole, a consistent one, and it presents an arresting contrast with that of the other Evangelists. Let us first examine this contrast, which forms one factor of the difference of treatment which this Gospel exhibits. Briefly, it may be said, in words which the present writer used some years ago : " Eschatology as such has practically vanished. If the delay of the Lord's coming harassed men's minds, if the Jewish party were insistent on narrow nationalistic views, difficulties like these are brushed aside as of little inherent weight. The grand vision which mystic faith and communion inspired of life present yet eternal, springing from the sacramentally sustained union of the Christian with God in Christ or by the Spirit, replaces the older and

authentic expectations of a kingdom to be and a visible judgment on a transfigured earth. The local and national is absorbed in the human and universal. . . A Gospel about Jesus, it freed the essential revelation of Jesus from its very local and transitory, yet initially necessary and indeed protective, raiment of eschatology, and unveiled once for all its underlying eternal and universal qualities" (*Jesus and the Future*, 353 f.).

This judgment must now be supported somewhat in detail, so as to demonstrate the transmuting of the old conceptions. *The Kingdom of God*, for example, which filled the foreground of our Lord's teaching in the other records, has but two references made to it in the Johanninė reinterpretation of the Master's words. There is first the mystic doctrine of re-birth, that experience which, according to the discourse built upon the episode of the visit of Nicodemus (iii. 3, 5), is needful for the apprehending of the Kingdom of God. And that heavenly birth is both sacramental and spiritual. Water is foreshadowed as the vehicle of Spirit, and the spiritual re-generation initiates the believer into a state which overlaps present and future alike, the age that is and that which is to come, thus transcending the old Jewish and primitive Christian conceptions. The setting of the other instance of the expression on our Lord's lips serves to abstract from it all political and indeed temporal connotation: the Kingdom is "not out of this world" (xviii. 36). Here "John" is much nearer than Paul to the language and atmosphere of the Mystery-religions of a somewhat later period.

On the other hand, *Life*, which was the chief quality and characteristic pertaining to the Kingdom in the primitive tradition, becomes the supreme designation for the condition of blessedness, which is entered upon here and now as the result of faith and love (expressed or

implied), and nurtured and rendered effective by sacraments. In fact the prime purpose of the Incarnation of the Logos—like the function of the cognate personification, Sophia, Prov. iii. 18; viii. 35, etc.—is the communicating of abundance of "life" (x. 10; cf. iii. 36; iv. 14; v. 21, 24 f., 40; vi. 33, 35, 48, 51, 57 f., 63; viii. 12, 51; x. 28; xi. 26; xvii. 2 f.). This is richer than the quasi-negative term "salvation" (iii. 17; iv. 22; xii. 47, etc.; cf. 1 John iv. 14), for the former is the inalienable but communicable quality of His divine being (i. 4; v. 21, 26; vi. 35 ff.; xi. 25; xiv. 6; cf. 1 John v. 11 f.). The significance of "life" for the future may be the more prominent in some places (iv. 36; vi. 27; xii. 25). Obviously the feeling of the possession of such life, with the consequent reposeful assurance, provided a very real and practical antidote to the feverishness of popular expectation. It allayed that restless yearning for, and deep dismay at the delay (xxi. 22 f.; cf. 2 Peter iii. 4) of a spectacular Parousia and a Messianic Kingdom established upon earth, which were such dominant features of the belief and hope of primitive Christians. In the world of Johannine thought we seem to breathe the atmosphere of contemporary Jewish-Alexandrian philosophy, of the Mystery-religions and of sacrificial conceptions of worship and communion. Yet that is not to assume that there is any question of dependence: one can but think that with some "eschatologists" impatience with the spiritualising of conceptions is excessive.

Consider for a moment this *Coming* or Return just mentioned, the Second Advent of a later period, and notice the treatment which it receives in the body of this Gospel. It is transformed into a present Parousia in the Spirit, the Paraclete, the Substitute for the Incarnate who is also Himself, freed for ever from physical limitations (xiv. 3, 16, 18, 23, 26, 28, etc.). Pentecost and Advent are merged in one,

for both alike are dependent on the exaltation or glorification of Jesus. And this personal presence is conditional on faith (vii. 39 f. ; xiv. 12 ; cf. iv. 14) and love (xiv. 15, 21, 23) and prayer (xiv. 13 f.), while joy is the ultimate issue thereof for the disciples, the members of the Christian churches (xiv. 28 ; xv. 11 ; xvi. 20 ; xvii. 13).

Again, *Resurrection*, physical resuscitation, popularly associated with the coming in of the new age, recedes into the background, as if it were an event unnecessary and indifferent. The inward, spiritual, eternal life, begun now indeed in historic time by faith and in feeding on the life-giving Son, is not broken by the transition of physical death or of material resurrection, because it partakes already of the nature of the life of God, mediated through matter and Spirit, the informing divine potency, through Paraclete and sacrament. And yet it is at the same time the Son Himself who exercises this life-giving power, and that on those who believe (v. 21, 24 ; xi. 25 f.), because He shares the life-dispensing being of the Father. This aspect of the revelation may be best summed up in the claim : " I am the resurrection and the life " (xi. 25), while Martha's expression of faith represents the older Jewish and current Christian type of belief. The hopeful racial universalism of the author, in contrast with narrow nationalistic claims, may be perceived in the references to other " folds " (x. 16) and " many abiding-places " (xiv. 2), indicating that there is place for each and all, but the latter expression betrays a tinge of the earlier realistic apocalyptic symbolism.

We turn awhile to the sterner and darker side of the presentation. According to the prevalent opinion of the communities, *Judgment* was conceived of, in the fashion familiar to us from the more primitive teaching reflected in the earlier Gospels, as one of the great events connected with the end of this age and preliminary to the establishment of the

eternal Kingdom of God. Either the Father Himself, or the Messiah, the Lord Jesus, as His Viceroy, would carry out that final assize and separation of men. But in the view of the fourth Evangelist—who perhaps composes the speeches uttered by the Lord on the basis of reminiscences of the mysterious "eye-witness" or from a nucleus of current memories and traditions, working in his own long and intensely real personal experience of fellowship with God through the glorified Lord—judgment too is a process in the present, but just as effective and complete as any "day of the Lord" after the apocalyptic manner. Owing to the writer's Jewish and ultimately pessimistic religious dualism the process of judging and therefore of separation goes on continually. It is accomplished according as men choose by faith the revelation of light and knowledge or prefer to remain in the worldly state of darkness and ignorance, just as the unreceptive attitude of Israel to the Incarnate Life (i. 11) was displayed also by "the world" (xvii. 9 ff.). Thus, if the object of the revelation under earthly conditions was indeed rather to save men (iii. 17 ; xii. 47), the human response may become automatically in its result a self-judgment (ix. 39 ; xii. 48) by the rejection of the light (i. 5 ; iii. 19). So the Son judges, and that now in man's mundane probation (xii. 31), in His divine (v. 22 f.) as well as human (27) capacity. Even the judgment of the mythologically inherited figure, "the prince of this world," is regarded as already accomplished in the Cross (xii. 31 ; xvi. 11 ; cf. xiv. 30). The ethical result on human conduct from the communion with and indwelling of God and the Son by the Spirit is simply taken for granted. It is exhibited in the consequent life of faith and love, and of doing the divine will, which is the liberty of truth (viii. 33) and the avenue of knowledge (vii. 17). The Epistle deals with this aspect more fully.

We have seen above that the death of the body is to the Johannine mystic a mere incident in life, a matter of no anxious concern ; but the Jesus of this Gospel has much to say about *Death* in a deeper, spiritual sense. It is the opposite of Life, separation from the True, the Beautiful and the Good, and thus the uttermost terror. Such the hostile Jews will endure, dead in sin and its varied manifestations (vii. 34 ; viii. 21, 24), in contrast with the faithful who cannot be said really to die at all (vi. 50 ; viii. 51 ; xi. 26). From another angle it is " destruction " or perishing, which no true believers can ever experience (iii. 16 ; vi. 39 ; x. 28), because the divine Spirit-imparted life is within them already (v. 14) by sacramental appropriation (vi. 54 ff.).

Two other features of Johannine divergence in connexion with the subject of Outlook require some notice, before we pass on to consider the inconsistencies therein. The term *Son of Man* ceases in this anti-Jewish polemic to possess, as applied to our Lord, the eschatological significance of the Danielic and apocalyptic figure. The author represents Jesus as calling Himself indeed, as in the Synoptists' narratives, Son of man ; but " the title becomes a synonym for the eternal Logos of the prologue in His incarnate state," whose " glorification " (vii. 39 ; xii. 16, 23 ; xiii. 31 f. ; xvii. 3) or " uplifting " (viii. 28 ; xii. 32, 34 f.) is the condition of, and transition to, the dispensing of His life-giving Spirit-power. And this He does in His present heavenly existence (iii. 13 f.), which belonged to Him essentially in pre-incarnate conditions with the Father " before the world was " (xvii. 5). It may be just His perfect human sympathy—" a son of man "—which qualifies Him for continually judging men, as Bearer of the divine revelation (v. 27 ; cf. Hebrews iv. 15). The Son of man is once closely related with the Spirit (vi. 62 f.) ; He claims faith and accepts wor-

ship (ix. 35, 38). The title, it must be observed, is not utilised in the Farewell discourses ; nor is any " day " or Parousia of the Son of man as such named. Nor are angels mentioned in this narrative, but for the synoptic reference (xx. 12) in connexion with the Tomb, save as " ascending and descending upon the Son of man " (i. 51). The phrase may be patient of an eschatological interpretation, or may signify pictorially the continuous and unbroken communion with God under incarnate conditions. But it occurs in a verse which some have questioned.

Closely related with this title is the Johannine rationale of the *Communion*, the Christians' Liturgy. It is generally accepted that the sacramental meal of the Church's worship and experience is associated with " the flesh and blood of the Son of man " (vi. 53) in that wonderfully rich chapter where, in connexion with the synoptic miracle of the loaves, the Lord is made to foreshadow His union and fellowship with His own through the Spirit in the symbolism of eating. Such is the food which He, Son of man, will give, and which abides unto eternal life (27), because it possesses the qualities of His own divine and spiritual being. It is God's " bread " (32), and yet it is Himself (35, 41, 48, 51). So the Incarnate Life is continued and perpetuated in a heightened and extended manner as the vehicle of essential spiritual life, as a divine indwelling (56), which is the response to human faith (40) and action (51, 53 f.), and conveys immortality (57 f.). With this highly developed anticipation of the Christian Eucharist we can hardly be surprised to find that at the Last Supper—to which indeed but a bare allusion is made (xiii. 2 ff.) by way of introducing the acted parable of humble service—the eschatologically coloured Institution of the synoptic narratives is wholly omitted.

This high doctrine is closely parallel to that of the coming of Christ by the Spirit, His other Self, as taught in the vale-

dictory addresses. But in them, as already remarked, and as is natural from the author's special use of it, the title Son of man is not found. Here the exalted and glorified Lord of the Church's experience, one with the Father (xvi. 14), joins in the " mission " of His Substitute, the Spirit of truth (xv. 26 ; xvi. 7), yet comes Himself (xiv. 18, 23, 28), for dwelling in the disciple through the imparting of divine life, joyful (xiv. 28 ; xv. 11 ; xvi. 22, 24), victorious (xvi. 23), and eternal.

It is quite erroneous to expect from " St. John " any more than from other Biblical writers a closed and rounded off system of doctrine or an exact symmetry of treatment. Nor does the modern view of Inspiration anticipate or presuppose an accuracy above that which is in accord with contemporary habit and knowledge. It is the spiritual truth that matters. There is no gainsaying the loyal devotion, religious depth, zealous earnestness and utter sincerity of our author. But inconistencies in treatment or presentation will not surprise or offend us. The difficult problem for us moderns is to explain them with any adequacy, in our comparative ignorance of the conditions obtaining at the time of composition. Let us recall those which pertain to the special subject of this paper.

II. The Inconsistencies.

It is necessary to recognise the fact that, as the text of the Fourth Gospel has been transmitted, the older and indeed the current popular eschatology peeps through in various places, despite the general and almost complete re-orientation of the material. The prevailing dualism of the work seems to be more consonant at first sight with an eschatological attitude than with the outlook of mystic experience. It reflects the alternating pessimism and hope which is characteristic of apocalyptic writings both Jewish and Chris-

tian. But there are phenomena in the present text which arrest us by their apparent reversion to beliefs which the author would seem to have outgrown and which strike a discordant note in the general harmony of his conceptions.

Within the body of the book perhaps the most familiar and striking example is to be found in those unexpected and incongruous verse-endings which contain the expression " in the last day." In the great discourse concerning the Bread of Life the " raising up " of " it " (all the God-given, vi. 39) or of " him " (the believer, 40) or of the one drawn to Christ by the Father (44) or of the spiritual assimilator of the " flesh and blood of the Son of man " (54) is said to be " in the last day." These turns or allusions appear not only to be needless but in fact out of agreement with the teaching of the interpenetration of earthly experience by life eternal which marks the context. This would appear to afford meagre, although not the sole, support for Schweitzer's theory of " eschatological sacraments " in this Gospel (*Paul and his Interpreters*, 200 ff.). Of course all cultus-sacraments must be eschatological to this extent, that their practice and their utility alike cease at the close of human history, but that does not necessitate the acceptance as true of the strictly " materialistic " view which he supposes our writer to have entertained.

The expression we are considering is also used in the answer of Martha to our Lord (xi. 24), but there it is quite in place in representing her as clinging to the cruder physical conception of resurrection which neither Pauline nor Johannine teaching could arrest or eliminate. It gained an overwhelming predominance during the conflict with Gnosticism in the crassly materialistic apologetic of the second century, above all in that of Athenagoras. Again, the latter part of xii. 48 breaks the connexion in an interpretative fashion, with its reference to the " word " of Jesus

judging those that reject Him " in the last day." We may remark that " the last hour " in the Epistle (ii. 18 ff.) is scarcely parallel ; for that is the period of history to which the activity of " many anti-christs " appears to point, by their denial of the Messiahship and Sonship of Jesus (cf. iv. 3). No theory of compositeness or scheme of partition known to the present writer is fully satisfactory, but some elucidation of passages such as the above seems to be requisite, as also hypotheses to account for the many incongruous interpretations found in scattered verses of the Gospel. In the case of some of them, editorial treatment and the admission of interpolations before the transmitted text became fixed would satisfy the phenomena best. Such would be the work of Christian readers whose additions and comments did not attain to the high level of the thought of the author whose meaning they sought to explain or revise.

Now this Gospel does not claim elsewhere than in the references given above, any more than do the synoptic records, that the Lord is the agent of a physical resurrection, but the transition is rather accomplished by the Son during the earthly life of believers by virtue of His divine quickening power (v. 21). But verses like 25 and 28 f. in the same chapter break the sequence of thought. The former either refers to the spiritually dead quickened by the revelation of the Incarnate Son in His ministry, or else introduces an alien allusion to the widely prevalent doctrine of His activity during the *descensus ad inferos*, to which the Epistle of Peter. the Odes of Solomon, and so many other early Christian writings testify. The longer passage (v. 28 f.) seeks to establish the judicial prerogatives of the Son, in language reminiscent of the Matthean Judgment picture, as consisting in a final separation of all the dead either for life or condemnation. Here conduct forms the decisive test, as in the other evangelical narratives. If

this addition or interpretation seems to have some point of contact with verse 24, it is yet foreign to the context, and appears to betray the hand of one who failed to grasp the true nature of the preceding teaching and sought to improve on it by accommodating it to popular belief. A similar reaction to the terms of the old eschatology is traceable in the Epistle (iv. 17), where the " day of judgment " is looked for, but with " boldness " or confidence, the Christian trait which links the verse with the words of iii. 21. The difficulty might be diminished if the writer of the Epistle should prove to be the editor rather than, as is generally supposed, the actual author of the Gospel.

Opinion is still divided upon the question of the identity of the authorship of the Appendix—apart from the two concluding verses—with that of the rest of the book. At any rate, with regard to the object which we have in view at present, it may be said that the former reverts to the prevalent and synoptic expectation of the Return within the lifetime of the Apostolic generation. This can be seen in the attempted explanation of the " tarrying till I come " of " the disciple whom Jesus loved," which suggests with reasonable certainty that the decease of that elusive personality was to this writer already a matter of fact (xxi. 22 f.). This may possibly indicate that " that disciple " had ultimately no precedence over the restored authority of the once disgraced but now truly converted and rehabilitated Peter. Once more an accommodation or reaction of the same type is discoverable in the Epistle, where " boldness " is again the believers' attitude in view of the (hypothetical) Manifestation and Parousia (ii. 28 ; cf. iii. 2), which is contrasted with the historic manifestation (iii. 8). Here too the thought links more readily with the Appendix than with the body of the Gospel.

We can approach the elucidation of these Inconsistencies

within the Fourth Gospel in one of at least three ways. But it does not follow that any one method will solve all alike. (*a*) They may be real, and original. (*b*) They may have been introduced later. (*c*) They may be only apparent.

(*a*) We have said already that it is too much to anticipate a full and perfected system of religious thought even in this sublime Apology in Gospel form, which is indeed so nearly a harmonious whole. Inspiration involves neither inerrancy nor completeness. If they be real and authentic, it is quite permissible to endeavour to account for these samples of inconsistency, the inclusion of these strictly incongruous views and expressions, by supposing them to be due to the insufficient thinking out of the presentation in every detail, or to the imperfect carrying through of what appears to be the general transformation of outlook. Even now we ourselves combine comfortably in our ordinary religious belief conceptions which on critical examination are by no means harmonious. Here we have a devout writer, teaching, evangelising, defending, and composing out of a burning intensity of mystic experience of inward fellowship with God through the Lord and His Spirit. He thus interprets as none other has done the inward and spiritual factors of his Master's doctrine, and yet in a literary form which would have been largely inapplicable and probably unintelligible to the mental outlook of the Galilean followers during the earthly ministry. It is necessary to read such an one's work with intense sympathy as from within, rather than with narrow criticism as from outside his experience. For even the pure fire of the message and earnest zeal in defence do not always lead to or assure full consistency or complete harmony of presentation. A partial retention of older forms of thought and expression cannot therefore be ruled out of account. And it may be doubted whether apocalyptic symbolism was ever really taken at its face value.

(*b*) Of the forty or more interpolations which have been detected, surmised, or suggested by students from time to time for one reason or another, we are only concerned at present to notice those which bear upon the eschatological outlook of the Gospel. These are contained for the most part in those two passages which deal respectively with the functions of the Son (v. 28 f., 25) and the relation of the appropriating of the Son of man as Spirit through faith and sacramental fellowship unto eternal life (vi. 39 f., 44, 54). With these that other verse-portion about the word of Jesus judging in the last day may probably be associated (xii. 48). It is to be observed, however, that a radical criticism of these sentences or clauses, unlike some cases where the Lewis and other codices can, when extant, be brought in as evidence, receives no support by way of omissions from the manuscripts. This fact gives us pause ; but much must have happened in the period of fluidity of transmission and freer transcription before the fixing of the text to the extent to which our best MSS. testify. Further, by those who uphold in the criticism of this Gospel the contentions of the thorough-going eschatologists, the Johannine teaching as to our Lord's prerogatives and as to the sacraments which He created is conceived of as being directed just with special regard to the End, for the assurance of life through death, during the little while till He should come again to exercise His divine functions in the final separation of men.

(*c*) In conclusion, there is a third broad line of argument which may be followed. And that is to adjudge these mutual disagreements in outlook as merely apparent, virtually as being the inventions of hypercritical students and perverse editors. But to the present writer at least the question of the compositeness of the Fourth Gospel in the state in which it has been transmitted to us cannot thus be lightly dismissed as a simple or even as a non-existent pro-

blem. Nor can theories of rearrangement and of additions large or small, however reverently suggested, be treated all alike as baseless hypotheses. For there *is* much which requires explanation. With regard to adjustments and interpolations there is ample evidence existing, despite the fact that such is not actually to hand in respect of these definitely eschatological verses. The latter evoke suspicion by reason of their being akin to the common view and foreign to the general outlook of the book. If they should be in all respects genuine, then we must concede that the writer was much more of an eschatological materialist after the popular manner than the tone of twenty chapters, and especially those containing the farewell discourses, would lead us to imagine. At the least we should have to conclude that he was not averse to introducing fragments of the old apocalyptic symbolism. Yet we feel instinctively that the author was too great and too thoughtful, albeit often so simple in conception and literary form, to have combined in this fashion quite incongruous notions, despite the fact that this is done in every generation by uninstructed, unthinking, and uncritical but earnestly faithful Christians.

We have purposely brought no discussion of conflicting theories of partition into the survey of this difficult, important, and elusive subject of the outlook of " St. John." One humble student, at any rate, knows of no magic key to unlock the riddle's casket. But all must admit that in this composition, alike apologetic and evidential, the importance of the true " life " of the individual, be he Jew without or Christian within, is vastly more prominent than the End as such. It is indeed questionable whether at this stage of history we possess the data requisite for any sure and certain solution. Years of study may on the one hand only render the Christian scholar the more conscious of the com-

plexity of the problem of the unity of the Fourth Gospel; but on the other they also compel him to realise progressively its immense value as an interpretation of the Blessed Life more closely related to our modern modes of thought than any other within the covers of the New Testament.

EDWARD WILLIAM WINSTANLEY.

ELIJAH ON MOUNT HOREB

IN trying to realise the bearing and significance of the theophany described in the nineteenth chapter of the First Book of Kings, the writer has had once more brought home to him the fact that for purposes of serious investigation it is always absolutely necessary to make a fresh minute study of the text, instead of relying too much on previous acquaintance with it. It may sound paradoxical, but it is nevertheless true, that it is quite possible to know one's text by heart without knowing it properly. The very fluency with which one may be able to recite a passage whenever the need arises may, in fact, constitute a serious obstacle to a satisfactory appreciation of its details. For whilst the words and sentences follow one another in sure and quick succession, the mind remains without a stimulus to the exercise of its faculties of observation and analysis.

A parallel mistake into which young students and even older learners are apt to fall consists in a wrong manner of using commentaries, and probably few Scriptural subjects can offer a more striking illustration of persistent adherence to doubtful exegesis which may be caused thereby (see particularly the latter portions of this article) than the great theme to which the reader's attention is here to be directed. Instead of first of all making as careful a study as possible of the text, and then proceeding to gain light on difficult matters from commentaries, many students are in the habit

of plunging into the explanations offered by the various works they are using before having scanned with even a moderate degree of close attention the passage which is to be explained. It is surely time to sound a note of warning, and to remind ourselves of the elementary truth—or, if you like, truism—that knowledge of the Scriptures, to be real, must in the first instance be derived from a careful study of the Scriptures themselves, that arguments about commentaries may lead us away from the texts rather than lead us to them, and that, therefore, the plentiful helps which are now fortunately at our command must never be allowed to engross our attention at the cost of intimate acquaintance with the Bible itself.

It is, besides, very important for the student of the present narrative to realise as far as possible the psychology of its central figure as well as of the time in which he lived and the life that surrounded him. Without this kind of insight the attempt at producing a living presentation of the great dramatic scene cannot prove anything less than a failure.

With these preliminary thoughts in our minds, we may now venture to approach the subject of our contemplation.

The great triumph for the cause of Yahweh gained by Elijah on Mount Carmel lasted but for a short space of time. Jezebel, whose power had remained unbroken and authority unshaken, sent him a threatening message which in its complete form probably ran : " If thou art Elijah, I am Jezebel ; so let the gods do to me and more also, if I make not thy life as the life of one of them [i.e. of the prophets of Baal slain on Mount Carmel] by to-morrow morning about this time."[1] And Elijah, who, though endowed with the strength of a superman for the work which he had to do, was not alto-

[1] 1 Kings xix. 2, the addition at the beginning being found in LXX and Lucian.

gether exempt from the weaknesses of ordinary men, became afraid,[1] and "he arose, and went for his life." Extreme depression of spirit had followed the exaltation of his great triumph. Night seemed to have gained dominion over day, moral ruin was the result, and no hope of good things remained to him. He had manfully stood in the breach, and with a few helpers fought a host of adversaries, but now that his work was overthrown, and the enemy was once more gaining the upper hand, what, after all, was he but a weak mortal who was afraid to die the death which he had himself inflicted on the opponents of the cause to which he had dedicated his life? [2]

He fled southwards towards the wilderness beyond Judah. On his way through that kingdom he may have passed through Jerusalem, but that city, though particularly dedicated to his God Yahweh, is not likely to have exercised a special attraction over him. He knew Yahweh, and he knew the great and distant Mount Horeb whence the majesty of Yahweh was revealed to his great spiritual ancestor Moses; but Jerusalem was to him a later and secondary kind of sanctuary which sought to appropriate to itself (or at least equally share in) the glory and the privileges of the original and still supremely sacred seat of Yahweh's power. Jehoshaphat the son of Asa, who at that time ruled over Judah, was, moreover, a sworn ally of Ahab,[3]

[1] Reading וַיִּרְא instead of וַיַּרְא at the beginning of ver. 3 with most ancient versions and several modern authorities.

[2] St. Ephrem (quoted by Thenius) remarks that Elijah felt obliged to flee because his death at the hand of the enemy would have nullified his victory over idolatry. And there may possibly be some truth in it, though, of course, the effect of his victory had already been very largely neutralised. Human nature is complex, and Elijah's sensations at the time may have included divers elements of doubt and fear. In the main, however, the text as it stands favours the view adopted in the present article.

[3] See 1 Kings xxii. In ver. 45 it is stated that Jehoshaphat made peace with the king of Israel, and the alliance was further cemented by the marriage of Jehoram, son of Jehoshaphat, with a daughter of Ahab (2 Kings viii. 18; 2 Chron. xviii. 1). Jehoshaphat's pious adherence to

and was, therefore, not likely to shield him from the persecution of Ahab's queen. And there was probably a third reason why not even Jerusalem was capable of offering a congenial refuge to a man like Elijah. His bitter experiences of life and the many keen disappointments of his cherished hopes had for the time being caused him to lose faith in man and all things human. The world looked very black to him, and the society of the priests and prophets of Judah could, under such conditions of his inner being, have only inspired him with distrust even if they had, on their part sought to befriend him, which, indeed, was not at all likely, considering the great aversion which polished mediocrity and statutory piety is always apt to exhibit towards all that is independent, real, great, truly elemental, and, therefore, naturally rugged in man.

So he hastily traversed Judea from north to south, either avoiding the capital or quitting it within a short time of his arrival there. He hastened on till he reached Beersheba lying on the edge of the wilderness on the southern borders of the Kingdom. The actual vicinity of the desert appears to have increased his already intense longing for utter loneliness. He had hitherto been accompanied by one human being, a youth who had probably stood to him in the double relation of attendant and disciple.[1] But he now determined to relinquish his last hold on humanity, to break the last link that bound him to it. He left the youth at Beersheba, and

Yahweh was, therefore, not of a nature that would prompt him to side with Elijah against the royal house of Israel.

[1] The Peshitta actually translates the Hebrew נַעַר (which primarily means "a youth") by "disciple." Elisha is thus also said to have "poured water on the hands of Elijah" (2 Kings iii. 11). Gehazi, who is described as נַעַר to Elisha (2 Kings iv. 12, 25) probably also occupied the position of attendant and prophetic disciple, and the two youths who accompanied Balaam (Num. xxii. 22) are, perhaps, also to be so classed, though the Peshitta, which classes Gehazi as disciple, only treats them as attendant youths.

went himself a day's journey into the wilderness that thence stretched far away into the lonely south, south-east, and south-west. Being at last surrounded on all sides by silent desert wastes,[1] and desolation reigning supreme in his darkly brooding soul, he sat down under a tall species of *retem* or broom, and " requested for himself that he might die ; and said, It is enough ; now, O Lord, take away my life, for I am not better than my fathers." [2]

It might at first sight seem strange that, having fled to the southern wilderness all the way from Jezreel in consequence of a threat to take his life, he should now pray for death to come to him. But there is, in the first place, a difference between falling by the hand of Jezebel's henchmen and dying in open nature by a *fiat* of Yahweh.[3] Against the former kind of death a temperament like that of Elijah might well rebel with all the strength of his soul, whilst the latter would not be out of accord with the mood of deep depression and the sense of utter failure which had greatly deepened during the time of his desert loneliness. It should also be remembered that there seems to be a tendency in the case of some great human spirits towards a desire to pass out of life in complete isolation, unfollowed, and unseen ; and the tradition regarding the passing of Moses (see Deut. xxxiv.)

[1] The Sinai Peninsula—if Horeb lay there—has been declared by Prof. Petrie and others to have enjoyed a high degree of civilisation even at the time of the exodus ; but this would surely only apply to the caravan routes and roads to mining districts. Much actual desert there no doubt remained.

[2] The natural meaning seems to be this : " I am, after all, not more fitted than my fathers were for the accomplishment of great things in the world. Why, therefore, should I continue to carry on an existence which—henceforth, at any rate—seems to be as devoid of a great purpose as theirs was ? There may, however, possibly also be an allusion here to Elijah's reputed great age (so Kimḥi and Levi b. Gershon). Why Burney (*in loco*) should endorse the explanation of Thenius—" As human I must die, and now it is death that I desire "—is by no means clear.

[3] Compare David's cry : " Let us fall into the hand of the Lord . . . and let me not fall into the hand of man " (2 Sam. xxiv. 14, parall. passage 1 Chron. xxi. 13), though the two cases are by no means analogous.

would, if such a tendency be attributed to Elijah, be naturally have the effect of strengthening his desire to die alone in the midst of the desert wastes around him.

"And he lay down and slept under another [1] *retem* tree; and behold, an angel touched him, and said unto him, Arise and eat. And he looked, and behold, there was at his head a cake baked on hot stones [2] and a cruise of water. And he ate and drank, and laid himself down again. And the angel of the Lord came a second time, and touched him, and said, Arise and eat, for the journey is too great for thee. And he arose, and ate and drank, and went in the strength of that meat forty days and forty nights as far as Horeb, the mountain of God" (vers. 5–8).

One is strongly tempted to introduce a touching human element into the narrative by identifying the מלאך (= messenger) here spoken of with the attendant Elijah left behind him at Beersheba, who might thus be supposed to have, unobserved by his master, followed him into the desert in solicitude and love. It, indeed, may have been so in the actual history of the prophet. The impression of the ministration of an angelic instead of a human agency might in that case be assumed to have arisen naturally in the prophet's mind under the weird conditions in which he found himself. But as we are in any case not justified in thinking that no legendary (or idealising) elements had crept into the tradition, or let us say, rather, as the tradition is in any case presented in a decidedly superhuman colouring, there can

[1] Venturing to read אַחַר instead of אֶחָד, though not supported by the versions.

[2] The idea apparently is that a cake of this kind could be prepared even in the desert, where stones heated by the sun may be found. The Arabic representative of רְצָפָה "means a stone heated in the fire, to be dropped into milk for the purpose of making it boil" (Burney *in loco*). The Targum has חררא מעפפא, "a folded cake," probably connecting the word רצפים with the meaning of רצף as "fitting together; see the Oxford edition of Gesenius' Lexicon, *s.v.*

be no gain in definitely eliminating this particular instance of it.

The much discussed question regarding the geographical position of Mount Horeb, and even as to whether Horeb is to be identified with Sinai or originally signified an entirely different locality, need not detain us long in this place. Winckler, with whom a number of other critics are on this point in more or less substantial agreement, considers (*Encycl. Bibl.* iv., col. 4639) that the present narrative "originally placed Horeb in the region of Edom," adding as a reason that "Elijah could not have undertaken any remote desert journey when he is already at the point of fainting at the close of a single day." As a corollary to this Winckler felt bound to assert that "the forty days were first introduced in order to establish a parallelism with the Moses-legend." But is it not rash, or rather entirely unwarranted, to suppose that the original Elijah-legend had no close prophetic connexion with one form, at any rate, of the traditions regarding the work of Moses and of the theophanies that were granted to him? Does not (apart from some probable special parallels of ideas and, perhaps, even terms to be mentioned presently) the mere mention of "the Mountain of Elohim, Horeb," clearly look back to the covenant made between Yahweh and Israel by the mediation[1] of Moses as whose descendant in the direct spiritual line Elijah must have regarded himself? Winckler and others with him appear, moreover, to forget that the entire narrative—as, indeed, it could not be otherwise in an account of a theophany—lies in the region of the miraculous, and that therefore, his reference to Elijah's physical inability to undertake a remote desert journey is entirely beside the point. The author of the part of Kings before us worked,

[1] See Deut. v. 5, and the use of the term μεσίτης in Gal. iii. 20, and comp. Hebrews viii. 6, ix. 15, xii. 24, and 1 Tim. ii, 5.

not on geographical, but on prophtetico-theological lines. The long past presented him with an idealised vision of the wondrous work of Moses, based on the narrative of E. (prevalent in the north of Palestine, Elijah's scene of activity); and the venerated personality of Elijah, who had in more recent times been engaged in the equally wondrous task of defending the worship of Yahweh against the debasing rivalry of the Baal-cult, stood vividly before his mind as a figure fully worthy to take his place beside the first great prophet of Israel. Yahweh had vouchsafed special visions of His power and attributes to Moses, and the task of the narrator of this part of Kings was to show that Elijah also had a great and overpowering vision in which Yahweh spoke with him, as He had spoken with Moses of old.

This is all that was of importance to the author of the account before us. He wrote under the inspiration of the Divine Presence that rested on the prophetic school to which he belonged. The theophany which he undertook to describe naturally took a form suggested by the prophetic ideas of his time and the traditions preserved by the sacred college of his order; and we who in the present day read the narrative must read it in the spirit in which it was written. Elijah, like Moses before him, did, in fact have visions of Deity, and we must, through the form in which they are placed before us, try to behold the reality which they enshrine. We should not confuse the literary expression of the deep inner experience realised by great human souls with mere legendary invention, and we must at the same time beware not to expect accuracy of physical details in visions which aim at the presentation of great spiritual realities.[1]

We now come to the theophany itself: "And he entered

[1] There is, from the same point of view, no ground either for special wonder when we are told that, for instance, the great neo-platonist Plotinus had on some occasions in his life the mystic's beatific vision of the Eternal.

there into the cave,[1] and lodged there; and behold, the word of the Lord came to him, and he said unto him, What doest thou here, Elijah? And he said, I have been very zealous [2] for the Lord, the God of hosts, for the children of Israel have forsaken thy covenant,[3] thrown down thine altars, and slain thy prophets with the sword, and I, even I only, am left, and they seek my life to take it away. And he said, Go forth,[4] and stand upon the mount before the Lord. And behold, the Lord was passing by, and a great and strong wind was rending mountains and breaking in pieces rocks before the Lord; but the Lord was not in the wind: and after the wind an earthquake; but the Lord was not in the earthquake. And after the earthquake a fire; but the Lord was not in the fire; and after the fire a still small voice" (or, more accurately, "a sound of gentle stillness") [5] (vers. 9–12).

[1] There is surely no reason for translating the definite term המערה by "a cave." We may assume that to the author and his readers "the cave" meant a special cave made famous in olden times, such times being naturally understood as those of Moses. Possibly the immediate specification would be as a place to which pilgrims were in the habit of resorting; but even so, the reason for the cave being so used would in all probability lie in Mosaic tradition. Nor should the definite identification of the מערה with the נקרת הצור ("a cleft of the rock") of Ex. xxxiii. 22 (so Rashi and Kimḥi) be dismissed as overstrained. The Targum actually translates נקרת הצור by מערת טינרא ("cave of the rock").

[2] With קַנֵּא קִנֵּאתִי used here compare the term אֵל קַנָּא ("a jealous God") of the mosaic traditions.

[3] ברית in this place would, one should think, refer to the covenant made between Yahweh and Israel by the mediation of Moses (see previous note on use of *μεσίτης*). But LXX. and Lucian have both here and in ver. 14 *ἐγκατέλιπόν σε* = עֲזָבוּךָ (the *τὴν διαθήκην σου* before *καὶ τὰ θυσιαστήριά σου* of the LXX in ver. 14 being apparently a later addition); and it is not unlikely that עזבו בריתך was a substitution for עזבוך made by the Soferim or Scribes to avoid an expression which looked like an anthropomorphism.

[4] The LXX. has Ἐξελεύσῃ αὔριον, "go forth the next day," which is followed by Josephus (*Antiquities*, Book viii. ch. xiii. 7).

[5] So R.V., the more accurate rendering being given in the margin. Burney (*in loco*) is, of course, literally right in saying that the term *stillness* is "incompatible both with קול and דקה and with כשמע of the following verse." But the exact force of *stillness* is surely determined by the context in which it stands, as is also the word *still* in "a still small voice" of both

The theological significance of Yahweh's manifestation in a still small voice, as well as the place which the idea occupied in prophetic tradition, will be discussed in connexion with the last portion of text coming within the range of the present article. For the moment another question, which is, indeed, preparatory to the one just described, must occupy our attention. Was the manifestation of Yahweh as a still small voice an entirely fresh revelation to Elijah, or had he been accustomed to think of this mode of His intimate self-manifestation as belonging to the established order of prophetic revelation? It is generally imagined that the very essence of the theophany lay in the lesson, now specially imparted to him, that God comes to man, not with violence and tumult, but in "a sound of gentle stillness"; but it seems to the present writer that the erroneousness of this conception can be easily demonstrated from the part of the text just given. Elijah is unmistakably represented as not coming out of the cave before he hears this significant sound of gentle stillness; and as he had received no instructions concerning the exact manner of Yahweh's coming manifestation with the command to go forth and stand before the Lord, it is right to assume that he required no instructions regarding it, but on the contrary knew beforehand that when the manifestation came, it would come in a still small voice. When, therefore, the roaring of the mighty wind reached his ear, he left not the inner part of the cave in which he had taken up his abode, nor did he move out from it when the earthquake and the

A.V. and R.V. The word דממה only occurs in two other places in the O.T., viz. Ps. cvii. 29, and Job iv. 16, and its exact meaning can only be inferred from the sense attaching to the verb דמם, which means "to be still, quiet." In the first-named passage: "he maketh the storm *a calm*," and in the second: "there was silence, and I heard a voice." Levi b. Gershon makes in the present passage the sage remark that "it was a gentle voice from the Lord, compounded, as it were, of sound and silence," and this is exactly the idea which both text and margin of R.V. appear to suggest.

fire came. He knew by training, experience, and tradition that Yahweh's full and intimate self-revelation takes place neither in winds, however mighty, nor in earthquakes nor in fires. But when the still small voice reached his listening faculties, he knew—again by tradition, training, and experience—that now the God of Israel and Moses was in clear reality manifesting Himself to him, and so he came out of the cave to receive the divine answer to the pressing enquiry of his afflicted and all but despairing soul.[1]

By way of further enforcing this point of view, it is necessary to remind ourselves that only fragmentary indications of the higher mental life of those ancient days have come down to us, and that we must here, as elsewhere, reconstruct the past from the hints that lie before us in the records we have received. And it seems clear that from the wording of the narrative before us we must conclude that the manifestation of the Deity in a sound of gentle stillness must have been one of the great principles or doctrines of the theological and prophetic school in which Elijah had been trained, and of which he had now for a long time been the chief. In the turmoil and distressful activity of the busy and hostile world around him he was—at that time, at any rate—not able to bear that voice; nor would there have been any chance for him to retire, so to say, into "the cloisters" and repose of a prophetic college in order to wait for the divine manifestation which he needed, for Jezebel

[1] It is interesting to compare the exegesis, on this point, of Rashi, whose training had been purely Rabbinical, with that of the philosophically instructed Levi ben Gershon. According to the former, the statements in vers. 11–12: "the Lord was not in the wind," "the Lord was not in the earthquake," and "the Lord was not in the fire" are to be taken as instructions given to Elijah in the course of his vision. But the latter says that in each case Elijah *remembered* (זכר) that the real manifestations of the Lord was not in any of these destructive elements. Even less tenable than the view of Rashi is that adopted in the *Cambridge Bible for Schools and Colleges*," which regards vers. 11–12 as containing the expected instruction to Elijah, in accordance with the LXX.

had been but too thorough in the warfare which she urged against all such institutions and the persons connected with them.[1] But when he came to Mount Horeb, the chief or original seat of the Glory of Yahweh, where, amidst the vast silence of desert and mountain-range his fervent spirit could again commune unhindered with the wonderful associations of the past, the sound which he had longed to hear at last drew near to him. His soul had by that time become attuned to the hoped-for revelation; and when at last it actually came Elijah, at once recognised the voice in which he had expected the highest Reality to show itself to him.

"And it came to pass, when Elijah heard it, that he wrapped his face in his mantle [2] and went out and stood in the entering in of the cave.[3] "And behold, there came a voice[4] unto him, and said, What doest thou here, Elijah? And he said, I have been very zealous for the Lord, the God of hosts, for the children of Israel have forsaken thy covenant, thrown down thine altars, and slain thy prophets with the sword: and I, even I only, am left, and they seek my life, to take it away. And the Lord said unto him, Go and return by way of the wilderness to Damascus,[5] and thou shalt enter and anoint Hazael to be king over Aram. And Jehu the son of Nimshi shalt thou anoint to be King over Israel: and Elisha the son of Shaphat of Abel-meholah shalt

[1] See, besides vers. 10 and 14 of this narrative, 1 Kings xviii. 4, 13).

[2] Comp. Ex. iii. 6 (Moses' first theophany); also his being hidden in the cleft of the rock (Ex. xxxiii. 20–23, second theophany).

[3] The LXX (*ὑπὸ σπήλαιον*) must have read תחת instead of פתח; but meaning not clear.

[4] "The word of the Lord" (דבר יי) of ver. 9 indicates the usual mode of prophetic inspiration, the mind of God making itself perceptible in the inner consciousness of the human instrument; whilst the voice (קול) of ver. 13 gave the prophetic listener the impression of speech addressed to him from a source outside himself.

[5] מִדְבַּרָה דַּמֶּשֶׂק may also be rendered "to the wilderness of Damascus," as in the text of R.V., but the translation adopted here fits in better with the instruction to enter for the purpose of anointing Hazael.

thou anoint to be prophet in thy place. And it shall come to pass that him who escapeth from the sword of Hazael shall Jehu slay, and him who escapeth from the sword of Jehu shall Elisha slay. Yet will I leave in Israel seven thousand,[1] all the knees which have not bowed to Baal, and every mouth which hath not kissed him "[2] (vers. 13–18).

We have now to consider the most vital question connected with the theophany which we are contemplating. What ideas did Elijah and the members of his school associate with the divine manifestation in a still small voice? Or, putting the enquiry in a more complete form, what was, under all the surrounding circumstances of the case, the meaning of the entire vision, commencing with the roaring of a mighty wind, continuing with the destructive forces of earthquake and fire, and culminating in the sound of gentle stillness?

The answer must, of course, depend on what is to be regarded as the main purpose of the vision? The naturalistic or philosophical explanations that have been offered fail just in this that they proceed on a theoretical or *a priori* line of thought, without taking proper account of the object that was to be attained in the particular circumstances of the case. The writer of the article in The *Encyclopaedia Biblica* thus tries to satisfy us with the bare statement that "here on the sacred mount, when hurricane, earthquake, and lightning have cooled the air, Elijah in the rustling of a gentle breeze discerns Yahweh's presence" (vol. ii., col. 1272). This is in practical agreement with Klostermann (*Die Bücher Samuels und der Kōnige*, 1887, *in loco*): "It is the soft breathing of nature, refreshed once more by purifying explosions, which bears the promise of an assured peace

[1] "Seven thousand" must be understood to mean a sufficiently large number of persons.

[2] Comp. Hosea xiii. 2; Job xxxi. 26, 27; also, though passage doubtful, Ps. ii. 12.

and is the symbol of re-establishment." And Thenius (*Die Bücher der Könige*, 2nd edition, 1873, *in loco*), adopting a more decisively philosophical mode of exposition, says that the still small voice represents the most incorporeal substance that can be imagined, " chosen to impress on our faculties (*Veranschaulichkeit*) the presence of the Divine Being."

There may be a good deal of truth in the ultimate religious conceptions which these writers place before us, but they leave out of consideration the personal and immediate requirements of the case, nor do they do anything like justice to the *tout ensemble* of the prophetic narrative. What, then—we must ask once more—did the author of this part of Kings intend us to regard as the main purpose of this great and stirring theophany ?

It has been very widely assumed that its chief object was to impress Elijah with the need of exercising gentleness and kindly consideration towards his erring fellow-men instead of continuing the impetuous and violent methods which the prophet had lately (and probably often in his life) been following. Thus in the article " Elijah " in Hastings' *Bible Dict.* (vol. i., p. 689), which may fairly be described as highly representative, we read : " J. represents to E., by a magnificent acted parable, the contrast between law and grace, judgment and mercy. As the prophet of J", E. has been using the weapon of force. He has never conceived it possible to defeat the enemies of God by any other weapon. . . . And he has failed. Force has left men hard and indifferent. J. makes experiment upon E. with his own weapon. He visits the mountain with a hurricane, with an earthquake, and with a fire. The prophet's wounded spirit is not moved by any of these. J. is not in them. But in the calm which follows the tumult he hears a still small voice which thrills his inmost being ; he feels that God is

there. . . . He is thus taught the meaning of his failure. He is shown in a parable 'a more excellent way'."

This view, though containing a psychological feature which is peculiar to itself, is essentially the same as that taken in the *Speaker's Commentary*, where "the acted parable" is declared to have been "an anticipation of the Evangelical rule." But it is almost impossible to understand how such a theory could be upheld in view of the clear indication to the contrary presented by the text. "And it shall come to pass that him who escapeth from the sword of Hazael shall Jehu slay, and him who escapeth from the sword of Jehu shall Elisha slay." Does this read like an admonition to exercise mildness and gentle consideration towards opponents of the cause to which one happens to be passionately attached? And there is, besides this strange disregard of the text itself, the further serious error—already shown to be such in this article—of imagining that the divine manifestation in a still small voice was an entirely new revelation to Elijah, instead of regarding it as the expected mode of Yahweh's manifestation to His chosen prophets. The theory could not be maintained even if the revelation had been of a perfectly new kind; but as it is, there does not even exist an initial warrant for proposing it.

Yet is there, as it not infrequently happens in the case of untenable propositions, also a large element of truth in the interpretation we have been considering? For it must first of all be admitted that the "sound of gentle stillness" offers as complete a contrast as possible to the tumult and destructiveness of the wind, the earthquake, and the fire which preceded it. And there is, secondly, the fact that the words addressed to Elijah end with the reassuring statement: "Yet will I leave in Israel seven thousand, all the knees which have not bowed to Baal, and every mouth which hath not kissed him."

What, then, was the exact meaning which Elijah and the prophetic circle to which he belonged attached to their experience of God speaking to them in a sound of gentle stillness? We must, indeed, assume that the conception which they had gradually formed of the "I am that I am" who had revealed Himself to Moses was that He was in His essence eternally reposeful and undisturbed; also that the final aim and object of all that He may order or allow to go forward was the establishment, in conformity with the attributes borne by His own essence, of peace and gentleness in the world which He had made. One might even go a step farther and say that in the doctrine of the still small voice there was something that may be regarded as definitely preparatory to the idea of God as "the Father of Lights with whom is no variableness neither shadow of turning" (James i. 17).

It must also be granted that this teaching represents a distinct advance on the doctrine contained in the Mosaic tradition. In Exodus xix. 18, Yahweh is stated to have descended on Sinai—Horeb in fire, and in Deuteronomy iv. 24, ix. 3, He is described as "a consuming (or devouring) fire."[1] It is likely that even in those early days the divine essence was, in the higher prophetic circle of the time, not thought of as being embodied in hurricane and earthquake; but now even the fire is completely separate from it, and only appears as a precursor of the manifestation of Yahweh. It, indeed, still moves quite close to Him, but it no longer carries His essence within itself.[2] A procession of great and

[1] A distinction must, of course, be drawn between the date of Deuteronomy as a Book and the origin of certain parts embodied in it. It is here assumed that the description of Yahweh as a consuming fire belongs to an early stage of Hebrew tradition.

[2] It should be remembered that we are here only dealing with the form of doctrine indicated in the narrative before us. The naturalistic and subjective elements which may lie behind it would require a separate investigation.

tumultuous forces of destruction forms itself in order to uproot, burn, and destroy all that is essentially false and alien to the will of the Lord ; and when this has been accomplished, the presence of Yahweh Himself appears in all His immutable strength and eternal calm : the God before whom only the true and genuinely noble can stand.

This was the doctrine of the school to which Elijah belonged, and when drawing near Horeb in order to commune with God, he knew beforehand what form the theophany would take. He, at any rate, fully expected the actual manifestation of the Lord to come in a sound of gentle stillness ; but neither could the presence of the forces of upheaval and destruction which preceded it have been a surprise to him. He was himself a man of storm and fire. This was his mission and destiny. He was a precursor of as determined and uncompromising a type as could be thought of, and as such he was at one with the tumult and violence which heralded the theophany itself. Nor was there any intention of changing the character of his mission and destiny. He had towards the end of his career achieved a great victory, but his triumph was followed quickly by abject defeat. Despair took hold of his soul, and his spirit fainted within him. He fled from the society of men and even prayed that his life might come to an end. But he was all the time journeying onwards towards Horeb, the chief or primal seat of Yahweh's power and glory. His innermost desire was to commune in as direct a manner as possible with his Lord, in order to overcome the distraction and heaviness of his soul, and to obtain a clear direction as to what he was to do. Amidst the grandeur and solitude of mountain and desert lands the associations of the past assumed a living form. The divine voice of gentle stillness at last spoke to him, and the purport of the words addressed to him—far from counselling gentler methods of procedure—

was as follows: "Despair not, Elijah! Thy mission of storm and fire will soon be ended, but before the final completion of thy tumultuous task thou must appoint successors to carry on the same mission of storm and fire; for the necessary procession of destructive forces on the face of the earth is not yet over. Go, therefore, back the way thou camest, and anoint new kings over Aram and Israel, and a prophet to take thy place. These three will continue the work which thou must leave unfinished; they will wield the sword which is destined soon to drop from thy hand. But wait—something remains to be added. My kingdom will not pass out of the souls of men. I will leave in Israel a sufficient number to keep alive the spirit of holiness and purity on the earth, even all the knees that have not bowed down to falsehood, and every mouth that hath not bestowed the kiss of homage on Baal, Mammon, or any other deity falsely so-called."

The theme on which we have undertaken to treat is now ended. But a remark must be added on the discrepancy between the account we have of Elijah's performance during the time following the theophany of Horeb and the command he had received there. The anointing of Elisha as prophet in his stead is related at the end of the chapter of Kings before us, but we have no record of the fulfilment of the remainder of the charge laid on him. On the contrary, Jehu is reported to have been anointed at the bidding of Elisha by one of his prophetic disciples (2 Kings ix.), and it is again Elisha who (merely) announces to Hazael his imminent succession to the throne of Aram (2 Kings viii. 13). The most natural solution of the difficulty seems to be that the Books of Kings embody different traditions, and that the narrative of the theophany is but a fragment—though a most valuable one—of one of the sources used by the com-

piler. There is, indeed, a question regarding the true boundary line between the Elijah- and the Elisha-traditions. There may have been considerable uncertainty in the records or oral tradition in the assignment of certain acts to the one or the other. All we can do at present is to gather up the theological import of each part of the narrative that has come down to us, and to appraise the historical character of each tradition in accordance with sound principles of historical research.

G. Margoliouth.

"IT IS ENOUGH."

Since the summer of 1914 much has been said and written in America concerning Jesus' attitude towards war. The question whether it is ever possible to wage war with the sanction of the mind of Christ has become one of very much more than merely academic interest. Advocates of military preparedness and the use of force have often preferred to base their arguments on single texts of the gospels rather than on certain broad and fundamental principles of our Lord's teaching. This method of citing texts to prove that Jesus approved of warfare is unsatisfactory, and the exegesis of the verses quoted is often doubtful and sometimes fantastic.

Luke xxii. 38, where the two swords are mentioned, is a favourite passage with those who are seeking a proof-text for the above-mentioned view among the words of Christ. The Master tells His disciples that a certain scriptural prophecy must be fulfilled in Him, and that the course of His life is drawing to a close (τὸ περὶ ἐμοῦ τέλος ἔχει). This is of course an unwelcome saying to His followers, and they immediately exclaim, "Lord, behold, here are two swords"—as if such meagre equipment were sufficient

to avert the catastrophe that threatened.[1] Thereupon, according to the accepted division of the text, Jesus replied, "It is enough."

The short section on preparedness against dangers (verses 35–38) is found only in Luke, and it intervenes between the prediction of Peter's denial and the agony in Gethsemane. Wendt and B. Weiss think it was taken from Q.

How are the words "It is enough" in verse 38 to be interpreted? The Old Syriac in both forms and the Peshitto understand them with reference to the two swords.[2] According to some Jesus really thought that two swords would be adequate for the defence of Himself and His friends in case any one should attempt to do them violence. When, however, He found Himself confronted by "a great multitude with swords and staves," He abandoned the idea of offering resistance and submitted to arrest. And yet, when one of the disciples drew his sword and smote off the ear of the high priest's servant, Jesus said to him, "Put back thy sword into its place; for all who take the sword shall perish with the sword."[3] In view of this passage, which is separated from Luke xxii. 38 by a very short interval of time, it is impossible to suppose that Jesus countenanced the use of the sword by His disciples in the latter verse.

Were the words "It is enough" intended merely to dismiss the subject, or were they spoken in irony? The

[1] In view of Chrysostom (*In Matt. Hom.* LXXXIV.) and Euthymius that the μάχαιραι mentioned in verse 38 were large knives used for killing and cutting up the paschal lamb is purely fanciful and should not be adopted. Elsewhere in the New Testament μάχαιρα means *sword*, and nothing in the context requires us to understand it in any other sense here.

[2] Sinai Syriac: "They are sufficient for you." Curetonian Syriac: "They are sufficient; arise, let us go." Peshitto: "They are sufficient." Old Latin manuscripts are divided among three readings: *satis est*, *sat est*, and *sufficit*. The Vulgate has *satis est*.

[3] Matt. xxvi. 52. Cf. also John xviii. 11.

former of these alternatives is adopted by Theophylact and many modern scholars[1]; but others,[2] following Cyril of Alexandria and Euthymius, understand the saying in an ironical sense. A few, as de Wette, combine the two interpretations. Bruce regards *ἱκανόν* as a pregnant word and quotes with approval the interpretation of H. J. Holtzmann (*Hand-Commentar zum N.T.*[2], 1892, i. p. 282): "For the purpose which I have in mind more than enough; but also enough of misunderstanding, disillusionment, speaking, teaching, and life generally."

The phrase *ἱκανόν ἐστιν* is found only here in the New Testament, and it corresponds to the Hebrew רב used as an exclamation and meaning "It is enough." The Aramaic equivalent of רב in this exclamatory sense is סַגִּי followed by ל and a pronominal suffix[3]; and it is probable that Luke's *κανόν ἐστιν* represents סַגִּי, or perhaps סַגִּי לִי, in the Aramaic source upon which this section of his narrative is based. Genesis xlv. 28 well illustrates the exclamatory use of רב. Jacob has just been told by his sons on their return from Egypt that Joseph is still alive and is ruler over all the land. He has also heard the words of his long-lost son and seen the wagons which he had sent to bring his father and his belongings down to Egypt. "And Israel said, It is enough (רב); Joseph my son is still alive: I will go and see him before I die." Then Jacob "took his journey with all that he had" and in due time arrived in Egypt.[4]

[1] The most recent representatives of this view in England and Germany respectively are Plummer and Hahn.

[2] E.g., Schanz and Godet. Wellhausen (*Das Evangelium Lucas*, 1904, p. 125) says: "These means (i.e., the two swords) are ridiculously insufficient; Jesus, however, with painful resignation declares them to be sufficient and lets the disciples have their own way.

[3] Cf. Targ. on Num. xvi. 3, 7; Deut. i. 6; ii. 3; iii. 26; Ezek. xliv. 6; xlv. 9; Gen. xlv. 28=סגי לי חדוא; 1 Kings xix. 4=סגי לי ארכא. In 2 Sam. xxiv. 16 רב is rendered by מסת. The usual translation of the exclamatory רב in the LXX is *ἱκανούσθω*.

[4] Cf. also 1 Kings xix. 4: "And he (i.e., Elijah) went a day's journey

Jesus has bidden His disciples, in figurative language, to be prepared against danger, and they have grossly misunderstood His meaning. They ever suppose that He means to fight.[1] Thereupon He exclaims, "It is enough," and immediately goes out to Gethsemane. In both cases "It is enough" is a phrase of transition. It looks forward rather than backward. It marks the beginning of what follows rather than the close of that which precedes. The words ἱκανόν ἐστιν are not spoken in reply to what the disciples have said about the two swords, and they express neither approval nor disapproval of the use of force. However, the Master could not have-condemned the idea implied in his followers' naïve remark more eloquently than by ignoring it altogether. Ὁ δὲ εἶπεν κτέ. is the beginning of the next section, which recounts the things that happened in the garden of Gethsemane. The period after ἐστιν should be changed to a colon, and then verses 38 and 39 will run thus: "And they said, Lord, behold, here are two swords. And he said to them, It is enough; and he went out and departed, according to his custom, to the Mount of Olives; and the disciples also followed Him."

WILLIAM H. P. HATCH.

into the wilderness, and he came and sat down under a broom shrub; and he asked that he might die, and said, It is enough (רב); now, O Jahveh, take away my life, for I am not better than my fathers."

[1] The Fourth Gospel gives correctly Jesus' view of this question. Cf. John xviii. 36: "My kingdom is not of this world. If my kingdom were of this world, my servants would fight, that I should not be delivered to the Jews; but now is my kingdom not from hence."

THE CONCEPT OF THE INFINITE IN THEOLOGY.

I.

THE word 'infinite' as applied to God or His attributes is not a Scriptural term. Even the divine 'almightiness,' omnipresence and omniscience, which are asse ted or implied in passages of both the Old and New Testaments, do not necessarily transcend the finite, unless the universe created, indwelt and known, be infinite. It is, in fact, from Greek philosophy that theology derived the concept of infinitude in order to predicate it of God.

The earliest philosophers of Greece were in quest of the ultimate principles or principle (*ἀρχή*) of the world, and the characteristics of ultimate reality. And one primitive philosopher, Anaximander, found this principle in what he called *τὸ ἄπειρον*, i.e., literally, the endless or infinite. The predominant, if not the only signification of this term, when it first came into use in philosophy, was, however, the indeterminate; and *ἄπειρον* soon became a synonym for *ἀόριστον*. 'Infinite' thus at first meant boundless, not in the sense of 'exceeding all possible limits,' but in that of 'essentially devoid of all defining limitations': i.e., indefinite, formless, unrelated, and perhaps we may add—potential (as contrasted with actual). We shall see that this signification, which is identical with one of the senses of 'absolute,' is still associated sometimes with the term 'infinite,' and that the interpretation of omnipotence, or infinite power, to which it points, has recently been used

as the basis of an argument against the theistic explanation of the existence of evil. But although this highly abstract kind of infiniteness was paralleled in the meaning of terms used with reference to God by certain Gnostics and mystics, it does not seem to have been implied in the language of representative teachers of the ancient Church. Clement of Alexandria is the most thorough-going of the Fathers in imitation of Philo's abstractive or eliminative method of seeking a philosophical conception of God; and he only follows that method when, speaking as a pure philosopher, he forgets for the time being that he is a Christian teacher. Origen is typical of practically all the rest of patristic writers in that he seeks, for the determination of the concept of God, not what is simplest or most abstract, or even what is infinite, but (after Plato) rather what is perfect.

The second sense of 'infinite' to be met with in Greek philosophy is that which characterised the mathematical usage of the term until the nineteenth century, and according to which the infinite is the endless or limitless in space, time, or number: that which cannot be reached by successive acts of addition or division. The difficulties attaching to this quantitative type of infinity were exhibited in the well-known paradoxes of Zeno. Infinitude strictly of this kind did not admit of application to the idea of God, who has neither magnitude nor parts; and it is not until quite recent years that an analogical use of the 'new infinite' of modern mathematics has been applied to the elucidation of certain theological concepts and doctrines. Of this attempt, which is of some interest to theologians, more will presently be said.

A third conception of infinity which was current amongst philosophers of ancient Greece calls for mention. To some of the Eleatic school, 'the infinite' signified not the boundless in the sense of the indeterminate, but a

boundlessness which, while not being quantitative, is at the same time definite or determinate : the boundlessness which might belong to a cosmos as contrasted with the non-entity sometimes called chaos. A circle, for instance, is an endless line, though a circle is a definite figure. Endlessness, as well as indeterminateness, was indeed eliminated from the connotation of the 'infinite'; or rather, infinity came to be replaced by another idea—that of perfection or completeness. A tendency arose to substitute a teleological for a purely logical or mathematical category wherewith to characterise the first principle of the world which Anaximander had called τὸ ἄπειρον. This tendency, promoted by the doctrines of the Pythagoreans, Parmenides, and Anaxagoras respectively, culminated in Plato's substitution of the perfect, the good, or God, for the merely indefinite or the endless. We are thus brought, however, to a different conception altogether, and are no longer concerned with a meaning of 'infinity.'

Plato, then, did not apply ἄπειρος to God; he rather regarded the finite world as in itself an ἄπειρον of chaotic matter which was constrained to wear a form, or to receive determinateness, by the Divine mind. The changefulness, and therefore the lack of true reality, in the finite world was ascribed by him to the impatience of the ἄπειρον under the imposed determination; and God was distinguished from the finite by His perfection, which implied immutability. Immutability is an essentially Greek characterisation of reality, adopted by Plato from Parmenides. It is alien to Hebrew and Christian thought alike, and its introduction into Christian theology involved difficulties and inconsistencies; but these may be considered more appropriately when the conception of perfection is dealt with in a future article.

It was doubtless the influence of Plato which led philosophically-minded Christian Fathers, such as Origen, to

seek to describe God in terms of perfection rather than of infinity. And it was the concrete and historical ground of Christianity which compelled adoption, for the most part of the affirmative rather than the negative, or abstractive, method—to use a distinction drawn by 'Dionysius'—in, theology. The affirmative method, in turn, required a forsaking of the guidance of Plato for that of Aristotle in one respect. That is to say, the Aristotelian view, that the highest is that which possesses the greatest wealth of attributes, was more congenial to Christian theology than the counter-view held by Plato (at least with regard to the ideal realm) that the highest is the most abstract. Plato, and the Christian writers who followed him, were unable to see that the content of a notion is inversely proportional to its comprehensiveness or abstractness. Consequently the negative way, the pursuit of the simple by the method of abstraction, was dear to Eastern compilers of doctrine towards the close of the patristic age in virtue of their leaning towards Neoplatonism; and a similar tendency to abstractness and subtle disputation about empty words is obvious in Aquinas and other Schoolmen, who were students of 'Dionysius' and John of Damascus.

Thus Aquinas, when discussing (*Summa*, I. Q. 7) the infinitude of God, without defining what 'infinity' should mean, follows the Platonic canon and the abstractive method. Infinite matter (such as Anaximander's ἄπειρον), he argues, would be imperfect simply because of its not partaking of form; while the infinite, *qua* form, contains the idea of something perfect. Pure being, he says, is the emptiest or most comprehensive of all forms: which is intended to imply that being is the highest reality. God, the only underived or self-subsistent Being, must therefore be infinite as well as perfect. Aquinas seems indeed to deduce God's infinitude from His self-subsistence. Thus he merges

infinity, when it is other than indeterminateness, in perfection; but he uses 'infinity' ambiguously. He also seems, in proportion as he is in earnest in following his Neoplatonist guides, to reduce the conception of God to the idea of a non-actual abstraction.

The earliest philosophers of the modern period, again, seem to regard infinity as implied in perfection. They further desire infinitude of a positive kind wherewith to characterise God, while they tend to identify determination with negation and finitude. The mathematical infinite being negative (mere endlessness), did not alone suffice for this purpose; and it was accordingly fused with the teleological concept of perfection. Implicit in Descartes and even Spinoza, this tendency is explicit in Leibnitz, with whom 'perfection,' when it is not used as metaphysically identical with the good, connotes complete positive reality (*omnitudo realitatis*) as contrasted with the highest abstraction or emptiest form. Spinoza also conceives of God, the "absolutely infinite being," as a "substance consisting in infinite attributes," and as perfect in the sense of excluding all potentiality and all change.

The foregoing historical introduction will perhaps have served to show that in so far as the concept of infinity has been deemed serviceable for the expression of doctrine concerning God, its meaning has changed from the indeterminate and the boundless in a mathematical sense (both of which are negative meanings) to something positive, qualitative, and determinate. In undergoing this change in meaning, 'infinity' has, so to speak, been preparing itself to abdicate in favour of the ancient concept 'perfection,' or to have its meaning merged in that of the latter term. In the sense of surpassing all limits, while yet admitting of the connotation of determinateness, 'infinite' has come to be applied primarily to the Divine attributes,

such as power or knowledge, rather than to the Divine Being Himself, and to be applied secondarily to God in virtue of His possessing "the fullness which filleth all in all." 'Infinite,' indeed, like 'absolute,' means nothing unless a 'what' is spoken of as infinite or absolute, or infinite and absolute be taken to imply infinity or absoluteness in some specific respect. The *omnitudo* of conceivable attributes, the unqualified infinite, the assemblage of all qualities good or bad and otherwise mutually incompatible, is not only a concept which theology cannot identify with that of God; it is also a self-contradictory non-entity, as indeterminate as the abstraction reached by the 'negative way.' It is natural, then, that whenever the infinitude ascribed to God has been more than the form of self-subsistence (as with Aquinas) it should at any rate have no wider denotation than that of the determinate fullness of all positive excellences. But even so, usage of the term has to reckon with the possibility of limitation, if only self-limitation, applicable to God; and in view of the need of Christian theology, after Origen's example, to emphasise the self-limitation of God as an essential Divine attribute—not to speak of other limitation implied in mere determinateness—continuance of the use of the concept of infinity, as applied to the Divine Being, calls for qualification, as well as for restriction to an univocal connotation.

Such qualification of God's infinitude or boundlessness in respect of power, i.e., of His omnipotence, seems, in the first place, to be necessary, if Christianity and theism generally are to possess a satisfying theodicy, or to explain at all the existence in God's world of physical suffering and moral evil. We have to face the old dilemma: either God is not perfectly good or He is not infinitely powerful. For if evil could be excluded, yet is not, His goodness is impugnable; and if evil cannot be excluded, His power must

somehow be limited. This dilemma was forced anew upon the theist very trenchantly by Dr. McTaggart in his book *Some Dogmas of Religion* (1906). But in order to make it effective against theism, the author needed to adopt a meaning of 'omnipotence' which probably no theist accepts. He took 'omnipotence' very literally; i.e., to mean infinite or absolutely unlimited power: power to do all things, including the realising of a contradiction. The theologian, however, does not include in the omnipotence which he ascribes to God ability to do the inherently impossible; he regards it as absurd to define omnipotence as control over the impossible and the possible alike, or to assume that God must, by arbitrary exercise of will, be the author of the possible as well as of the actual. If this be not to be in earnest with the literal meaning of 'omnipotence,' it may be said that the term is not essential to theism; though the insinuation that in such case it had better be renounced is perhaps pedantic. To meet the dilemma in this way, however, involves the assumption that there can be such things as inherent impossibilities, even for God, as Augustine and Aquinas admit, and that God's 'infinitude' is not to be taken literally. And there are two ways in which this assumption, that there is a necessary distinction valid for Divine as for human thought between the possible and the impossible, might conceivably be justified.

The first would consist in maintaining that the fundamental laws of logic—the "laws of thought" as they have been wont to be called—such as the law of contradiction, are valid of all terms and relations with which any thought can operate; or that these laws are valid independently of God or of the Divine will. Some philosophers, e.g., Lotze and Professor J. Ward, have objected, as against this position, that valid laws, apart from the actualities of which they are valid, are formal abstractions and mental figments, and

have affirmed that there can be no eternal *prius* of law independent of the actual world or of God, all law valid of actuality being grounded in the nature of God. This question of the 'reality' (or independent subsistence) of the 'valid,' is indeed one as to which philosophers differ, and as to which difference of opinion has of late been the more manifested in consequence of the development of the new logic or Logistic and the emergence of the new realism. This is not the place to enter upon discussion of it; but it may be affirmed, beyond the possibility of dispute, that the argument against our theodicy based on interpreting 'omnipotence' *au pied de la lettre*, assumes that this vexed question is settled, and settled in one of the two alternative ways possible rather than the other. And if this assumption be wrong, the argument based upon it falls. Because nothing *exists*, prior to Creation, other than God, it does not follow that whatever happens in the universe must be explained from His nature alone, *unless* the valid (e.g. the law of contradiction) *cannot* be independent of the actual and of God. In this case alone would it follow that the evil of the world must be grounded in the nature of God, that God cannot at once be all-powerful and all-good, and that there is no possibility of believing evil to be repugnant to the Divine will. If, on the other hand, this solution of the problem as to the reality of the valid be *not* the true one; if, that is to say, the fundamental laws of logic are independent of actuality and of God, then it will be arguable that the Divine choice lay between not creating an universe at all and creating one in which, if it were to be a cosmos and a possible theatre for moral life, evil must have place. It may be observed that Dr. McTaggart himself regards it reasonable to suppose that the laws of logic are necessary even for the thought of God; yet if his opinion be the true one, his whole argument is inconclusive.

However, the theist is not necessarily committed to the same opinion, which, as we have said, is at present disputable, if he is successfully to meet the dilemma offered to him. There is still open to him a second method of reply to the contention that the possible is an arbitrary creation of God, and that the possible and the impossible are alike to omnipotence. He can reply that God is a determinate Being; not an infinite comparable to Anaximander's ἄπειρον, or an Absolute in whom all differences are lost. In that God is wise, He does not pursue the absurd; in that He wills the development of a moral order, He does not will a world of mere animal contentment; and so on. "I am that I am," implies 'I am not what I am not'; not everything in general and nothing in particular. And to be self-consistent, this and not that, definite or determinate, does not subtract from the majesty of God. But determinateness does imply limitation. This is not to say that God is a "finite God," in the sense in which we ordinarily use the term 'finite,' or that He is merely more powerful, wise and good than we are. To be a determinate Being is not, from the theist's point of view, any derogation from almightiness; and infinitude, when it means indeterminateness, cannot possibly be predicated of God by a Christian. The bearing of this elementary truth upon the problem of theodicy, in that it implies that God is limited by the impossible and absurd, and is restricted to compatibility of attributes and consistency in purpose and action, is evident; but with that problem we are not here directly concerned. It has been alluded to at all merely because it renders obvious that there is one sense of 'infinitude' in which that term cannot be predicated of the living God.

If, then, infinity be a predicate of God which theology needs to retain, it must be of some other kind than mere indeterminateness. One of the two other traditional meanings

of the word which have previously been considered was found to belong rather to 'perfection': a concept so different from any generally received connotation of 'infinity,' that its possible meanings hardly call for discussion when it is infinitude that is in question. The remaining meaning is that which the term has borne till lately in the field of mathematics; but this can only have reference to magnitudes. It cannot be relevant at all to qualitative attributes such as wisdom and love, to which 'perfect' rather applies; and it is only relevant to the Divine knowledge and power in so far as these can be identified with knowledge of, or power over, an endless or infinite number of things. And this, if a correct usage, is hardly a fruitful one. However, an entirely new conception of infinity has been introduced, within the lifetime of most of us, into mathematical science; and here and there a philosopher or a mathematician interested in theology has attempted to apply it to theological problems such as that of expressing the nature of God. To this "new infinite" we now turn; we will later discuss its importation into theological speculation.

From the time of Zeno the infinite, regarded as actual, has been a concept beset with difficulties; and the various objections to it from Zeno to the present day have owed their force either to the tendency to identify the infinite with the indeterminate, or else to conceive it as differing from the finite only in that it cannot be attained or exhausted (completed) by successive addition or enumeration—the infinite was regarded as the endless. This kind of infinite is now called by mathematicians "the improper infinite," and the new infinite which replaces it in mathematical science escapes the old objections. The new infinite is a property of classes,[1]

[1] A class is a numerical conjunction of terms: of all terms having a given predicate or class-concept. Thus men are a class; Socrates is a

primarily, and is derivatively applicable to series. And infinite classes are given all at once by definition of the defining property of their members, so that there is no question of successive synthesis, and 'endlessness' is irrelevant. Some infinite series have ends, and some have not; some collections are infinite without being serial (or having their members in an order); and it cannot be said of them, therefore, that they have or have not ends.

Thus the series of instants from any earlier to any later time is infinite (in the new sense) though it has two ends; the series of instants from the beginning of time to the present moment is infinite, but has one end.[1] What then is the positive characteristic of the infinite in recent mathematics? Dedekind defines a collection as infinite, if it can be put in one—one correspondence with, or can thus be found equal (in number of terms) to, one of its own parts. What is thus meant can be explained as follows. If we write in one row the series of natural numbers, and underneath it the series of even numbers, thus $\begin{matrix} 1, & 2, & 3, & 4 \ldots \\ 2, & 4, & 6, & 8 \ldots \end{matrix}$, we always have a number in the lower series corresponding to one in the upper, and neither series contains the same number twice. The two infinite series contain the same number of terms, yet the lower differs from the upper in being without the whole series (infinite) of odd numbers. The number of numbers in the whole of the series of natural numbers is not greater than, but equal to, its part—the series

term or member of the class; humanity is the class-concept. The class 'men' is not the concept 'man,' but is denoted by it. Not every collection of terms is a class, for we may form a collection of terms which have no class predicate in common. The relation of a member to its class (Socrates *is a* man) is not the same as the relation of part to whole. And there are 'wholes' which are not merely aggregates of parts associated merely by 'and,' and which are not completely defined when all the parts are known. Only classes have numbers. These technical points are mentioned here because they bear on what follows.

[1] See B. Russell, *Our Knowledge of the Eternal World*, Lecture VI.

of even numbers only. A collection is infinite, if it thus contains a part which, in respect of the number of its terms, is equal to the whole. The part corresponds to the whole, each member of the one to one member of the other ; so that an infinite collection can also be defined as one which is capable of being precisely represented in complexity of structure, or in number of constituents, by one of its own parts. Not endlessness, but *self-representativeness* is the characteristic of infinity. Further, infinite numbers—better called transfinite—are not increased by adding to them. The two infinite series $\begin{matrix} 0, & 1, & 2, & 3 & \ldots \\ 1, & 2, & 3, & 4 & \ldots \end{matrix}$ correspond, one to one, or are equal in number of terms, though the former contains all the numbers occurring in the latter *and one more*, viz. 0. The self-representativeness of the infinite has also been illustrated by the example of a picture which contains a picture of itself, which in turn must contain a picture of itself, and so on.

Thus we are presented with an infinitude which is determinate, which is not all-inclusive, which does not imply endlessness, which is a positive and not a negative notion. An infinite collection may be part of another collection, and an infinite collection is not altered as to its infinity by subtraction of the finite, and even of the infinite, from it. Two questions arise with regard to this new infinite : 1st, is it not self-contradictory ? 2nd, if not self-contradictory, is there anything which, in this sense, is actual (numbers do not belong to the realm of actuality, but only numbered things) ? As to the former of these questions, it may be remarked that the new notion of infinity is based upon a new definition of what number is. So long as any number was defined as $n + 1$, no number could be regarded as anything but finite ; and the transfinite number could not be regarded as a number at all. Some philosophers say that the new theory renders the notion of infinity " harmless " simply

by incorporating the contradiction involved in infinite number into the definition of infinity itself : by introducing, and at the same time violating, the concept of whole and part and the concept of equality. But where other eminent philosophers and mathematicians find no contradiction, the non-mathematician shrinks from criticism. As to the latter question, it may be said that the new notion may have objective significance in the realm of pure mathematics, which deals with non-actual entities, without necessarily having any application to the existent, or the actual as distinguished from the possible. Royce's illustration of the map or picture, alluded to just now, is obviously nothing actual. The totality of a person's possible thoughts—thoughts of thoughts, and so on—has been offered as an example of an actual infinite ; but again, possible thoughts are not necessarily actual. And as Professor Mackenzie has remarked, Russell's problem of Tristram Shandy taking two years to write the history of two of his days, and yet at the same rate of writing completing his biography—as would be possible in time infinite according to the new notion—seems like a *reductio ad absurdum* of the applicability of the new theory to actuality. The validity of the notion may then be but formal, or applicable only to abstract forms and not to concrete or actual matter ; and it seems probable that nothing actual—no class of existent things—is infinite in the new sense of the term. The actual world sets limits to the applicability of logic and mathematics, which students of these pure sciences are apt to try to override.

Now theology professes to be concerned with the actual ; and in the light of the foregoing remarks it seems *a priori* doubtful whether the new mathematical concept of infinity is capable of illuminating such problems as the Being and Attributes of God. Infinity, as we have seen, has often

been predicated of God—His duration, His power, wisdom, goodness. Of these, duration alone consists of parts external to one another ; and the problem of eternity is here left over for discussion in another article. Infinity in the sense of 'endlessness' certainly seems to have no fruitful relevance to the Divine attributes : here, as we have seen, it is rather a question of perfection than of infinitude in the older senses of the term. The new infinite is applicable only to classes, aggregates, series—to whatever has 'members,' and so would seem to be almost incapable of theological application. It could only be applied, e.g., to the Divine omniscience through its application to the infinite number of objects which the Divine knowledge knows—the temporal, spatial and causal orders.

Nevertheless, the attempt has been made to apply the new mathematical infinite to theology ; and if only the procedure were legitimate, the results would be interesting if not important.

The earliest of such suggestions was made by Bolzano, one of the chief pioneers of the new mathematics. In his *Paradoxien des Unendlichen*, p. 9, this mathematician says : "We call God infinite, because we must attribute to Him powers of more than one kind which possess an infinite magnitude (*Grösse*)." Since 'magnitude' is capacity for the relations of greater and less, it is applicable to the Divine attributes ; but theologically, there would seem to be no gain in our being able to consider any attribute, such as the knowledge or the wisdom of God, as a whole which has a part equal to itself. So far, the application is barren of results.

More recently the new notion of infinity has been used to "elucidate" the doctrine of the Trinity, which, it is said, ceases to be an incomprehensible mystery or a mathematical contradiction [it never, surely, was that], if we can

regard each Person as an infinite manifold. There can be three, or any number, of infinite manifolds in one, as we have seen above; and removal of any one of them will not destroy the infinity of the whole. So infinite manifolds can form an infinite triune system. But can the Persons of the Trinity be regarded as manifolds or aggregates? On any theory as to the ontological status of the Divine hypostases, from that of modalism to that of tritheism, this would seem impossible. A Person in the Sabellian sense is not a collection of discrete states, and a Person analogical with a human person cannot be reduced to a mere aggregate of mutually exclusive experiences. When, then, Professor Keyser, speaking with reference to the doctrine of the Trinity, says:[1] "It is plain that we have here to do with the structure of infinite manifolds," I would submit that he is maintaining with regard to the Divine hypostases what cannot even be maintained as to the Divine attributes as such, but only as to the objects of the Divine power or knowledge, and that he is therefore two removes from the truth.

The late Professor Royce,[2] again, has attempted an application of the new infinite to the problem of the Person of Christ. He suggests that Christ may be infinitely less than God, one of an infinite number of possible "parts" within the Divine whole, and yet able not "to count it robbery to be equal with God," if by immortal life or perfect self-attainment He have received an infinite expression in the universe. But is it more than a play upon words to speak of "an infinite expression in the universe," or of the infiniteness of "self-attainment" as if they were identical in sense with the mathematical infinite? Surely the cases

[1] *The New Infinite and the Old Theology*, p. 88.

[2] *The Hibbert Journal*, I. i.; cf. his Supplementary Essay in vol. i. of *The World and the Individual.*

are disparate. Indeed, throughout Royce's discussion of theological subjects in the light of the new notion of infinity, there would seem to be an usage of a highly technical term, serviceable only in mathematics, in a vaguely analogical, and indeed a merely rhetorical, sense. He imparts to this 'infinity' a non-technical interest. The infinite of Cantor and Dedekind is a highly specialised and quite definite conception, applicable only within a restricted range—that of classes. Divine hypostases and a Divine-human person, however, are not classes. 'Self-representation,' again, as characteristic of the new infinite, is a specialised term of precise range and technical meaning; but by Royce it is used much as in popular discourse, while the relation of the one sense to the other is merely figurative and devoid of scientific precision. A self-representative God there may be; but hardly in the sense of the representation of an infinite class by its infinite part. For the mathematical concept of whole and part, in this connexion, expressly implies that both whole and part consist of members different from both the whole and the part; application to other sorts of wholes and parts is therefore precluded: but this is overlooked by Royce and even by Keyser. Theology, unlike mathematics, is not concerned with terms such as are mutually exclusive; and it does not appear that we are the better enabled, by means of the new infinity, to describe the self-limited Divine Being as infinite.

Professor Keyser seems to labour under the idea that so long as theology can somehow cling to the *word* 'infinite,' it may be content. This would appear to be the case, at least, in his discussion of the bearing of the new infinite on the problem of Divine foreknowledge and human freedom. Complete knowledge of the past, without knowledge of the future, would, as we have already seen, be knowledge of an infinite series, and so might be called infinite knowledge,

though not omniscience. Such infinite knowledge, as Keyser observes, would admit of easy reconciliation with our free-will, because it would not include foreknowledge, round which the difficulty centres. But it is precisely omniscience, including foreknowledge of acts of human volition, that theology has been anxious to ascribe to God; and if this be not assured, it cares little about the infinitude of Divine knowledge of the past. Human freedom is compatible with such infinite knowledge, though (as some have maintained) not with foreknowledge; and as complete knowledge of the past, being infinite, is of the same 'dignity' as knowledge of both past and future, Keyser is able to say that human freedom is in any case compatible with the 'dignity' of omniscience, if not with omniscience.[1] This, after all, does not bring comfort to theologians who are concerned to defend Divine omniscience as to the future. Nor has theology of late been especially zealous to retain the particular term 'infinite' in its enumeration of the attributes of God. In any case it need not continue to be anxious to do so. For, as we have seen, the term seems never to have borne any connotation which is at the same time definite and valuable, and it has tended largely to be replaced, since the time of Parmenides, by terms such as 'perfect' and 'eternal.' Discussion of what these, in turn, connote, will be undertaken in future contributions.

F. R. Tennant.

[1] *Op. cit.*, pp. 92 ff.

The term 'dignity' (Cantor's *Mächtigkeit*), which has a precise meaning in the mathematics of the infinite, is here 'applied,' apparently, only in the sense which the word bears in common discourse.

A FRESH STUDY OF ZECHARIAH'S VISIONS.

It has long been recognised that these visions, which occupy the greater part of i. 7 to vi. 8 in our present book of Zechariah and which are fitted with an introduction i. 2–6, stand by themselves, not only in this prophecy but in the Old Testament. They differ from the visions of Amos chap. viii. in that they are much more deliberately artistic, and are patently the outcome of conscious and full reflection on the part of the prophet. Not that the visions of Amos have no connexion with matters to which the prophet had already given thought. They show what had already been the theme of his meditation. But they might very well have been the product of what is to-day called his sub-conscious mind ; i.e., the prophet may well have seen, flung up without his own conscious reflection, these reproductions of mental processes, these sudden answers to quiet broodings.

Zechariah's visions, on the other hand, bear rather the signs of being the outcome of intense and conscious thought. The form in which they are cast is the artistic medium which he deliberately chose in order to convey to other men conclusions which were the outcome of his convictions. But the conclusions themselves and the convictions were not arrived at by means of the visions : they were reached prior to the visions, which were but the clothing in which he reproduced what he meant to say. In this respect what comes nearest to Zechariah's visions is the visions of Ezekiel. There, too, we have the vision used as an artistic medium for conveying thoughts on the Divine nature and purpose which the prophet had reached before his vision. Only I cannot but feel—though this is a mere subjective impression—that Ezekiel's visions are not so much a consciously chosen medium for his thought.

They seem in his case, however they came, to have been a means by which the prophet was aided to clarify for himself his own thought. Ezekiel arrived at his convictions partly through his visions, while Zechariah had reached his independently and turned to the form of the vision as an artistic medium for his self-expression.

Principal Smith has expressed surprise that a man who, like Zechariah, has the gift of direct and vigorous speech, who has a sane and beautiful message to deliver to his nation and who is so capable of uttering it, should have chosen to convey his thought through pictures of smiths and horns, of chariots and lampstand. But does not one see something of the same kind appear in the case of Ezekiel ? The earlier prophet has quite as direct a speech, when he condemns idolatry or urges definite and clear duties on his people. Yet his vision of the chariot is full of symbolism and obscure symbolism, which makes one rise continually from the study of it, as Dr. Davidson said, with a certain sense of defeat. There are minds, clear pungent minds with a gift of expressive speech, which love pictures and pictures of the Pre-Raphaelite type, full of detail clearly conceived and minutely described, but full also of symbolic detail which is not so clear in its meaning to other men as it was to those who saw and described it. The men see these things so clearly themselves that they are incapable of realising how dim they may become to other men. Illustrations are admirable when they accompany a letterpress : they are dangerous media when they stand alone.

Now, because the visions are the outcome of reflection on Zechariah's part and to a large extent the literary form into which he has cast his thought, they have a close connexion and are best studied as forming a united whole, which deals with a common subject. It is worth while to try to discover what this may be. In doing so, it will of course

be also necessary to take care that everything which forms no real part of the vision is excluded.

The first vision, i. 8–17, introduces at once the main subject of the whole, viz., the imminence of the day of the Lord. It serves at the same time to show on broad lines how Zechariah conceived of this day, so far at least as concerns the means by which it is to be brought about. The horsemen, who have been sent to walk through the earth and bring back report of its condition, intimate that the whole earth lieth quiet and at rest, i.e., there is no sign of that Messianic age which is to usher in the period of Israel's deliverance. When the angel, who is coming to be very like the guardian angel of Israel in Daniel, cries aloud to Yahweh for relief to the nation in the apparent hopelessness of any relief, he receives the assurance that, despite all appearances to the contrary, Yahweh is about to intervene for His people's help and for the chastisement of the nations which have abused their position by ill-treatment of the chosen people.

It is well known that such a description of the world at the time of the prophecy does not answer to the political condition of Darius' empire. The world was very far indeed from lying quiet and at rest. "The elevation of Darius to the throne was the signal for the outbreak of great disturbances in the Persian empire. As we learn from the Behistun inscription, a series of pretenders arose in different parts of the empire, and many provinces revolted, which had all to be reconquered by Darius. First, Susiana rebelled under one Atrina, who styled himself king there: then Babylon, under Nidintubel, who claimed to be 'Nebuchadnezzar, son of Nabuna'id' and who is shown by contract tables to have reigned in Babylon from October 521, till August 520, when Darius defeated Nidintubel in front of Babylon, and, entering the city a few days afterwards, put him to

death. Whilst he was in Babylon, Darius tells us, the provinces of Persia, Susiana, Media, Assyria, Armenia, Parthia, Margiana, Sattagydia, Sacia all revolted. . . . Altogether, Darius enumerates (including Gautáma) nine pretenders, and says that it cost him nineteen battles to put them down. His authority was not finally established in his empire till the spring of 519" (Driver).

Zechariah's "quiet" world can only therefore mean a world which shows no sign of Messiah's coming, not a world which was destitute of political agitation. One of his predecessors had seen in such a movement among the nations the indication of the intervention of Yahweh for His nation: Deutero-Isaiah had not hesitated to call Cyrus, the conqueror of Babylon, Yahweh's servant and Messiah. Zechariah is not looking in that direction at all for his Messianic age. It is not to come through political upheaval or change in the position of the great nations of the world. He looks for it directly from Yahweh, who is to intervene because of His having compassion on His people, and because He is angry with the nations whom He used as the rod of chastisement on Israel's sins, but who abused the position into which they were placed. The prophet is not scanning the wide horizon of the world to see in any change in its strange fortunes the breaking of a new dawn for the distressed Israelites: he is looking away from earthly movements to Israel's God, and from Him and from Him alone he expects the sure and immediate rise of a better day. All other signs are against so greatly desired a change: but the one sure sign does not fail to the prophet, viz., that which comes from the unchanging nature and the unfaltering purpose of Yahweh. He alone brings in His day, and He is about to do it.

Further, so far as this vision carries us, the day concerns Israel and Israel only. In a measure it concerns the nations,

but it only concerns them, because, and in so far as, they have been in contact with Israel. It shall be a day of indignation upon them because of their treatment of the people for whom Yahweh is now jealous with a jealousy which prompts Him to intervene on their behalf.

Hence Zechariah passes directly to his second vision, i. 18–21, viz., that of the four horns and of the four smiths who are to break down the horns. The horns are the nations in all the four quarters of the world which have used their power to ruin Judah and Israel. The smiths are agents commissioned by Yahweh to break down the horns. Both are present before Yahweh : and, even as the nations exist in their pride, so the smiths have already received their commission. The day of the Lord is at hand. The prophet's theme is repeated : but this time its concern is with the nations of the world. These are regarded merely from the point of view of their treatment of the chosen nation. As they scattered Israel, so shall they be scattered. The attitude is entirely different from that which was taken by Amos. Amos could see and did say that in the great day of the Lord the nations shall be judged according to their deeds, even those deeds which had no immediate influence on Israel's fortunes. He could denounce doom on the little tribe which burned the bones of a neighbouring kinglet into lime, because the crime was a crime against humanity though it did not at all affect the fate of Israel.

One may not justly, and ought not rashly to conclude from this that the later prophet takes a different view of the nations and of their fate. It is possible for a prophet to believe that certain peoples have been cruel and brutal, and for these vices deserve and shall receive a severe judgment, although the cruelties about which he speaks have been practised towards his own nation.

On the vision which describes the judgment on the nations,

so far as they have oppressed Israel, Zechariah makes to follow the vision of the man with the measuring-line who goes out to measure Jerusalem, ii. 1–5. This man is not sent to his task, nor does he go from the presence of God, like the chariots or an angel: he is self-commissioned. He is the representative of a class of men, of whom there must have been many in the troubled impoverished little community at Jerusalem, who likes to see the exact measure of everything which he undertakes. Such men are everywhere, excellent men for their task, but without the imagination which accompanies a large faith in God. They seek to limit the future by the measures of the past and reconstruct along the exact lines which that past seems to them to have laid down and made possible for the future. But Zechariah sees the future as coming from God, and brought about through His direct agency. Because it is to come thus directly from God, it and its outcome are illimitable. They cannot be charted out according to the measures which man's narrow experience supplies: they are only to be limited by the power and the promises of Him whose kingdom is being set up by Himself.

Accordingly, the interpreting angel sends one of his subordinates to tell the man with the line to cease from his self-imposed duty. Jerusalem is to have no walls. Walls are useless to the new world which Yahweh is bringing about. If they are regarded as limits, they only cramp the boundless influences of a city which expresses a divine thought about man and for man. If they are regarded as defence, they only serve to make men forget that the future kingdom of God needs none, since it has God Himself as its protector. It may be pressing the prophet's thought too far to say that he regards the Messianic future as too spiritual to be defended or to be capable of defence by earthly weapons. For what may be in his mind is possibly that in

the new world there shall be no enemies left to conquer or to oppose the blessed powers of the kingdom of everlasting right. Yet one cannot but notice his saying that Yahweh is to be a wall of fire round about. Certainly, such a statement, taken by itself, seems to suggest that there shall be foes to the kingdom but that Yahweh will make its sure defence. Yet it is possible that all he meant to say was to promise sure continuance and safety to the new Jerusalem, while he did not clearly picture to himself from what it should be thus secure.

To this vision there has been appended a little address, ii. 6–13, which reminds the reader very strongly of the hymns in Deutero–Isaiah. It forms an address to the scattered Jews of the diaspora, urging their return in order that they may share in the security and peace of the new kingdom, and thus seeking to provide for the limitless new Jerusalem a sufficient population of faithful sons. If one could feel sure that the summons was written by Zechariah himself, it might go far to answer the question of the last paragraph, viz., as to those against whom Yahweh is to be a wall of fire for His own. In that case, we should have to conceive that the nations are to continue as nations, outside the Messianic kingdom, when God has renewed the condition of His own people. But it is possible that Principal G. A. Smith is right in his suggestion that this is a foreign fragment introduced by another hand, though it dates from an earlier period. Personally, I do not feel the need to regard it as belonging to any other than Zechariah himself, for, both in language and idea, it may very well have been written by the prophet. If it is borrowed and added, it has been added with greater understanding than some of the other additions that have found their way into the prophets. Its connexion is singularly good and its presence very effective in the place in which it

occurs. When Yahweh does such great things for His people may He find a people capable of faith in Him, and may they answer to His summons when He comes.

Since, however, the hymn, whether it is by Zechariah or not, forms no integral part of the preceding vision, it can be used for no more than illustration of the thoughts of the prophet.

There follows the remarkable vision of Joshua, the high priest, who is here the representative of the community, accused by the Satan before the angel, iii. 1–10. None of the visions shows more clearly than this the extent to which all the visions are the outcome of prolonged meditation on the part of the prophet, and the artistic expression of his slowly ripened convictions. The Satan, be it noted, is no fallen angel: such an idea is wholly foreign to this stage of Hebrew thought. What he represents is best understood from two other passages. The one is that in which the widow, with whom Elijah lodged, said after the death of her son, "Art thou come to call my sin to remembrance and to slay my son?" (1 Kings xvii. 18). She does not think of the prophet as calling her sin to her own remembrance, since the fact of her remembering her sin has no connexion with her son's death. She means that Elijah has called her sin to God's remembrance. God might have ignored her sin and passed it by, but for the appearance of this prophet, who, in his function of accusing man or community of sin, has reminded God of hers. As a result of God's attention being called to her transgression, the penalty has followed and her son has died. The other passage is the prologue to the Book of Job. Here the Satan is the angel who has as his function to bring forward those things in a man which merit the divine judgment. He does this, as a servant of God, not as one who has any independent function. He represents, as it were, the unsatisfied justice

of God, which demands that men shall suffer for their sin. He does not misrepresent anything: he simply tells the truth of what men are, though the side of that truth which embodied justice sees and emphasises is the part of man's nature and conduct which merits judgment.

Join this idea of the Satan with the other idea, so prevalent in Hebrew thought, that a man's outward condition was the indication of his inward state before God and of his desert, and it is easy to understand the scene presented in the vision. The community at Jerusalem was "clothed in filthy raiment," poor, struggling with surrounding enemies, torn with internal dissensions, suffering from bad harvests. Everything seemed to be against them. Surely there was sufficient evidence in their condition that their God was still angry with them. He had not yet exhausted all that indignation which had led Him to cast their fathers and themselves into exile. There still reigned over them the inexorable, unsatisfied justice of the Almighty. They do not question that they have deserved it, i.e., the humble and pious among them do not. They are rather profoundly conscious of the sense of ill-desert which the exile, following on the utterances of the great prophets, had produced in the minds of those who remained faithful to their religion. But they are utterly depressed, as men must be, who have a vivid belief in the direct government of God and who also believe that this government is being strictly controlled by the dictates of the divine justice.

Now Zechariah for himself has overcome such a view. He has become convinced that, in His purposes with the community, God's mercy is to prevail over His justice. The day of the Lord is to Zechariah a day in which the Divine mercy prevails over justice. But the great task of a prophet, as of any man, who has become sure for himself of some profound spiritual truth which he has received through his

own experience, is to mediate this to other men, who have not had the same experience as himself. Zechariah chooses this vivid vision to make clear his faith to his people.

First the angel, speaking as though he were but the representative of Yahweh or His outward self-manifestation, rebukes the Satan. The Lord who hath chosen, or better, who delighteth in,[1] Jerusalem rebuke thee. There is the key-note of the vision—the Lord who delighteth in Jerusalem: His mercy is now supreme. Then the angel bids his attendants reclothe the representative of the community in clean garments and so make outwardly manifest the favour with which its God regards it: "I have caused thine iniquity to pass from thee and I clothe thee with rich apparel." What is the divine resolution concerning His people will soon appear in their outward condition. Finally, the angel gives an exhortation and encouragement to the community for the future: "If thou wilt walk in my ways and keep my charge, if thou wilt also rule my house and keep my courts, I will give thee right of entry among those who stand continually by (Me)."[2]

The divine *grace* now governs the fortunes of the struggling

[1] בחר of v. 2 is better translated "delight in" than "choose." "Choose" gives too much the appearance of a wholly new beginning. Note how often בחר is parallel to "love," Deut. iv. 37; vii. 7 f.

[2] It is better so to translate the verse, following the Massoretic accents and the Jewish interpretation. The R.V. makes the apodosis begin at "thou shalt judge my house," and has in its favour גַּם אַתָּה with which that sentence begins, and which emphasises the sentence that thus begins. Presumably then the meaning of "thou shalt judge my house" is that the high-priest now is promised complete control over the temple as contrasted with the limited control he had during the existence of the kingdom. But this reference to the period of the kingdom seems far-fetched. It is better to make גַּם אַתָּה mark the transition from the high-priest's private life to his public duties. If thou wilt walk in my ways and keep my charge—duties incumbent on every member of the community (cf. for this sense of שְׁמֹר מִשְׁמֶרֶת, Gen. xxvi. 5; Num. ix. 19, 23, etc.), if thou wilt also rule my house and keep my courts—the specific duties of the priest, then thou shalt have the right of entry among those who stand continually before Me, i.e., thou shalt maintain for the community the assurance of the divine grace being over it.

community: but as ever that grace is conditioned by the faithfulness of the community to the simple and far-reaching requirements of its God. Let them prove their loyalty to the grace in which they now stand by patient fulfilment of the divine requirements. If they do this, they shall have right of entry before God, the power to walk continually in the assurance of His favour. The outcome will be the speedy coming of Messiah, for the restoration of the priesthood with its right of access to God given back is the guarantee that Messiah is at hand.[1] For, the angel concludes, Yahweh has a stone, the ornament of the high-priest, already graven with its graving; and this, worn by one who is promised constant access into the divine presence, means that the iniquity of the land, which has always formed the hindrance to God's favour, is removed utterly by God Himself.[2]

[1] Wellhausen says that the restoration of the priesthood is the pledge of the restoration of the independent king and kingdom of Judah. But this ignores how Zechariah is nowhere interested in the restoration of Judah's independent kingdom *per se*, and it further ignores the clear Messianic reference of צֶמַח: the "shoot" is never an earthly king, but the King of the consummation. Even if, as Wellhausen holds, Zechariah believed that Zerubbabel was to be Messiah, it remains true that he expected him to be Messiah, not an ordinary king over Judah. The old kingdom was not to be restored in him, as the priesthood had been restored in Joshua. Even a post-exilic prophet would not have departed so far from the attitude of the earlier prophets toward the kingdom.

[2] Verse 9, as is well known, is a *crux commentatorum*. It is impossible here to enter into any discussion of the suggestions as to its meaning which are as widely divergent as they are numerous. It may be enough to say that what determines me to see in הָאֶבֶן an ornament for the high priest is the last clause of the verse which promises that Yahweh is removing the iniquity of the land. On the one hand, that receives its explanation from Exodus xxviii. 36, 38, where the ornaments of the high priest are connected with forgiveness. On the other hand, it agrees with the whole sense of the vision, which in the rebuke of the Satan, and the removal of the filthy garments from Joshua as well as in the grant of constant access to God's presence promises assurance of forgiveness. I do not suggest that Zechariah refers to a high-priestly ornament which already existed and which he already knew, for a community, which had not yet succeeded in rebuilding its temple, is not likely to have planned the details of the priest's garments.

Throughout, the vision insists that now Yahweh's justice is satisfied and that the community may rest in the assurance of the constancy of the divine mercy by which it is maintained. Yahweh's grace guarantees its present continuance and makes sure a more glorious future in the speedy coming of the shoot, even Messiah.

On the greatness of all which was involved in such an assurance Zechariah fell into deep meditation from which the angel needed to rouse him, as one rouses a man who has fallen into sleep, iv. 1. The angel is charged with another vision, that of the lampstand, iv. 1–6*a*, 10*b*–14. Here, again, it is necessary to remove *vv.* 6*b*–10*a*, a message of encouragement to Zerubbabel in the task of rebuilding the temple, which disturbs the close connection between *vv.* 6*a* and 10*b*. Yet it is necessary, not only to remove the verses, but to try to forget them in the effort to interpret what is left. Unfortunately, even those who have seen the necessity of taking away the little address have not allowed the remaining vision to speak for itself, but have permitted the address to Zerubbabel to influence their interpretation of the remaining verses, notably in the direction of finding in the vision a reference to Zerubbabel which does not exist. Zechariah sees, then, a lampstand provided with seven lamps and a reservoir of oil to supply its lamps with a constant supply. Now this lampstand has really nothing to do with what is called the golden candlestick of the second temple. Certainly the second temple was provided with a single lampstand (Exod. xxv. 31–40), as contrasted with Solomon's temple, which possessed ten separate lamps (1 Kings vii. 49 ; cf. Jeremiah lii. 19). But it is likely that the temple, which was not yet even finished, was not furnished with such a detail as its lights : and the likelihood becomes certainty when it is noticed that Zechariah, who came of a priestly race, definitely tells the

angel that he does not even know what the thing which is shown to him can be (*vv.* 4, 5). Besides, the lights which burned in the temple represented an offering which Israel presented before God continually: they were, like the sacrifices and offerings, gifts in honour of the temple and Him who reigned there. The lights Zechariah saw are the seven eyes of Yahweh which go to and fro over the whole earth (*v.* 10*b*). They represent nothing which man offers, but something which Yahweh continually sends. They stand for that abiding Providence of God which watches continually over and perfectly knows all that takes place in His world. In this way the vision agrees with all the other visions. They all speak of what Yahweh is doing or is about to do, not of what men are doing. Where they speak of human deeds, they speak of these as based on or required by the activities of God. Zechariah teaches in his visions what Yahweh is towards Israel or towards the world. What is the subject of the other visions is clearly also the theme of this one.

When this is held clearly, it is necessary to interpret in its light the meaning of the two "sons of oil" which stand beside the Lord of all the earth (*vv.* 11, 14). These are generally understood to apply primarily to Zerubbabel and Joshua as the two heads of the Jewish community, and secondarily to State and Church, as supplying the offering of the oil for the lamps. Here the presence of the little address to Zerubbabel has worked mischievously on the interpretation of the whole vision. In reality the two "sons of oil" have nothing to do with Zerubbabel or Joshua, or any other human agents. The interpretation is as inaccurate from the point of view of language as from that of exegesis. "Sons of oil," does not naturally mean "anointed ones," as king and priest were anointed in Israel: the phrase undoubtedly suggests that the two were

full of oil.[1] As referred to Zerubbabel and Joshua, the words can only mean "anointed ones." Besides, the oil throughout the vision is not employed for anointing but for illumination. It is difficult to see how the fact of these two, who represent Church and State, being anointed can qualify them for giving a supply of oil to anything. But the great difficulty in the way of this interpretation is that the lamps are not lighted by men in order to honour God. They are not symbols of the Jewish Church illuminating the world with light. If they had been such, they would have needed and should doubtless have received help and supply from human agents. But the lights are the eyes of Yahweh which run to and fro through the earth. And no human agents would ever be represented, at least by a Hebrew prophet, as supplying an essential requisite to these agents of the Almighty.

In reality the two sons of oil are as supernatural as the eyes themselves: they stand before the Lord of all the earth as His constant ministers. Whether they supply anything to the lamps is more than doubtful.[2] It is possible that, as the man among the myrtle-trees received report from the horsemen who traversed the earth, the two figures maintain and receive report from the all-searching eyes. But, even if they are conceived as supplying anything, they do so directly from Yahweh, and are but His agents for this purpose. Probably, however, they were originally meant to be those to whom the eyes, the

[1] Note as a slight but confirmatory indication that these are called בְּנֵי הַיִּצְהָר. Now יִצְהָר means unrefined juice of olives, cf. Deut. vii. 13; xi. 14; Num. xviii. 12. The word for prepared oil is שֶׁמֶן, Exod. xxv. 6; 1 Sam. x. 1.

[2] Verse 12 is very dubiously original. One always suspects a clause which is ushered in by "I answered a second time," especially when, as is the case here, there is no reason apparent for a second inquiry. Then the language is of a very difficult and dubious character, and the construction makes rather weird Hebrew.

hypostatised agents of Yahweh's care over His world made report of what they had seen in their survey of all the world.

The vision is wider than the one which precedes it. The community has been assured, in the vision of the rebuke to the Satan and of the reclothing of Joshua in clean garments, of the loving care of Yahweh for its interests. Now Zechariah speaks about the Lord of all the earth and of His agents in the world. The Providence of God watches over all His works, and not merely over Israel. He watches, through those who bring Him true report, over the interests of all creatures, to know when the time is ripe for bringing in His purpose. But nothing escapes those vigilant eyes, which are as unwearied as they are vigilant, since they draw supply of vigour continually from Him who constantly sends them out on their mission. Let not the community think, in the slow, unchanging years, that nothing happens or can happen for their help. They, and the world in which they live, are the objects of that unsleeping Providence which has watched over all things from the beginning and which has not ceased from its inquiry and its heedfulness.

It were well, however, continues the next vision, v. 1-4, that the community should remember what is implied in living under such a vigilant care. God has seen not only that which happens on the face of all the earth, but that which is continuing among His own nation. In particular, He has seen the impunity which perjurer and thief have so long enjoyed even in Israel.[1] The vigilant eyes which watch all human things have taken note of this moral indifference among His

[1] Read in verse 3 זֶה בַּמֶּה for מִזֶּה כָּמוֹהָ, and note how the phrase is used in vii. 3 for "how long." This retains the usual sense for נִקָּה and gives the meaning "this long time back a thief has remained immune from punishment" but such a condition shall cease. The translation recommended has the further advantage that by its adoption *v.* 4 becomes more than a mere repetition of *v.* 3.

own people and have given in their report. Yahweh is resolved that such a condition shall come to an end. Before the day of the consummation can arrive, there must be a people fit to welcome it and fit to live in it. Else its coming were not the blessing to the world which Yahweh has designed it to be. Zechariah sees the flying roll of the curse which is to alight on all such sinners in Israel, and which, because it comes from Yahweh Himself and is directed by His unerring wisdom, will purge these away. "I will cause it to go forth and it shall enter into the house of the thief, and into the house of the perjurer, and it shall take up its abode there and consume the house, wood and stone alike." Such sinners shall cease to form any part of the community. To destroy hut or house is to shut their owners out of the clan or tribe or nation to which they belong.

It is no slight thing, says Zechariah, to live under the awful care of God. His purpose is to set up a new kingdom on the earth, and for the fulfilment of that purpose there must be worthy men. Before He brings the new outward conditions, He will see to it that there is a people prepared for the Lord and for the life and blessings which He is making sure. And the long impunity which sinners have enjoyed is no protection to them from the eyes of Him who seeth and searcheth into all things.

Yet the removal of certain offenders is not sufficient, as the next vision proves, v. 5–11. The root of all offence must be cut out. The angel brought forth something [1] with the usual inquiry by which to draw the prophet's attention to his action. Zechariah learned that he saw a barrel which contained the sin of all the land [2] and, when the lid was lifted, found that in it crouched a woman who was

[1] At verse 5 point ויצא as hiph. וַיּוֹצֵא

[2] At verse 6 read for עֵינָם their appearance, עֲוֹנָם their sin, with LXX *ἡ ἀδικία αὐτῶν*.

wickedness itself. The figure was cast down into the barrel with a lid securely covering it, and barrel, lid and woman were carried by two wide-winged figures[1] to Babylon, where henceforth wickedness might make its home. There it might be established on its base in its own house, since such a land was fit for such a visitant.

The method of expressing the prophet's thought seems to us perhaps clumsy enough: but, if we have sufficient patience to reach beyond the clothing in which the thought is wrapped, it proves a remarkable advance in Hebrew thinking, or in any thinking. Zechariah has advanced beyond the thought of sin as consisting of isolated, individual acts of transgression. He has gone further than merely to see the sinners of the community as a certain number of perjurers and thieves, who can be separated from the rest, and whose removal will leave the remnant wholly purged and innocent. He has seen the evil heart out of which all sin in its individual acts springs, and which, so long as it remains, will produce a fresh crop of perjurers and thieves after the first number has been purged away. He has realised that this appears in all men deep-rooted, permanent, universal, enduring. Sin has become to him something of an independent power carrying on its dreadful work, not in a few, but in the whole multitude. Having seen this, he has recognised also that the only one who can remove it is Yahweh Himself. No human resolution, nor any official action, such as might have made it impossible for perjurer and thief to remain immune from punishment in the holy land, can be of permanent efficacy. But, even as it needs Yahweh to remove it, so men will find

[1] Note the prophet's love for exact detail in his imagery. The figures have the wings of storks. The man has seen the flights of storks which crossed and cross Palestine in their annual migration. When he thinks of creatures flying East, he thinks of storks' wings because he sees them so in his mind's eye.

that Yahweh can and will give the new heart which is as necessary as the new conditions and the new covenant which are to appear in the day of the Lord.

God has promised to manifest His grace to His people, so that they shall find the assurance of His forgiveness and live therein with complete and ready access to His presence. He has assured them of the new conditions of the outward sort which are symbolised in the clean garments of Joshua and the rebuked Satan. Now He makes sure that the source out of which all the evil past sprang shall not continue to devastate the new future. Before His day which shall renovate the world and Israel's fate, He will renovate Israel itself by removing what has always been, what, if it remained, would always be the source of its ruin.

Finally (vi. 1–8) Zechariah saw the four chariots of the Lord going out into all the earth. They were eager to fulfil the commission of their Lord,[1] and now, when He judges that everything is ready, He sends them forth. The judgments of the Lord are already abroad, says the prophet, on all the earth : and the day of the Lord is at hand. Men need not fear or hesitate or doubt : Maranatha.

When one now gathers up all the visions and seeks to grasp their general import, it will be seen that they have one theme, the imminence of the day of the Lord with what this implies specially for Israel and for the nations which have come into close contact with Israel. The fact that all the visions have a common theme confirms the view of them as being the outcome of close meditation and deliberate artistic purpose. Zechariah has pondered over his subject, turning it this way and that, seeing its meaning in one direction and in another. And now he chooses this

[1] In v. 7 " sought to go," should be referred to all the chariots, not as in R.V. to that with the bay horses alone. The direction in which the bay horses were to go has fallen out. The bay horses went—somewhere or other. And they all were fretting to go.

special method of bringing it before the notice of the public whom he addresses. He clothes his thought in such figures as shall best, he thinks, make it appeal to the world in which he lives.

But further, one sees how i. 3–6 forms an integral part of the central theme, and is not a mere general introduction or address on the need for repentance, such as any prophet at any time might utter. It belongs to the visions in their unity, for it is closely related to their common theme. Since Yahweh is about to act and act greatly for the salvation of His people, let them repent as their fathers did not, so that they may be ready to meet Him and welcome Him in His day. Your fathers, says Zechariah, only repented after the chastisement had fallen upon them : they did not listen to the prophets and so prevent the chastisement. Be not ye as unrepentant as your fathers, lest the day of the Lord, when it comes, be turned for you into doom, and ye repent only when it is already too late. What Zechariah has to say is practically the message of John the Baptist, " Repent, for the kingdom of God is at hand." Yahweh is about to intervene in His world : prepare to meet your God.

The more one works at the materials left from the community which founded the second temple, the clearer does it appear that the devout souls among them lived, like the early Christians, in the expectation of a parousia. The parousia was that of Yahweh with all the historical content which had come to connect itself with His great name, and consequently the effect of the expectation on those who looked and longed for His appearance was very different from that which attended the later situation. But the men were looking for a kingdom, which only God could bring in, and, as Zechariah's visions make clear, was one which would guarantee the continuance of a grace wherein and whereby the faithful were to live. For such a king-

dom all souls could only prepare by a hearty repentance. To pursue the subject, however, would lead too far from the immediate purpose of this paper.

ADAM C. WELCH.

THE DATE OF MARK'S GOSPEL.

THE Sunday School world is now studying the Gospel of Mark. Already the interest of the world of New Testament scholarship had been centred upon the Second Gospel as one of the Two Documents (Q and Mark) used by Matthew and Luke for the major part of their Gospels. Critics are not quite unanimous on this solution of the Synoptic Problem, for Zahn still insists that the Aramaic Matthew precedes Mark (*Introduction to the New Testament*, transl., 1909, vol. ii. pp. 394 ff.)as his interpretation of what Irenaeus and Clement of Alexandria say. But the majority of modern scholars agree with Sanday, who says pointedly: "We assume what is commonly known as the 'Two-Document Hypothesis'" (*Oxford Studies in the Synoptic Problem*, 1911, p. 2). In either case, whether one follows Sanday (as I do) on this point or Zahn, the date of Mark is still a matter of debate and of importance.

The general effect of the "Two-Document Hypothesis" has been to push Mark back to a comparatively early date. If we admit the use of Mark by Luke, this seems necessary. Even Bartlet admits this, though he does not concur with the view that Q was so used: "That our Mark was used in the two other Synoptic Gospels I firmly believe, and so far agree with the current documentary hypothesis. On the other hand, I cannot see that the common use of a second document, whether by Matthew and Luke alone, or by Mark also, is probable" ("The Sources of St. Luke's Gospel," p. 315 in *Oxford Studies*).

The argument is therefore part of a chain, the links of which hang together. Harnack admits that the reasonable explanation for the close of Acts is that events had at that time proceeded no further. "We are accordingly left with the result: that the concluding verses of the Acts of the Apostles, taken in conjunction with the absence of any reference in the book to the result of the trial of St. Paul and to his martyrdom, make it in the highest degree probable that the work was written at a time when St. Paul's trial in Rome had not yet come to an end" (*Date of the Acts and of the Synoptic Gospels*, transl., 1911, p. 99). After a survey of the argument of Wellhausen that the destruction of Jerusalem had taken place before Luke xxi. 20–24 was written, Harnack says: "Hence it is proved that it is altogether wrong to say that the eschatological passages force us to the conclusion that the third Gospel was written after the year 70 A.D." Since Luke wrote his Gospel before the Acts, as he himself says (Acts i. 1), the first question is the date of Paul's release from his first Roman imprisonment. It is not certain that Nero passed on the case or that it came to trial. But, whether Paul was dismissed without trial or set free after trial, it could not be later than A.D. 63. Ramsay places it "towards the end of A.D. 61" (*St. Paul the Traveller and the Roman Citizen*, p. 357). In any case we may allow some three years (two in Rome and the year of the voyage) for the completion of the Gospel of Luke in Caesarea where Paul (with Luke) spent two years (Acts xxiv. 27). This was about 56–58 A.D. It is not necessary to date the Gospel of Luke so long before and to place its composition in Caesarea, though this is the natural thing to do, for, while in Palestine, Luke had the time and the opportunity to procure the data used by him (Luke i. 1–4). Luke may have completed his Gospel in Rome. This is the conclusion of Harnack: "It

now seems to be established beyond question that both books of this great historical writer were written while St. Paul was still alive" (*Ibid.*, p. 124).

It is clear that if this line of argument is correct, Mark's Gospel must come not later than 60 A.D. and probably earlier. Wellhausen [1] admits that it is not later than the sixth decade A.D. Harnack [2] concurs. It is here assumed, of course, that Luke wrote both Gospel and Acts. Harnack (*Luke the Physician*, transl., 1907, p. 14) agrees with the judgment of Zahn: "Hobart [3] has proved for every one who can at all appreciate proof that the author of the Lukan work was a man practised in the scientific language of Greek medicine—in short, a Greek physician." [4]

If we seek the earliest probable date and not the latest, we are at once confronted with Q (the other main source of Matthew and Luke), which was apparently earlier than Mark. Indeed, there are not wanting those who find in Mark traces of the use of Q. The whole question of the limits of Q is involved, but it cannot be discussed here. It is enough to say that we are not justified in confining Q solely to what is preserved in Matthew and Luke (cf. "The Original Extent of Q" by Streeter, *Oxford Studies in the Synoptic Problem*, pp. 184–208). We may admit that Mark shows some use of Q. "We hold, therefore, that Mark knew and used Q, but only to a limited extent" (Streeter, "St. Mark's Knowledge and Use of Q," p. 178, *Oxford Studies in the Synoptic Problem*). If so, then Mark is later than Q. But Moffatt opposes the idea that Mark knew Q.[5]

[1] *Einleitung in die drei ersten Evangelien*, p. 87.
[2] *Date of the Acts and the Synoptic Gospels*, p. 18.
[3] *The Medical Language of St. Luke*, 1882, pp. 305 ff.
[4] *Einl.*, ii. p. 427.
[5] *Introduction to the Literature of the New Testament*, 1911, p. 221; Wellhausen, *Einl. in die drei ersten Evangelien*, pp. 73 ff., makes Q dependent on Mark.

But what is the date of Q? Streeter says: "The interval of time between the original writing of Q and its use by Matthew and Luke was probably very considerable" (*Oxford Studies*, p. 205). "The Gospel of Mark forms the transition" (*Ibid.*, p. 210) from Q to Matthew and Luke. Streeter thinks that Q "was probably written twenty years before Mark" ("Literary Evolution of the Gospels," *Oxford Studies*, p. 219). Ramsay (The Expositor, May, 1907) holds that Q was written during the ministry of Jesus, since it stops short of the events of Passion Week. Salmon (*The Human Element in the Gospels*, 1907, p. 274) holds the same view. Streeter (*Oxford Studies*, p. 215) holds that the expectation of the nearness of the Parousia explains the absence of the Passion Week in Q and suggests twelve years after the death of Christ as a probable date for Q. Nolloth[1] has argued that the common use of shorthand during this period renders it quite possible that Q contained shorthand reports of the Sayings of Jesus. If we place Q at 42 A.D. and Luke's Gospel at 58 A.D., we seem to have the limits for Mark's Gospel. Allen indeed proposes 50 A.D. as the date for our Gospel of Mark (*Introduction to the Books of the New Testament*, p. 213). It is interesting to note how the most recent and reliable synoptic criticism thus points to an early date for Mark's Gospel.

If Matthew's Greek Gospel made use of Mark, as is now generally admitted, though some voices insist that Mark made use of the Aramaic Matthew, the argument for the early date of Mark is made still stronger. In spite of Zahn's contention that Mark used the Aramaic Matthew (*Introduction to the New Testament*, transl., vol. ii. pp. 601 f.), M. Jones concludes that "the use of St. Mark by the authors of the First and Third Gospels as one of their main sources

[1] *The Rise of the Christian Religion*, 1917, p. 23. Nolloth (p. 20) places Mark's Gospel "about A.D. 50."

seems proved beyond dispute" (*The New Testament in the Twentieth Century*, 1914). It is not necessary to show that Luke made use of Matthew to prove the early date of Mark's Gospel.

Allen proposes a still earlier date for Mark's Gospel in an Aramaic form: "A very suitable date would be about the year A.D. 44, when St. Peter, who had been prominent as a leader of the Church at Jerusalem, was obliged to leave the city (*Introduction to the Books of the New Testament*, p. 13). But the whole question of the Aramaic original of our Greek Mark is quite uncertain. In fact, I am inclined to agree with the judgment of Swete (*Commentary*, p. xxxvii.) that a translator would hardly give both the transliteration and the translation of the Aramaic. Allen seeks to overcome this point by suggesting that Mark himself wrote the Aramaic while with Peter in Jerusalem about 44 A.D., and made the translation while with Paul and Barnabas at Antioch about 50 A.D. I do not care to discuss here the position of Blass, Marshall and Wellhausen that the original Mark was in Aramaic. The point that is pertinent is that the date of the Greek Mark seems to be as early as A.D. 50.

It is true that some of the early Christian writers suggest Rome as the place where the Gospel of Mark was written. Papias, however, has nothing as to the place of writing. Harnack examines with care all these traditions and concludes: "Tradition asserts no veto against the hypothesis that St. Luke, when he met St. Mark in the company of St. Paul the prisoner was permitted by him to peruse a written record of the Gospel history which was essentially identical with the Gospel of St. Mark which was given to the Church at a later time" (*Date of Acts and Synoptic Gospels*, p. 133). Harnack suggests, therefore, that Mark made a "final revision" of his work in Rome. There is nothing incongruous in the idea that Mark revised his Gos-

pel once or twice. Holdsworth (*Gospel Origins*, 1913, p. 115), indeed, suggests that Mark wrote one edition of his Gospel at Caesarea, a shorthand report of Peter's sermon (Acts x. 34 ff.), another later in Egypt, and another in Rome. It is not necessary to pass finally on these suggestions. They all go to show how criticism has cautiously felt its way in the study of the Gospel sources. Allen (*op. cit.*, p. 13) is willing to concede a third edition of Mark's Gospel in Rome. Swete wished to reserve the question of editorial revision for further study (p. lix.), though he was convinced of the unity of the work and of the Marcan authorship. Even Pfleiderer (*Christian Origins*, transl., 1906, p. 222) says: "Nothing can be urged against the Church tradition that this Gospel was written by John Mark." Mark was with Peter in Jerusalem (Acts xii. 12) and later in Rome (Babylon, 1 Pet. v. 13), and possibly at other times. If his Gospel, as Papias said, rests primarily on the preaching of Peter, there is ample room for it in the early period. There is nothing to support the tradition in Irenaeus that Mark wrote after Peter's death.

The view of Wendling calls for remark. He suggests three "Marks" (M^1, M^2, M^3 = our Mark). Williams makes a careful survey of this problem under the title, "A Recent Theory of the Origin of St. Mark's Gospel" (*Oxford Studies*, pp. 387–421). Wendling's books (*Urmarcus*, 1905; *Die Entstehung des Marcus-evangeliums*, 1908) have attracted considerable attention (cf. Menzies, *Review of Theology and Philosophy*, July, 1909; *The Earliest Gospel: A Historical Study of the Gospel according to Mark*, 1901). Williams notes "the extreme interest and acuteness of the literary analysis by which the theory is supported" (*op. cit.*, p. 390) and says: "It cannot be denied the merit of ingenuity and plausibility" (*op. cit.*, p. 403). He concludes, however, "that a great deal, if not all, of Wendling's elaborate struc-

ture will have to be dismantled " and thinks that the facts have been " forced into a Procrustean mould in order to be explained " (*op. cit.*, p. 403). The Urmarcus theory still appeals to some minds, and Moffatt suggests " hesitation not in the acceptance but in the working out of the hypothesis that the canonical Mark, written shortly after A.D. 70, is based for the most part on Mark's draft of the Petrine reminiscences " (*Introduction to the Literature of the New Testament*, p. 227). Bacon calls our canonical Mark R (Redactor) in distinction from Mark's Petrine Reminiscences which were used by the Redactor. Bacon follows the tradition of Irenaeus that " Mark " (Redactor) wrote after the death of Peter as " explicit " and speaks of " the futile attempt of the divergent form of the tradition in Clement of Alexandria, to bring the writing under the *imprimatur* of Peter without making him responsible for all its contents " (*The Beginnings of Gospel Story*, 1909, p. xxxi.). The conclusion of Harnack, quoted above, seems more plausible, that these contradictory traditions leave us free to settle the date of Mark's Gospel apart from the stories in Irenaeus and Clement of Alexandria. It is hard to feel the force of Bacon's next clause : " Even the very beginnings of the composition must therefore date almost as late as the outbreak of the Jewish War (66 A.D.)." The " must therefore " rests upon Irenaeus, who is contradicted by Clement of Alexandria, Origen, Eusebius, Epiphanius, Jerome. " As it is, Mark must be dated about 70–75 A.D., and Matthew but very few years later " (Bacon, *Beginnings of the Gospel Story*, p. xxxiii.). This positive tone of Bacon is dependent upon the certainty of his theory of a Redactor. It is pertinent to quote the cautious judgment of Sir John C. Hawkins in his *Horae Synopticae* (2nd ed., 1909, p. 152). " On the whole, it seems to me that such an examination of the Marcan peculiarities, as has now been attempted, supplies

results which are largely in favour of the view that the Petrine source used by the two late Synoptics was not an 'Ur-Marcus,' but St. Mark's Gospel almost as we have it. Almost; but not quite." Hawkins sees "a later editor's hand" in i. 1, "Jesus Christ"; ix. 41, "Christ's" and some half dozen other details. Burkitt (*Gospel History and its Transmission*, 1906) also opposes the Ur-Markan Theory.

It cannot be said that the Synoptic Problem is settled. No problem in human knowledge is ever settled, so that no intellect can raise objections to it. Mr. J. M. Robertson has a new book, *The Jesus Problem*, in which he seeks to show that Jesus never existed and is only a myth of the imagination. But Maurice Jones carries most with him when he introduces his treatment of the Synoptic problem with this sentence: "The most notable achievement in the department of recent New Testament criticism is undoubtedly the fairly general agreement arrived at with regard to the mutual relations of the first three Gospels" (*The New Testament in the Twentieth Century*, p. 189).

It is not claimed that modern scholars are agreed as to the date of Mark's Gospel, only that "a very late date is not contended for" any longer (Jackson, "The Present State of the Synoptic Problem," *Cambridge Biblical Essays*, 1909, p. 440). As we have seen, the critics range from 44 A.D. to 75 A.D. Those who contend for the later date (70–75 A.D.) argue mainly from Mark xiii., which is made to depend on a "Little Apocalypse" circulated among the Jews at the time of the destruction of Jerusalem and incorporated into the Second Gospel. But it is equally possible that the hypothetical "Little Apocalypse" was a report of the discourse of Jesus on the Mount of Olives, as it purports to be, which was used by Mark. There is no real reason for thinking that Mark confined his Gospel to his own notes or recollections of Peter's discourses. He may have em-

ployed Q. He probably used oral and written sources as did Luke. Certainly the position of Mark in Jerusalem made it easy for him to learn the current interpretation of Jesus among the disciples.

Since writing thus far, I have turned to pp. 202 and 203 of Stanton's *The Gospels as Historical Documents* (Part II), where he gives his eight "conclusions from the foregoing inquiry" concerning Mark's Gospel. They are all in substantial accord with the line of argument pursued in this paper. Luke himself in his Gospel (i. 1–4) should have taught us all long ago that the writing of the sayings and deeds of Jesus began very early, for he spoke of "many" such attempts. Perhaps most of them were more or less incomplete or gave only detached incidents or reports of single discourses or parables. The Oxyrhynchus Logia of Jesus, recently discovered, furnish a partial parallel to Q. Somewhere between 40 A.D. and 60 A.D., I should say, Mark wrote his Gospel substantially as we have it now and in Greek. It seems to me that the evidence as a whole points to 50 A.D. as the probable date.

At any rate, we can all be grateful for the critical unanimity with which the priority of Mark is acknowledged and the correspondingly early date of this Gospel. It is worth all that it has cost to reach solid ground here. I do not share the pessimism of Schweitzer when he wails: "Modern historical theology, therefore, with its three-quarters scepticism, is left at last with only a torn and tattered Gospel of Mark in its hands" (*The Quest of the Historical Jesus*, transl., 1910, p. 307). That is true of too much of the German criticism which has had its vogue and of which Schweitzer (*Ibid.*) says: "The liberal Jesus has given place to the Germanic Jesus" under the teaching of Nietzsche, a curious prophecy of present-day conditions. "At the present day the Germanic spirit is making a Jesus

after its own likeness" (*Ibid.*). That is too gloomy a view and was expressed by Schweitzer to make room for his own "eschatological" Jesus. More just is the statement of von Soden about Mark's Gospel: "For a first attempt to combine in a complete whole the isolated written and oral reminiscences of the public ministry of our Lord current at the time, this Gospel is a masterly performance" (*The History of the Early Christian Literature*, transl., 1906, p. 162).

The evidence on the whole demands an early date. This date is consonant with the character of the Gospel which preserves the life-like touches from the preaching of Peter and allows some use of Q and other data from various sources with a few editorial touches some years later either by Mark himself, as is most likely, or by an editor. In Mark's Gospel, therefore, we catch the very atmosphere of the first generation of those who walked with Jesus over the hills and plains of Galilee. The note of wonder runs all through the Gospel of Mark. The people are seen all aglow with excitement in the presence of the Wonder-Worker. Peter preserves the freshness of that early morn of Christianity. Mark himself is full of it, and makes abundant use of the historical present tense as he visualises the glory and rapture of those early days of the kingdom of God on earth. The frequent use of the imperfect tense is to the same effect. It is as if a cinema machine had snapped the moving crowds as they thronged about Jesus and followed him from place to place. The picture is toned down in Matthew and in Luke, but in Mark the negative has the lines in the picture still. It is no wonder that the children are fond of Mark's Gospel, for they can see Mark's picture of Jesus and their eyes sparkle as they behold Him.

A. T. Robertson.

THE TITLE ΚΥΡΙΟΣ AS APPLIED TO JESUS.

Professor Morgan, in his recent book on *The Religion and Theology of Paul*, puts forward an interesting suggestion with regard to the origin of the application of the title κύριος to Jesus. He denies that this title is uesd in the theology of the primitive Church and maintains that it was first introduced into Christianity from pagan sources. "The question how the title Kyrios came to be applied to Christ," he says, "can be answered only in one way. It was the title borne by the cult gods, the title that marked them out as objects of worship." This theory has many points of similarity with the hypothesis of Deissmann who thinks that the use of the word κύριος passed over into Christianity from the terminology of Cæsar worship.

The facts to which both theories appeal are undeniable. The use of the term κύριος, both in the pagan cults and in Cæsar worship, has been demonstrated beyond the vestige of a doubt. Professor Morgan can cite from the Papyri such well-known statements as "I thank the Lord (κύριος), Serapis that when I was in peril on the sea, he saved me," and "I make supplication for thee daily to the Lord Serapis." Deissmann is able to produce most abundant evidence to prove that the title was commonly bestowed upon the Roman emperors. No less than twenty-seven instances are found among the Papyri and the Inscriptions where Nero is described as κύριος. Even the derivative adjective κυριακὸς is found twice in an edict of an Egyptian prefect, which dates from the year 68 A.D., denoting in the one case "the imperial finances" and in the other "the imperial audit." Moreover there is the evidence of the New Testament itself. The phrase in 1 Corinthians viii. 5—"there are lords (κύριοι) many"—shows that Paul was familiar with the

application of the term to pagan deities and in Acts xxv. 26 Festus speaks of the Emperor as his κύριος.

Both theories too can be stated in a manner that is perfectly unexceptionable from the point of view of the Christian Faith. If all that is implied in them is—that in passing from the Jewish into the Greek world Christianity was inevitably compelled to change its language and adopt the terminology in common use in the new countries into which it had gained an entry,—it must be admitted that there is no *a priori* objection to either of these hypotheses. They simply afford us a first century illustration of what has happened in connexion with every missionary enterprise of the Christian Church. The first duty of the pioneer missionary is to discover the nearest native linguistic equivalents for the ideas which he wishes to convey. There is the classic illustration of China for instance. When Christianity entered China there was the utmost difficulty in finding a Chinese equivalent for the word "God." The nearest available term, Shang-te, had a connotation connected with it that made many missionaries feel that its use was undesirable, and for generations there was a controversy between Catholic and Protestant missionaries about the wisdom of using the word. Now if the Christian missionaries of the first century simply commandeered the term κύριος, as their modern successors in China commandeered the term Shang-te, and if they merely used it as the nearest Greek equivalent they could find to the Jewish title "Christ," there is nothing in their action which raises the slightest difficulty for the theologian. The investigation of the theories of Morgan and Deissmann is on this supposition an interesting academic exercise which can be treated quite dispassionately. It is simply a question of the facts and has no vital bearing upon Christian doctrine at all.

But if, on the other hand, it is maintained that the adoption

of the term κύριος changed altogether the nature of the Christian Faith and introduced into it ideas which had no place in the earliest Christian tradition—if it is responsible for the "rise of Christ worship" as Professor Morgan calls it—if it made Jesus for the first time the centre of a new cult and raised Him in the esteem of His followers to a position which He had never held before, then the consequences are much more serious, and the investigation has much more than a mere academic interest. Such a theory seems to menace the very foundations of the Christian Faith. If Christianity was transformed by the use of the term κύριος, it seems to follow as a logical conclusion that the new train of ideas which the adoption of the word introduced destroyed the primitive purity of the Faith and baptized it into paganism. A very serious issue is raised. It is not merely a matter of terms and categories as Professor Morgan suggests. The question really is, Did Christianity capture paganism or did paganism capture Christianity? The nominal victory of course, rested with Christianity, but which side won the real victory? If this exposition of the development of Christianity is true, we shall be compelled to confess that we have here another example of the truth of the old adage *Victi victoribus leges dederunt.*

Before we examine the basis upon which the argument rests, there are two preliminary admissions which must be made. One thing is quite certain. Before the missionary journeys of Paul, the Christian creed was summed up in the formula "Jesus is the Christ." After the missionary journeys in Gentile lands, at any rate, that formula was changed into "Jesus is the Lord." In other words, on Jewish soil the predominant title for Jesus was "the Christ." In the Greek world the predominant title was "the Lord." Whether the latter title was employed by Jesus Himself or

used by His immediate followers is a question which we shall have to investigate.

Secondly, it is impossible not to recognise the fact, that the conflict of Christianity with the pagan cults must have produced a reflex influence upon it. We know that in later times the battle with Gnosticism left its ineffaceable mark upon the Christian Church and there is no reason to suppose that Christianity came scatheless out of the earlier controversy. It would be contrary to all experience to suppose that Christianity was not influenced by its early struggle with the pagan cults. The law that every organism is affected by its environment was not abrogated in the first century in the interest of the new Faith. The only point that is arguable is—was the influence exerted by the pagan cults merely on the circumference of Christianity, or did it extend to the centre and soul of its Faith ?

I.

We may now proceed to the examination of the real problem. What is the evidence for the allegation that the term *κύριος* was not applied to Christ till Christianity entered the Gentile world ? We must deal with the main arguments of Professor Morgan *seriatim*.

(1) The first argument may be stated thus—The term *κύριος* implies that the recipient of the title received worship. That title could not have been bestowed upon Jesus by Jewish Christians because it was reserved for Jahweh and was the recognised Greek translation of the sacred Tetragrammaton. The whole validity of this argument depends upon the assumption that the term *κύριος* was exclusively restricted to God in Jewish thought. It is by no means clear, however, that this assumption is true without reservation, and if it can be proved that there are any exceptions the argument falls to the ground.

One obvious exception to the rule seems to occur in the famous description of the Messiah in the *Psalms of Solomon* (xvii. 36): "And their King is the Lord Messiah" (*Χριστὸς κύριος*). Now it may be freely admitted that this phrase, with its parallel in the LXX translation of Lamentations iv. 20, is probably a misrendering of the Hebrew words מְשִׁיחַ יְהוָה—*Χριστὸς κυρίου*, "the Lord's Anointed." But the fact that the mistranslation was made by a Jewish writer seems to prove that in his mind at any rate there was nothing derogatory to God in applying the title *κύριος* to the Messiah even when the Messiah was regarded merely as a human figure. We are precluded from supposing that the translator of the Psalms of Solomon was a Christian and that the phrase "Lord Messiah" was the outcome of his Christian instincts, by the fact that there is absolutely no other trace of a Christianising tendency in the whole of the book.

Then again the same formula is used in the announcement to the shepherds in the first chapter of Luke, "To-day is born . . . a Saviour who is Christ the Lord" (*Χριστὸς κύριος*). There can be little doubt about the Hebraic colouring of this narrative, and the phrase *Χριστὸς κύριος* is not borrowed from the current vocabulary of the Christian Church. There seems, therefore, to be something more than a possibility that the phrase "Lord Messiah" may have been stereotyped into a formula before the commencement of the Christian era.

Nor, can it be absolutely proved that the term *κύριος* was never applied to Angels—especially in view of the fact that in the fourth book of Ezra the seer twice addresses the Angel as "O Lord, my Lord" (iv. 38, vi. 11). It is a curious fact that one of the ranks in the hierarchy of angels should have been called *κυριότης* (Eph. i. 21; Col. i. 16). Moreover, there is no little force in the argument of Bousset that

we should not have found such emphatic warnings against angel-worship in the New Testament and the Targums unless the practice had been introduced into the Jewish religion and threatened to become popular. In the light of these facts there is no ground for thinking that the first argument proves Professor Morgan's case.

(2) In the second place it is maintained that our documentary evidence affords us no sure warrant for believing that the title was ever bestowed upon Jesus during His earthly life. "In Mark, apart from the ungenuine conclusion, it is found only once in the words 'the Lord hath need of him.' Q, the Logia-source common to Matthew and Luke, if we exclude the doubtful passage Matthew viii. 8 = Luke vii. 6, does not contain it at all."

Let us take the last statement first. Supposing for the sake of argument that we grant the truth of the assertion that Q "does not contain it all," is this a final proof that the title was not employed in the lifetime of Jesus? It is always difficult to prove a negative, and never more difficult than when the argument is based upon Q. The *argumentum e silentio* is always recognised as precarious, but when it is applied to Q, it is not merely precarious, it is unscientific. What is generally known as Q is at the best only a hypothetical and fragmentary reconstruction. It is perfectly certain that we do not possess and cannot obtain anything like the whole of the document, and we have no means of telling with anything like scientific precision what was and what was not to be found in the part that is absent. Supposing that Mark had been lost and that we were to attempt to reconstruct it on the same principles as those on which Q has been reconstructed, we should discover that the result gave us less than two-thirds of our present Gospel, and we should have absolutely no criterion for determining what was contained in the missing third that could not be recovered.

From this analogy we can be perfectly certain that the contents of Q must have been half as much again, to say the least, as the modern reconstructions would lead us to suppose. Consequently the safe and prudent rule to adopt is this : we can base an argument upon what our reconstructed Q does contain, but no certain deduction can be founded upon what it does not contain, because we do not possess the whole document and cannot therefore say with any certainty what might or might not have been present in the missing portion. There are several passages for instance in Matthew and Luke, where Jesus is addressed as *κύριος* by His disciples, which might very well have been taken from Q.

The one clear instance where *κύριος* is applied to Christ in Q does not help us much, because it is the title conferred on Him by the centurion, and it is difficult to suppose that he used it with any theological import. *Κύριος* was commonly used by an inferior in addressing his superior, and it is almost certain that the centurion employed the term in its popular sense.

There is a case, however, where it seems not improbable that Q recognises the use of the title in reference to Jesus with a more definite connotation. Let us compare the two passages in Matthew vii. 21, and Luke vi. 46.

The Matthew passage runs :

" Not every one *that saith unto me, Lord, Lord,* shall enter into the Kingdom of Heaven, but he that doeth the will of my Father in Heaven."

In Luke we read :

" Why do ye *call me Lord, Lord,* and do not the things that I tell you ? "

It is true that these passages do not seem to have very much in common, but they both contain a reference to certain people who saluted Jesus as " Lord, Lord " and whose devotion to Him ended with that acknowledgment. Moreover —and this is really a very significant fact—both passages occur

in the same context and form the introduction to the famous parable of the "the rock and the sand." It seems quite reasonable to suppose that both may have been derived from a common statement found in Q. At any rate we may not in the light of this eventuality categorically deny the possibility that Q may have recognised the use of *κύριος* as applied to Christ. The furthest limit to which we can go in a negative direction is to say with Harnack, "The common source [of these two verses] perhaps lies far in the background of time, and we may not with absolute certainty claim the verse for Q." This conclusion is very far removed from the dogmatic statement of Professor Morgan, "Q does not contain it at all."

With regard to the silence of Mark (with the exception of the one passage, "The Lord hath need of him"), it must be admitted that this is the strongest piece of evidence in support of the theory. There is this, however, to be said on the other side. Mark, like the other Synoptics, contains the incident in which Jesus quotes from Psalm cx, "The Lord said unto my Lord" (Mark xii. 36). We can scarcely regard the interpretation which Jesus puts upon the Psalm as "a fragment of Church theology," since it is one of the best authenticated logia in the Gospels. And it is surely jejune to say that "it can mean nothing more than that a prince of the House of David is inadequate as a description of the Messiah." Jesus does not seem to be dealing with abstract questions of Messianic theology. If Jesus regarded Himself as the Messiah, and if He held this prophecy to be Messianic, it seems impossible to deny that, indirectly at any rate, He tacitly claims the title *κύριος* for Himself.

II.

So much for criticism. We must now endeavour to state the case for the opposite theory.

1. The scantiness of the available evidence in the Gospel narrative admits of a very simple explanation. We have to recognise first that the term κύριος could not have been applied to Jesus in its theological sense until after the recognition of His Messiahship at Cæsarea Philippi. The confession of Peter is the condition precedent for the use of the term. There only remains, therefore, the short interval at the close of the career of Jesus when it was possible to apply the title to Him in its technical sense. Secondly, if the language generally used by Jesus was Aramaic, it is obvious that the Greek word κύριος would not often be employed either by Jesus or His disciples. There is one very interesting piece of evidence that the familiar title by which Jesus was addressed by His disciples was an Aramaic word. In the appeal that is made to Jesus by His disciples during the storm on the sea of Galilee, "Save, Lord, we perish," the name by which Jesus is called is given in Matthew as κύριε (viii. 26), in Mark as διδάσκαλε (iv. 38), in Luke as ἐπιστάτα (viii. 24). It is perfectly obvious that these three Greek words represent three different translations of an original Aramaic term. For these two reasons the available evidence must in the very nature of the case be slight.

2. But the paucity of the evidence is not the only difficulty that confronts us. We are bound to take into account the possibility that some of the references to the term κύριος in the Gospels may simply reflect the opinion of a later time which has probably quite unwittingly been inserted into the gospel narrative by the historian. This is certainly the case in the seven instances in the Gospel of Luke where ὁ κύριος is used as the appellation of Jesus in historic narrative (vii. 13, x. 1, xi. 39, xii. 42, xiii. 15, xvii. 5, xxii. 31). Then, too, we must not take it for granted that when the term κύριος does occur, it necessarily bears the later theological connotation. As we have already seen, the term

is constantly used as the proper mode of address for an inferior speaking to his superior. It is employed in the Gospels, for instance, to denote the proprietor of a vineyard, or the master of a house or the owner of slaves. The investigation of the problem consequently is beset on every side with such serious critical difficulties, that it is well-nigh impossible to arrive at any result in the nature of demonstrative proof.

3. One of the strongest pieces of evidence is to be found in the texts in Matthew and Luke already quoted which definitely state that it was the custom of the followers of Jesus to address Him as "Lord, Lord." Whether these statements can be ultimately traced back to Q or not, they seem to afford us proof which it is not easy to set on one side. It is open to us of course to argue that these Logia are later inventions which have been put into the mouth of Jesus by our Evangelists. They would suit admirably a situation which must have often arisen among Christians of the second generation, when there was a tendency to divorce creed from conduct and when there must have been many members of the Church who were ready enough to confess that "Jesus is Lord" but were much less willing to recognise the moral demands of the Christian life. If these texts were the one isolated fact that stood in the way of Professor Morgan's theory, and if the rest of the evidence were strongly in his favour, we should probably be justified in resorting to some such explanation. But as this is not the case, it is an act of critical violence to excise from the Gospels a well-authenticated Logion of Jesus, because it does not happen to favour a particular interpretation of the development of a theological idea.

It is more difficult to determine the exact connotation which was given to the word *κύριος* when the title was applied to Jesus by His disciples and followers. If the word was

used before the confession at Cæsarea Philippi, it could not have possessed anything like its full theological import, though after this date it might of course have been employed as the equivalent of Messiah. The Lukan version of the Logion seems to imply that the term involved or ought to have involved, the recognition of the authority of Jesus as a Teacher. The probability is that the word was used with a growing connotation, and that as the faith of the disciples in Jesus intensified, a richer and deeper significance was attached to the title.

4. One of the most serious stumblingblocks in the way of the new theory is to be found in the Aramaic phrase Maranatha which is used by Paul in 1 Corinthians xvi. 22. "Maranatha" is obviously one of the earliest watchwords of the Christian Church, and it crystallises the belief of primitive Christianity in the speedy advent of the Lord. It consequently seems to provide us with an irrefragable proof that the title "Lord" was bestowed upon Jesus by Christianity in its pre-Hellenistic stage. Professor Morgan recognises the difficulty and makes an ingenious attempt to surmount it. "Unquestionably," he says "this formula, which is known to Paul, carries us far back, and is most naturally explained as a product of Jewish Christianity. But its Gentile origin in a bilingual community like that of Antioch is by no means impossible." This suggestion involves a very complicated process. It implies that when Christianity first came to Antioch the title *κύριος* was unknown to its theological vocabulary. The Gentile section of the Church were the first to adopt its use, borrowing it from the language of the pagan cults. The Jewish section, seeing the advantage of the new word, resolved to make it their own and so found an Aramaic equivalent for it which they embodied in the formula "Maranatha." Such an explanation, however, is far too circuitous and cumbrous to

possess any verisimilitude and there is not a single shred of tangible evidence in its support. It is simply a device for getting rid of an awkward fact, which, as Professor Morgan himself recognises, is absolutely fatal to his theory. On the balance of probabilities it is much more likely that the theory itself is wrong than that the origin of the formula Maranatha is due to the reflex influence of Hellenistic Christianity.

5. But the formula Maranatha is not the only proof that Jesus was called Lord before Christianity entered the Gentile world. Our knowledge of primitive Christianity is of course very fragmentary, and it is always difficult for us to be dogmatic in our conclusions. But if any importance at all is to be attached to the speeches of Peter in Acts, it is difficult to resist the conclusion that the words of Acts ii. 36 bear on their surface at any rate the stamp of primitiveness—"God hath made Him both Lord and Christ, this Jesus whom ye crucified." The Christology which is implied in this statement is not, as far as we can gather, characteristically Lukan, and is scarcely that which we should expect a disciple of Paul, writing as late as 80 A.D., to put into the mouth of Peter at Pentecost. Luke must have been a greater genius than Thucydides if he could have thought himself back into the situation which prevailed in the early days of the Church at Jerusalem so clearly that he was able to avoid the anachronism of introducing the theology of his own day and the characteristics of his own style into the early speeches of the Apostles. It is difficult to imagine a historian, who was in Rome with Paul when he wrote Colossians and must have heard and read his greatest Christological utterances, so far forgetting his Master's teaching as to accept the Adoptionist position and describe Christ as a man approved of God by His miracles and signs and wonders, and raised to the rank of Divinity and made

"Christ and Lord." Such a theological position is extremely natural in the elementary stage of the Church's thought, but surely it had been completely outgrown before the date at which Acts was written.

Of course it is impossible for us to prove the genuineness of the reference to κύριος, but the phrase is certainly in keeping with the general theological outlook of the speech. It seems to be quite clear that in quoting Psalm xvi. 5—"I foresaw the Lord before me continually"—the speaker took the phrase as a reference to Christ.

Moreover the general position assigned to Christ in the belief of the primitive Church seems to warrant the supposition that even if the title itself could not be proved to be used of Christ in the earliest period, the thing it stood for was certainly part of their faith. The earliest Christians believed that Jesus had risen from the dead and ascended into heaven: they believed that His death was in some undefined way connected with the forgiveness of human sin: they equated Him with the Holy Spirit: they regarded Him as the Messiah in the fullest sense of the term: they were absolutely convinced that His triumphant Parousia was near at hand. What is more natural than that with this high creed they should have termed Him their κύριος or Lord?

6. If the higher Christology of the New Testament was derived from the pagan cults, it is remarkable that there are no signs of the process in the New Testament. There is not the slightest hint or suggestion that there was any point of attachment between the two. Is it conceivable that when Christianity first became a missionary religion its teachers found that the pagans they were trying to convert were more devoted to Serapis that they themselves were to their Christ? Had Christ to be raised to the rank of Serapis before Christianity could hope to succeed in the

task of conquering the world ? Was it the worshippers of Serapis who really created the Christology of the Church ? Did they, in return for the moral teaching of Christianity show the Church how to deify its Founder ?

We may admit to the full that there was a development in Christology in the Apostolic Age. There is a wide gulf fixed between the simple creed with which Christianity started—Jesus is the Messiah—and the theological implications of the prologue to the fourth Gospel. But what we deny most strenuously is the theory that the development was produced by the reflex influence of the pagan cults. It was not because Paul was anxious to outdo the enthusiasm of the worshippers of Serapis that he claimed for Christ that " in him the fulness of the Godhead dwelt in bodily form." It was not in order that his Lord might outshine his pagan rivals that he declared that Christ " was the image of the invisible God, the firstborn of all creation, for in him all things were made. All things were fashioned through him and unto him, and he is before all things, for in him all things consist."

No, the secret of the development in Christology is not due to the reaction of extraneous influences. It springs out of the depths of Christian experience. This is what the modern historico-critical school always overlooks. The real weakness of Professor Morgan's book is that it has so little to say about Paul's own experience and the part which that experience plays in the construction of his theology. It was because Christ had done so much for Paul himself, because when he was passing through the throes of his grim and hopeless struggle with sin Christ had found for him the way of escape through the redeeming grace of God, it was because the Spirit of the risen Christ had broken into his life on the Damascus road, and more than that, had been his constant companion and comforter in all the triumphs

and failures of his career, and had so entered into his own personality that he could only describe the relationship in the words, "I live, yet not I, but Christ liveth in me"; it was because of all this that Paul came to feel that the only place fit for Christ to fill was the seat "on the right hand of the throne of God." Paul may have borrowed this category and that from outside sources, he may have borrowed some ideas from the current philosophies of the age, but the *vera causa* of his attitude to Christ and of the Christology in which that attitude took shape and found expression is to be sought in the depths of his own experience of salvation and the grace of God. Professor Morgan writes with knowledge and insight when he is analysing the "psychological climate of the age," but he seems to forget at times that the environment is not omnipotent, and that the life-generating forces are to be looked for in the organism itself, and not in its surroundings.

H. T. Andrews.

GREEK PAPYRI.

Much is being said just now of the bearing of the Greek Papyri on New Testament study. And if the extravagant claims sometimes advanced on their behalf may at once be set aside, there can be no doubt that they have thrown light of a very welcome character alike on the language and form of our New Testament documents, and on the historical surroundings in which these books took their rise. In these circumstances it may be of interest to recall briefly the history of the discovery and publication of these Papyri for the sake of those who have not been able to follow that history in detail. But, before doing so, it is necessary to form as clear an idea as possible of the appearance and character of the Papyri themselves.

I. Manufacture of Papyrus.

In itself, the word papyrus is the name of a reed-plant which at one time grew in great profusion in the river Nile, and gave its name to the writing material or "paper" of antiquity, which was formed from it. The process of manufacture was of the simplest. The stem of the papyrus, plant was cut into long thin strips, which were laid down on a flat table and soaked with Nile water. A second layer was then placed crosswise on the top of the first, and after the two layers had been hammered together, and scraped with a shell or a bone to remove any roughness, a material not unlike our brown paper was produced. A common size of a papyrus sheet was about ten inches in height and five inches in breadth, but, when more space was required, a number of sheets were easily fastened together to form a roll—a roll of twenty sheets being apparently an ordinary selling length.

The side of the papyrus on which the fibres ran horizontally, or the *recto* as it came to be known, was from its greater smoothness preferred for writing, while the back, or the *verso*, in the case of letters at any rate, was generally reserved for the address. Not infrequently, however, if papyrus was scarce, the original contents were washed or crossed out, and the *verso* was turned to new purposes, much as we would use the back of an old letter.

The character of the handwriting naturally varied with the nature of the document and the education of the scribe. But the task of decipherment can rarely be said to be easy, partly owing to the frequent use of contractions, and partly to the numerous *lacunae* or gaps caused by the brittle nature of the material. The restoration of the letters or words that have thus dropped out demands the exercise of the utmost patience and skill. And those who have had an opportunity of inspecting some of the originals can only

marvel that intelligible transcriptions have ever been made from them at all.

When then we speak of "Papyri," we are to think simply of rolls or sheets of paper of the above character, that had been employed for the many and various purposes to which paper as a writing material is put amongst ourselves, while the addition of "Greek" distinguishes those written in that language from the Aramaic or Latin or Coptic papyri that have been similarly recovered. We need only add that the earliest dated Greek papyrus we possess belongs to the year B.C. 311–10, and that from that time an almost continuous chain of documents carries us far down into Byzantine times.

II. Discovery and Publication of Papyri.

When we turn to the discovery of these documents, the fact that, with the exception of some calcined rolls from Herculaneum, that were brought to light as far back as 1752 and the following years, papyri have been found only in Egypt is due simply to the marvellously dry climate of that country. A certain number, more particularly those of a literary character, have been found in tombs or in sealed jars in the ruins of temples and houses, but the great mass come from the rubbish heaps on the outskirts of old Egyptian towns or villages, where they had been thrown out as waste paper when no longer required, and, after being covered over with the fine desert sand, have remained practically uninjured down to the present day. As a rule they consist of single sheets, or parts of sheets, but occasionally whole baskets are found full of official documents, which had been cleared out *en masse* from public archives or record offices. And every one will recognise the romantic interest attaching to these "scraps of paper," discarded as useless by their first writers and owners, and on which no

eye has looked for a thousand to two thousand years, but which now, as original documents, recreate and revivify the past for us in a way which nothing else could have done.

The earliest finds in Egypt of which we have any knowledge took place in 1778 when some Arabs, digging for their own purposes in the Fayûm district, accidentally came upon about fifty rolls in an earthen pot; but unable to find purchasers they destroyed them on account, it is said, of the aromatic smell they gave forth in burning. Only one roll was saved which, from passing into the hands of Cardinal Stefano Borgia, came to be known as the *Charta Borgiana*. And though the contents are of little general interest, being merely an account of the forced labours of the peasants on the Nile embankment at Arsinoë in the year A.D. 191–2, the papyrus will always have the significance of being the first Greek papyrus to be published in Europe. This was at Rome in 1788, the title being *Charta papyracea Graece scripta Musei Borgiani Velitris*, ed. N. Schow.

In the year 1820 further finds, dating from the second century before Christ, were made in the neighbourhood of Memphis and Thebes, some of which throw vivid sidelights on the internal administration of the great Temple of Serapis at the former place. The next year saw the first important literary find, a manuscript of Iliad xxiv., and this was followed in 1847 by the recovery of a large roll containing three of the lost orations of Hypereides, a contemporary of Demosthenes, who had been hitherto only a name in the Lexicons.

These discoveries were largely accidental, and even in 1877, when great masses of papyri were unearthed on the site of Arsinoë, the ancient Crocodilopolis, most of which went to Vienna to the collection of the Archduke Rainer, the work still suffered from want of method and supervision, with the result that a large proportion, probably

quite a half of the papyri found by natives in this district, perished altogether. It was not until 1889–90 that a beginning was made in systematic exploration when Professor Flinders Petrie extracted a large number of Ptolemaic papyri from the mummy-cases at Gurob, into whose interstices they had been stuffed. These were for the most part records of property and business transactions, but they also included parts of the "Phaedo" of Plato, and of the "Antiope" of Euripides, written in the early part of the third century before Christ, and forming therefore the oldest classical manuscripts then known to exist. To the same period belong such important literary finds as the lost work of Aristotle on the "Constitution of Athens," copied out on the back of a farm-bailiff's accounts, which are dated in the eleventh year of Vespasian, that is A.D. 78–9, the "Mimes" of Herodas, and about thirteen hundred lines of the "Odes" of Bacchylides, a contemporary of Pindar, and a nephew of 'pure Simonides," for the recovery of whose works Wordsworth longed in a well-known sonnet, but for which we have still to wait.

But significant though these discoveries were, their interest in the public esteem was largely eclipsed by the results of the digging carried on in the same year by Dr. Grenfell and Dr. Hunt at Oxyrhynchus, the ancient Behneseh. The attention of the two English explorers had been attracted to the spot in the expectation that early fragments of Christian literature might be found there, in view of the important place which Oxyrhynchus occupied in Egyptian Christianity in the fourth and fifth centuries. And their prescience was rewarded, for, amongst the papyri found on the second day, was a crumpled leaf, written on both sides in uncial characters, amongst which Dr. Hunt at once detected the word *ΚΑΡΦΟΣ*, "mote." This suggested to him the "mote" of our Lord's Saying in the Sermon

on the Mount (Matt. vii. 3–5); and on further examination he found that he had in his hand a leaf out of a very early collection of our Lord's Sayings, some of which corresponded closely with the canonical Sayings of the Gospels, while others were new. We are not at present concerned with the many questions that were thus raised, but the importance of the discovery was undeniable, especially when it was followed next day by the identification of another uncial fragment as containing the greater part of Matthew i., written not later than the third century, and therefore a century older than the oldest manuscript of the New Testament previously known. Both leaves, Dr. Grenfell suggests, may not improbably form "the remains of a library belonging to some Christian who perished in the persecution during Diocletian's reign, and whose books were then thrown away." [1]

Along with these, and other almost equally sensational finds, Oxyrhynchus yielded an enormous mass of documents of the most miscellaneous character dating from the Roman conquest of Egypt to the tenth century after Christ, when papyrus was superseded by paper as a writing material. Of these, thanks to the unwearied energy of the discoverers, nearly sixteen hundred texts have now been published in twelve volumes of *Oxyrhynchus Papyri* issued under the auspices of the Graeco-Roman Branch of the Egypt Exploration Fund. It will require, so Dr. Grenfell informs me, at least fourteen additional volumes to complete the publication of the Oxyrhynchus collection alone.

Other large volumes contain the results of the same editors' work on the collection of papyri belonging to the late Lord Amherst,[2] and on their own discoveries at Hibeh

[1] *Egypt Exploration Fund : Archæological Report*, 1896–7, p. 6.

[2] These include a considerable fragment of the original Greek text of the *Ascension of Isaiah*, and the oldest Christian letter known to exist, dating from the latter half of the third or the beginning of the fourth century.

and Tebtunis. The finds at the latter spot were of a novel character, for there the Oxford scholars in the course of their excavations came across a large cemetery of mummied crocodiles, and to their amazement discovered that in certain cases these crocodiles were actually wrapped up in sheets of used papyrus, while the heads were occasionally stuffed with papyrus rolls. As might have been expected from the circumstances, few literary texts were found amongst these papyri, but, on the other hand, they include many important official documents, which throw great light on the administration of Egypt in the second century before Christ.

Apart from the publications associated with the names of Dr. Grenfell and Dr. Hunt, this country can boast of three volumes of *Flinders Petrie Papyri* edited by Professor Mahaffy, latterly with the assistance of Dr. Smyly, and four stately volumes of the *Catalogue of Greek Papyri in the British Museum*, edited by Sir F. G. Kenyon, latterly with the assistance of Dr. Bell. To Dr. Hunt's volume of literary texts from the *Greek Papyri in the John Rylands Library, Manchester*, there has also been added recently a second volume containing nearly four hundred texts of a most varied character, in the preparation of which Mr. Johnson of Oxford and Mr. V. Martin of Geneva have taken a leading part.

Of collections published abroad, in addition to the older Turin (1826–7), Leyden (1843–85) and Paris (1865) Papyri, we have now four large volumes of texts from the Berlin Museum, the result of the collaboration of many scholars. Smaller, though hardly less noteworthy, publications are associated with Vienna, Leipzig, Strassburg, Florence, Geneva, Lille, and various other places.[1]

[1] A collection of many of the most important texts, with valuable introductions on Papyrology generally, has been published by L. Mitteis

The general result is that there are now available about ten thousand published documents, and that these will be largely added to as soon as normal literary activities can be resumed.[1] Whether the still unedited papyri have any great surprises in store for us, it is vain even to conjecture. But even if they have not, they will serve a useful purpose in illustrating and confirming the lexical and other results that have already been reached, and of increasing still further our stock of first-hand documentary evidence regarding the most important period in the world's history.

III. Classification of Papyri.

The papyri are generally classified under the two main heads Literary and Non-literary, while the Biblical and Theological texts occupy a position about halfway between the two.

1. *Classical Texts.*

Of the strictly literary or classical texts upwards of six hundred and fifty have now been published, of which it has been estimated about one-third are Homeric, rather less than one-third contain texts of the works of other ancient writers already known to us, and rather more than a third contain new writings, or writings which, though known by name, were believed to have been hopelessly lost.[2] Amongst these last we may specially mention, in

and U. Wilcken under the title *Grundzüge und Chrestomathie der Papyruskunde* (Leipzig-Berlin, 1912). For "The Future of Græco-Roman Work in Egypt" reference can now be made to an article by Dr. Grenfell in *The Journal of Egyptian Archæology*, iv. pp. 4 ff. See also Dr. Hunt's valuable paper on "Papyri and Papyrology" in the same *Journal*, i. pp. 81 ff.

[1] It may be of interest to note that, as recently as 1916, a handsome volume of *Griechische Texte aus Ägypten* appeared in Berlin under the editorship of P. M. Meyer. It comprises forty-five papyri belonging to the New Testament Seminar in Berlin University, and ninety-two Ostraca from the collection of Professor Deissmann.

[2] See E. J. Goodspeed, Art. "Papyrus" in the new *International Standard Bible Encyclopædia*, iv. p. 2241.

addition to those already referred to, a papyrus roll of the "Persae" of Timotheus, dating from the end of the fourth century before Christ, and thus forming perhaps the oldest Greek literary manuscript in the world—a long historical document dealing with the years B.C. 396–4, which Drs. Grenfell and Hunt identify with the "Hellenica" of Theopompus, but others prefer to attribute to Ephorus or to Cratippus—fragments of four of the plays of Menander—a sufficient number of fragments of the "Hypsipyle" of Euripides to admit of the reconstruction of the plot—a number of Sappho's songs—and nearly three hundred lines of a manuscript of the first half of the second century containing the "Pæans" of Pindar.

Apart from the general interest of these discoveries, covering as they do so many and varied branches of Greek literature, it may be asked whether the new manuscripts of extant works, going back to a date earlier by many hundreds of years than the great mass of Greek classical manuscripts, have any special light to throw on questions of text, and more particularly on the conjectures which from time to time have been brought forward for the amendment of the received text. The latter point has been specially investigated by Sir F. G. Kenyon in an address delivered before the British Academy in 1904,[1] and is also referred to by the same writer in an article on "Greek Papyri and Recent Discoveries" that appeared in the *Quarterly Review* for April, 1908, where (p. 343) the general conclusion is reached "that the tradition of the classical texts is substantially sound, and that the best vellum MSS. of the tenth and later centuries are as good as, and often better than, the Egyptian papyri of a thousand years earlier." At first sight, therefore, we may not seem to have gained

[1] *The Evidence of Greek Papyri with Regard to Textual Criticism* in the *Proceedings of the British Academy*, vol. i.

much in this particular from the new discoveries, and yet surely the confirmation of our traditional text from such ancient witnesses counts for a great deal, to say nothing of the romantic way in which that confirmation has come.

2. *Biblical Texts.*

When we pass to our Biblical Texts, the results are again very gratifying. We might indeed have expected, in view of the close connexion of the Septuagint or Greek version of the Old Testament with Egypt, that very considerable portions of it would have been found, whereas these do not number more than about forty, and only one contains a passage of any considerable length. But they are at least again sufficient to test the general accuracy of what has been ordinarily regarded as the best text, and are regularly cited by the editors in the critical apparatus of the larger Cambridge Septuagint.

The same applies to our New Testament fragments. Of these I was able to describe twenty-three in my *New Testament Documents* published in 1913,[1] and at least eight can now be added to the list. More detailed reference must be reserved for another occasion, but when we remember that the list includes six, possibly seven, fragments belonging to the third century, which are therefore from a hundred to a hundred and fifty years older than our great vellum codices, that they are drawn from twelve of our New Testament books, that the longest of them, dating from the first half of the fourth century, contains about one-third of the Epistle to the Hebrews, including the later chapters which are wanting in the Vatican Codex, and that, so far as they go, they generally confirm the type of text found in that Codex and its allies, it is clear that they cannot be lightly set aside.

[1] Appendix D : New Testament Texts on Papyrus.

3. *Non-literary Documents.*

Another opportunity may be found of dealing with other classes of Christian documents on papyrus, and of illustrating the light they throw upon the early history and worship of the Church, but in the meantime it is necessary to say something of the great mass of non-literary documents, which can be numbered not by hundreds but by thousands. Their contents, as has already been stated, are of the most miscellaneous character, embracing as they do all manner of official documents such as Imperial rescripts, accounts of judicial proceedings, tax and census papers, contracts of marriage and divorce, notices of birth and death, and so forth, along with a large number of private letters touching upon all sides of family and everyday life.

And as thus the contents of these documents are wide as life itself, so they supply materials for the most varied fields of human learning. Their value to the historian and the jurist is apparent on the surface, while with their aid the geographer can reconstruct maps of Ancient Egypt with a precision previously impossible. To the palæographer again, who was previously sadly hampered by want of actual evidence for judging the development of ordinary script, they offer an uninterrupted series of examples, many of them exactly dated by year and month and day, from the third century before Christ to the eighth century after Christ. And to the philologist they show the true place of the *Κοινή*, the "common" or "Hellenistic" Greek, as distinguished from the dialects of the classical period, in the development of the Greek language. Examples of the *Κοινή* on its literary side had not indeed been previously wanting, but now, for the first time, it was possible to see it as it were in undress, as it was ordinarily spoken and written by the men and women of the day.

It was from this last point of view that the importance

of the papyri for the Biblical student was first realised, for it was now made evident that the so-called "peculiarities" of Biblical Greek, apart from those due to the influence of translation Greek and to the moulding power of Christianity, were in reality no "peculiarities" at all, but arose from the fact that the New Testament writers made use for the most part of the ordinary speech of the day. The Book, that is, that was specially intended for the people was written in a tongue "understanded by the people." If the papyri had done nothing else than make that clear to us, it would have been worth all the labour that has been bestowed upon them; but their significance is far from being exhausted by any such general statement. Not only do they confirm the traditional meaning of words which had hitherto rested on very insufficient evidence, but in not a few instances they have supplied new meanings by which difficult and obscure passages have been rendered intelligible. And above all they have added new freshness to much familiar Biblical phraseology by lifting it back once more into direct contact with the actual life and thought of the day.

No one can read, for example, Professor Deissmann's *Bible Studies* or his *Light from the Ancient East* without feeling that the New Testament writings, and perhaps more particularly the Epistles, modelled as they are so closely upon the ordinary letter-form of the day, have gained for him a new reality, and that by being brought into still closer touch with the actual circumstances under which these books were first written, he has found in them a deeper and more pregnant message for himself.

It is only by actual illustration, which is impossible in the present paper, that these points can be made effective. But enough I trust has been said to show how great is the debt of gratitude under which we rest to the original dis-

coverers and interpreters of these fascinating texts, and also what a wide and fruitful field of study they offer to all who are willing to devote themselves to it.

G. MILLIGAN.

TWO PAULINE ANTITHESES.

"Out of faith—unto faith"; "Through Jesus Christ—in Christ Jesus."

THE careful reader of the Epistles of St. Paul must have noted the delicacy and exactness with which *relations* are indicated by his use of prepositions. Two prepositions are sometimes set in contrast; as in Romans iii. 30: "(God) shall justify the circumcision '*out of*' faith (ἐκ πίστεως) and the uncircumcision '*through*' faith (διὰ πίστεως)." In the usage of the Greek language there is great fulness of meaning in such words as ἐκ (out of) and ἐν (in); and it is hardly necessary to say that this fulness of meaning is often very inadequately indicated or expressed in the Authorised Version of the New Testament. The Revised Version shows a marked superiority to the older translation in this as in many other respects; and the scholars who produced that Version deserve our gratitude, not least because of the contribution which they have made to our understanding of the mind of St. Paul by their more accurate rendering of prepositions,—those little but most significant words of relation.

St. Paul was a writer who delighted in antithesis. His keen and analytical mind found pleasure in the recognition of distinctions—of points of contrast as well as of agreement. Two particular antitheses are of especial value in letting us into the heart of the Apostle's teaching,—one of them standing at the very threshold of his great argument

in the Epistle to the Romans, and the other forming part of the warp and woof of the argument itself.

St. Paul addresses himself to the great theme of his Epistle to the Romans in these words : " I am not ashamed of the gospel of Christ ; for it is the power of God unto salvation to every one that believeth ; to the Jew first and also to the Greek. For therein a righteousness of God is revealed ('out of faith—unto faith' (ἐκ πίστεως—εἰς πίστιν), according as it is written, 'The just shall live by faith' (ὁ δὲ δίκαιος ἐκ πίστεως ζήσεται)" (i. 16, 17). Faith as (*a*) *subjective ground*, and also (*b*) as *instrument* of man's justification,—as not only the means by which God's righteousness is secured but also as the source out of which that righteousness is made apparent in the life of man,—this is what is expressed by the double formula " out of faith—unto faith." The double phrase at once opens up that great and far-reaching contrast between the 'subjective' and the 'objective' in our religious experience. Well did the Son of Sirach declare, " All things are double one against another, and He hath made nothing imperfect." [1] God's righteousness, His salvation, is in the first instance objective—coming to man from without. Faith is from this point of view purely receptive ; it simply affords the point of contact whereby the Divine power and grace may enter into the personal life of man. This is seen most clearly in the fact that it is faith's function to appropriate the Divine forgiveness,—that *first* form of Divine righteousness, whereby even the ungodly man, believing, is justified (Rom. iv. 5). Various prepositions are used to set forth this office of faith. In Philippians iii. 8, 9 the Apostle states it as his supreme desire that he " may win Christ, and be found in him, not having mine own righteousness, that, namely (which is) 'of law' (ἐκ νόμου), but that (which is) 'through faith of

[1] Ecclus. xlii. 24.

Christ' (διὰ πίστεως Χριστοῦ) the righteousness (which is) from God (τὴν ἐκ θεοῦ δικαιωσύνην) 'upon faith' (ἐπὶ τῇ πίστει, see R.V. margin)." In this passage two prepositions, διά and ἐπί, are used to set forth faith as (1) the instrument by which Divine righteousness is appropriated and (2) as the point where that righteousness comes in contact with human life. This instrumental office of faith is also expressed by the dative case (πίστει) in connexion with the word 'to justify' (δικαιόω), as in Romans iii. 28: "We reckon therefore that man is justified by faith (δικαιοῦσθαι πίστει) apart from works of law."

The phrase by which this instrumental function of faith in man's justification and salvation is usually expressed is διὰ πίστεως ('by' or 'through' faith), which (as is known even to the casual reader of St. Paul's Epistles in the original) occurs in a multitude of passages.

And now for the other side of the antithesis—ἐκ πίστεως. St. Paul says that in the Gospel "a righteousness of God is revealed 'out of' faith" as well as "'unto' faith." This phrase ἐκ πίστεως, like the complementary phrase διὰ πίστεως, occurs in a multitude of passages in St. Paul's Epistles. Its force was, however, not recognised by the King James translators, who confused ἐκ πίστεως with διὰ πίστεως, rendering both 'by faith.' The consequence of this was that the subjective office of faith in our justification tended to become obscured, and was even denied by the rigid Calvinism of a past age, which recognised merely the *instrumental* function of faith. This subjective force and validity of faith is, however, set in a clear light by St. Paul's statement that "faith is reckoned (or counted) for righteousness" (Rom. iv. 5, 9, 22–25), and finds distinct recognition in the Augsburg Confession (A.D. 1530), that first great doctrinal statement of Protestantism.

We may be grateful to the translators of the Revised

Version that they have indicated this meaning of the preposition ἐκ wherever it occurs, in the margin, thus bringing again to light an important phase of the teaching of St. Paul.

The distinction between the meaning of ἐκ πίστεως and διὰ πίστεως may be observed in Galatians ii. 15, 16—that very significant passage in which St. Paul is witnessing to the function of faith in man's justification—in the presence of his fellow-apostle St. Peter: "We, being Jews by nature, and not 'sinners of the Gentiles,' yet knowing that a man is not justified 'out of' works of law, save only 'through faith of Jesus Christ'[1];—even we believed on Christ Jesus that we might be justified out of faith of Christ (ἐκ πίστεως Χριστοῦ) and not out of works of law, because out of works of law shall no flesh be justified." Here the question is not that of a simple antithesis between 'faith' and 'works,' or even between 'faith of Christ' and 'works of law'; there is also to be noted the distinction between ἐκ πίστεως and διὰ πίστεως—ἐκ indicating, as we have said, the *subjective ground*, and διά the *instrument* of justification.

In the same context (verse 20) we also find the preposition ἐν occurring with πίστει. St. Paul says: "That (life) which I now live in the flesh, I live in faith (the faith, namely) of the Son of God, who loved me, and gave himself up for me." Here the words ἐν πίστει set before us faith as the vital element in that new life which is 'in Christ.' It is not merely that faith rests or reposes upon the Son of God, but it is the personal faith of the Son of God Himself, living and working in Paul. That new life is 'out of' faith as its source, and 'in faith' as its element.

To sum up, then:—the *instrumental* function of faith is expressed by the prepositions διά, εἰς, ἐπί, and by the

[1] Vulg. (closely following the Greek) "non justificatur homo ex operibus legis, nisi per fidem Jesu Christi."

use of πίστις in the dative case (πίστει); the *vital* force and efficacy of faith in the life of justification and salvation 'in Christ' is expressed by the prepositions ἐκ and ἐν—and especially by the former.

The address of St. Paul to St. Peter and the other brethren in Antioch, as recorded in Galatians ii. 14–21, is a marvellous example of condensed and pregnant utterance. In it St. Paul's whole Gospel may be said to be comprehended, with its fundamental antitheses of 'death' and 'life,' of 'law' and 'grace,' of faith as resting upon an objective atonement (redemption) and of the same faith as the energy of a new life (revivification). If any passage in the entire New Testament, this one will repay being studied with a magnifying-glass. The argument which is given *in extenso* in Romans i.-viii. is here given in a nutshell. Furthermore, this pregnant passage also brings before us that other great Pauline antithesis to which I wish to call attention—the antithesis, namely, between the phrases 'through Jesus Christ' and 'in Christ Jesus.'

Our Lord's Name in the form 'Christ Jesus' is peculiar to St. Paul (if we except the disputed reading ἐν Χριστῷ Ἰησοῦ in 1 Peter v. 10, where, indeed, St. Peter may have been borrowing the phrase of his brother-Apostle St. Paul). This fact is obscured in the King James Version, where the Name 'Christ Jesus' is found (besides Acts xix. 4) in three passages outside of St. Paul's Epistles.[1] It is in the Epistle to the Romans that the distinction or antithesis between 'Jesus Christ' and 'Christ Jesus' is most clearly evident. 'In' (ἐν) is associated with the form 'Christ Jesus' as 'by' (διά with the genitive) is associated with 'Jesus Christ.' In chapters i.-iv. of the Epistle to the Romans (which contain the first stage of the Apostle's argument) the Name 'Christ Jesus' occurs but once (iii.

[1] These passages are: Heb. iii. 1; 1 Pet. v. 10 and 14.

24)—'Jesus Christ' being the usual form. There is, moreover, a significant contrast between the preposition 'through' ('by') and 'in' in v. 10: "For if, when we were enemies we were reconciled to God *by* the death (*διὰ τοῦ θανάτου*) of his Son, much more, being reconciled, we shall be saved *in* his life" (*ἐν τῇ ζωῇ αὐτοῦ*). The contrast here—like that between *ἐκ πίστεως* and *διὰ πίστεως*—was ignored by the King James translators, who rendered both prepositions by the same word, 'by.' In order to grasp the real significance of the distinction between 'Jesus Christ' and 'Christ Jesus' we must take each of these two Names of our Lord with its appropriate preposition. With 'Christ Jesus' *ἐν* (in) is associated; with 'Jesus Christ' *διά* (by). 'By' (or 'through') indicates the process of redemption as wrought out by Jesus Christ through His sufferings and death; 'in' exhibits to our view the state of achieved and attained spiritual life which is ours in union with our Risen Lord, Christ Jesus. The Resurrection and Ascension as the point of transition from 'Jesus' to 'Christ' had already been indicated in St. Peter's sermon on the Day of Pentecost, which closed with the emphatic assertion: "God hath made him both 'Lord' ad 'Christ,'—this 'Jesus' whom ye crucified" (Acts ii. 36).

The phrase 'in Christ Jesus,' which, as we have said, occurs once in the first five chapters of the Epistle to the Romans, recurs frequently in chapters vi.-viii., wherein the subjective aspect of our salvation is presented. In the sphere of objective redemption, "Being justified by faith, we have peace with God *through* our Lord Jesus Christ" (v. 1); "we rejoice in God *through* our Lord Jesus Christ, *through* whom we have now received the reconciliation" (verse 11). It is "the gift by the grace of the one man, Jesus Christ" (verse 15). "They who receive . . .

the gift . . . shall reign in life *through* the one, even Jesus Christ" (verse 17). God's great purpose was that "as sin reigned in death, even so grace might reign *through* righteousness unto eternal life, *through* Jesus Christ our Lord" (verse 21). With these '*through*—passages' ends the presentation of salvation as objective—as wrought out by the redeeming and justifying activity of Jesus Christ.

With chapter vi., however, begins a new stage of the Apostle's argument, as is clearly indicated by the use of our Lord's Name in its antithetic and complementary form 'Christ Jesus.' Again it is the Revised Version which sets this fact before us in a clear light. By the phrase 'in Christ Jesus' we are at once introduced into the sphere of that Risen Life which has been achieved by the Second Adam, who as 'the Lord from heaven' has now become 'quickening Spirit' (1 Cor. xv. 45, 47). First, there is the fact of our incorporation into that 'Christ Jesus' who had been already set forth to our faith (iii. 24, 25) as the embodiment of redemption from sin. Is this redemption and justification to remain simply a thing outside of us, having no effect upon our life, or upon our inner spiritual nature? "Shall we continue in sin, that grace may bound? God forbid! we who died to sin,[1] how shall we any longer live therein? What! are ye ignorant that all we who were baptized into Christ Jesus were baptized into his death?" (vi. 3). And union with our Lord in His death, as St. Paul goes on to show, involves also union with Him in His resurrection—within the sphere of His risen life. "Even so reckon ye also yourselves to be dead unto sin, but alive unto God *in* Christ Jesus" (vi. 11); "For the wages of sin is death, but the free gift of God is eternal life *in* Christ Jesus our Lord" (vi. 23). In the

[1] The relative pronoun *οἵτινες* carries with it the suggestion of quality; "we, being such persons as died to sin."

following chapter (vii.), which sets forth the opposition between man's sinful nature and God's righteous Law, as illustrated in the Apostle's own experience, the phrase 'in Christ Jesus' does not occur. Yet at the end of the chapter St. Paul "thanks God through Jesus Christ our Lord" that this apparently hopeless contradiction between the 'mind'[1] and the 'flesh' shall be—yes, may even now be overcome. Chapter viii. opens with the glorious and inspiring utterance: "There is therefore now no condemnation to them that are 'in Christ Jesus.' For the law of the spirit of life 'in Christ Jesus' made me free from the law of sin and of death." The 'impasse' of the Law (*τὸ ἀδύνατον τοῦ νόμου*) has now been overcome by grace, with the crowning result that "'the righteous requirement' of the law (*τὸ δικαίωμα τοῦ νόμου*) is now fulfilled in us who walk not after the flesh but after the spirit" (viii. 3, 4). Not only are we incorporated into Christ Jesus by our baptism; we are made to share in the very spirit of His own life. To be 'in Christ' means that Christ is 'in us' (viii. 10); that the Spirit of Christ (which is also the Spirit of God) actuates us; that we live and move upon the plane of the new life of Him who is risen from the dead, and who, "having died unto sin once for all," now "liveth unto God" (vi. 10). If the Name 'Jesus-Christ' brings our Lord before us as the 'Way'—the only Avenue of access to God and to salvation—it is the Name 'Christ-Jesus' that presents Him to us as the 'Life.'

W. S. Bishop.

[1] *νοῦς*.

ILLUSTRATIONS OF THE CREED OF MYSTICISM.

The Doctrine of Christ.

Mysticism, to use the word in its strictest sense, is a faith which does not rest on an historic basis; a doctrine which is incapable of rational expression; a life which is not controlled by any external law. As a faith it is the vision of an inward light; as a doctrine it is the evidence of things, not as they appear to us, but as they are in themselves; as a life it is the direction of the soul towards union with God. Mysticism, as it is properly understood, separates itself from all that is outward and relative; it is "the belief that we may attain directly, without the aid of the senses and without the aid of reason, by an immediate intuition, to the real and absolute principle of all truth, God." Mysticism is the religion of nature, reduced to its elements.

The thoughts which strive for utterance in the teaching of the mystics are at once Light and Seed. A seed is dropped into the soil, quick with the life of forgotten centuries, asleep to-day, only that it may awake in new but familiar unfoldings. Light falls from the high heaven, and spreads its many-coloured garment over the earth. Mysticism is as old as the life of the race; yet it wears the freshness of each returning spring. If we endeavour to trace its progress, to record its genesis, we shall succeed in part; but the most careful scrutiny will fail at times, for mysticism contains elements which are immediate, incalculable, as well as combinations which are separable by historical analysis.

Alain de l'Isle, a mystical poet of the twelfth century, describes the sending forth of an embassy by the Choir of the Virtues to the Author of All. Prudence was entrusted with the message, and Reason was commanded to guide her chariot. At first they advanced with speed, but after a time their course was arrested, and the charioteer exclaimed, "Here the road ends."

Christianity and mysticism both aspire to rise above sense and reason, but when "the road ends" they fall asunder. The mystics pass in the clearness of their spirits into the eternal darkness—alone; whereas the followers of Jesus hear in the silence, unbroken by any creature-utterance, the voice of the Son of God, "I am the way; no man cometh unto the Father but by Me."

The theme of mystical theology is the "transfusion" of the soul into one being with Deity. Christianity also teaches that the union of the saints with God is so intimate as to exhaust metaphor, and is shadowed forth rather than described in such words as these, "As Thou, Father, art in Me, and I in Thee." But this union is "in Christ," and is determined in accordance with the temporal relations of the Divine Word. In this determination Christianity differences itself from mysticism.

Nevertheless, "Christian mysticism" is an accepted, even though it be a singularly elusive term. Sometimes, with an inexactness against which it would be pedantic to protest, we describe as a Christian mystic one who emphasizes, lingers over, and perhaps exaggerates those doctrines of the faith which enshrine the mystery of the soul's union with God. At other times, and more legitimately, we give that name to one who attempts to reconcile the credenda of mysticism with the faith of Jesus Christ. Therefore when mysticism falls within the history of the Church it sweeps the whole scale between apostolic Christianity

and naked pantheism. It strives—and for the most part with success—to maintain its footing on the perilous edge which slopes down towards the abyss of annihilation; but it discloses a tendency to depress the doctrine of the person of Christ and to loosen the bands of obligation.

Mysticism within the Church does not, of course, eliminate the doctrine of Christ; nor is it content merely to shift the accent. It constructs its own system. The historic Jesus becomes the symbol of a divine idea, the sacrament of a divine energy. He is revered as the leader of the soul's progress, but He is not confessed in any true sense as a Redeemer. The cross on Golgotha has for its most majestic consequence the lifting up of the inward cross. Justification is a sentence of absolution which is given forth from the tribunal of one's own conscience, and not from the throne of God. And the Holy Spirit ceases to witness directly and only to Jesus the Nazarene.

But, on the other hand, the eternal relations of the Word made flesh are discussed by mystical writers with remarkable power, and sometimes with exquisite felicity of language. With unfainting strength of devotion the great mystics search along the barren heights of speculation for the print of feet that once were pierced; for the Man of Sorrows, returning to His native heaven, passed that way. The breathless words of St. Paul, in which he proclaims that the Son of the Eternal Love is "the image of the invisible God, the firstborn of all creation . . . the head of the body . . . the beginning, the firstborn from the dead . . . for it was the good pleasure of the Father that in Him should all the fulness dwell," are the inexhaustible text of Christian mysticism.

I.

In the victorious youth of the Church the distinction between the Christian faith and the ethnic systems of thought was regarded as absolute. But when love to Christ began to faint, pagan philosophy forced its way into the congregation of the faithful as the underlying moorland creeps up through the recently reclaimed soil whenever the care of the agriculturist is withdrawn. Even in the lifetime of the apostles, in the little societies of believers over which they watched as under-shepherds of the flock of God, the mysticism of the East had re-affirmed its ancient doctrines. But the plenary statement of the mystical union between the believing soul and Christ, which was given to the Church in the later Scriptures of the New Testament, stayed the progress of error for a time.

Only for a time, however, for in the second century the Church was filled with the mysterious doctrines of Oriental paganism. The result was a tangled growth of heresies which we class together under the general term, Gnosticism.

Speculations such as those which were advanced by the Gnostics possess an amazing vitality. Many of those weird imaginings had their home in India, in Persia, in Egypt, thousands of years before the beginning of the Christian age. But Gnosticism was rejected by the Church; her sufficient answer to it was the more careful statement of dogma.

In the third and fourth centuries ethnic philosophy, interpreted in the light of Christianity and reconstructed in such a manner that it became possible to embody in it many of the distinctive doctrines of the faith, was taught in the schools of paganism. The new wisdom, at first opposed by the Church, was in a short time welcomed by many of the Church fathers. They believed that it pro-

vided a scientific basis on which the truths of revelation might securely rest. And—perhaps with a motive similar to that which led the Latin missionaries to plant the sign of their faith on the altars of Druidism—they taught their disciples to exhibit the grace of God in the forms of a merely human wisdom.

Neo-platonism, as this reconstruction of ancient systems is called, was compounded of many of the elements which entered into Gnosticism, but in different proportions. Religiously, it was the effort of the human soul to attain to union with God by means of intellectual abstraction.

Plotinus, the great artificer of Neo-platonism, was born in Egypt in the beginning of the third century. He died at Rome in the year 270.

The system of Plotinus is architectonic—it is a philosophy of the universe. It was preceded by that interfusion of the ancient mythologies which marked the decadence of the early faiths and the dawn of the Christian era. Gathering its materials out of all history, and measuring the scale of human thought, it began to rear a mighty fabric which, like some ancient temple, holding within its pillared recesses a secret shrine, should conceal from vulgar observation and at the same time give ordered expression to the mystery of the soul's union with God. The task was beyond its powers, but the attempt was itself an achievement. The chief distinction of Neo-platonism is its recognition of the fact that human thought is essentially religious, that every true philosophy revolves round some theological concept, acknowledged or unconfessed, and that even those schemes of thought which seem to be most remote from the highest good yield to that resistless attraction which holds each human intelligence in awe and pours upon the earthliest imagination the splendour of Deity. Neo-platonism is the final expression of the ancient mysticism,

mysticism simple and pure, as yet hardly cognizant of Christianity, but capable of entering into the most diverse relations with the Catholic faith. It is the neutral ground on which the glowing visions of the Christian mystics have been emblazoned.

II.

In Edessa, towards the end of the fifth century, when the influence of Origen still wrought in the Laurai and Cœnobia of Syria, Stephen bar Sudaili, a monophysite monk of some repute, began to unfold a scheme of unrelieved mysticism. There were in it traces of Origenism, of the Kabbala, of the later Persian cult, of Chaldean theosophy, of Egyptian mystery-worship. But its author was not consciously an imitator; the seeds of all these doctrines were in the soil. He announced himself as a prophet, as one who had received enlightenment from above, who had heard the voice of God. The essential heathenism of his views evoked such opposition that he was compelled to leave Edessa. Sometime between 494 and 512 he went to Palestine, where greater freedom of thought was permitted. From a monastery near Jerusalem he maintained communication with a considerable body of disciples. On the walls of his cell he inscribed the formula—"All nature is of one essence with God." He wrote several treatises, but the "sealed book" of the sect appears to have been *The Book of the Holy Hierotheos on the hidden mysteries of the Divinity.* Hierotheos was, according to tradition, first Christian bishop of Athens. Gregory bar Hebraia, a monophysite patriarch who lived in the thirteenth century, was able only with much difficulty to procure a copy of this excessively rare treatise. Professor Frothingham had the good

fortune to discover in the British Museum the very manuscript which Gregory so hardly obtained.

There is, says "Hierotheos," one being. Distinct orders of existence have arisen out of a fall from this universal essence. But all things shall be redeemed.

Complete restoration to the one being is to be attained in the dissolving of forms and the cessation of conscious life. In this upward movement there are two points of attainment—Union and Absorption.

The soul which would begin the ascent must unite its essential divinity with the All-Good. By purification and self-sacrifice that which separates the soul from the all-embracing divinity is cleansed away. When this has taken place the soul has become Christ, and is able to say, There is no God beside me. This attainment is Union.

But the soul must scale still loftier heights. It leaves the name of Christ behind: it passes distinction, reason, thought, so that it may no longer be said, "Father, glorify Thy Son, that Thy Son also may glorify Thee"; for all distinction between the glorifier and the glorified has passed away. Henceforth there is neither Father, Son, nor Spirit. The Godhead itself has ceased to exist, for Deity implies love and mercy. The soul is now confusedly mingled with the All-Being. This is Absorption.

If we take these words as they stand, it is clear that Hierotheos thought of the Deity as an abyss, not as an active principle; as the extinction of being, not as its interpretation. And such in strictness seems to be his meaning. He teaches that the one essence bent over, and drew to itself the chaos and darkness which had fallen out of the true being. This act of Deity, this movement of eternal love, is the manifestation of Christ. Christ is thus made "Head and Ruler over all essences." His manifestation is "the motion of life and consciousness in all creatures."

He is "the universal reason." In Him the ascent to God begins and continues. But as all things are gradually led back into the one being, the act of God, which is love, comes to an end. The light dies out of the shining sea, and all things are plunged into a fathomless abyss.

III.

The doctrine of Hierotheos cannot, in fairness, be termed Christian; but a significant and masterly attempt to clothe the unfeatured mysticism of the East in forms of Christian truth proceeded, towards the close of the fifth century, from the Syrian cloister, and, apparently, from the school of Hierotheos.

The Book of Hierotheos is addressed to an unnamed disciple whom the author salutes as "son" and "friend," and of whom he speaks with affectionate regard. It has been conjectured that that disciple was Dionysius, called the Areopagite. Dionysius, in his turn, frequently refers to his revered "initiator," Hierotheos. For his own writings he claims only that they are a popular restatement of the more abstruse treatises of the Master who so far excelled in authority, in closeness of argument, and in fulness of sacred thought all the teachers of his day, that one dared not even gaze with unveiled face upon so bright a luminary.

Perhaps we cannot affirm that the relation of Dionysius to Stephen bar Sudaili has been established beyond possible doubt. But various lines of evidence make it extremely probable that the writings of Dionysius belong to the close of the fifth century, and that they are the work of a Syrian monk, presumably of Edessa, possibly of Antioch. They present, and it is here that their interest for us lies, a complete interpenetration of ecclesiastical Christianity with Oriental mysticism.

The great Latin doctors, with splendid determination, insisted that Dionysius should talk in a fashion that would not misbeseem an Augustinian canon. They maintained that the Catholic faith was "the principle, the rule, and the term" of the philosophy of the Areopagite. But the Greek scholiasts, with a finer perception of the meaning of their author, confessed that he had combined his originally unrelated conceptions by means of the regulating principle of Neo-platonism.

Dionysius conceives of Deity as the One who is also the all. Himself self-existent, He is the source of all that has life in itself. His singular essence unfolds, and displays itself in a trinal unity. Among the Divine Subsistences the Father is primal Being; the Son and the Spirit emanate as streams from that fountain, as branches from that stem, as rays from that luminary. From the everlasting Trinity the descending gradations of being, "the beneficent progressions of the Godhead" flow. These are mediated by the Son, who is the Word, the ineffable source of wisdom, being, power.

As wisdom, Christ is coincident with the "universal reason" of Hierotheos; also, with the impersonal "mind" of Neo-platonism which is cognizant of itself, and which holds within itself "the eternal ideas of all the forms, general and particular, that become explicit in the things of time and space."

As being, He is the pervasive life of the whole, that "august essence which penetrates without stain all essences," the source and perfection of all hierarchies, the sustainer of all being, the life of every creature.

As power, He is at once the cause and the reconciliation of all things, originator of the diversities of existence, and restorer of the broken peace of the one essence.

The system of Hierotheos was a loose syncretism. To

him "Christ" was a name, indicative now of the *Logos* of Philo, now of the *Adam Kadmon* of the Kabbala, now of the *Nous* of the Neo-platonists. He is less than the Absolute; personality cannot, in any strict sense, be ascribed to Him; and His relation to Jesus of Nazareth scarcely appears.

Dionysius follows his "initiator" in declaring that the Eternal Son is the universal reason, the primal energy of God, the beginning of creation, and the fulness of humanity. But he speaks of the Redeemer who came to earth to save, who went among the mountains seeking the sheep which had gone astray, and at last yielding His life for the world's health. Dionysius was, it is true, a philosopher of the school of Proclus, but he was also a monophysite Christian of general orthodoxy, who had a firm persuasion of the compassion of Christ towards himself, and a hearty realization of his personal interest in the finished work of redemption.

In the writings of Dionysius one is confronted at every turn with an apparently invincible distinction between "symbolical" and "mystical" theology. This dualism arises from the fact that two contrasted and eternal movements are proper to the divine essence—one downward, through the heavenly hierarchies, to material existence, and even to the non-existent; the other upward, through the scale of being, to the enfolding embrace of the One who is the all. The knowledge which the downward progress brings to us is *symbolical;* that which the upward movement yields is *intuitive.*

(1) By the first of these eternal movements the Deity progresses endlessly through an apparently endless creation. He is the Fountain of Light uncreated: from Him the divine Subsistences and the heavenly hierarchies proceed. But, seeing that these rivers of light flow through "the variegated veils of existence," they fall upon our sight in

broken and coloured rays. It is therefore impossible to determine the true character of the primal Source of light from the mere vision of the many-tinted hues of the divine forthshining. The cause is by no means necessarily like to the effect. If one were ignorant of the nature of flame, one could not gain a just conception of it from the sight of a charred ruin. We are, therefore, unable to pass through the ceaseless progressions of Deity to the immediate knowledge of Him whom no man has seen or can see. Earth mirrors heaven; but the mirrors are stained, and grow darker with each distinction. We dare not say, God is Life, or Light, or Love. All that we are able to affirm is that He is the primal Source of life, and light, and love. And all that we can say of the Eternal Word is that He is fitly imaged in Jesus of Nazareth, whose life and work have been bequeathed to us as an enduring symbol and pledge of the everlasting love of God.

(2) The upward movement, by which all things return to the divine quiescence, is for us a way of abstraction. Dionysius teaches that definition is limitation, and that attributes, as we conceive them, are inconsistent with that One who is all-pervading essence. A sculptor stands before an unshapen block of marble. In a frenzy of artistic passion he exclaims, "What a god-like beauty thou hidest!" With his chisel he flakes off fragment after fragment, until the latent perfection which his inward eye had detected is disclosed. Similarly, by abstraction, we affirm that God is more than good, more than love, more than being, more than life, more than wisdom, more than righteousness, more than deity. He transcends all titles and attributions. He is the Nameless One. Yet we come to know Him by this very way of abstraction. In the blindness of sense and reason a spiritual vision is kindled. For, having passed above all creatures, we have entered into God.

We dwell in the eternal light, beholding in Himself, the First and the Fair, looking towards Him with "a blind understanding," and gazing upon Him with "eyeless minds." Dionysius counsels us to rise from the Manhood of Jesus into His very Godhead. It is obvious that in this progress the Manhood is lost to us. It ceases to possess for us even a symbolical value.

IV.

The influence of the Areopagite on the Church mystics was less in the region of Christology than in other fields of doctrine.

(*a*) Dionysius' doctrine of the One, revealing itself in a trinity of subsistences, moves uneasily between two heresies. On the one hand, it approaches a Sabellian distinction between the *nature* and the *operation*. On the other hand, it tends to a view of the divine paternity in which, by an eternal generation, the primal essence gave birth to a *secondary* substance. Dionysius appears to have been aware of the opposing dangers, and to have tried, with doubtful success, to avoid them. His followers leant, sometimes to the one extreme, sometimes to the other.

The doctrine of the eternal generation of the Son continued within the Church, and became a regulating thought in the mystical systems of the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries. Ruysbroek, for instance, affirms the following positions: (*a*) In a beginning without beginning an everlasting radiance streams from the Father. This is the eternal begetting of the Son. (*b*) Through this eternal begetting all creatures exist in the Son before they have been created in time. (*c*) The endless progression which

confers upon us being in God is the cause of our temporal existence. (*d*) And thus, as dwellers in time, we receive without cessation the eternal coming of the Bridegroom to our souls.

In this scheme the difficulty is to preserve unimpaired the unique relation which subsists between the Eternal Son and the Infant of Days who was cradled in Bethlehem. We have seen that Dionysius was able only to establish a correspondence between them. For the "things in the heavens" are the immaterial and timeless *patterns* of "things on the earth."

The Church mystics, taught to draw all their "thoughts and feelings" within the "doctrine of Holy Church," were guided to the great and fruitful acknowledgment of Christ as Head of the race, embracing in His single Person the fulness of humanity. This conception, which opens out into vast tracts of thought, was sometimes expressed with great power and beauty.

Among the sects the frame of Christology was less rigid, and the tendency to regard Jesus of Nazareth no longer as a solitary Saviour and unexampled Revelation, but rather as a signal illustration of the working of a universal law, often broke the mould of doctrine. The Son was thought of as a Divine Spirit, incarnating Himself ever afresh in the lives of the saints. And the saints fill up "the process of Christ," as His birth, His passion, His resurrection, are reproduced in them. The human life of Jesus was at most a sacramental display of the grace of God; and the modern paradox, "Be a Christ," became a deliberate counsel of perfection. The Brethren of the Free Spirit asserted that those who lived in the likeness of the life of Christ were in nothing inferior to Him; and Henrick Nicolaes, founder of the Huis der Liefde, roundly declared that, whereas "there was in times past one Christ in Israel, now every full-age

member of the Family of Love is He." The Pauline truth which underlies these "wild and whirling words" was obscured by the virtual denial of the Godmanhood. By that denial the whole mystery of Christianity became an allegory to enfold and bedeck certain moral teachings.

(*b*) The Victorines, deriving their doctrine from Augustine, Origen and Dionysius, enjoin the proficient to rise to the contemplation of Jesus-God by Jesus-Man. Bernard argued the competency of such a process from the familiar proof-texts: "It is the spirit that quickeneth; the flesh profiteth nothing," and, "Yea, though we have known Christ after the flesh, yet now henceforth know we Him no more." The argument has a scriptural sound, but a fallacy lurks in it. Harnack says of it, "This final and most questionable direction of mysticism . . . nullifies historical Christianity, and leads on to Pantheism." Much of course depends upon the meaning placed upon the words in question. It may be correct to say that we ought not to allow our minds to rest on the earthly career of the Man of Nazareth, nor permit them to dwell in the recollection of His human perfection, but should behold Him rather in the virtue of His Godhead, and in the light of the eternal world. But those who insisted on this mode of contemplation came often to disregard the great Christological maxim, *There is one Christ, and He is not divided.* Sometimes they sundered His person, sometimes they disparted His work. In the one case, the Jesus of history ceased to be the Christ of faith; in the other, the intercession within the veil was lifted out of all relation to the blood-shedding on Calvary. And contemplative aspirants judged it possible to rise by Christ to a recognition of absolute being, to descend with Him into the quiescence of the universal essence.

But perhaps the general intention of the ascetic theologians was harmless enough. The classical passage on

this theme is in Albert's treatise, *De Adhaerendo Deo*, a writing which more than any other moulded the thought of the English contemplationists. "He who desires to win Christ," says Albert, "must wholly retire within himself, allowing no object to possess his thoughts save Jesus Christ wounded. Then, straining with constant attention and unremitting earnestness, he must make it his sole endeavour *to pass by Him into Him*, that is to say, to pass by His Manhood into His Godhead, by the wounds of His Humanity into the hidden glory of His Deity." In these sentences the *Doctor Universalis* probably intended only the evangelical counsel, Realize the power of the indissoluble life of the ascended Lord, and receive the Holy Ghost.

(c) The sensuous imagery of Eastern mystery-worship lent itself to a debasing emotionalism in religion which has sometimes reappeared in mysticism. Hierotheos and Dionysius both adopt the erotic mode of speech, and the latter defends it. He affirms that when Ignatius said of Christ, "My Love (ἔρως) was crucified," he spoke well.

The Old Testament conception of Jehovah as the husband of His people passed into the New Testament. The martyr saints of imperial Rome anticipated in their apocalyptic visions the day when it should be said, "Be glad and rejoice . . . for the marriage of the Lamb is come, and His wife hath made herself ready." Almost all the Greek fathers dilate on the espousal covenant between Christ and His Church. After Methodius, an unhealthful application began to be made of the marriage contract between the Bridegroom of souls, and those who, "burning in love" for Him, had renounced the sweet content of an earthly union. Seuse, with characteristic exaggeration, cut the name of Jesus in deep letters on his breast; and countless ecstatics, in the spirit of Angela di Foligno, chiding the "creeping hours" which drew on so tardily the consum-

mate union between Christ and the souls which were faint with love for Him, were confronted at some simple turning of the road by the heavenly Bridegroom, who addressed them in words of delicate tenderness.

But the great mystics all speak with deliberation on this difficult subject. Bernard insists firmly that the entire community of the faithful, and not the individual saint, is the Bride. For no believer, while still on pilgrimage, can possess in himself those illustrious tokens which are the adornment of the Holy Church. He admits that in a partial and modified sense the children of God may refresh themselves with the contemplation of the marriage relation which subsists between the Redeemer and the souls for whom He died. That quality of bridal love which distinguishes it from all other manifestations of affection is its "onlyness"—its personal and exclusive propriety; and this quality belongs to faith on the one hand and to grace on the other. Bernard himself wrote out and nailed upon the wall of his cell his favourite text: "A bundle of love is my Well-beloved unto me: He shall lie all night between my breasts." He would have concurred in Tersteegen's gloss on St. Paul's words, *He loved me: and gave Himself for me;* "Paul, what is this that thou sayest? Did Christ die for thee only? Yea; for me only—and for thee only." He would have said with Von Zinzendorf, "I have only one passion; and it is He."

V.

The Baptist martyrologies give prominence to a tenet which was jealously maintained within the Anabaptist communities, although it became the occasion, if not the cause,

of unrelenting persecution. "Christ," said the Anabaptists, "took not flesh of the Virgin."

A tincture of Doketism may be detected in the earliest ecclesiastical writings. This is due in part to the fact that controversy had not then clarified the Church's apprehension of the Person of the God-man. Afterwards, the infusion of Greek dualism into Christian dogmatic encouraged the open belief that the humanity of our Lord was mystical. In the beginning of the third century, the Eastern Church was penetrated with Doketism: Christ was declared to be a Divine Being clothed upon with a spiritual body. Various tendencies contributed to the diffusion of this error—a misdirected zeal for the vindication of our Lord's Godhead; a metaphysical conception of the Deity which represented Him as dwelling in an unapproachable solitude raised infinitely above our loftiest thought; a haunting sense of the incapacity of matter to be the vehicle of spiritual truth; a deep belief in the sinfulness of mortal flesh.

Clement of Alexandria, Cyril, and perhaps Origen, leant towards Doketism. Hilary, among the Latins, spoke of the *corpus cœleste* of the Redeemer. Dionysius Areopagita continually bordered upon this heresy; and Erigena, whose thought was steeped in Neo-platonism, frankly crossed the line. Erigena's celebrated treatise, *De Divisione Naturae*, was eagerly accepted by the heterodox mystics of the succeeding age, and thus the ancient error that the "flesh" of Christ was not germane to that of common humanity gained a broad currency.

Doketism has many forms: the variant of it which appeared among the Anabaptists was intimately related to the doctrine of Valentinus. This particular opinion was ruled out of Church theology, but it held its ground among the sects. The Euchites of the eleventh century taught

that Christ "passed through" the Virgin Mary, and was revealed in a spiritual body. Those who saw Him thought that He was of one flesh with them. He seemed to suffer, die, and rise again; but He did so only in appearance. The curious statement of Euthymius Zigabenus, that the Bogomiles believed that Christ passed through the ear of Mary, is possibly only an Oriental expression of the opinion which was current among the English Anabaptists, and is finding fresh expression among us now, that Christ was born of the Virgin's "faith and belief." In Flanders the Popelikans, in Italy the Cathari, in France the Tisserands, in Germany the Sect of the New Spirit, appear to have embraced the same strange tenet. It revived in the Anabaptist movement, and Melchior Hoffman used the very language of the Valentinians, "Christ passed through Mary as though a channel." The controversy which Menno Simonis waged with John à Lasco touched upon this very point. Menno refused to say that Christ "received the flesh of Mary," but he confesses that it was "formed in her." If the statement of Cornelius van Huysen is correct, Menno was able to modify the views of the spiritual Anabaptists, but many of them continued to cling to the ancient forms of speech. Christ passed, they said, through Mary "as water through a pipe, or as light through glass."

It is hard to find any explanation of the fact that the heresy of Valentinus lingered among the Mennonites when other extravagances, less hurtful, and less repugnant to Christian instincts, had been pruned away. It is true that the permanence of phrases is one of the most marked features of the transmission of thought. But the error of which we speak does not seem to have been a merely inoperative opinion, held in an otiose manner, and accepted by successive generations in mental indolence. It was firmly

held, and was judged to be an important item in the Anabaptist creed. It was strenuously opposed by the leaders of the English Reformation on the very grounds on which Irenaeus and Tertullian assailed it in the second century —that it was the virtual denial of the incarnation, that it removed the Son of Man from followship with us in temptation and sorrow, and that it darkened the glory of the cross of Christ. And yet, men whose daily endeavour it was to abide in union with the Redeemer persistently clung to this ancient error of the Syrian Gnostics.

It seems most reasonable to suppose that the early Anabaptists had tenaciously maintained this article of their creed in face of the bitterest persecution, and in spite of its logical incoherence with other doctrines, because it enabled them to vindicate their refusal to yield divine honour to Mary, and also because it poured contempt upon the sacrifice of the Mass.

David M. M'Intyre.

THE CONCEPT OF PERFECTION AS APPLIED TO GOD.

'PERFECT,' as applied to God, is, unlike 'infinite,' a Biblical term; and in my previous article on 'infinity' it was observed that concept had tended, at least so far as its meaning is concerned, to be replaced by that of perfection.

But 'perfect' is an exceedingly ambiguous word; and perhaps some small service may be rendered to theological students by an attempt to distinguish and discuss the several meanings which it has borne in theological and philosophical literature. Such a discussion will involve reference also to the more specifically philosophical term 'absolute,' which is often imported into theology.

There are at least four different senses in which 'perfect' has been used in the history of theology, not to speak of numerous hybrids between them. Some of these are identical with some of the various meanings of 'absolute.' Thus both these terms have sometimes meant the infinite or the indeterminate, not only in the sense of the highest logical abstraction, but also in that of the *omnitudo realitatis*. Both terms, again, have connoted the 'completed'—a word etymologically antithetical to 'infinite' as 'unfinished'—the completely actual as distinguished from the potential: and so, by implication, the immutable. The remaining meanings of 'perfect,' however, are different from the remaining meanings of 'absolute.' For instance, 'perfect' has sometimes been used as a term of value rather than of being, and has meant the ethically perfect or the good (Platonists have identified the good with the existent), while the Absolute has often been regarded as transcending the distinction between the good and evil along with other distinctions, and has been equivalent in meaning to 'unconditioned' or 'unrelated.' Finally,

'perfect' has been used so as to include such mutability as is involved in activity, life, and even development (though not such as is involved in growth), while 'absolute,' for its fourth distinguishable meaning, has connoted the independent or self-subsistent.

(1) As to the first of these senses of 'perfection,' which is identical with that of 'indeterminateness,' little needs to be added to what was said in my previous article. The meaning obtained a footing in Christian literature through the influence of Neo-Platonism, and is common in the work of Dionysius the Areopagite. This writer speaks of God as in Himself above all essence and life, all wisdom and understanding, though the cause of all reason, and apparently in that sense as possessing infinite reason. God, according to Dionysius, is ὑπέρσοφος and ὑπέρζως; wisdom and life being evidently regarded as unworthy to express the Divine perfection. Unintelligence is ascribed to God not by way of defect (κατ' ἔλλειψιν), but by way of eminence (καθ' ὑπεροχὴν). We are thus reminded of the Good of Plato as described in the *Republic*,[1] which transcends real existence in dignity and power; of the God whom Philo, and sometimes Clement of Alexandria, conceived of in complete abstraction from His attributes; of the absolute non-existent of Basilides; the One of Plotinus; the Substance of Spinoza; the Absolute of Hamilton; the Unknowable of Mansel and Spencer; the Super-Absolute (!) of Nicolas of Cusa: conceptions all reached by the 'negative way' of abstraction. This mode of thinking leads of course to nothing but agnosticism, and its result is devoid of all significance for theology and religion, notwithstanding that it has been set up as the perfect God of Christian faith.

And theology has fared no better when, going to the

[1] Book vi. p. 509.

other of two extremes which meet, it has endeavoured to conceive of the Perfect as τὸ ὅλον or τὸ τέλειον after Aristotle's guidance: as "Actus Purus," in which there is no potentiality unrealised. This conception was taken over by Scholasticism under the name of *ens realissimum*, and when its actuality, not its idea, was concerned, was described by *omnitudo realitatis*. But an 'everything in general' is no more a determinate actual entity than a 'nothing in particular'; and perfection or completeness in this sense, though a positive and not a negative conception, is after all but completed endlessness, and a self-contradiction. Determination involves negation, truly, of what is left out, but, at the same time, affirmation of what is left in, the actuality which is determinate or defined: and perfection, to be a theologically useful conception, must denote not a mere endless jumble of all conceivable attributes; while to escape pantheism it must, as an ontological term, denote non-inclusiveness of the whole of reality. Too full, as well as too meagre, a content destroys such perfection as can significantly be predicated of God.

(2) We pass now to the second meaning of perfection or completedness—that of the negation of all potentiality, and therefore the affirmation of immutability. This is the Parmenidean, and largely, the Platonic, sense of the term; and perhaps it has had as baneful an influence on theology as the usage of 'perfect' which has just been described.

The 'real being' of Parmenides is described by him as without beginning and without end, uncreated, indestructible, immutable, indivisible. Parmenides set out from the dogma that whatever can be thought of, *is*. From this it follows that the past still is, and therefore that change is impossible in the truly real. This philosopher did not distinguish between the 'is' in 'is thought of' and the 'is' which expresses existence independent of thought;

and from this fallacy flows the doctrine of the immutability of the truly real, which so largely moulded great systems of Greek philosophy, and in turn shaped much Christian doctrine in the patristic and scholastic ages.

Perhaps 'unchanging' is still the commonest meaning which the term 'perfect' bears in theology. The conception is therefore cognate to that of 'eternity,' discussion of which is reserved for a future article.

Apart from the alleged impossibility of change in the truly real, whether imperfect or perfect in other senses, it is so obvious as to be scarcely worth remarking, that the perfect cannot change if change in it would lead to its becoming imperfect. And immutability has been maintained, on these lines, as a predicate of God, by Plato and by Aquinas, not to speak of writers of theological textbooks who have followed their guidance.[1] This, however, is but one kind of mutability; and to affirm its impossibility is very far from repudiating such change as would seem to be involved in all conscious process, all activity, and all life; unless indeed time be assumed to be unreal; and even then there would remain for consideration that reality—there must be some reality—of which time is the illusory appearance. However, immutability in the sense of the impossibility of lapse to imperfection, is hardly worth the theologian's consideration, in comparison with the many respects in which strict immutability seems to be *prima facie* inconsistent with the whole theistic and Christian conception of God and its religious worth.

If, in the first place, immutability be inconsistent with activity, an immutable God cannot be a Creator; and for Aristotle, the God who is called Prime Mover (in a world the very knowledge of which is precluded to the Mover)

[1] Plato and Aristotle, in so far as they imply only the inconceivability of God's changing His *nature*, or of contradicting Himself, teach harmlessly. Cf. Mal. iii. 6, "I, the Lord, change not."

and indeed *Actus Purus*, is active only in so far as He eternally contemplates the 'intelligible' world of ideas and necessary truths. Such activity might be called quiescence. And indeed there is logically no means of identifying Artistotle's Absolute, perfect and quiescent, who with His *νόησις νόησεως* constitutes a perfect whole, with God in any other than the pantheistic sense of the Name. We are still in the realm of abstractions, and a realm wholly alien to that of Christian theology. For the God of Christian belief is a living God : a God who *is* Life, a Spirit and not an idea.

Whether timelessness be the mode of the Divine Life, and therefore God is to be called immutable—for there can be no change where there is no time—is a question for discussion elsewhere than in the present essay. Here we shall provisionally assume, for the purpose of further inquiry concerning perfection, the common view that God has some functional relation to the time-process of human experience, though the temporal may be inadequate to express exclusively the Divine life. In this case, knowledge of and interest in the course of human history, such as is implied in Divine Providence, will not be excluded from the mind of the Eternal. But relation of a Being who is not 'in time,' to the time-process, implies change in consciousness ; and indeed, in any sense conceivable by us, experience itself is change and experience of change. A living God, then, who 'worketh hitherto' and is the Strength and Stay of His evolving world, cannot in any proper sense of the term be immutable ; and, in that sense, cannot be perfect.

At this point we may parenthetically consider for a moment the particular kind of immutability which is denoted by the word 'impassibility.' This again is a conception which used to figure conspicuously in theological accounts of the nature of God. If the word impassibility

only mean that God knows no (bodily) 'passions' such as play so important a part in human experience, impassibility is an attribute of God beyond all question, and at the same time not worth emphasising: like the immutability which only denotes the exclusion of lapse to imperfection. But it has usually meant at least so much more than this as incapability of suffering. Opposition to Patripassionism led some teachers to exclude the capacity to suffer from the Divine nature of Christ, simply in virtue of its Divinity; and Deity and capacity to suffer have frequently been held to be incompatible. But if such New Testament expressions as 'Grieve not the Holy Spirit of God,' when divested of anthropomorphic ideas, are not entirely without meaning, there must be capacity for something resembling the human emotions of joy and sorrow in 'the heart of the Eternal.' And this implies passibility. So careful a writer as Berkeley, indeed, has denied that God can suffer pain, or has put such denial in the mouth of Philonous;[1] but in the context here referred to he is speaking of but bodily or sensible pain, and apparently not of that to which psychologists now generally apply the term 'feeling.' But to feel, in the stricter sense of the word, is to be passible; and for us, at least, feeling is a pre-requisite not only for moral life but also for all appreciation and distinction of values. Value, it is admitted by all philosophers with apparently no exception save two or more of the new realists, is inconceivable apart from relation to, or dependence on, subjective feeling; and though it is precarious to reason by analogy from the human to the Divine consciousness, it may be said that in this particular connexion analogy can hardly be conceived as not to hold. In this case, a God who is an ethical Being cannot be conceived as impassible: and certainly a God who felt no sympathy with human suffering

[1] *Third Dialogue between Hylas and Philonous.*

would not be a Being such as alone many human souls can love and reverence. What is more to the point, He would be no such God as is revealed by Jesus Christ.

Impassibility then, along with immutability in any connotation so far considered, must be relegated to the Absolute of abstract philosophical speculation; it must be eliminated from the Divine attributes and perfections, as incompatible with a Spirit of whom we may predicate will and ethical qualities. The Divine Blessedness is of richer content than the otiose and disinterested contemplation of an intelligible world, to which Christian theologians, under the heavy yoke of Platonic and Aristotelian Absolutism, have with great inconsistency or in spite of themselves reduced it. A living God cannot be a static unity; and the purely intellectual satisfaction afforded by such an unity is obtained only by sacrifice of all the rest of what constitutes religious experience.

The only use that the term 'immutability,' or the term 'perfection' in the sense of immutability, could serve in Christian theology would consist in a repudiation of the idea of God, not as active and living Spirit, but as a struggling and developing Being. This question, however, can be dealt with more appropriately when we come to consider the fourth meaning of 'perfection' here to be distinguished.

(3) Meanwhile we may drop the ontological implications of 'perfection' to discuss briefly the usage of the word as a term expressing value only, or as meaning exclusively ethical perfectness.

Platonism, indeed, identified the good and the existent; and as this tenet exerted some influence upon patristic and scholastic doctrine, it may receive here a passing notice. Its influence is to be seen in the theory that evil is non-existent or is defect, which was widely prevalent in ancient theology; and again in Augustine's doctrine of the Church.

Augustine expressly teaches, as in the passage quoted by Aquinas,[1] that "inasmuch as we exist we are good"; and Aquinas is Platonist also in this connexion. He offers a proof, indeed, of the Platonic theory, though he admits, apparently without seeing the destructiveness of the admission, that being and goodness differ logically; and his proof involves the identification of the perfect with the completely actual. Modern logic, however, distinguishes things that differ, and refuses such definitions of the existent as involve particular philosophical findings or results (such as those of Plato or of Lotze) as to what may happen to be the marks of the existent. Certainly the existent does not connote the good; and equally certainly, the non-existence or unreality of evil is to-day an obsolete view.

The Platonist identification, then, being discarded, we may distinguish ethical perfection from ontological perfection; and in putting the emphasis on the former kind we arrive at a quite definite meaning of 'perfection' as applied to God. And when thus restricted so as to refer only to ethical value, the perfection of God is necessarily to be understood as static or immutable. There can be no degrees of goodness, if there be degrees of perfection in other senses of the term, in God. God's moral perfection is of quite a different order from that of human perfection, which must admit of degrees simply because we are developing, i.e., growing, beings. But we cannot attribute growth, tentativeness, living and learning (*with relation to standard and ideals*) such as inevitably condition human perfection through the various stages of life, to God. We cannot attribute to the Deity any conflict of motives; not because the idea of evil as alternative to the good is absent from His mind, nor that He lacks the power to realise the evil if He so willed; but because He rejects it

[1] *Summa*, I, Q. 5, Art. 1.

by His self-determining will, and in Him is that perfection of being which is marked by the exclusive love of the good, and which in the human saint can only approximately be acquired by discipline and effort. God cannot therefore experience temptation, or feel what we are inevitably compelled by our very nature to feel, in virtue of our soul's connexion with a body and the passions which necessarily arise therefrom. Thus the statement that God is a moral being, while possessing very real meaning, contains an implication which is partly different, and different in important respects, from that which is involved in predicating morality of the finite and imperfect human creature. Of God it does not hold that "no heart is pure that is not passionate." And all this is implied, perhaps along with much more, in the affirmation that God is ethically perfect: His goodness is of the highest order, is of the kind which s possible only to God in His unique being, and is immutable. Perhaps it is only in this respect that immutability is predicable of God: or rather only in this sense and in respect of the unchangingness of the Divine purpose—with Him there is "no variableness, neither shadow of turning." Ethical perfection involves ethical immutability; but not necessarily immutability of other kinds, such as, e.g., are involved in providential control, overruling human evil, adapting means to ends as the time-process (assuming its reality) may require, especially if (as some philosophical theologians allege) human free-will or creativeness impose limits upon the Divine foreknowledge.

The immutability of God's ethical perfection may be further accentuated by contrast with such perfection, of the moral kind, as is possible to finite beings like us. "Be ye perfect, even as your Father in heaven is perfect," cannot imply that we are called upon to change the constitution of our being; it rather means that we are to order our

life in accordance with the ideal of perfect manhood; to use faultlessly, at each successive stage of our moral growth, such necessarily imperfect natural talents as we may have. Divine perfection and human moral perfection are then quite different things. There can be no one absolute ideal for man, independent of the varying conditions of individual lives, static, fixed, and the same in content for all or for the same man at every stage of his development from infancy to death.

Perfection that is within the reach of man is comparable to a fixed ratio rather than to a fixed quantity; for human nature is not a constant but a variable. Development implies necessary imperfection, as judged by a fixed absolute standard, in all but its final stage. The moral ideal or law must be differentiated according to different individuals and different stages of individual life if it is to be identical for all; or, to have absoluteness of form, it must have relativity of content.[1]

But these human limitations, of course, do not apply to the Divine Being. With Him there is no ethical development, no variability of purpose or of ideal, no limitation by matter. Perfection with us must admit of degrees—paradoxical as this may sound to those who identify the perfect with the completed or wholly actualised; and it must admit of different kinds. The usual denial that perfection can be applicable at all to developing beings is based on the assumption that development is necessarily but a means to an end, that childhood, e.g., is but a stage to manhood and has no value for itself and no perfection in itself. This may be wholly wrong. There may be a perfection in progress, and progress in perfection, as well as progress towards perfection—for developing finite beings. The anthropolo-

[1] For a full discussion of this topic I would refer to my work, *The Concept of Sin*, 1912, Chapter III, on "Sin and Imperfection."

gical side of theology has suffered indeed from the static concepts taken over by the patristic and scholastic ages from Greek philosophy. So, too, as we have seen, it has suffered in much of its teaching concerning God. But in attributing ethical perfection to God, and in affirming the static immutability of that perfection, as contrasted with the kinds and degrees of perfection of which finite creatures are capable, it has laid a foundation-stone which will never need to be replaced. The third of the various meanings of 'perfect' which have been here set forth is the first which we have encountered that remains acceptable to theology.

(4) The fourth and last meaning, or possible meaning, of 'perfect' as applied to God, is again ontological rather than having reference to value; but it differs from the ontological meanings previously considered and repudiated, in connoting ideas similar to those which have been found necessary, within the sphere of value, in the concept of perfection as applied to man but not to God. 'Perfect,' when predicated of God, has sometimes been used, that is to say, to describe the continuity of the Divine life in which there is not only such change as we have already postulated as essential to the conception of a living and active God, but also development; not only progressive self-revelation, but also progressive self-realisation. Creation of the world in time, if this were a fact, would be a case of realisation of what had previously, or timelessly, been potential, or existent only in the Divine thought. The Incarnation of the Logos "in the fulness of time" would be another case. For both these events in the time-process would be moments in the Divine life, new departures so to say, in which the fulness of the Divine life was in some sense, though by self-limitation, enriched. Some such notion of perfection must be implicit in common Christian belief, which is not wont to be so sophisticated as to regard the

life of God as timeless. To deny that human progress affects the life of God would be to return to the idea of static Being rather than of a living Spirit. Until finite spirits have reached the goal of their development, and time be merged in eternity, it would seem that the life of God cannot be wholly realised, and that His perfection must be conceived otherwise than as exclusive of all potentiality. It must rather signify full and unceasing activity of self-realisation, self-fulfilment through and in the finite. As in the Divine 'immutability' there must be self-identity through change, so in the Divine 'perfection' there must be perfectings of different kinds at different stages of self-realisation. The goal that for man is wholly future may be wholly present, in potentiality, to the Divine mind; and God's purpose, though as yet unrealised in time, eternally satisfied. God strives, yet without the weariness of non-attainment and doubtfulness of the issue which characterise human strivings; potentially, though not actually, the work which He worketh is finished. So non-attainment in time is, *sub specie aeternitatis*, Blessedness; fruition is achieved not solely at the end of time. Thus the Divine perfection can be so conceived as not to be static completedness, but as self-manifestation of love in a finite world, and revelation of the Eternal in the temporal process of ethically significant history. It can be conceived in terms of the Heracleitean, as well as of the Parmenidean, doctrine of ultimate reality; in terms of endless flux as well as of immutable quiescence. That it has been expressed, throughout the development of Christian theology, predominantly in the latter way, is an accident of history, but not necessarily an evidence of truth. And though theology can never sever itself from metaphysics, it can quite well abandon time-honoured usage of particular dogmas of particular philosophical schools, should these

borrowed presuppositions prove to be old bottles for new wine. Moreover there can be no objection to the phrase 'a developing God,' provided we guard against the extravagances of mere theosophical speculation such as Baader and Schelling and so-called mystics have indulged in. For as there is one perfection of the rosebud and another of the rose, one perfection of the Child Jesus and another perfection of the Man Jesus, so the infinite perfection of God, ever perfect in love, goodness, and purpose, may—from the point of view of time—be a series, perhaps a 'new infinity,' of kinds of perfection, and consistent with the actualisation in time of the eternally potential. But this is to approach the subject of eternity, the problem of Creation, and the mystery of the Trinity: matters which cannot be pursued here.

In conclusion of this brief and tentative examination of the meaning of 'perfect,' a few words may be said with regard to the two senses of the cognate term 'absolute' which have not yet been commented upon.

Of these we may take first the meaning of 'self-subsistent,' which, as applied to God, is equivalent to that of the phrase, often met with in theological works, 'absolutely necessary' contrasted with 'contingent' (being). This contrast of the necessary and the contingent may be said to serve no useful purpose, and certainly seems out of place, when used to distinguish God as the self-subsistent source, from all other reality of which He is the source. Within our experience, what can properly be called 'necessary' is that which depends—causally, or through logical implication—on something else, viz. its cause or its ground. Obviously, then, the term applies only to a part of some whole: it is inapplicable to the world, or to reality as a whole, and to God who is not dependent on any prior being. As 'absolute' means independent, and 'necessary' implies

'dependent,' the union of these terms in one phrase creates a self-contradiction. God, then, cannot be called an 'absolutely necessary' or even a 'necessary' Being. He simply is; and no more can be said. The phrase '*causa sui*,' often used in the same connexion, is similarly self-contradictory if taken literally, and similarly empty of any further meaning than is implied in 'existent' or 'self-existent' (i.e., underived from another existent), however it be taken. Both God and the Absolute, if 'the Absolute' mean the whole of reality, can be called neither necessary nor contingent, in the sense which is usually intended; they may possibly be necessary in the sense of being implied in the finite; but so far they become dependent—which is not what is intended.

'Absolute,' alone, in the sense of self-subsistent and independent of any other, is a legitimate conception; but the Absolute, so defined, must not be identified with God. For God is a Subject; and an absolute subject, abstracted from any object for its experience, is an abstraction which leads to insuperable difficulties. Here, again, we are brought face to face with the problems of Creation and the Trinity.

The remaining sense of the Absolute to be mentioned is that of the whole of reality; and in this case again God and the Absolute cannot be identified. If God be the whole of reality, there can be no theology other than pantheism or acosmism. And whenever theology has striven after absolutism in ancient or in modern times, it has lapsed into acosmism. We finite spirits may "have our being" in God; but we are not God, nor parts or modes of God; nor is our experience, as it is for us, God's experience as it is for Him: unless, indeed, pantheism, not theism, be true.

Thus, it would seem, Christian theology can make little or no use of the philosophical term 'the Absolute': God is absolute only in the sense that He alone is self-existent or

underived from another. The yearning for such ideas as are expressed by 'absolute,' 'infinite,' 'immutable,' bespeaks the presupposition that there is one ultimate, all-sufficing concept, embracing all others and at the same time denoting something actual. We have in this and the preceding article encountered various concepts claiming such a place; and we have found them to be but logical abstractions corresponding to no actuality. The actualities which have been stripped away in the process of obtaining these abstractions cannot be afterwards got out of them, simply because the actuality has not been left in them. They are empty; and when hypostatised they denote non-entities. So we get the contradictions of Pseudo-Dionysius and Aquinas, who now speak of God as if He were pure being, the emptiest because the highest of all abstractions, and now predicate of Him the fulness of all attributes and all reality, the absence of all potentiality. These concepts are like the 'substance' of Spinoza, which has been compared to the night in which all cows are black, or to the lion's den—*vestigia nulla retrorsum*. They have no relevance to a theology of the living God. And the more modern phrase 'the Absolute' which theology has sometimes favoured, has only the semblance of serviceableness. The semblance which it has, is due to equivocation. In 'Absolute Good,' 'Absolute Self' and such phrases, 'good,' 'self,' etc., lose all their meaning when generalised into absolutes. Thus Plato's Good is no *case* of goodness, or of beauty, or of truth; in becoming more than good it ceases to be good; Fichte's absolute will passed inevitably into absolute fate. 'Super' or 'absolute,' when prefixed to any term denoting the actual, immediately deprives that actual of its actuality, and the compound term never means what it appears to say. From such equivocations theology should keep itself free.

F. R. Tennant.

THE LORD'S TABLE.

I.

In answer to the question, "What is the meaning of 'the Lord's table' in the Bible?" most Christians would unhesitatingly reply, "The table of that 'communion' about which it is said, 'The bread that we break, is it not a communion of the body of Christ? seeing that we, who are many, are one bread, one body, for we all partake of the one bread. Behold Israel after the flesh; have not they that eat the sacrifices communion with the altar? . . . . Ye cannot partake of *the table of the Lord* and of the table of devils.'" [1]

But in the Old Testament, "table" has what may be called a technically sacred meaning. Though it occasionally means a table for private meals, or (more frequently) a royal table to which a king's servants are admitted, it mostly means (when used in the singular [2]) that table which stood in the Sanctuary of the Tabernacle, and on which were laid, week by week, certain "cakes," rendered in the Text of our Revised Version "shewbread," but in the margin, "Presence-bread," and renderable, more literally, "Face-bread," or "bread of the Face." [3] In the Pentateuch, "table" has no other meaning than this. Not till we come to the book of Judges do we find the word used in any other sense.[4] The "cakes" were twelve in number; and in the only passage where Scripture mentions this fact, the Jerusalem Targum supplies a reason for it by adding "according to the twelve tribes." [5]

Josephus, however, explains the number as symbolic

[1] 1 Cor. x. 16–21.

[2] The pl. "tables," meaning the tables of the Commandments, represents a different Hebrew word.

[3] Exod. xxv. 30.

[4] Judges i. 7, "And Adoni-bezek said, Threescore and ten kings, having their thumbs and their great toes cut off, gathered [their meat] under my *table*."

[5] Lev. xxiv. 5.

of the twelve months of the year [1]; and not improbably this was the symbolism in the first institution of the shewbread.[2] But a much more important question for Christians is "What symbolic meaning, if any, was attached to 'the table' of the Presence-bread or Face-bread by Jews and Jewish Christians in the first century, and does the answer throw light on any sayings of Jesus or His Apostles?" In particular, there is a saying of mysterious import assigned by Luke to our Lord on the night of the Eucharist: "And I appoint unto you a kingdom, even as my Father appointed unto me, that ye may eat and drink *at my table* in my kingdom; and ye shall sit on thrones, judging the twelve tribes of Israel."[3] Does this mean merely "at my royal table"—with a suggestion that it will be the beneficent table of "one greater than Solomon," not like the tables of such conquering kings as Adoni-bezek under which seventy captive kings gathered their meat? Or does it also mean—with some allusion to the Presence-bread—"at my table of the bread of God's Face or Presence," whereby it is given to man to receive the food of the vision of God?

A discussion of "the table" necessitates a discussion of the phrase connected with it, "the bread of the Face." "Face"—a plural word in Hebrew like the English "features," and meaning countenance and hence presence—is here applied anthropomorphically to God. "Before (*lit.* to) *the face of*," and "from *the face of*," are so frequently used in Hebrew for "before" and "from" that we often fail to recognise in our English Versions the latent Hebrew "face." The first Biblical instance of this anthropomorphism is in Genesis, where Adam and Eve "hid themselves from *the*

[1] Joseph. *Ant.* iii. 7. 7.

[2] See Hastings, *Dict. B.*, iv. 497, on the possibility that there was "early Babylonian influence" in the institution of the shewbread, and that "the number twelve was later brought into connexion with the number of the tribes of Israel."

[3] Luke xxii. 29–30.

face of the Lord God," just before the curse is pronounced [1]; the last is in Revelation, describing God's servants in the New Jerusalem, where the curse is taken away: "And there shall be no curse any more: and the throne of God and of the Lamb shall be therein: and his servants shall do him service; and they shall see his *face*." [2]

In the chapter of Exodus that immediately precedes the one containing the institution of the bread of the Face, it is said that "seventy" of the elders of Israel "saw the God of Israel . . . and beheld God, and did eat and drink." [3] If "seventy" represents the Council of the nation, it corresponds to the twelve tribes, somewhat as the seventy translators of the Bible into the Greek Version called the Septuagint are said by Josephus to be "seventy" and yet to be "six out of each tribe." [4] This favours the view that the "beholding" of God by the "seventy" and their "eating and drinking" are preparatory to the institution of the "twelve" cakes of the bread of the Face, according to the number of the twelve tribes of Israel—which follows soon afterwards. The LXX alters the text of the narrative about "the elders," so as to soften the anthropomorphism; but the Talmud explains it spiritually as meaning that the vision of God, or of the Shechinah, was meat and drink to them.[5]

This connexion of God's "face" with "bread" in the Old Testament goes far to justify the author of the Fourth Gospel in attributing to Jesus a doctrine, set forth in ample and various forms, about bread that is "living" and "cometh down from heaven." It is one of the most perplexing

[1] Gen. iii. 8 R.V. and A.V., "from the presence of . . ."
[2] Rev. xxii. 3–4. [3] Exod. xxiv. 10–11.
[4] Joseph. *Ant.*, xii. 2. 4–5, 7, where *ib.* 8, 9 adds an elaborate description of "the table," meaning a table, imitative of the Table of the Shewbread, made under the personal supervision of Ptolemy Philadelphus.
[5] See Taylor on *Aboth*, iii. 25, quoting *Berach.* 17*a*.

of the many perplexities in the Marcan Gospel that Mark is almost entirely silent about a doctrine of bread.[1] Yet probably all would agree that Jesus taught His disciples to pray for bread as Matthew and Luke assert. It seems likely that there was early obscurity about the precise meaning of this "bread." The Double Tradition of Matthew and Luke calls it *epiousios*.[2] But Origen tells us in effect that this Greek word was of Christian invention, and we are not certain what it means.[3] A similar uncertainty is found in the Threefold Tradition of the Precepts to the Twelve, where Mark has "that they should take *a staff only*, no bread"; but the parallel Matthew has "*nor staff*," and no mention of bread; and the parallel Luke has "*neither staff* . . . nor bread."[4]

Some verbal errors appear to have arisen from various interpretations of metaphors about "staff" and "bread," and afterwards from the inadequate and ambiguous word *epiousios*. But underlying these there might well be a deeper source of error—a Gentile failure to appreciate the Hebrew and Jewish conception of the twelve tribes of Israel as being still united in God's all-seeing and foreseeing sight, though scattered over the earth in the sight of the nations,[5] and as being always dependent on Him—not dependent merely during the period of the forty years of wandering in the wilderness, but dependent at all times and in all places, night and day, for the food of life and light that came to them from the Face of Jehovah, so that, as it were, they fed continually on His Presence.

[1] There are negative indications, of some doctrine not understood, in Mark vi. 52 and viii. 17 foll., but there is no positive doctrine.

[2] Matt. vi. 11; Luke xi. 3. [3] Origen, *De Orat.*, § 27.

[4] Mark vi. 8; Matt. x. 10; Luke ix. 3.

[5] See the Eucharistic prayer in *Didaché*, ix. "As this broken bread was scattered over the mountains and being gathered together became one, so let thy Church be gathered together from the ends of the earth into thy kingdom."

The dependence of the twelve tribes began when they were babes. "The Lord thy God *bare thee*," says Moses to Israel, "as a man doth bear his son." [1] "Bare" is reduced to prose in the Acts as "*suffered their manners*." [2] But Rashi takes us back to the Hebrew thought in his comment on the Psalmist's cry, "Thou didst make me trust [when lying] upon my mother's breasts, I was *cast upon thee* from the womb." [3] He tells us that *as soon as the fathers of the tribes were born*, God "*carried them*." He repeats this in his comment on Isaiah, "Hearken unto me, O house of Jacob, . . . who have been *borne* [*by me*] from the belly, who have been carried from the womb." [4] There (according to Rashi) God addresses, in effect, "the fathers of the tribes," without mentioning them :—"From the time when ye were born in the house of Laban the Syrian, *I carried you in my arms*."

This Old Testament picture of God carrying the infant Israel in His arms prepares the way for the New Testament picture of Jesus receiving babes in His arms. But the latter picture is lamentably obscured. Mark (and Mark alone) does indeed mention the affectionate "taking them in his arms," but he does not call them "babes." [5] Both Matthew and Luke omit the nurse-like, or mother-like, "carrying in the arms." Luke alone calls them "babes." A reason for these variations is apparent when we examine early Christian literature. "Babes" occurs only in two passages of Christian writers of the first century and a half, and there it is once in a bad sense.[6] The Petrine Epistle indeed bids us come to Christ as "babes" longing for "spiritual milk;" [7] but the Pauline Epistles rather dis-

[1] Deut. i. 31. [2] Acts xiii. 18.
[3] Rashi on Ps. xxii. 9. [4] Isa. xlvi. 3.
[5] Mark ix. 36, parallel to Matt. xviii. 2, Luke ix. 47 ; Mark x. 16, parallel to Matt. xix. 15, Luke xviii. 15 foll.
[6] Hermas, *Sim.* ix. 29 (in good sense) ; Tatian, *Oratio*, xxx. (in bad sense).
[7] 1 Pet. ii. 2.

parage "infants in Christ" and encourage us to become full-grown men.[1] Paul himself, however, says "In malice be ye infants,"[2] and Isaiah teaches us that the same Nursing-father by whom Israel was "carried from the womb" will "carry" them to the end: "Even to old age I am he, and even to hoar hairs will I *carry* you."[3] Men are always to be dependent on the divine Presence, whether it be symbolised as the Mother giving milk or as the Father giving bread. The metaphor is changed, but the spiritual truth is the same. The milk from the "breasts," the bread on the "table of the Face," both are continuous.

Returning to the first mention of the shewbread as bread of God's face, in the precept, literally rendered, "Thou shalt set . . . bread of the face (*lit.*) to my face," i.e. before me,[4] we should note that "the face of God," in Hebrew, is *Peni-El*, mentioned in the story of the wrestling of the ancestor of the twelve tribes: "Jacob called the name of the place *Peni-El*, for, [said he,] I have seen God *face to face*."[5] The LXX word *enōpios*, used in the first mention of the shewbread, is very rare, but recurs in the description of the Lord communing with Moses "*face to face*."[6] Here Onkelos has "*word with word*," and the Jerusalem Targum "*With word opposite to word*, the voice of discourse was heard, but the splendour of the face was not seen." These passages illustrate the caution of the Johannine Prologue, which says, long before introducing the doctrine of the bread that cometh down from heaven, "We beheld his glory"—that is, the glory of the incarnate Word—and

[1] 1 Cor. iii. 1, xiii. 11, etc. [2] 1 Cor. xiv. 20. [3] Isa. xlvi. 4.

[4] Exod. xxv. 30, ἐπιθήσεις . . . ἄρτους ἐνωπίους ἐναντίον μου. For ἐνωπίους Aq. has προσώπου, Symm. προθέσεως; Jer. Targ. "panem interiorem," i.e. bread of the inner, or presence, chamber (as distinguished from the antechamber).

[5] Gen. xxxii. 30. LXX renders Peniel by εἶδος θεοῦ.

[6] Exod. xxxiii. 11 ἐνώπιος ἐνωπίῳ. Ἐνώπιος occurs in LXX only six times

" of his fulness we all received," but adds the warning " *No man hath seen God at any time;* the only begotten Son, that is in the bosom of the Father, he hath declared him." [1]

Leviticus describes the shewbread, not from the divine but from the human point of view; not as " bread of the Face," but as " twelve cakes " set " in two rows, six in a row, upon the pure table before (*lit.* to the face of) the Lord," [2] perhaps alluding to the blessing and the cursing on Mount Gerizim and Mount Ebal where six tribes stood opposite to six.[3] It adds that, although the bread was to be " for Aaron and his sons," after being replaced by fresh cakes every Sabbath day, yet there was to be an offering of pure frankincense—the LXX, followed by Philo, adds " and salt "—put upon each row, " that it may be to the bread for a memorial, even an offering made by fire unto the Lord. Every sabbath day he shall set it in order before the Lord continually. It is on the behalf of the children of Israel, an everlasting covenant." [4] The context does not expressly say that " the children of Israel " means " the twelve tribes," and that the frankincense was offered up for them, and that the twelve cakes represented them; but the Jerusalem Targum adds a clause to this effect, and it seems clearly implied.

Passing over the brief and merely enumerative references in the historical books to the " table," or " tables," in Solomon's temple,[5] we come to prophecy. And there, though shewbread itself is not expressly mentioned, there is a mention of " the table that is before (*lit.* to the face of) the

[1] John i. 14–18.

[2] Lev. xxiv. 5–6. The marg. " piles," though favoured by pictures of Assyrian sacred tables with piles of ritual loaves, is not favoured by the derivation and use of the Hebrew word (Gesen. 789–90).

[3] Deut. xi. 29, xxvii. 12, 13.

[4] Lev. xxiv. 5–9; Philo ii. 151, 484.

[5] 1 Kings vii. 48; 1 Chron. xxviii. 16, etc.

Lord," which demands attention. It is in Ezekiel's vision of the New Temple: "*The altar* was of wood . . . and he [i.e. the angel] said unto me, This is *the table that is before* (lit. *to the face of*) *the Lord*."[1] There were two altars connected with the Tabernacle and Solomon's Temple; what then does Ezekiel mean by thus particularising one altar in his vision as "*the altar*," and identifying it with "the table that is before the Lord"?[2]

On examination, it will appear that "*the altar*," *in the extant text of Ezekiel, always means "the altar in the place last mentioned.*" Here, then, it means the altar *inside* the Sanctuary. For "the sanctuary" is the place last mentioned before "the altar of wood": "As for the face of the sanctuary, the appearance [thereof] was as the appearance [of the temple]."[3] Previously "the altar" in the New Temple has been the term applied by Ezekiel to the altar of inferior holiness in the court *outside* the Sanctuary. There the prophet first described a chamber "for the priests, the keepers of the charge of *the altar*," and then added that the angel "measured the court an hundred cubits long and an hundred cubits broad foursquare. *Now* (or *but*, R.V.

[1] Ezek. xli. 22 inserts the article before both "altar" and "table." Hastings, *Dict. B.*, iv. 709, says: "It is described as a 'table (set) before Jehovah.'" This is not quite adequate.

[2] Ezekiel has previously referred to "the altar" in the recently destroyed temple, (viii. 5) "the gate of *the altar*," (viii. 16) "between the porch and *the altar*," (ix. 2) "*the brazen altar*," on which Jerome says "There were two altars, one of incense, golden, inside [the Sanctuary], and the other before the Temple, brazen, of holocausts." The context indicates that the brazen altar is meant in all these previous instances.

It is generally agreed by modern critics that there was no altar of incense till some time after the days of Ezekiel; and the sections in the Pentateuch on the altar of incense are assigned to some of the latest additions. But this would not affect *Jewish thought in the first century*, which would accept the altar of incense as Luke (i. 11) accepts it, and "two altars" as Jerome accepts them, and both as being instituted by Moses.

[3] Ezek. xli. 21. The Targum has "Et facies domus propitiatorii, et aspectus eius sicut aspectus gloriae eius," which Rashi renders: "Like the throne of glory which I had beheld on the Chariot near the river Chebar" (Ezek. i. 1–28).

and) *the altar was before the house.*" [1] This final clause appears to be a kind of parenthetical warning, meaning, "Now the altar I am speaking of was not the one inside the sanctuary, about which I shall speak later on. It was the one outside. I shall give its dimensions and details in due course.[2] For the present, it will suffice to mention its position." The Targum, as also our Authorised Version, expresses this in a different way, "and [*he measured*] *the altar that was before the house.*" But the rendering of the Revised is more exact; and it suits what follows if we substitute in it "*now*" for "*and.*" [3]

With this explanation, we are able to understand that the altar in the Sanctuary is quite distinct from the altar in the Court. But it is not so easy to explain "The altar was of wood, three cubits high, and the length thereof two cubits; and the corners thereof, and the length thereof, and the walls thereof, were of wood." Why is the breadth altogether omitted? [4] Why is "wood" twice inserted? If the altar was to be used as an altar, with fire, why is no mention made of its being overlaid with gold (like the altar of incense in the Tabernacle), an omission that causes Jerome to say that no "word of man" can explain how it could be saved from fire? [5] If it was not to be so used, of what use was it? Rashi's comment says: "Poterit dici quod mensa (hic) vocetur altare, quæ illo tempore (futuro) expiabit, sicut altare." He seems to mean that, when the Temple was no

[1] Ezek. xl. 46–7. Ewald's comment is useful: "The extent, and the altar, *of this court*; the further description of the altar cannot be given before xliii. 13 sq."

[2] Ezek. xliii. 13 foll., "and these are the measures of the altar."

[3] "Now" is represented by Hebrew *vaw* ("and") in Gen. iii. 1, x. 1, xi. 27, xii. 1, etc. This would not be worth mentioning but for the fact that Oxf. Gesen. 251–2 gives, as equivalents of *vaw*, "so, then, and, or, but, notwithstanding, howbeit, thus, therefore, that," *but not* "*now.*" "Now," corresponding to δέ, is one of the most frequent and important equivalents.

[4] Ezek. xli. 22. The LXX inserts the breadth, "two cubits."

[5] Jerome on Ezek. xli. 22.

longer standing, a faithful son of Israel would make *his own table a kind of altar or table of the Lord by inviting poor folk to it and giving them of his bread, thus making expiation for his sins.*[1]

This is not without truth, though rather narrowly and prosaically expressed.[2] But it does not go down to the Prophet's latent thought, if he is distinguishing this "table that is before the Lord" from "tables" mentioned previously—antecedently to the altar outside in the Court. Those "tables" were subsidiary to that inferior "altar," for on them were slain "the burnt offering and the sin offering and the guilt offering." There were also "four tables, of hewn stone, for the burnt offering," whereon were laid the instruments for the slaughter of the sacrifices.[3] No other prophetic or scriptural passage mentions such "tables" nor the "tables of hewn stone"; and the R.V. margin refers to nothing but a prohibition in Exodus, "If thou make me an altar of stone *thou shalt not build it of hewn stones.*"[4] After mentioning, in his own person, such inferior tables as being outside the Sanctuary, the Prophet prepares us to hear the voice of the Angel himself, announcing, concerning the altar inside the Sanctuary, "This is the table that is before the Lord."

Modern commentators appear to be justified in concluding that Ezekiel's "table" must mean, not the altar of incense, but the table of the shewbread or Face-bread.[5] If so, we may infer that that table appeared to the author, or to the editor, of the prophecy, as a symbol superior to the altar of incense itself, and also to the golden candlestick, both of which he leaves unnoticed, though both were in the Sanctuary. For these and other reasons we must not

[1] See *Berach.* 55*a*, *Menach.* 97*a*.
[2] Comp. Luke xi. 41. [3] Ezek. xl. 39–47.
[4] Exod. xx. 25.
[5] *Encyc. Bib.* (Altar) 126; Hastings, *Dict. B.* (Temple), iv. 709.

narrow down the symbol to "a table of almsgiving." It should rather be called a table of brotherhood, an altar in a new and higher, though more homely, sense, not merely a domestic hospitable meal-table, nor yet the table of a king or nobleman feeding guests or dependants, but a combination of altar and table, an altar in respect of God the Father to whom men look in adoring service, but a table in respect of the human brethren gathered round the table before the Father's face.

We cannot indeed say that Ezekiel either here or elsewhere uses the expression "the table of the bread of the Face" or connects the table with the twelve tribes. But we can say that he, more than any other prophet, has the unity of the tribes at heart. He, alone of the prophets, gives the names of the twelve tribes in full,[1] after predicting a redistribution of the land "according to the tribes of Israel." [2] No doubt, he has also at heart the unity of the one nation. It is a part of his gospel that the Lord will heal the schism between "Joseph and the tribes of Israel his companions" on the one hand, and Judah on the other hand, and that they shall be "no more two nations" but "one nation" under "David" as "king." [3] But his protest against "two nations" does not imply a protest against twelve tribes. Beside the national unity there is to remain a partnership of tribal individuality. In the last section of his prophecy describing the new Jerusalem whose name is to be THE LORD IS THERE, he adds, "And the gates of the city shall be *after the names of the tribes of Israel.*" [4]

Along with this tribal partnership implied by the table of the shewbread, it is natural to look for some suggestion of a different kind of partnership, namely, between God, the Provider of bread, and Israel, represented by the sons of

[1] Ezek. xlviii. 30–34.
[2] Ezek. xlvii. 21.
[3] Ezek. xxxvii. 19–24.
[4] Ezek. xlviii. 31.

Aaron, who, after making an offering to God of His own gift of bread, receive it back again from Him, so that they might be said to "eat the bread of their God."[1] This strong expression is actually used in the Law about the priestly partnership in the meal-offering. But it is not to be found in Ezekiel's prophecy. Nor do we find in it a suggestion that God is the Father presiding at "the table that is before the Lord." The word "Father," applied to God, is not to be found in Ezekiel's prophecy.

But it occurs in Malachi—to whom we now pass as being the only other prophet that speaks of "the table of the Lord." Almost at the outset of his prophecy Malachi attacks the priests for dishonouring One whom they ought to honour as a "father" in connexion with His "table"; "A son honoureth his father . . . if then I be a father, where is mine honour? . . . O priests that despise my name . . . ye offer polluted bread upon mine altar, and ye say, Wherein have we polluted thee? In that ye say, *The table of the Lord is contemptible.*"[2] On this Rashi says that the priests "scorned to divide, each one with his brother, that which fell to them in offerings and holy things" because their portions were so small. If this is correct, Malachi is not referring to the table of the shewbread but to the altar of holocausts regarded as the meal-table of God, from which the priests, as being sons of Aaron, derived their sustenance secured to them by what is called, in the Law, "a covenant of salt."[3]

[1] Lev. xxi. 6–22.

[2] Mal. i. 6–7. Comp. i. 12, "Ye say, The table of the Lord is polluted, and the fruit thereof, even his meat, is contemptible."

[3] Numb. xviii. 19, "It is *a covenant of salt* for ever before the Lord unto thee [Aaron] and unto thy seed with thee." Comp. Lev. ii. 10–13, "That which is left of the meal offering shall be Aaron's and his sons' . . . every oblation of thy meal offering shalt thou season with salt; neither shalt thou suffer *the salt of the covenant of thy God* to be lacking from thy meal offering; with all thine oblations thou shalt offer salt." These

That altar was like the table of the shewbread in a certain sense and in theory ; for both the altar and the table implied partnership between the Lord and His priests. But it was different in practice. From the table of the shewbread the priests received all the cakes and the Lord received nothing but the frankincense that had rested on them. From the altar, regarded as a table, the high priest with the priests received portions of multitudinous offerings and sacrifices, compared with which the twelve cakes of shewbread were as nothing. In collecting these portions there appear to have been abuses on the part of the officials of the high priest who exacted more than the portion due to him.[1] And the context indicates that, owing to bribery and favouritism, unsound beasts ("lame and sick") were passed as sound and offered as sacrifices.[2] The total result was that the "sons" dishonoured the "father" and spoke contemptuously of the paternal "table."

We do not add that they dishonoured also the "covenant of salt," for Malachi does not use that phrase. Yet thrice in his short prophecy he mentions "*covenant*" in connexion with "*Levi*."[3] Now in the Law, the covenant with Levi—and that covenant alone—is, in effect, called a covenant of salt. For the latter phrase is never used in the Pentateuch except where the Lord says to Aaron and his sons concerning their partnership in the sacrifices, "*It is a covenant of salt* for ever before the Lord unto thee and to thy seed with thee. . . . I am thy portion and thine inheri-

are the only instances of "covenant" connected with "salt" apart from 2 Chron. xiii. 5. See note, p. 288, on Num. xviii. 19-20.

[1] Rashi (on Lev. ii. 1-3) says : "Part of it was not divided" but accrued to the high priest. Jer. *Joma* i. 2 (Schwab, p. 167) says that the high priest was not entitled to take more than half of the sacerdotal share of each offering. But there were differences of opinion.

[2] Mal. i. 8. See also i. 13, "Ye have brought that which was taken by violence."

[3] Mal. ii. 4, 5, 8.

tance."[1] Conversely, the Levites are declared to be, so to speak, the Lord's "portion" when He says to Moses, "Take the Levites instead of all the firstborn among the children of Israel . . . the Levites shall be mine."[2] When the Lord thus said to Aaron and his sons, in effect, "I am thine and ye are mine," He bound them to Himself by what might be called in Malachi's language "a covenant" of "the table" but in the language of the Law "a covenant of salt."

Somewhat similarly, but with varying metaphor, in one of the Gospels, Jesus says to His disciples, "Ye are the salt of the earth."[3] This may seem to imply that they are His priests going forth to "salt" or purify others so that they shall (as Malachi says) offer unto the Lord offerings in righteousness.[4] But He also says in another Gospel, "Every one shall be salted with fire"[5]—probably adding (though some authorities omit it), "and every sacrifice shall be salted with salt." This seems to imply that all must be purified by One who was (to quote Malachi again) "like a refiner's fire."[6] But the prophecy and the Gospel are complementary to each other rather than mutually confirmatory. In Malachi, "table" is mentioned without "salt"; in the Gospels, "salt" is mentioned without "table." Why is this?

The explanation appears to be, that in connexion with such a phrase as covenant of salt, there were two distinct currents of thought, one Hebrew, and one Greek. The Hebrew or Levitical current referred to the literal salting of oblations by the priests. This so narrowed the meaning that the

[1] Num. xviii. 19–20. It occurs also in 2 Chron. xiii. 5 (about a covenant made by God with David and his seed, comp. 2 Sam. vii. 14, "I will be his father, and he shall be my son"). "Covenant" and "salt" are also connected in Lev. ii. 13, "the *salt of the covenant* of thy God" concerning the "salting" of "all oblations."

[2] Num. iii. 45.

[3] Matt. v. 13.

[4] Mal. iii. 3, "He shall purify the sons of Levi . . . and they shall offer unto the Lord offerings in righteousness."

[5] Mark ix. 49.

[6] Mal. iii. 2.

prophets never use the word metaphorically and only once (in Ezekiel) Levitically.[1] But in Greek of every period "*salt and table*" was a phrase meaning the bond or oath of hospitality.[2] Also, in an Aramaic passage of Ezra, "to eat the salt of the palace" means "to be devoted servants or courtiers of the king,"[3] and such phrases as "eating a man's salt" or "unfaithful to salt" are stated on good authority to have been current in the East for many centuries.[4] We may assume that Malachi, the latest of the prophets, would be familiar with this expression. In accordance with prophetic usage he abstains from using it literally, but he retains the spirit of the "covenant of salt" when he speaks of the fit relation between Jehovah and priest as that of "father" and "son,"[5] and describes the Lord's "covenant with Levi" as one of "life and peace."[6] In Galilee, the Galilee of the Gentiles—not only in the Greek cities but also in those where Aramaic was spoken—"salt," in the lips of the common people, would often be used to mean the salt of hospitality.

This consideration of the metaphorical application of "salt" may seem to be leading us away from the thought of "the table of the Lord," regarded as the symbol of the unity of the twelve tribes in the one nation of Israel. But we shall find ourselves returning to it when we come to the utterance of the Psalmist, "Thou preparest a table before me in the presence of mine enemies,"[7] and to Origen's comment on the Psalm in connexion with the promise of Jesus to the Twelve about eating and drinking at His

[1] Ezek. xliii. 24, "The priests shall cast salt upon them."

[2] See Steph. *Thes.* ἅλς and τράπεζα quoting Archiloch. "a great oath, *salt and table*," alleged by Origen (*Cels.* ii. 21), confuting Celsus, who asserted that Judas could not possibly have plotted against Jesus after "sharing the table with him."

[3] Ezra iv. 14.

[4] On the Arab. phrase, "There is salt between us," see *Encyc. Bib.*, 4250.

[5] Mal. i. 6 [6] Mal. ii. 5 [7] Ps. xxiii. 5.

" table " and " sitting on thrones judging the twelve tribes of Israel."[1]

Meantime we may reflect that the unity of the spiritual Israel, derived from its possession of the Spirit of Peace, is implied in the tradition peculiar to Mark, " Have salt in yourselves and be at peace with one another."[2] The variety of the applications of prophetic metaphor is occasionally perplexing, but it is better to be perplexed by metaphor than enslaved by literalism. We are at all events safe in assuming that Jesus did not approach the perilous task of cleansing the Temple that the sons of Levi might " offer unto the Lord offerings in righteousness," as Malachi predicted, without meditating frequently and deeply on this and other language of that prophet; and in the course of these meditations His " zeal " for the Father's " house "[3] could not but bring before His mind a contrast between the ideal " table " promised to Him by the Father, and that other earthly and desecrated implement of sacerdotalism about which the priests themselves exclaimed, " The table of the Lord is contemptible."

EDWIN A. ABBOTT.

[1] Luke xxii. 30. [2] Mark ix. 50.
[3] Comp. John ii. 17, quoting Ps. lxix. 9.

PAULINE ILLUSTRATIONS FROM RECENTLY PUBLISHED PAPYRI.

Professors Grenfell and Hunt's latest volume of Oxyrhynchus Papyri (vol. xii., 1916) contains, as usual, much matter which has an incidental bearing upon the language of the New Testament.

One letter (no. 1489) is worth quoting in full, since it affords more than one point of contact. It is a private letter of the third century, written in vulgar Greek, with very indifferent spelling. The latter is corrected in the text as here given:

Σάττος Εὐφροσύνῃ· Ἄσπασον Φίρμον καὶ Τεκοῦσαν καὶ τοὺς ἡμων πάντας παρὰ τοῖς θεοῖς τῆς πόλεως τῶν Ἀντινοέων. Τὸ κιθώνιν (=χιτώνιον) ἐπιλέλησμαι παρὰ Τεκοῦσαν εἰς τὸν πυλῶνα· πέμψον μοι ὡς ἔπεμψάς[1] *μοι. Καὶ ἐνοχλεῖς μοι ὅτι ὀφείλεις Ἀγαθὸς* (sic) *Δαίμονι χαλκόν· πεπλήρωκα αὐτὸν. Εἰ πεποιήκατε ψωμία, πέμψον μοι, ὡς τοῦ ἄλλου μηνὸς ἐλεύσομαι. Εἴθε πάντας πεπλήρωκα ὡς Ἀγαθὸς Δαίμων* (he means *Ἀγαθὸν Δαίμονα*!). *Οὐκ ἦς ἐμὸς ἀνάδοχος· οὐκ ἔχεις πρᾶγμα· μὴ ἐνόχλει. Εἰ δεῖ, ἔρχομαι τῷ ἄλλῳ μηνὶ. Παράδος τὸ κιθώνιν μου Κεραρέᾳ τῇ κουρίδι. Ἀσπάζου Στράτον καὶ Στρατονίκην καὶ τὰ παιδία αὐτῶν. Ἐρρῶσθαί σε εὔχομαι.*

This may be translated as follows:

"Sattos to Euphrosyne; Greet Firmus and Tecusa and all our folks before the Gods of the City of the Antinoans (=Antinoopolis). I have forgotten my tunic (and left it) with Tecusa at the Gate. Send it to me, as you did (before). You are worrying me about your owing money to Agathodæmon; I have paid him. If you have made cakes,[2] send me (some), as I shall be returning in another month.[3] I only wish I had paid them all, like Agathodæmon. You

[1] The form used is *ἔπεμψες*, showing that confusion between forms of first and second aorists which is so common in vulgar Greek.

[2] Cf. John. xiii. 26–30.

[3] This is the rendering of Grenfell and Hunt for the peculiar phrase *τοῦ ἄλλου μηνὸς* (cf. *τῷ ἄλλῳ μηνί* below; for the interchange of genitive and

were not my surety ; it's not your business ; don't worry. If necessary, I am coming in another month. Hand my tunic to Cerarea the hairdresser. Greet Straton and Stratonice and their children. I pray for your health."

It is unnecessary to point out the now familiar features of greetings to friends and prayers for the health of the recipient, which this letter, like numbers of others, shares with the Pauline epistles. But the reader of Paul will at once be reminded, by the request made in the present letter, of the well-known passage 2 Timothy iv. 13, *Τὸν φελόνην ὃν ἀπέλιπον ἐν Τρῳάδι παρὰ Κάρπῳ*[1] *ἐρχόμενος φέρε*. Sattos has forgotten his *χιτώνιον*, or *κιθώνιν* as he calls it in his vulgar way ; we may take it to have been an ordinary indoor garment. In Paul's case it is his *φελόνης*,[2] his "*pænula*" or travelling-cloak, that is missing. Another correspondent in this Oxyrhynchus volume sends for a cloak of the same sort, though whether he too had left it behind, or was ordering a new one, cannot be said. The short note (no. 1583, of the second century, and so nearer still to the New Testament passage in time) is perhaps worth giving in full (again with corrected spelling), for the sake of other interesting expressions it contains :

Διογένης Διοσκορᾶτι τῷ τιμιωτάτῳ χαίρειν. Πρὸ πάντων εὔχομαί σε ὑγιαίνειν. Καὶ τὸ προσκύνημά σου ποιῶ παρὰ τῷ Κυρίῳ[3] *Σαριάπιδι. Γενοῦ παρὰ Ἰσίδωρον χάριν τοῦ*

dative in temporal expressions cf. Mark xiii. 35). It may be compared with the expression *ἡ ἑτέρα* (*ἡμέρα*), which means "the day after next." Indeed in view of the confusion of *ἄλλος* and *ἕτερος* in the vulgar Greek one would be inclined to suggest that the phrase here might mean "the month after next," on this analogy.

[1] The grammar of the New Testament writer is here superior : Sattos uses *παρά* with the accusative instead of dative, and *εἰς* in the sense of "at," both more or less vulgarisms. But the close parallel, *ἐν Τρῳάδι παρὰ Κάρπῳ, παρὰ Τεκοῦσαν εἰς τὸν πυλῶνα*, is interesting.

[2] Note that the New Testament writer spells the word with transposition of λ and ν. In this he is at one with the writers of Oxy. Pap. VI. 933, Fay. Pap. 347, etc.

[3] Note the intercession for the correspondent with "our Lord Sarapis,"

φαινόλου[1] *καὶ τοῦ ἐπικαρσίου καὶ ἀπένεγκον παρὰ Καλύκην· καὶ πέμψατε ἡμῖν ἅς ἐὰν ἧς εἰληφὼς παρὰ Φαριτῶν* (?), *τὴν δερματικὴν* (he means *δαλματικὴν*)[2] *καὶ αὐτὸ πέμψον καὶ τὸν κύαθον. Γράψον μοι περὶ τῶν ὄντων καὶ τὰ γενόμενα. Ἄσπασαι Εὐπλίαν. Ἐρρῶσθαί σ' εὔχομαι.*

"Diogenes to Dioscoras his most precious (friend) greeting: Before all I pray that you may be in health; and I make supplication for you to (our) Lord Sarapis. Go to Isidore for the cloak and the "cross-over"[3] and take them to Calyce; and send anything you may have received from Pharit. . . .(?)—the dalmatic—and send it and the cup. Write me about the present state of affairs, and (tell me) what has happened. Greet Euplia. I pray for your health."

To return now to the letter of Sattos: we find that Euphrosyne (who is described in the endorsement of the letter as his *ἀδελφή*, perhaps not in the sense of family relationship) has been "worrying" him (cf. Luke vi. 18, Heb. xii. 15) about a debt owing to Agathodæmon (the declension of whose name causes the poor man much trouble). He sets her mind at rest. He has paid Agathodæmon: he only wishes he could say the same of all his creditors! But in any case Euphrosyne is not responsible for his debts: it is not *her* affair (*πρᾶγμα ἔχειν*, cf. 1 Cor. vi. 1); so she may "stop worrying" (the present imperative used with the negative in its regular sense, regular in all periods of the Greek language down to the present day—see Moulton, *Prolegomena to New Testament Greek*, pp. 122 sqq.). But the

at the *beginning* of the letter, where Paul also is accustomed to place a prayer for his friends.

[1] The form here is *φαινόλης*, more closely transliterating the Latin "pænula." A diminutive form appears in the next letter, no. 1584, which speaks of *φαινολίων ζεύγη β'*, "two pairs of cloaks."

[2] The composition here halts badly. Apparently Diogenes at first contemplated a number of articles (feminine plural), received by his correspondent; but ultimately mentioned, of them, only the dalmatic. What *αὐτό* stands for it would be hard to say.

[3] *Ἐπικάρσιον* (cf. Oxy. Pap. 921, with the editors' note) is something which "crosses," presumably some sort of a wrap.

point of special interest is the word here used twice for paying a creditor. If a modern Greek wishes to say "I paid him," he says *τὸν ἐπλήρωσα*; exactly so, Sattos writes in the third century *πεπλήρωκα*[1] *αὐτὸν*. The present indicative of the verb is now *πληρόνω*, the shorter form *πληρῶ* being retained for the old meaning "fill." But the words are identical. The direct object being personal, the verb can be used in the passive in the sense "I am paid," as in No. 1473 of this volume, *πληρωθῆναι τὸν Ὠρείωνα τοῖς προκειμένοις αὐτοῦ ταλάντοις δυσὶ*, and just below, *ἕως οὗ ἄν πληρωθῇ*. The participle *πληρωμένος*, actually meaning simply "paid," has in modern usage acquired a sinister sense, and denotes one who is hired or bribed for some dirty work. I do not find the meaning "pay" for *πληρῶ* with a personal object in the Lexica; though "pay" with an impersonal object is an established sense of the word[2] (see the Lexica of Liddell & Scott, Passow, Van Herwerden, and Sophocles for examples in classical, ecclesiastical, and Byzantine authors, and in inscriptions). I suggest, however, that the word is used once by Paul (Phil. iv. 18) in the same sense as that which we have found in the papyrus letter of the third century. The whole context merits examination. It has long been recognised that in Philippians iv. 15–18 Paul is playing with commercial terms in making his acknowledgement of the money sent him from Philippi. As we can well understand, he felt uncomfortable about receiving presents of money, and, as we can also understand, he covers his sense of discomfort with a half-humorous tone. He pretends to be very formal and "businesslike" about the matter.

[1] He actually wrote, the first time, *πεπλήρωσα*!

[2] I am much disposed here to suggest that the phrase *νόμον πληροῦν* has not been unaffected by this use of the verb. Cf. Romans xiii. 8–10, where the demands of Law are "debts" to be paid, and *ἀγάπη* is the *πλήρωμα* of them all.

Consider the terms he uses. *Δόσις* and *λῆψις* are ordinary trade terms for "credit" and "debit":[1] *εἰς λόγον* is the common business expression for "to the a/c of . . ." or "on a/c of . . ." ;[2] *καρπός* is used of the profits, returns, or interest upon capital or upon a business;[3] and we have the authority of Chrysostom for taking *πλεονάζοντα* in the sense of "accruing," as interest.[4] Finally, *ἀπέχω* is now known from hundreds of papyri and ostraka to be the universal formula of receipt for moneys paid.[5]

The heaping together of these terms gives to the passage a strongly commercial flavour, which is well brought out by Professor Moffatt's translation: "No church but you had any financial dealings with me. . . . It is not the money I am anxious for; what I am anxious for is the interest that accumulates in this way to your divine credit! Your debt to me is fully paid and more than paid." So far so good. But it now appears that the next phrase contains yet another of these commercial expressions. *Πεπλήρωκα αὐτὸν*, writes Sattos, of Oxyrhynchus: "I have settled his account." *Ἀπέχω πάντα*, says Paul, *πεπλήρωμαι*: "I have received payment; my account is settled." That this rendering is more happily fitted to the context than the ordinary renderings[6] which derive the meaning from *πληροῦν* ="fill," will, I think, be admitted, if once it is conceded that the word can bear the meaning "to pay (a person)."

[1] For *δόσις* see Moulton & Milligan, Vocabulary, s.v.; for *λῆψις* cf. Tebtunis Pap. 238, a fragmentary account of quantities of corn received: the heading of the various amounts is of the form: "*λή(ψεως)*, (*πυροῦ*) (so much) *κ(ριθῆς)* (so much)." Wetstein (note ad loc.) quotes examples of the set phrase *Δόσις καὶ λῆψις*.

[2] Cf. No. 1495 in this vol. *Δὸς τῷ ἀδελφῷ μου . . . εἰς λόγον μου ὡς τεσσαράκοντα τάλαντα*. Further examples in Wetstein ad loc. and Dibelius in Lietzmann's *Handbuch zum Neuen Testament*, note ad loc.

[3] This sense is established even in classical Greek; see L. & S.

[4] His note is *ὁ καρπὸς ἐκείνοις τίκτεται* (Hom. in. Phil. xvi. p. 314 C).

[5] See Moulton & Milligan, s.v.

[6] Moffat: "I am amply supplied"; Dibelius, "Ich habe die Hände voll"; J. Weiss, "Ich habe die Fülle."

I can adduce no further example from ancient Greek in which the word clearly bears this sense ;[1] but it would be no unique phenomenon if a usage not otherwise attested in ancient Greek should be established by the coincidence of a New Testament epistle, papyri in vulgar Greek of the Roman period, and the common speech of modern Hellas.[2]

Finally, the new volume enables us to add one more probable example of *ἀρχιτέκτων* (cf. 1 Cor. iii. 10) to those given in Moulton and Milligan's Vocabulary. No. 1450 is an estimate, unfortunately in a very fragmentary condition, for the repair of a public building ; and it is signed, in a second hand, with the words . . . *τέκτων ἐπιδέδωκα*. The editors, with some hesitation, restore *ἀρχιτέκτων*, pointing out that *οἰκοδόμοι*, *ἐργάται*, and *κονιαταί* were under the direction of the person in question, who is therefore probably a " master-builder."

C. Harold Dodd.

[1] Wetstein ad loc. quotes from Epictetus (Arr. III. 24) a passage in which *ἀπέχω* and *πεπλήρωμαι* are used in conjunction, just as in the Pauline passage ; and I suggest that the meaning there may be the same : *Τὸ γὰρ εὐδαιμονοῦν ἀπέχειν δεῖ πάντα ἃ θέλῃ, πεπληρωμένῳ τινὶ ἐοικέναι.*

[2] It is possible that we have a trace of the same usage in Byzantine Greek in a papyrus of the sixth or seventh century, given by Grenfell, *An Alexandrian Erotic Fragment, etc.*, No. 65 : *ταύτην ἡμᾶς ἐπλήρωσας εἰς πλῆρες καὶ εἰς ὁλόκληρον*. The editor notes " *ἡμᾶς* should be *ἡμῖν*," and that is doubtless right, but the illiterate writer of the letter may have produced the double accusative by a confusion of *πληροῦν τι* and *πληροῦν τινά*, both in the sense of " pay."

"... AND WITH ALL THY MIND."

THOUGH the war still rages, and we may have still a long way to go before we reach that crisis from which, as from a mountain-crest, we shall see the red and blessed Dawn, nevertheless, it may even *now* be permitted to us to lift up our hearts a little. We have suffered. Of course we have suffered immeasurably. But it was the fault of our ignorance or it was another proof of the depth to which we had forgotten the very principles of our faith, if we are astonished that a world which—as we see—had gone profoundly and passionately wrong could ever be brought back to wisdom except by encountering a sea of blood and tears. The brutality of the world towards Christ should of itself have prepared us to accept it as an inevitable ordinance that wrong things are righted on this earth only by their moving on to their own catastrophe, a catastrophe in which guilty and innocent are heaped together in the night; and that it is only when the storm has abated, and in the grey of the morning, that truth is seen sitting downcast amongst the ruins.

Still, I should like to lift up my own heart and to celebrate certain aspects of the hour. I am not thinking at the moment of the military position, though we do want to thank God that that is what it is. For truly, if it had not been the Lord who was on our side, the proud waters had gone over us. Nor am I thinking of the steady and mounting fidelity of the kindred and free peoples of the world to what, as the struggle has proceeded, has been perceived to be the matter at issue, namely, as to what type of human being and what type of human society is henceforward to control and point the surging and fluid possibilities of our common human nature. Though already we can foresee that the

human race in its unborn generations shall rise to call *us* blessed who in a crisis at which man found himself at the cross-roads contended that for man there was only one way. I am thinking rather of the fine results which have *already* emerged from the struggle—the new wisdom, the new humility, the new shadow of responsibility, culminating, as I believe, in all serious and forecasting minds, in an acknowledgment already becoming articulate,—that the deepest wisdom of the world *stands*, and that, now that Christ has come into our midst, our only safety is in making Him, as the world to its own sorrow has never yet made Him, King of Kings and Lord of Lords, the Moral Judge and Conscience of all men and of all peoples.

For I believe these things have already happened ; these truths and insights and revelations have already come home. The Spirit of God in certain of its manifold offices, has descended anew upon man. Not yet upon all men ; but upon men of the kind who in every dark time have been the first to see their way. Already these fine things which are going to save and heal and rebuild the world have been revealed. They have come home as the living truth to a company very much larger and very much more influential than was that little company—though of course, *it* included a St. Paul—who in the world-confusion of their day saw and announced the terms on which, and as we now agree, man might live and multiply and lay plans, without any fear either by the way or at the end.

The one thing that is most powerfully in my mind is the fine revival of thinking which is one of the happiest symptoms of a new orientation. Perhaps it is only one whose work is largely amongst books, that is to say amongst the deliberate thoughts and judgments of men, who is in a position to see how deep and rich is this new river of God—for a river of God I do not hesitate to call this serious and

passionate out-put of men's minds. We have popular writers of fiction practically confessing that the principles of life which, in the days of their own ease and folly, they declared were sufficient for such a being as man is, are now tragically inadequate; "finding God." And, though it may seem to us that they have found God as the Highlander found the tongs—at the fireside where the inmates of the house always knew they lay—still therein we do rejoice, yea and will rejoice. Our very day has witnessed a new interest in history, a new and eager study especially of the great epochs in the human career, the times when, as is being perceived now, the same principles really were at work; crises in which an old epoch, presuming upon its long-established security, ignoring certain sinister movements of its own day despite many a warning voice, suddenly found itself confronted by certain untamed forces, before which it failed and passed away.

Hardly a day goes by without the appearance of some paper or lecture or book, dealing with matters which a few years ago we should all have regarded as dead and done with, matters to which, therefore, we should never have given a hearing—matters, nevertheless, which we now see come as closely to us as the struggle for our daily bread. Every serious man who has something to say is saying it. Men whose names yesterday were unknown to us—and this to our shame,—quiet students, university dons, have now, many of them for the first time in their lives, an eager and humble hearing. Not a day passes in which I am not tempted to exclaim, as I rise from the reading of some page simply pregnant with truth, "Where were these men before the storm burst, men so qualified to rebuke our folly, and to fill our vacant minds? Why did they hold back these teeming children of their brain, these ideas and moral sequences and inevitable forecasts which might have startled

us and directed us in this difficult business of life? Why is it that only now, when the ship has foundered, and we have only with difficulty struggled to the shore, and that shore still a haggard and unhomely place,—why is it that it is only now we learn from them that the sea over which we sailed was full of rocks and reefs and disastrous tides, and that those rocks and reefs and disastrous tides had all the time been known to them?"

And yet, I do not for one moment blame them; I blame ourselves. We never asked them. We never indicated to these lonely unselfish students, who were living for the most part on a pittance, that we wanted to hear them speak. "Fools and slow of heart to believe all that the prophets have told us," we thought we were well able to manage the dark business. And so we chattered and amused ourselves until the flood came.

For the revelations of the spirit can never be disclosed until they are asked for and solicited. Real thought comes to birth only in an hour of acknowledged necessity; and we are so made, alas, that we see nothing until it is too late, too late to ward off the crisis which was on the way, but not too late, thank God, even now to be wise.

It is the hope and prayer of all of us that from this time of human distress there shall emerge for the whole world what in the language of piety we call a "Revival." Now, my point is that the revival has begun, the revival of seriousness and thoughtfulness. We have discovered and have acknowledged the bankruptcy and failure of those ideas and principles on which, as individuals and as societies, we were living. We have learned and are learning the nature of this life of ours. We have gone back to school, and are not ashamed that we must begin with the very alphabet of wisdom. It may very well be that this revival, which I declare has begun, may disappoint for a time the expecta-

tions of many. It may not make use of the language of any former time of reconstruction ; but far from that being regarded as a sign that in some ways this new revival is a thing to be suspected or a thing that falls short of what God intends, it may well be that the very newness and unexpectedness of the wave of seriousness which I am now celebrating is a sign that it is from God. For there is a saying of Holy Scripture, which we must not be afraid to face, to which we must not hesitate to give a larger interpretation than was our habit,—I mean the words, " God's thoughts are not our thoughts, neither are His ways our ways." It would be an attitude unworthy of our faith in God were we, by our prejudices and announced expectations, to be, as it were, dictating to God how He shall come anew nearer to the living interests of men. But already this revival has some of the qualities which have marked every new outburst of the religious spirit. *We stand convicted of sin* ; and the sin that I am thinking of at the moment is not any particular sin,—a sin of the flesh, or any classical sin of the mind, like hard-heartedness, or pride. The sin we stand convicted of to-day in our own eyes is what Plato called " the sin of ignorance," the sin of superficiality, the sin of not knowing the perilous nature of the human soul, of not knowing and not taking safeguards against the sinister capacities and tendencies of a human nature which was more or less frankly abandoning God. We stand convicted of the sin of superficiality, of atheism, of frivolity of mind ; the sin of honouring trivial writers and cynical interpreters of human nature ; the sin of tampering with forces which the long wisdom of the world had solemnly bidden us guard against : but we did not guard against them, we played with them, we encouraged them until they seized the reins of government and have driven us down a steep place into the sea.

Now I say it is the first step in the revival of man towards God that we have become aware of all that. It may very well be that we who have become aware of these things are a minority. It may very well be that we are destined to remain a minority. It is a saying of Ibsen's—though it was nothing very wonderful for him to say, and I quote it only because there are those who will take from Ibsen what they will not take from St. Paul—it is a saying of Ibsen's that "it is minorities which govern the world." What makes our position even as a minority a hopeful and responsible thing to-day is that the argument from every side is absolutely in our favour.

The world is prepared to-day to listen to wisdom. We have been cleansed of pride. I believe we are ready to accept new orders; I believe we are prepared to learn. There will be no need surely for many a long day to come to use violence in order to throw open the reluctant door to the entrance of truth. Man always lives by what he thinks the truth, and the truth by which man in the mass had been living he now knows to have been no truth. And so I celebrate this day in which we live when at the cost of incalculable grief and fear our hearts at length lie open to the approach of God.

When one comes to think of it under the anxious light of this present time, one sees how much of our Lord's teaching was concerned with nothing more than this and nothing less than this,—that men should arouse themselves to *think*, that they should understand that they live in a world where, to quote the immortal words of Butler, "things are what they are, and the consequences will be what they will be." Our Lord, of course, cannot be quoted in support of any mean regard for one's own comfort; and the idea that anyone should refuse to launch out on a high course because of the troubles which a lofty obedience might bring him,

is utterly repugnant to His spirit. But there is nothing more natural and habitual to our Lord's mind than to invite people to sit down quietly and think; to work out in their own minds how certain principles are likely to work in this world, and to check and oppose those principles if, upon sober reflection, they seem to be unworthy and full of danger. His severest words almost are spoken with regard to people of whom you might say that what was wrong with them was just this, that they did not sit down and think; they never took themselves apart and had a talk with themselves, for example, as to how things would be likely to go with themselves, if they go on as they are proposing to go on. Or they never sat down to think out what kind of world this would be, and what kind of world it would certainly be were every one in the world to proceed and to behave himself as *they* are proposing to proceed and to behave themselves. Our Lord's severest condemnation—sometimes it manifests itself as sorrow and pity for them—is for people who don't seem to understand that every action of theirs, and even every thought of theirs, is caught up by this spiritual world of ours, and is multiplied, and comes home and back, not only upon their heads, but upon the heads of other people, and breeds disaster in this world.

Now we have learned that; and it is the first step towards the making of a better world. We have the hearing ear and the understanding heart.

And now let me, as I conclude, indicate one or two plain matters which have come home to us, which I verily believe serious people throughout the whole world are now beyond disputing. And in each case the thing we have learned is really something which we should never have forgotten. And yet, once more, we don't want to depress ourselves, but to give thanks to God if even now and at this terrible cost we have learned what we have learned.

For one thing, we see now very clearly that we live in a world where things if left to themselves simply go wrong. We have a saying that perpetual vigilance is the only safeguard of liberty: perpetual vigilance is the only safeguard of every living thing, for every living thing is a protest and contrivance against impending death.

Another thing we have learned is that our minds must be instructed and our sympathies enlarged so that we may get to see and may keep seeing things from the point of view of other aggregates of human beings, that is to say, of other peoples, and even of other races. It may very well be that all the wisdom of the world is not confined to our nation or to the nations of our western civilisation.

Another thing we have learned is the very old piece of wisdom,—that one thing leads on to another thing, that wrong ideas about life lead on to wrong practices, and these wrong practices lead on to wrong national policies, and these wrong national policies breed anger or suspicion in the hearts of other peoples, and so material slowly masses ready for the exploding spark.

I think we have learned too, and are still learning, that it is a long way that lies ahead of us—the very lesson which the Church of the New Testament had to learn—in their language—that Christ's coming might be delayed, that they themselves might never see the glorious thing of which they dreamed. Well, let that delay and the likely length of the journey not dishearten us as it did not dishearten them. After all, it would be no very lofty behaviour simply to contend and plan for something which we ourselves are going to enjoy. Surely it is a greater, more beautiful, more Christ-like thing to contend and plan, to labour and to pray for something the fruits of which shall only be tasted by those who come after us, whom for the most part we shall never see, who will never know our names. For when a

man is contending for things which he himself is going to enjoy, he is still on the level of mere nature. It is not a spiritual but a purely animal instinct which leads us to contend for what we call our rights. So long as we are contending for *our* rights merely we are on the animal plane. When we begin to sow seed towards a harvest which only our children shall reap, we begin to be good men and women. But when we lay plans for a world which it may be shall come into being only far on in history, when, that is to say, we labour and plan for the Kingdom of God, why then we touch the hem of Christ's Garment.

I think what I set out with the intention of saying more particularly is something which has rather escaped me, though it lies at the back of what I have been saying. What I meant to say rather more pointedly is this. In the new time towards which we are looking, and upon which indeed we have entered, let us take care not to hanker too much after the merely marvellous or miraculous, as though it were only the presence of the mysterious and unnatural which is the sign of God. It may very well be, and this is my own view, that the next generation is going to be marked in its finer souls by a return to serious thinking, modest speech, self-control, patience, the mood, in short, which men display who are aware that they are dealing with a difficult matter, but a matter by no means hopeless. I think that we are going to place our confidence not so much in lightning-flashes of the Presence of God as in the steady growth of good sense, forbearance, kindness, industry. For faith stands to reason. God is Light: though there will always be reserves of lightning about His throne.

JOHN A. HUTTON.

THREE NOTES ON EPHESIANS.

(i) *The Architecture of the Church.*

ii. 19–22: ἄρα οὖν οὐκέτι ἐστὲ ξένοι καὶ πάροικοι ἀλλὰ ἐστὲ συμπολῖται τῶν ἁγίων καὶ οἰκεῖοι τοῦ θεοῦ, ἐποικοδομηθέντες ἐπὶ τῷ θεμελίῳ τῶν ἀποστόλων καὶ προφητῶν, ὄντος ἀκρογωνιαίου αὐτοῦ Χριστοῦ Ἰησοῦ, ἐν ᾧ πᾶσα οἰκοδομὴ συναρμολογουμένη αὔξει εἰς ναὸν ἅγιον ἐν κυρίῳ, ἐν ᾧ καὶ ὑμεῖς συνοικοδομεῖσθε εἰς κατοικητήριον τοῦ θεοῦ ἐν πνεύματι.

The position has changed since these words were written, and the change has been so radical that an effort of the historical imagination is required if they are to be understood. When St. Paul was alive, one of his great tasks was to see that non-Jewish converts were welcomed in the church, instead of being treated with the same sort of condescension which was usually meted out by Jews even to thorough-going proselytes. There were to be no Christians of a second class in the church; non-Jewish converts were not to be made sensible that they were in the smallest degree inferior to Jewish Christians. Nowadays the reverse is probably the case. It is converts from Judaism who sometimes need to be encouraged by the kind of assurance which the writer of this epistle holds out to his readers. There is a tendency among ordinary Christians to look somewhat askance at such converts, in fact to regard them with much the same feelings as many Christian Jews in the first century were apt to look upon non-Jewish converts.

The encouragement of this passage is an inference from what has just been said about the work of Christ in transcending and obliterating the sharpest racial distinctions. The non-Jewish Christians are told, "Thus you are strangers and foreigners [1] no longer, you share the membership of

[1] Compare Philo's comment in *De cherubim* 34, upon Lev. xxv. 23. There is a semi-pantheistic tinge in Seneca's remark (*Ep. Mor.* xiv. 4, 30): "Totum hoc, quo continemur, et unum est et deus: et socii sumus eius et membra."

the saints "—with the full rights and privileges of the church, in access to God and common worship—"you belong to God's household (*οἰκεῖοι τοῦ θεοῦ*)." Then the double sense of *οἶκος* (*οἰκεῖοι*) enables the writer to change his metaphor, by an easy transition, from politics to architecture. "You are a building that rests on the apostles and prophets as its foundation"—for this is more natural as a rendering of *τῷ θεμελίῳ τῶν ἀποστόλων καὶ προφητῶν*, than "on the foundation laid by the apostles and prophets," and in view of iv. 11 the prophets are the prophets of the Christian Church, not the old Testament prophets—"with Christ Jesus as the corner-stone." Only, Christ is more than the *ἀκρογωνιαῖος*, underlying the structure; He is the power of growth for the Church, the vital atmosphere and element in which it rises as a compact, living organism. Hence the writer adds: "In him the whole structure"—for this is the plain meaning of *πᾶσα οἰκοδομή*, and the use of *πᾶς δόμος* in Euripides' *Medea* 112 f. helps to illustrate the Greek usage—"is welded together and rises into a sacred temple in the Lord, and in him you are yourselves built into this to form a habitation for God in the spirit."

The last clause really takes up and repeats, for the sake of emphasis, the thought of what has preceded. The verb *συνοικοδομεῖσθε* is probably indicative, not, as Calvin preferred, imperative. And *ἐν πνεύματι* is in contrast with the *ἐν σαρκί* which defined the pre-Christian position of the readers (ver. 11 *ὑμεῖς τὰ ἔθνη ἐν σαρκί*). What is most perplexing to a modern student is the architectural metaphor. Some light is thrown upon it by Mr. W. W. Lloyd in *The Classical Review* (vol. iii. pp. 419 f.), during the course of an argument for "the whole structure" as the proper meaning of *πᾶσα οἰκοδομή*. He points out, for example, that "a peculiar feature of the great Ephesian temple was the elevation of the platform of the colonnade

and *naos* on a basement—a *θεμέλιον*—of unusual height and spread, with an ascent of many more than the normal three stages. It was upon this that the *naos* was raised, of which the walls certainly were examples of that marble masonry, with all but invisible joints and beds, which was usual in fine Greek architecture." He adds, "The word *naos* is technical in Greek architecture for that division of the cellar of the temple which housed the statue of the god or goddess, and thus a proper equivalent of *κατοικητήριον*. One more architectural hint may be in place. The *acrogoniaios* here is the primary fundation-stone at the angle of the structure by which the architect fixes a standard for the bearings of the walls and cross-walls throughout." The allusion here to the original significance of *κατοικητήριον*, which in the LXX denotes the divine sanctuary, brings out a point which the modern reader is apt to miss in the passage. In ancient religion a temple was not built for the comfort of the worshippers, but as a shrine to house the deity. Its *raison d'être* was God, not man. Hence, when the Christian Church is figuratively described as "a sacred temple . . . a habitation for God in the Spirit," the idea is that the common life and worship of the Christian fellowship is designed to form a fit setting for the Divine Presence; it is planned to give God, as we might say, room to live and move and be honoured in this world. This is the end and aim of the Church. Already the writer has expressed the same thought by means of another metaphor—"the church, which is his Body" (i. 22). And presently a similar conception is expressed in the bold thought of iii. 10—*ἵνα γνωρισθῇ νῦν ταῖς ἀρχαῖς καὶ ταῖς ἐξουσίαις ἐν τοῖς ἐπουρανίοις διὰ τῆς ἐκκλησίας ἡ πολυποίκιλος σοφία τοῦ θεοῦ*. The church as the embodiment of God and as the instrument of His self-revelation, such is the underlying idea of all three passages. It is in the light of such purposes

of God that the functions and fabric of the Church are intelligible, to bring out His mind of love, to make His presence accessible, to set Him forth in such a way that He shall be adored, to maintain a life of such real fellowship and faith that it answers more and more to the spiritual life of God Himself. Men should feel that they meet God in the life of His Church, that the forgiveness and peace and service which they experience there are a proof that God, the God of Jesus Christ, is really present among such people. In 1 Corinthians xiv. 25 St. Paul had described the overpowering effect which might be produced by Christian worship upon an outsider who was present when the spirit of prophecy thrilled the gathering; "the secrets of his heart are brought to light, and so, falling on his face, he will worship God, declaring 'God is really among you'." This was a dramatic and sudden occurrence. The bearer was caught out of his scepticism and curiosity by a wave of overpowering religious conviction; he was impressed by the reality of the divine presence among the Christians, the immediate reason being some word that penetrated to his conscience. What the present passage in Ephesians suggests is the mission and commission of the Christian Church to produce this impression generally; but the special power of its appeal lies in the impression of unity and brotherhood which it ought to make upon men. The living centre of the Church's fellowship is One who has reconciled men to God and to one another. The real presence of God in the Church is best exhibited by the reconciliation between its members, by the living proof which it affords that in this fellowship racial and social and national differences disappear before the absorbing fact of union with Jesus Christ. It is only where this brotherly temper pervades Christians that the Church becomes "a habitation for God in the Spirit." There is no room

for the Christian God in sectarianism or caste-prejudice, even when these are covered by religious names; He cannot be at home except in the fellowship of those who are so possessed by the spirit of Jesus Christ that they count their common faith in Him to be more than any separating tradition of birth or training.

(ii) *The Winds of Doctrine.*

iv. 14: *ἵνα μηκέτι ὦμεν νήπιοι, κλυδωνιζόμενοι καὶ περιφερόμενοι παντὶ ἀνέμῳ τῆς διδασκαλίας.*

It is a mark of immaturity to yield to novel and passing fashions, in religion as in any other sphere of life. The *νήπιος* is not distinguished by a fixed grasp of principles. Openness of mind is his charm, but the besetting temptation of this charm is instability. Owing largely to his lack of experience, he is apt to take up with whims and fancies which are more plausible than reliable, or to fail in steady pursuit of the real good in life. It does not take much to blow him out of his course or to abate his energy of persistence.

> "'Tis a kind youth, but fanciful,
> Unfit against the tide to pull,
> And those that with the Bruce would sail
> Must learn to strive with stream and gale."

Such is the writer's appeal in our text, an appeal for the unity and growth of the Church which would develop reliable, mature Christian experience—"that we may be no longer immature, blown from our course and swayed by every passing wind of doctrine."

The reasons for this unsteadiness vary. (*a*) Sometimes, as Sir Walter Scott suggests in the lines above quoted, people who are inexperienced and soft yield to any influence that suggests an easy course. The natural desire to avoid discomfort as far as possible can generally find some theory to justify it. The fault in this case is lack of staying

power. Men are carried away by some teaching which involves the line of least resistance and promises to abate the demand of loyalty to definite principles. The religious world is always open to such misinterpretations. They are often plausible and always dangerous. (*b*) Sometimes, again, it is the false spirit of individualism which sways people. They set up their private convictions, which are often no more than inherited and unexamined prejudices, against the common truths of the faith, and, by this self-assertion, deprive themselves of the growth which is alone possible to those who adhere to the unity of the Church because they realise that no church is meant simply for people of the same tastes. Perhaps this is what is most prominent in the context. There is a specious fascination in differing from the majority, which easily becomes dissent for dissent's sake. It appeals to the right instinct of independence, but it plays upon this instinct until it becomes a passion for divisiveness and self-conceit. Church history is crowded with instances of such diversions from the straight course. Independence is one thing, and wilfulness is another, but who can say when the one does not pass into the other? (*c*) On exactly the opposite side, however, the danger may be that of allowing oneself to follow unverified opinions which are voiced by a multitude. The "wind of doctrine" may be that of a crowd or majority as well as that of an individual. It is in this sense that Burke quotes the verse, in his great speech upon Conciliation with the Colonies. He begins by declaring that when the problem of England's relations with America came before the House of Commons, he felt the need "of forming some fixed ideas concerning the general policy of the British Empire. Something of this sort seemed to be indispensable; in order, amidst so vast a fluctuation of passions and opinions, to concentre my thoughts; to ballast my conduct; to preserve me

from being blown about by every wind of fashionable doctrine. I really did not think it safe, or manly, to have fresh principles to seek upon every fresh mail which should arrive from America." Burke's position was that of a small minority at the time. The majority of his contemporaries disagreed with him, but he was none the less determined to guide his conduct by some definite political principles instead of allowing himself to be swayed by passing gusts of public opinion. This application of the text by Burke is more than interesting. It is psychologically sound, and it serves as a timely complement to the truth already suggested. The passing winds of doctrine, in religion and in politics, are not always individualistic ; sometimes they may be the *Zeitgeist*, Majorities as well as minorities are liable to be eccentric, that is, off the safe, sound centre of truth ; and it is as necessary to guard against the vagaries of a popular man as of an unpopular. Conformity may be as facile and wayward as nonconformity. The mere fact that an opinion has numbers on its side is not necessarily a reason for yielding to it any more than for suspecting it. To make it such a reason is as childish in the one case as in the other.

An illustration of what is meant by *μὴ περιφερόμενοι* is afforded by the remark of Marcus Aurelius (i. 15) about his debt to a Stoic philosopher. *Παρὰ Μαξίμου τὸ κρατεῖν ἑαυτοῦ καὶ κατὰ μηδὲν περίφορον εἶναι.* What this Stoic philosopher taught the emperor was to have a centre for his life, and he evidently impressed this on his pupil by personal influence as well as by precept, for Aurelius goes on to say that Maximus displayed in his character and conduct *τὸ ἀδιαστρόφου μᾶλλον ἢ διορθουμένου φαντασίαν* —he was not a man to be turned aside by current modes of thought and practice.

(iii) *Wine and Inspiration.*

v. 17–18: διὰ τοῦτο μὴ γίνεσθε ἄφρονες ἀλλὰ συνίετε τί τὸ θέλημα τοῦ κυρίου· καὶ μὴ μεθύσκεσθε οἴνῳ, ἐν ᾧ ἐστὶν ἀσωτία, ἀλλὰ πληροῦσθε ἐν πνεύματι.

"So do not be senseless"—ἄφρων here corresponding to the "fool" of Proverbs, the person whose mental dulness is due to moral obtuseness—"but understand what is the Lord's will." A specific instance of this divine θέλημα is given later in vi. 6, for Christian slaves, but the general content is expressed by the περιπατεῖν already mentioned in verse 15: "The Lord's will" is the conduct becoming Christians, the life they ought to lead. This the writer does not stop to define. He goes on to add: "And do not get drunk with wine—that means profligacy" —ἀσωτία, the dissolute temper of life which indulges its impulses without any restraint—"but be filled with the Spirit." Ἐν πνεύματι after πληροῦσθε is an un-Pauline but quite natural phrase in this sense. The real difficulty is to see the connexion of thought between verse 17 and verse 18. Why does the writer follow up his general counsel about intelligence with a special warning against intoxication?

This question cannot be answered till we grasp the meaning of his antithesis in verse 18. Tertullian (*adversus Marcionem*, v. 18), seeking "semina praeceptorum vel augmenta" as proofs that God inspired both Testaments, thought that μὴ μεθύσκεσθε οἴνῳ, ἐν ᾧ ἐστὶν ἀσωτία, was suggested by the reproof given to the Israelites by Amos (ii. 12): "ye gave the Nazirites wine to drink," which was a violation of the rule (Lev. x. 9) that no priest was to touch liquor when he was entering the sacred precinct. He also points out how aptly this prohibition of drunkenness is followed by the allusion to "singing psalms and songs" (in ver. 19), since God censured, in Isaiah v. 11–12, those who

not only drank heavily but played and sang at their carousals; Christian singing is to be of a very different character and to have another kind of inspiration and accompaniment! Tertullian's interest is to prove, against Marcion, the connexion of the Old Testament with the New. But none of these passages was before the writer's mind. What probably underlies the passage in Ephesians is the LXX version (A) of Proverbs xxiii. 31, which departs from the Hebrew decidedly:

> μὴ μεθύσκεσθε ἐν οἴνῳ ἀλλὰ ὁμιλεῖτε ἀνθρώποις δικαίοις, καὶ ὅμιλεῖτε ἐν περιπάτοις.

Only, the author of Ephesians makes the edge of the antithesis sharper. Instead of saying that you should seek better company than you find at a symposium, instead of advising his readers to prefer sober, sensible companions to the frequenters of a drinking-bout, he tells them to seek a higher not a lower source of exhilaration.

This is quite an intelligible explanation of the passage, in view of what went on at contemporary guilds in the empire. The Church had its social gatherings, like many of these societies. The latter, under the patronage of some deity, often collected monthly subscriptions from their members, the interest of which provided in some cases for a jollification on a member's birthday. Besides, annual carousals were held, the expenses being paid out of some bequest for the purpose or by a living member of means. Tertullian (*Apol.* 39) expressly contrasts the gatherings and disbursements of the Church with such practices. We do have our voluntary subscriptions to a common fund, he writes, but they are devoted to charitable purposes, not to selfish and sensuous ends. "Haec quasi deposita pietatis sunt. Nam inde non epulis nec potaculis dispensatur." It may be that the author of Ephesians is thinking here

of social meetings like the *agapæ*, which united Christians in a free and informal fashion, and that he is warning them to use such gatherings for their true purpose, not to get drunk or to sing ordinary songs, but to be uplifted by the Spirit into a divine enthusiasm which vented itself healthily in spiritual songs and praise. It is as if he said, "Do not let your gatherings degenerate to the level of an ordinary symposium; the object of your feasts is something nobler than to indulge too freely in the wine on the table." Or, we might assume that it is a warning against such pagan drinking-bouts themselves, as if the writer meant to discourage Christians from joining in social gatherings which usually led to heavy drinking. This, however, is less likely than the other interpretation.

But it is possible that the whole passage should be approached along another line. The connexion between verses 17 and verse 18 would be closer, if the prohibition of drunkenness were organic to the counsel about discovering the divine will. "Understand what is the Lord's will; and do not get drunk with wine—that means profligacy," instead of enlightenment; the proper way to know God's will is to be possessed by His Spirit. If this interpretation could be defended, it would make the allusion to wine less abrupt; μὴ μεθυσκεσθε οἴνῳ would be a side-reference to some contemporary practice of divination from which the writer wishes to deter Christians. Now, wine, as well as singing and dancing, was among the practices used by some ancient rituals[1] to induce communion with the deity and to produce an ecstatic knowledge of his mind. We may illustrate this by what Cumont says, in contrast-

[1] The religious use of wine is, of course, not confined to the ancient world. Renan, for example, pointed out that the drunkenness of the Bretons really meant their attempt, in their own way, to find what their saints found otherwise, a vision of the invisible world.

ing the lofty astronomical mysticism, which drew raptures of mental fervour from Posidonius and his followers, with the heated and sensuous methods of some cults. "Let us compare," he writes (*Astrology and Religion among the Greeks and Romans*, pp. 146–147), "this serene ecstasy, with the transports of Dionysiac intoxication, such as Euripides for example depicts for us so strikingly in the Bacchae, and we shall at once realise the distance which separates this astral religion from the earlier paganism. In the one, under the stimulus of wine, the soul communicates with the exuberant forces of nature, and the overflowing energy of physical life expresses itself in tumultuous exaltation of the senses and impetuous disorder of the spirit. In the other, it is with pure light that reason quenches her thirst for truth; and "the abstemious intoxication (*νηφάλιος μέθη*, Philo) which exalts her to the stars, kindles in her no ardour save a passionate yearning for divine knowledge. The source of mysticism is transfered from earth to heaven." *Mutatis mutandis*, this would apply to the antithesis in the present passage from Ephesians. The writer would be drawing a distinction between the right and the wrong methods of ascertaining the mind of God. The Church, he argues, is not to have recourse to the use of wine as a religious stimulant; the genuine method is spiritual rapture, accompanied by spiritual songs. The revelation of God is mediated for the Christian through no such sensuous indulgence as intoxication; it is very different from this kind of mysticism.

From the story of Acts ii. 13 we know that some of the physical phenomena connected with the rapture of the prophetic spirit in the early Christian communities were not unlike these of intoxication[1]; the flushed face, the broken,

[1] The sneer at the disciples who are in a spirit-ecstasy is: "They are brimful of new wine!" The golden vine over the entrance to the

unintelligible utterances, and that exhilaration of the whole person which the spirit-possession induced, might be mistaken for the signs of drunkenness. In any case, this interpretation gives a point to the whole passage which is absent from the ordinary view. If it is adopted, we should argue that the writer is dismissing the religious use of wine as a means of enlightenment and divine fellowship. Such indulgence, he caustically observes, amounts to profligacy; it is not religious at all. The true method of quickening the faculties for a perception of the divine will is to be found in the possession of the Spirit which the common worship secures for the Church of Christ; and this is neither tumultuous nor mystical, but controlled by the name of the Lord Jesus Christ.

JAMES MOFFATT.

sanctuary gave rise to a pagan slander that Bacchus was the god of the Jews (Plutarch, *Quaest. Conviv.* iv. 6). Tacitus mentions it in *Hist.*, v. 5.

LET PAPIAS SPEAK FOR HIMSELF.

The January Expositor contained an article by Professor B. W. Bacon entitled "The 'Five Books' of Matthew against the Jews," in which the position taken up by Dr. Rendel Harris in his *Testimonies*, Part I. is criticised and disallowed. Dr. Harris will no doubt defend himself with his wonted skill on the point of the existence and early date of the "Testimony Book"; but I should like to express my protest against Professor Bacon's presentment of what Papias says. One is inclined to adopt the professor's own words and affirm that the romancing which underlies his own interpretation of the data spoils its validity. If "Papias has been put upon the rack to extort testimony he cannot and will not give," it is not by Dr. Harris or by Dr. John Burslem Gregory (who is referred to as "an anonymous writer on *The Oracles ascribed to Matthew by Papias of Hierapolis*") that he has been so maltreated. Poor Papias was originally racked by Eusebius, who tortured bits out of his writings. Professor Bacon essays to reconstruct the body from what are only mangled remains. He reminds one of the bold and gifted architect who confidently undertook to restore accurately a whole cathedral from the sole surviving chip of pavement. He combines the exceedingly disjointed fragments of Papias's five volumes which have been preserved for us—two of them torn out of their context—and treats them as though they formed an original continuous and coherent whole. Take, for example, the sentence on page 58: "Papias merely says that the precepts, or oracles (λόγια), of the Lord which he proposes to interpret will be found in the well-known Gospel which all Christians then received as *the* Apostolic Gospel

par excellence." Now this can be met by a direct negative. Papias nowhere says that the λόγια which he proposes to interpret will be found in the well-known Apostolic Gospel [of Matthew]. Nor does he "add" that these existed in translation. He says nothing about translation, though he implies that the Logia (whatever they were) required some effort to interpret them. We are not to picture a class of schoolboys toiling at a difficult "construe," but serious enquirers (like the Berœans later on) examining the Messianic prophecies and interpreting them, so far as they were able, by the facts of Christ's life. No one will be disposed to deny that the lamentation of Rachel in Ramah and the allusion to the exodus in Hosea need considerable ingenuity of interpretation before they can be supposed to predict the slaughter of the innocents and the flight into Egypt.

To proceed with our examination of Professor Bacon's article (p. 59). Will the professor name some of "the innumerable early borrowers" from Papias who would be likely to "ring changes" on his statement about Matthew's work? True, Eusebius (*H. E.* iii. 39) says that in deference to his antiquity many ecclesiastical writers followed Papias in his chiliastic views; but these were apocalyptic, and not necessarily based upon either Old Testament oracles or Gospel writings. Irenaeus, whom Eusebius mentions as having been especially so influenced, may as easily have misunderstood Papias about Matthew's work as he did about the age of our Lord (see *Journal of Theological Studies*, October, 1907, pages 60 ff.). Again, still on page 59, would Professor Bacon restrict τὰ λόγια τοῦ θεοῦ of Romans iii. 2 to the Pentateuch? Surely, as in Hebrews v. 12, it includes all God's revelations to the Jews through Law and Prophets and Psalmists and Wise men. We may note in passing that Papias nowhere uses the phrase λόγια τοῦ Κυρίου which Professor Bacon (page 58) attributes to his pen. He wrote Expositions of λόγια

κυριακά, which may bear a very different meaning. In Polycarp the phrase *τὰ λόγια τοῦ Κυρίου* appears from the context to refer to Old Testament oracles, as Dr. Gregory shewed. It is due largely to failure to appreciate the history of the connotation of the word *λόγια* that has led to the misunderstanding of what Papias's work professed to be. Up to and including his day, *λόγια* (in Philo, the New Testament, Josephus, and Clement of Rome) meant either special utterances found in the Old Testament, or the Old Testament Scriptures as a whole. It was not until half a century later than Papias that *λόγια* came to be applied occasionally to special utterances of Christ, and not until Irenaeus that it was applied indifferently to the books of the New as well as to those of the Old Testament. Papias's work, as I read his own statement, consisted of (1) the *λόγια κυριακά*: (2) their interpretation: (3) illustrative comments gathered by him from those who had heard and seen the disciples of the Lord. This, it seems to me, is all that Papias says. It requires no imaginative embroidery to make it intelligible; and if the meaning of "Dominical Oracles," i.e. Oracles relating to the Lord (in the Old Testament), and not Oracles spoken by the Lord (in the Gospels), be given to the phrase *λόγια κυριακά*, it is strictly in accordance with the connotation of *λόγια* in Papias's time.[1] In no case can Papias be cited as a witness to the existence of our first canonical Gospel; for all that he tells us refers to some composition of Matthew in Hebrew. Professor Bacon's position, indeed, demands that our first Gospel be a translation from a Hebrew (Aramaic) original of Matthew.[2] Is he prepared to maintain that?

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[1] Canon Edward Carus Selwyn in his *The Oracles in the New Testament*, pages 396 foll., argues for the Messianic connotation of *κυριακά*.

[2] I may be allowed to refer to my article in the *Church Quarterly Review*, April, 1917.

THE MEDICAL SIGNIFICANCE OF THE GOSPEL.

1. SOMETHING might be gained if at times we returned to the primitive custom of the Christian Church and used the gospels alone without any commentary, even that of Paul himself. In the sixth century, the Irishman Columban had for such company on his travels the beautiful Bobbio manuscript of the Old Latin Gospels (*k*). And indeed, the four gospels were early gathered into one corpus and currently so used some two centuries before the Acts and the Epistles were generally found with them. Now the chief obstacle to such a use of the gospels is with many persons the narratives of healing, which are inextricably mingled with the narrative of the teaching of Jesus. These acts of healing have often been regarded in themselves and separately as though they were isolated interruptions of an otherwise credible history. So regarded they cause distress to many persons who would like to accept the teaching to which their inmost spirit assents, persons who at the same time feel somehow that they cannot sincerely make themselves at home in a world where their sense of probability is hurt. So far, however, is the miraculous element in the Gospel from being the chief concern of recent criticism that the sayings attributed to Jesus are found less credible than the miracles.

Let us apply the results which we have gathered to the solution of the easier problem, that of the miracles. We will recall for this purpose what was said about the "declara-

tory" sentence in our study of the fourth gospel.[1] We found that alongside of the nominal sentence which explains the meaning of a word, and the real sentence which describes an event in history or a circumstance in nature or a process in the mind, there was the word of power, or, as we ventured to call it, the declaratory sentence by which that which corresponds to the word, is brought into being. Such a form of sentence we illustrated by the word of command which as matter of everyday and frequent experience does actually produce in the minds and the actions of the persons who receive the command, the effect declared by the word of command itself. The effect of the word of command is perhaps most conspicuously seen in the training of the soldier. And those who can remember what took place in their minds when in being drilled they responded to the orders given will understand sufficiently what is meant by the word of power.

Now let us suppose that this word of power is applied beyond the limits to which it is usually confined. Again, as matter of experience, we observe that effects are sometimes produced. The verified phenomena of what is called hypnotism, include a whole series of unusual cases in which verbal suggestion creates effects which go far beyond what ordinarily follows upon the word of command. Let us apply this further analogy. In the paper already[2] quoted, attention was drawn to the probability that Jesus Himself interpreted the driving out of evil spirits in a manner more consonant with modern medical practice than would be gathered from the gospels by every reader. The disorders of speech that usually accompany mental disturbance

[1] Expositor, May 1916, p. 357. Throughout this article the "Gospel" with a capital letter will denote the mission and teaching of Jesus; tho "gospel" with a small letter will denote one of the four canonical narratives.

[2] Expositor, May 1916, p. 370.

are even now only understood in part ; and we need not be surprised that those who were present at the healing of "demoniac possession," referred the utterances of the subject to "devils." When Jesus rebuked the impure spirit which possessed the demoniac in the synagogue of Capernaum, He said, "Be quiet, and come out of him. And when the impure spirit had convulsed him it spoke with a loud voice and came out of him."[1] The effect of enjoining silence upon the patient apparently reinstated the self-control which was suspended during the period of possession. Now it is not necessary for our present purpose to go further. We can take it that through the spoken word an effect was produced beyond what was involved in the mere hearing of the word. How far the effects of the spoken word may reach is a question for those who are dealing with the whole series of cases of healing which are recorded in the gospels.

2. But this effect of the spoken word was not confined to the utterances of Jesus Himself. By the use of His name, others could perform similar cures without therefore being filled with the same spirit. The cures which took place at Port Glasgow in 1830 should give pause to those who regard the cures which the Gospel records as necessarily unhistorical. We gain help for our enquiry of a quite special kind. To take one case, when James Macdonald cured his invalid sister, he addressed her in these words of the twentieth Psalm : "arise and stand upright." He repeated the words, took her by the hand, and she arose. It[2] will be observed first that the speaker did not use the name of Jesus, secondly that, as appears from another account, the possession of this power of healing did not necessarily involve the gift of prophecy as applied to politics.[3] The healers proceeded to

[1] Mark i. 25. I have helped myself from Dr. Moffatt's translation.
[2] *Edward Irving.*[4] By Mrs. Oliphant. p. 289.
[3] *Letters of Thomas Erskine.*[3] Ed. by Hanna. p. 154.

speak publicly on current events and what they said attracted some notice. But on enquiry it was found that the origin of their oracular utterances could be traced to the newspapers.

We can now turn to the healing of the paralytic, also at Capernaum [1]: the healing is treated as subordinate to the spiritual event, the forgiveness of sins, which led up to it. "In order that ye may know that the son of man has power on earth to forgive sins," He says to the paralytic, "I say to you, rise, take your bed and go home." Jesus must thus be regarded as exercising a power of healing which was not confined to Himself or to His immediate disciples.

Just as the Gospel incidentally takes note of economic needs, so it takes note, also by the way, of bodily weakness. And the application of the Gospel is not complete without regard being had to the power of the word in this direction also. That the Gospel should be inadequately represented in this respect, has led by a reaction to movements like Christian Science which fix themselves too exclusively upon and exaggerate what after all is an incidental, and not an essential, mark of the Gospel. For there is another and a dark effect of the spoken word. Whereas Jesus checked the tendency to hysteria, some modern religious teachers cultivate it. I can recall an unedifying experience of my own when Moody visited London in the early eighties.

3. There are traces of the belief that the original, that is the Aramaic, language of the Gospel had a special value. It is noteworthy that Mark supplies the tradition of the exact words used by Jesus on two occasions of healing: *talitha koumi* and *ephphatha*. We have here, therefore, part of the Aramaic tradition which lies behind the second gospel, just as we have fragments of the Aramaic tradition in Paul's use of *Abba* as the first word of the Lord's Prayer, and in

[1] Luke v. 24.

Maranathą which is not only used by Paul and in the Didaché, but is translated in the epilogue to Revelation, "Come, Lord." The missionaries from Alexandria who, in the time of Irenaeus, obtained such success in the Rhone valley, used an Aramaic liturgy and this in the latter part of the second century.[1]

4. The translation of the Gospel into Greek involved the surrender of the tradition of the words which at their first utterance were so powerful. At first people clung to Aramaic as though the power of the original words would be lost if they were translated into another language. The occasional phrases which are retained in the New Testament, find an interesting parallel in the use of the Aramaic names of God by contemporary writers on magic who use alongside of their Greek text the foreign names which strike so strangely upon the eye. The translation of the Aramaic Gospel into Greek showed how far the primitive church was from being enslaved to the mere letter of her message. For the change was not necessarily from one written gospel to another in a different language. It was rather the interpretation of one living utterance by another. Sometimes the same speaker would pass from Aramaic to Greek as Paul did: sometimes the Aramaic speaker would be interpreted into Greek as Peter seems to have been interpreted by Mark.

5. Indeed the transition from one language to another involved no greater break than the transition from speech to writing within the same language. The declaratory force of the Gospel suffered less, we may be sure, when the tradition in whatever language remained oral, than when the oral tradition became fixed in writing. Hence the difference which previously [2] was traced between the style of Mark as nearer spoken language, and the style of Luke with its implications of written language, is of great importance for

[1] *Contra Haereses*, I. xxi. 3. [2] EXPOSITOR, April, 1915.

our understanding of the primitive Gospel which was orally delivered in Aramaic.

6. But the written gospels remained closer to the oral tradition than at first sight appears. For when they were written, they would still be pronounced aloud by nearly every reader. Even if a book was used for solitary meditation, it was still read aloud. When Philip in the Acts came across the minister of the Ethiopian queen, he had not to look over the eunuch's shoulder to find out what he was reading. "He heard him reading Isaiah the prophet." To read meant to read aloud, not only for the Oriental who still retains the custom; but—what is less realised—the Greek and the Roman in like manner used the voice in reading. This ancient custom survives conspicuously in the recitation of the Breviary by Roman Catholic priests. They are bound, even when they are in company and the sound of the voice would be inconvenient, at least to form each word by the lips.

But not only did everybody read aloud, they prayed aloud. Hence when our Lord recommended the practice of private prayer, He instructed His hearers to retire to their own room in order to avoid being heard by any one except God. Our Lord Himself prayed aloud, on the mountain side. Even in Gethsemane He chose to go apart from His disciples a stone's throw. On the cross itself He was heard to utter prayers in His native tongue. It is a question of supreme interest, whether the communion of our Lord with His Father was not for the most part aloud. This openness of speech was itself regarded as a virtue. "In secret I have said nothing," was the answer of Jesus to the high priest: one of those touches in the fourth gospel which are real. Even to whisper prayers was considered a mark of evil. "Your tongue hath muttered perverseness.[1] "Hence it is possible that the

[1] Isaiah lix. 3.

instruction of our Lord to say prayers privately in one's room, ran counter to a widespread feeling.

6. But men not only read aloud and prayed aloud, they often thought aloud. The Preacher talked not only to others, but to himself. "Then said I: 'wisdom is better than strength.'"[1] To meditate is to speak to oneself. It is difficult to trace always the point at which thought became separate from utterance. Muttering, here again, furnishes the transition from thinking aloud to silent meditation. But there are plenty of traces left, not only in the Scriptures but in Latin and Greek literature, of actual conversation with oneself. Scipio, the son of Hannibal's conqueror, used (according to Cato the Elder) to say that he was never less alone than when he was alone.[2] Cicero explains this by saying that Scipio was accustomed to talk to himself in solitude, so that he did not feel the lack of conversation with another. Further on in the same context Cicero refers to "silent thought," as though, without cause to the contrary, you would necessarily think aloud. Two centuries later Marcus Aurelius, writing during his campaign on the Danube, began the second book of his Commentaries with the words: "At daybreak to say to oneself: 'I shall meet the busybody, the ingrate, the brutal, the trickster, the unsociable.'" At the beginning of the fifth book, the succession of thought is actually put into a dialogue. It would appear, then, that the form of the Commentaries is a conversation with oneself. Thus the λόγος ἐνδιάθετος of the Stoics and their λόγος προφορικός—the interior, and the uttered, word—pass into one another. And we shall regard silent meditation, with Cicero, as an exception and thinking aloud as a rule.

7. We are now able to deal with a problem that has perplexed some. How far are we to regard the speeches in the Acts of the Apostles as authentic? At any rate one

[1] Eccl. ix. 16. [2] *De offic.* III. i. 1.

thing is possible : the author may have intended the speeches to represent the thoughts of the persons to whom they are attributed. In this respect the fourth gospel probably comes nearer, than the Synoptic gospels, to the Acts. The Synoptic writers record detached and definite sayings, the fourth gospel in comparison seems to give rather the general reminiscence of trains of thought, than the tradition of individual sayings.

8. In spite of the spread of books, and the consequent need, when persons were reading in company, that the interruption caused by reading aloud should be avoided, there seems to have been no noticeable separation of the thought of a word from its utterance. Even the word *soliloquium*, " a talking to oneself," did not come into use before Augustine's time. It would be a profitable enquiry, if we could fix upon the precise moment for the individual when thought frees itself from utterance.

9. If, however, we rise from thought considered as the function of the individual mind, to thought considered as a social function, we are still turned back upon the use of language. Plato can find no better phrase for thought than to describe it as " a dialogue within oneself." And therefore the Platonic dialogue in which the movement of thought is exhibited by way of question and answer, statement and counterstatement, remains the unsurpassed model of philosophical exposition. So far as this is the case, we shall cease to desire the entire separation of thought from language. Rather shall we seek to make language itself more effective as an instrument of thought, or even as controlling thought.[1] Yet we must remember that through sympathy persons may share thoughts that remain unuttered. The communion of the saints is often silent.

[1] This function of the liturgy, whether committed to writing or not, is deserving of careful examination.

10. On the other hand, to abstain from utterance is usually to abstain from thought—up to a certain limit. The practice of silence, therefore, has for its immediate effect the partial cessation of thought. And to that extent silence is often medicinal.[1] But in order that silence may thus take its full effect it is necessary, in accordance with what has already been advanced, that we should also abstain for the moment even from reading. Only then can we restore ourselves from the confusion and clamour of the multitude to the primitive and receptive mind of young children.

But it is just at this moment when we have attained silence, that occasions of evil no less than of good offer themselves. For when the grown person practises silence, he is not in the same position as the young child. It is impossible to return to Eden in the same state as when we left it. In a world where good and evil are inextricably mingled, each successive day leaves its stain. And it is the recognition of this intrinsic imperfection of the world order, so far as we share in it, that seems to be the permanent condition of the highest human happiness, no less than of the highest human excellence. To the better man in each of us the consciousness of sin and weakness is the minor chord which beautifully strikes and resolves into the victorious notes of the heavenly concord.

11. Consequences follow of considerable importance for our estimate of the purpose of teaching. The receptive attitude which is demanded from the disciple in order that he may receive instruction, involves a danger of which instruction must also take account. All teaching, therefore, so far as it takes account of our frail human nature, must be medicinal, must prepare the passage through what is limited, imperfect, faulty to the rounded completion, "the full stature," in which limitations disappear. Particularly is

[1] Supra, § 1.

this the case with all instruction in special forms of work or knowledge. And the more specialised the curriculum, the greater the need of a counterweight on the side of our common manhood. So far as any one is equipped for a special function, to that extent he tends to be withdrawn from the rounded fulness of the human ideal, and loses himself. Now in the case of a spiritual organism like man, this defect cannot remain something merely negative, the mere absence of good. In so far as he is an organism, defect passes over into disease. Fortunately, as we have seen, language can be the vehicle of his cure. The very power which attaches to the spoken word, capable as it is of abuse, combines with the intrinsic validity of the teaching of Jesus to produce a unique spiritual effect. In brief, the Gospel unites mental healing with teaching. The miracles of bodily healing which undoubtedly were performed by Jesus, should be counted rather as symbols of the mental healing which lies on the boundary between the physiological and the spiritual. At this time of day the strange spiritual effects which the Gospel produces, render credible in part the recorded physiological miracles. Then the Jewish hearer was drawn from the visible sign to the deeper meaning ; a transition which was prepared by the prophetic utterance of Isaiah : " Then shall the lame man leap as an hart, and the tongue of the dumb shall sing, for in the wilderness shall waters break out and streams in the desert." [1]

12. Can we define to ourselves the precise touch of the gracious hand which really heals our spiritual infirmities ? At any rate we can take note of the point at which we receive the benign influence. I think our first impression is one of surprise, at any rate in these modern times. Modern psychology has prided itself upon the high place which—in comparison with earlier thinkers—it has assigned

[1] Isaiah xxxv. 6.

to the emotions. "In the intuitions of feeling," says Rousseau, "we have a primitive light more brilliant and more pure than the light of reason." Such is not the Gospel.[1] But owing to the unfortunate ambiguity of the word "heart," our English version gives a meaning to the contents of the Gospel, which is almost the inverse of the true one. Not by promising full play to our feelings, but by subjecting them to a higher law than undisciplined impulse however well-intentioned, is the healing touch given.[2] "Thou shalt love the Lord thy God with all thy intelligence, and thy neighbour as thyself," requires to be re-examined in the light of the actual words of the Gospel. And to this difficult task we will now address ourselves.

13. Let us put a question first. Are we prepared to find that the Gospel is directed rather to the intelligence than to the emotions? In putting this question, we are returning to the primitive method of the church. The first touchstone of the convert was not love but belief.[3] And belief consisted, not in a passive feeling, but in the right attitude to an example and to a body of teaching. I am not concerned for the moment to enquire how much more was involved. But at any rate this much was understood.

When I inquire for my own satisfaction where I can get any help, where, that is, the teaching contained in the four gospels is put into something like a system, I find with a shock of surprise that comparatively few attempts have been made with anything like success to fulfil this pressing need.

[1] "Fear and hope are the two greatest natural motives of all men's actions: but neither of these passions will ever put us in the way of virtue, unless they be directed by conscience."—Swift, *Sermon* iv.

[2] The very barrenness of our emotional experience, the waters of Marah, may bring the needed change. Mr. L. P. Jack's story, *The Psychologist among the Saints*, may be consulted with advantage.

[3] Belief in the sense of "trust" includes love. The ambiguity of "love" is too often slurred over. Charity towards one's neighbour and the intellectual love of God are but two out of many rich meanings.

What writers are there who have confined themselves to the gospels? Seeley's *Ecce Homo* at once suggests itself. Then there is *The Imitation*, in which the figure which Seeley sketched in outline, becomes alive for the one who puts into practice the instructions contained in the *Imitation*. *The Fool in Christ* by Hauptmann, and *The Idiot* by Dostoieffsky are indeed more illuminating commentaries on the Gospel than many works of the professed theologians. The heroes of these novels lose their reason, their very selves. But they gain full value in exchange. Dean Swift, to take a real example, ended a life of service in long-drawn out mental disease. The Spirit sometimes breaks the cup in celebrating the eucharist. But Swift is almost the only exception to the general rule that the Gospel makes for sanity; and in his case the exception is merely apparent. For he enjoyed the full use of his reason until his seventieth year. Hence the novelists, writing from the outside, misunderstand, as Festus misunderstood Paul. Nor are the psychologists in a better case. We are moderately indebted to William James for his scientific formula: "the acme of this kind of discipline would be a semi-hallucinatory monoideism, an imaginary figure of Christ, for example, coming fully to occupy the mind." William James might with equal justice have described in like terms the effect of any other obsession upon us. His brother's unfinished story, *The Ivory Tower*, treats incidentally of a person obsessed by financial occupations. I suppose Milton also was obsessed by his own poetic calling. After all it makes some difference with what precisely one is obsessed. And this difference for us is determined by the details as well as the general scheme of the teaching of Jesus. It is not, therefore, our merely emotional attitude to the person of Jesus which exhausts the meaning of the Gospel. Our emotions—as I have observed at some revivalist meetings—may render us, if we let go our

self-control, the victims of charlatans. The memoir of Laurence Oliphant shows how dangerous it is to follow a will of the wisp at the bidding of impulse.

When, however, we turn to Jesus as the teacher we find in the comparatively "dry" light of the Gospel just that bracing and healthy atmosphere which is precisely not found amid the miasma of undisciplined feeling and impulse.

14. The difference between the intellectual appeal of Socrates and that of Jesus, is that the Gospel is not merely static and formal, but dynamic and health-giving. I am afraid to use such words as "dynamic" and "health-giving," however, because they are associated in my recollection with turgid and empty rhetoric. For the moment, then, in order to keep clear of this danger, we will emphasise rather the light than the fire of the Gospel. Yet the fire itself of the Gospel is no mere warmth by which we northerners find comfort in our colder climates. It is the purifier of the hot East, nor is it unknown to our own sanitary authorities. Hence the fire of the Holy Spirit is not the heat of excitement but something that cleanses impurities, and is not far removed from the light that delivers from error.

15. If we need to correct the familiar usage of the term "fire," much more must we be on our guard against the misunderstanding of the word "heart." The heart in the Semitic languages, as in Latin, is not the seat of the feelings but primarily the seat of the intelligence. And Aristotle took over the primitive view, in this respect falling back from Plato's more correct physiology, which referred the reason to the head and the brain. Under the influence of Aristotelianism the heart could still be regarded by serious thinkers as the physiological organ of mind, long after Galen had put medicine on the right path. The brain was commonly and for a long time regarded as a secretion, which needed to be cleared away from time to time, especially by

sneezing, or spitting.[1] So backward was medical knowledge.

Yet it is important for our present purpose, in which the memory of the spoken word counts for so much, to interpret Paul's "fleshly tablets of the heart"[2] in accordance with the medical knowledge, such as it was, of his time. The Aristotelian doctrine represented our memory as consisting in the impressions which the motions of the senses leave in the heart, as the impression of a seal is left on wax.[3] Paul's comparison also is sufficiently near in which the parchment which receives the ink of the pen illustrates the effects which our actions leave behind upon us. These two passages should be added to those medical allusions which have been traced by Hobart in the third gospel and the Acts. We can thus correct our tendency to contrast the popular and unscientific interpretation of disease in the gospels with a presumed scientific medicine of the same date. The Greek physician who took note of the cures associated with the temple of Asklepios at Epidauros, would be not less interested in the medical effects of the Gospel. So far as the Gospel was directed to calming the mind, it was curative beyond the resources of contemporary physicians. And we can trace not obscurely the successful physician in Jesus Himself.[4] We must therefore take note of the physiological suggestion which may underlie the word "heart" in the Gospel.

We thus trace two separate strands in the medical tradition, one deriving from Plato in which the Hebrew *leb*,

[1] The Valentinians seem to have used (in the second century) the curious phrase "to spit out the brain" as meaning to be clear-headed : Irenaeus, *Contra Haereses*, I. pref. 2.

[2] "From the table of my memory I'll wipe away all trivial fond records." —*Hamlet*, I. 5.

[3] *De Memoria*, i.

[4] *Jesus*,[3] Bousset, 22 ff. Loisy understates the case when he dismisses this side of Jesus' work as mere exorcism : *Jésus et la tradition évangélique*, 77.

" heart," is represented by *νοῦς* or *διάνοια*, the other more widely spread in which *καρδία* is used. That there was no difference in the psychological suggestions furnished by *καρδία* and *διάνοια* would appear from the interchange of these two words in the oldest MSS. of the Septuagint. In the liturgy of Antioch which was contemporary with these MSS. *νοῦς* and *καρδία* are put side by side at the *sursum corda*.[1] It is unfortunate that the English Bible does not reflect so clearly the meaning with which we are occupied. But there are still passages left in which the translation of *leb* by " understanding " is given, especially in Ecclesiastes.

Turning back to Paul's comparison of the mind to a letter, and to the Two Tables of the Law, it is clear now that we are dealing in Paul's view with processes which are mainly intellectual rather than emotional. And therefore we must understand Paul as intending by " faith " a rational discipline, whatever further implications of feeling are contained.

15. I shall now proceed to show with the help of the concordances[2] that the Gospel makes little or no reference to bare feeling and concentrates itself upon instruction and the obedience which is displayed in action. And this drift of the whole Gospel is underlined by those who gave the last touches to the four gospels. The epilogue to Matthew contains the command to give instruction to all nations. The text used by Eusebius ran : " teach all nations in my name," and omitted the reference to baptism. An African inscription : *qui in deo confidit, semper vivet*,[3] looks like an echo of the corresponding passage in Mark (xvi. 16). It is possible that the reference to baptism is in both cases an addition made for liturgical purposes. The third and the

[1] *Eastern Liturgies*, Brightman, 473.

[2] The figures which are given do not claim more than approximate accuracy.

[3] *Lat. christ. Inschr.*, Diehl, 206.

fourth gospels without question lay stress on the Gospel as instruction. Luke declared his object to be that his correspondent should "know the certainty of the words in which he was instructed." The first epilogue of the fourth gospel states that the record was put in the form of a book that the readers (or rather the hearers) might believe. To believe means here, then, to respond to teaching. Mark indeed has no formal preface or epilogue and takes for granted the use which will be made of his record.

This intellectual appeal is set in high relief by the comparative absence of the emotional appeal. The Gospel takes very little account of pain, pleasure or desire in the simple meaning of these terms. Hence we must interpret the not very numerous references to rejoicing and grief in an austere sense. For example, Mark never speaks of pain in the abstract λύπη, and only twice uses the corresponding verb λυπεῖν.

How different is it when we turn to the words referring to instruction, "teacher," "to teach," and "student." "Teacher" διδάσκαλος appears some forty-eight times, "to teach" διδάσκειν appears fifty-eight times. On the other hand, μανθάνω, "to learn," scarcely occurs and is replaced by "to know" γιγνώσκειν, and πιστεύειν, "to believe," especially in John. John uses πιστεύειν no less than one hundred times against thirty-four times in the other three gospels. But there is no opening for intellectual pride. Knowledge, γνῶσις, comes once only and in Luke. "Wise," σοφός, and "wisdom," σοφία, never in John, who for that matter never uses the word "faith," πίστις, although he harps upon the corresponding verb. Matthew, Mark, and Luke by their use of πίστις show that tendency to an abstract view of things, which we have already observed as a departure from the language of daily life, and to that extent they are to be distinguished from John.

If we turn now to the details of instruction, we find that "to question" occurs some seventy times. But it is the teacher who is questioned and not the taught. Curiously enough the second gospel has the word twenty-seven times, against Matthew's eight; Mark thus keeping nearer the actual dialogue, Matthew, as we might have expected, collecting the "sayings" into groups. The verb "to answer" chiefly used of the teacher is found no fewer than two hundred and eighteen times. Λόγος has a hundred and thirty, against ῥῆμα thirty-nine, mainly in Luke and John. On the other hand, "to hear," i.e. "to receive instruction," occurs two hundred and seven times, while "to follow" ἀκολουθῶ, i.e. "to act upon instruction," occurs eighty times.

Turning to the side of "works," as distinguished from feeling and thought, we find that the verb ποιεῖν, "to do" or "make," is found over eighty times in Matthew alone, and elsewhere in proportion. The fourth gospel, which has so much to say about believing, has twenty occurrences of ἔργον, "work," against nine in the whole of the other three gospels. Words denoting "to command" and the like occur not infrequently.

Our conclusion, therefore, is that the Gospel is less directed to the emotions than it is customary to represent it. But further than this. Since the Gospel moves so largely upon well-defined lines, it raises a challenge that must be met and either accepted or rejected. It is directed mainly against sins of the intellect. Or shall we say that it drags to light the intellectual character of sin? And this is done by emphasising the modesty of the intellect at its highest. The contemptuous note in the vulgar use of the word "meek" is a curious proof that the moral qualities of the intellect at its best elude the general apprehension. The humility of Francis of Assisi is a happy commonplace. But how seldom

has justice been done to the lowly temper of Peter! Although Paul was instructed in the Gospel by Peter, Paul could yet withstand his old teacher in such a way that Peter's figure harmonises with the traditions of the gospels and of Acts. None of the apostles was so often represented at a disadvantage as their leader. To him, if history goes for anything, the blessing which attaches to the poor in spirit belonged. And the first epistle which goes by his name is so far consistent that it contains within its narrow limits a large proportion of the New Testament references to humility. This poverty of spirit disdained the trappings of rhetoric, and found its proper voice in the use of common language, of the vernacular. The austere rationalism which made up an intrinsic part of the Gospel was conveyed authoritatively to the everyday world through the idiom of the market, the street, and the highway.

FRANK GRANGER.

ON THE IMPOSSIBILITY OF TRANSLATING THE OLD TESTAMENT.

Of course, translations of a kind may be made ; indeed, the present writer sometimes dreams of translating the Old Testament, if he ever has time. Moreover, translations A.V., R.V., etc., are of immense value ; sometimes indeed a translation of a section may be of more spiritual value than the original. It is usually possible to produce a version of a passage of the Old Testament, which shall convey to the English reader much of the meaning of the Hebrew original roughly and in a somewhat distant fashion ; often more can be done. But on the other hand, our title does not merely mean that it is impossible to make a rendering which shall be throughout an exact equivalent of the original ; the impossibility extends further ; for a large proportion of the contents of the book, no translation can produce any close approximation to the original. It is not a question of knowledge, care or skill ; it is not that, if a perfect translator could be found, and if all available information could be placed at his disposal, he could make an exact translation. Nor can existing translations be classed according to their approximation to a perfect translation ; so that it can be said that one is the best, another the second best, and so on. If the perfect translator were found and made acquainted with all that is known, or ever has been known, about the Hebrew and English languages and the Old Testament, the fulness of his gifts and equipment would only add to the difficulty of his task. We might have very different translations which would have the same value, equally accurate and equally inaccurate, but accurate and inaccurate in different ways. If a mathematical illustration may be used, we may

put it thus. In any given passage, let all the meaning of the original that can be apprehended by an expert in the subject, be denoted by $a + b + c + d$; d will be impossible to convey to the ordinary English reader ; $a + b + c$ might be conveyed to such a reader by a careful and thorough exposition orally by an expert teacher ; or the reader might get this measure of meaning for himself by a careful, thorough and intelligent study of a suitable selection of translations, commentaries, Bible dictionaries, etc. But any one translation could only convey the measure of meaning represented by either $a + b$ or $a + c$; in order to bring out b the translator would have to sacrifice c or vice versa. We shall have occasion to illustrate this further on.

Let us state briefly some of the grounds for this position. For one thing, the Old Testament has been referred to, because it is proposed to deal with the question with special reference to the Old Testament, but we are illustrating a general principle ; the impossibility of translating is a universal truth. Even in the same language, it is true of abstract terms and even of many concrete terms, that a word never has the same meaning for two different persons. It is still more true that no abstract word in one language is exactly equivalent to any one word in another language ; here again it is also true of many words denoting concrete objects. Thus statements like "A went to B," or "C killed D" can be perfectly translated, but exact rendering cannot be found for such statements as :—"The tenor which my life holds he readily may conceive." If anyone will try to translate this into Hebrew, he will appreciate the difficulty of translating Hebrew words of the same character into English. In the case of the Old Testament, we have writers of a remote antiquity, of a distant land ; their life and thought were partly determined by conditions of climate and geography differing widely from ours ; they

spoke a language belonging to a family different from that to which English belongs; obviously it will be specially true in such cases that often no closely approximate English equivalent can be found for Hebrew, whether as regards vocabulary, grammar, or rhythm; denotation or connotation. This is still more true of the general impression derived from a passage of Hebrew, through the working of the laws of suggestion and association and otherwise.

Let us take (1) *Vocabulary.* The fact that a Hebrew word means different things in different places does not seriously trouble the translator; *matteh*, for instance, means sometimes "staff" and sometimes "tribe." But even in such cases, there is a certain failure in equivalence; *Matteh*, "tribe," respectively call up different associations for the Hebrew and English reader. Similarly, puns cannot be translated, and the Old Testament revels in puns,[1] usually referred to by judicious commentators as cases of "paranomasia."

There are many Hebrew words, especially those denoting trees and animals, the meaning of which is unknown to us. There is a still larger number for which we have no equivalent in English; that is to say, the Hebrew word cannot be accurately represented by any single word or even short phrase. This is sometimes because the thing or idea does not exist with us, e.g., *torah*, *nephesh*; sometimes because languages differ as to the shade of a particular quality for which a word is provided, or as to the group of qualities denoted by a single word, e.g., *hesed*.

A word or two may be said about these examples, and a few other Hebrew words which have no English equivalent.

Ebed; A.V. and R.V. a bondman, servant, manservant. None of these suggest to the ordinary English reader the fact that the persons referred to are usually slaves. The

[1] See R.V. Mg., Jeremiah i. 11, 12, and *passim*.

translator is faced with a dilemma ; if he translates *ebed* by " slave," where it has that meaning, he indicates the legal status, but " slave " suggests to the English reader an unusual, degraded, and specially unhappy condition, not true of the Hebrew slave. If he uses " servant," he misleads his readers as to the facts of the case.

Torah ; A.V. " law," R.V. puts " law " in the text, but puts " teaching " or " instruction " in the margin in some instances. The Oxford Lexicon gives " direction, instruction, law." Now, in the later books, *Torah* often means a written code ultimately the Pentateuch ; and the translation " law " is not much amiss, though " law " suggests to the English reader something very different from the Pentateuch with its large element of narrative, exhortation and poetry. But also, especially in the earlier books, it denotes an oral communication of the will of God, sometimes made by the priest as to some point of ritual, sometimes made by the prophet as to conduct or teaching. It is also used in a somewhat different way, e.g., of the teaching given by a parent to a child. In such instances the meaning conveyed by " law " is wrong ; and though " teaching," or " instruction," or in some cases " revelation " would be much better, no one of these is an accurate translation. The guidance on some particular point given under religious sanction is quite different from the general fixed regulation denoted by " law."

Nephesh. A.V. Commonly " soul," " life," also " the dead." In many cases *Nephesh* represents Israelite ideas which have no equivalent in English ; it is a term of Israelite psychology, and to understand it we should have to understand Israelite ideas on the subject, ideas as to the psychology, the mental and spiritual nature of Man. Our understanding of these things is imperfect, and, if we understood them, the ideas would be so different from ours that we

should realise that the English language could not express them. A full discussion of *Nephesh* would occupy volumes. The more one studies the matter, the more dissatisfied does one feel with the word or words proposed to translate it. Sometimes a fair equivalent may be found, and we should get fairly near to the original meaning in "soul" or "self" or "life," though in most cases "soul" means too much and "self" too little, and both are at their best somewhat aside from the real meaning of *Nephesh*. To the English reader "soul" suggests things which were quite absent from the mind of the Israelite writer and readers; "soul" suggests the spiritual nature of man, the Pauline "pneuma," whereas *Nephesh* is much nearer the principle of physical life, the Pauline "psuche." Take the familiar phrase:—"Bless the Lord, O my soul (*nephesh*)." "Soul" suggests a crowd of associations and ideas foreign to the original; but such alternatives as:—"Bless the Lord, O myself," "Bless the Lord, O my life," "Let me bless the Lord" are either impossible or more open to objection than "O my soul."

Hesed. One difficulty of translation springs from the fact that a comparatively primitive language like Hebrew has a more limited vocabulary (as compared with Greek or English) for abstract terms. Hence a Hebrew word will cover a larger area of meaning than any one English word; or in other words no English would convey all the meaning of the Hebrew word, e.g., *Hesed*. This word denotes a quality which includes beneficence, benevolence and loyalty. For it English versions offer us the choice of "mercy" or "lovingkindness" or "kindness." *Hesed* no doubt may include "mercy" in some contexts, but "mercy" is always an inadequate rendering, and mostly misleading. Mercy is the attitude of a superior to an inferior; of a person who has been wronged to an offender. There is nothing of this

in *Hesed*. No doubt *hesed* might lead an injured person or superior to show mercy; but it is a quality which may be displayed quite as much between equals, or even by an inferior to a superior. We hear much of the *hesed* of God to man, but we also read of the *hesed* of man to God. Kindness is feeble compared to *hesed*; "lovingkindness" is both feeble and heavy, hardly English at all. Does anyone who is not directly or indirectly quoting the A.V. ever talk about "lovingkindness"? "Altruism" covers much of the same ground, but it is a cold, technical, pedantic term; while *hesed* is full of warmth and passion. "Generosity" includes much of the meaning of *hesed*, but it does not suggest either the loyalty or the strong feeling implied by *hesed*. Take the passage in Micah: God requires us to "do justly and love mercy (*hesed*)" (A.V.). "Mercy," as we have said, is quite inadequate; could we say "to love kindness" or "to love lovingkindness" or "to love altruism" or even "to love generosity"? Perhaps "to do justly and generously," or "to be just and generous" would come as near to the original as possible, but still not very near.

Such examples might be multiplied.

II. *Idiom*. Hebrew being Semitic, its syntax differs widely from that of English, and the differences are such that they cannot be represented in English. Again a few instances may be given.

Thus *way'hi*; a Hebrew sentence often begins with *way'hi*. A.V. and R.V. both render this "and it came to pass." The rhythm and general effect of the Hebrew are obviously at once spoilt, five English syllables, each a separate word, three of them long or heavy, for one Hebrew word of two syllables, which is practically a mere connecting particle. Moreover, the English would suggest all sorts of ideas which are quite absent from the Hebrew. A preacher recently derived from the phrase the lesson that earthly

experiences were transient, they only came to pass away—quite a legitimate deduction from the English; but one which would never have occurred to anyone reading the Hebrew.

Probably the best English equivalent is "and"; but this errs in the other direction; it is too short and also somewhat less emphatic than the Hebrew. In some ways "and so" would be about right. But a series of sentences each beginning "and so" would be intolerable.

Tenses. Hebrew has no tenses in the strict sense; it has a couple of forms, one of which, commonly called the "Perfect," denotes completed action; the other, commonly called the "Imperfect," denotes "incomplete action"; either form may be used for past, present or future; and further, each has a variety of uses too numerous to be discussed here. It will be clear at once that it is often impossible to reproduce in English the effect of the Hebrew verbal forms. This is especially the case with the Imperfect. Often it may be rendered quite accurately by the English future; but in many cases it is uncertain whether it is a graphic way of describing a past action, or an expression of a general truth, or a statement with regard to the future. The Hebrew suggested all these to the Israelite reader and left him to decide the meaning for himself; whatever he chose as the main sense, some flavour, so to speak, of the other possible meanings might be attached to it. No English rendering can do this. Again, as we have said, the imperfect may be a graphic way of describing a past event; but if translated by the English perfect, the style and effect of the original are lost. There is, of course, the English graphic present, e.g., a story may be told thus:—"The Knight comes to the castle-gate; he blows a horn, etc., etc." But again the effect of the English idiom is by no means the same as the Hebrew.

III. *Rhythm.* The effect of a passage, the balance of words and clauses, depends partly on the mere sound, length and number of words, not only in poetry and poetic prose, but also generally. As a rule, any translation which tries to be faithful to Hebrew sense and English idiom, will differ widely from the original as regards rhythm. Success in translation "in the metre of the original" can only be obtained by sacrificing either the meaning of the Hebrew, or the idiom and style of the English—usually both.

On the whole, Hebrew is more terse than English; it has something of the epigrammatic brevity of the Latin. This effect is constantly lost in translation.

It follows from what has been said, that the translator is often driven to a *choice of excellences*; he can obtain those he aims at only by sacrificing others. Every translator would wish to combine exact equivalence of the original in rhythm; style; meaning of individual words; effect or impression of phrases and sentences; general result of narrative or general teaching of didactic passages, etc.; with a correct, elegant, idiomatic English style, lucid and intelligible to the ordinary reader. It is impossible to combine all these excellences; the difficulty of combining correspondence of rhythm and sense has already been mentioned.

Again, take one of our illustrative words—*hesed*; if a translator tries to bring out exactly the full force of the Hebrew, he might say, instead of "love *hesed*" "love a quality combining ideas similar to those denoted by benevolence, beneficence and loyalty, with a suggestion of personal affection," a *reductio ad absurdum*; in the attempt at accuracy, all correspondence of rhythm and style is sacrificed. Further, in the attempt to include *all* the Hebrew meaning, something has been introduced which is not in the Hebrew; the paraphrase we have given could

not be translated into Hebrew, and any exegete expounding and explaining the English words would soon find himself getting outside the meaning of *hesed*.

The examples given under the above heads will perhaps suffice to suggest the necessary imperfection of any possible translation of many passages of the Old Testament. It may be added that often a passage is ambiguous ; alternative translations are possible. It might seem at first sight that an ambiguous English translation would be a faithful rendering of an ambiguous Hebrew passage ; but the English ambiguity would almost inevitably be different from the Hebrew. The alternative meanings possible in the one case, would not be the same as those possible in the other.

Again, a fair number of passages are unintelligible ; some of the best modern renderings of the Old Testament represent such a sentence or phrase by a line of dots.

According to the choice between different excellences, we get different *types of translation*. We have referred above to translations in the metre of the original.

There is also what may be called "*Hebrew in English words*" *translation*, which seeks chiefly to reproduce the original accurately as regards detail, to give word for word, to imitate the order. Even here the translator is often driven to sacrifice one shade of meaning of a word in order to express another. His chief aim—exact verbal equivalence—can only be very imperfectly attained ; as far as he does attain it, it is by a considerable sacrifice of the rhythm of the original, of the English idiom, and sometimes of intelligibility to the English reader. Both A.V. and R.V. belong to this class of translations.

The merits of the A.V. are immense, but they are partly obtained by a wholesale sacrifice of English idiom. Their charm and force are only partly due to merit as literary

English ; much of it is not English at all. There are three other causes which have more to do with its attractiveness ; by its close adherence to Hebrew idiom it conveys something of the dignity and power of the original. Then the un-English character and the obscurity, which often result from this method, have a charm of their own, a certain novelty and strangeness, and the pleasant magic of strange mysterious sounds which are only partly understood, " of little meaning, though the words are strong " ; the magic which attaches to an unfamiliar ritual in a foreign tongue. Probably, however, the chief charm of the A.V. lies in its religious sanctity and authority, the sacred associations which attach to it as having been for centuries the English Bible. When it first appeared, it was by no means hailed as a masterpiece of English Literature.

At the other extreme is the translator whose chief concern is that the translation shall be *an effective piece of English Literature.* For him much must be lost in the way of rhythm, style, verbal correspondence, and he is often tempted to sacrifice correspondence with the original to the taste of his readers.

Another type of translation aims at giving the general sense, rather than at a close equivalence of each bit of English with each bit of Hebrew, the result being more or less a *Paraphrase.* If the translator tries to bring out all the points of the original, it will be a paraphrase in the strict sense, and will not only abandon any attempt to follow the style, rhythm and effect of the original, but inevitably introduce ideas not present in the text. An extreme case is that given under *hesed.* A very different example of this method is seen in the paraphrases in Lightfoot's commentaries. Where attempts are made to give the general sense at about the same length as the original, an element of interpretation or exegesis enters in ; many

passages are susceptible of various interpretations; and the defect of what may be called a *short paraphrase* is that it must commit itself to a single interpretation. But this is a drawback which has to be accepted by the translator, who seeks to make his translation clear and intelligible to the general reader, so that not only each individual word, but a whole passage may convey a distinct idea to the mind. Nevertheless, the attempt to make a passage as a whole really intelligible to the English reader may lead the translator far afield. For instance, all references to money are misleading unless they are given in terms of purchasing power; the twopence of the Good Samaritan is absurd; eighteenpence is no better; supposing we estimated the purchasing power at twenty shillings, what would reviewers say to "He took out a sovereign"? Besides, by the time the translation was published, the purchasing power of a sovereign might be half or double what it was when the translator wrote.

What are the practical results of these considerations? What has been said does not apply equally to all parts of the Old Testament. Much of it may be readily translated with something like accuracy. But there are large sections for which no one translation can convey even an approximate idea of the meaning, force and effect of the original. This does not mean that we are to abandon the Old Testament as unintelligible. Even in these sections much of it can be understood, much of the history and moral and spiritual teaching of the Old Testament can be conveyed to the reader ignorant of Hebrew. Any one good translation—A.V., R.V., or whatever it may be—may suffice for the personal, practical needs of Christians, who do not wish to teach others or influence religious opinion or take part in controversy. Those who teach or preach or write on religion will need to use a sufficient apparatus. In this apparatus,

translations fill an important place, together with commentaries, histories, introductions, Bible dictionaries, etc. We must, however, repeat that no one translation can be regarded as *the* translation, nor as carrying an exclusive and ultimate authority.

The situation is very well summed up in the Declaration of Faith and Order issued by the Congregational Union in 1833 :—" The Scriptures of the Old Testament, as received by the Jews, and the books of the New Testament, as received by the Primitive Christians from the Evangelists and Apostles, Congregational Churches believe to be Divinely inspired, and of supreme authority. These writings, in the languages in which they were originally composed, are to be consulted, with the aids of sound criticism, as a final appeal to all controversaries, but the common version they consider to be adequate to the ordinary purposes of Christian instruction and edification."

W. H. Bennett.

WHAT DOES THE THIRD COMMANDMENT MEAN?

Among the commands of the Hebrew Decalogue, the third is certainly the vaguest and most obscure. What precisely is meant by taking God's Name in vain, and wherein does its guilt consist?

The common answer assumes that we have here a primitive prohibition of profane language. It is a commandment which condemns blasphemy. According to Dr. Johnson, a blasphemer means "a wretch that speaks of God in impious and irreverent terms," and blasphemy is defined as "an offering of some indignity to God Himself." The Heidelberg Catechism, followed by the Westminster Shorter Catechism—to mention only two standards of the Reformed Churches—adopts this interpretation in substance. And the Old Testament exemplifies the Jewish horror of the sin. One cardinal illustration of religious feeling on the question occurs in Leviticus xxiv. 10–16. An Israelitish woman's son "blasphemed the Name and cursed." And his solemn doom was thus revealed to Moses: "Bring forth him that hath cursed without the camp; and let all that heard him lay their hands upon his head, and let all the congregation stone him." This passage from the Priestly Code is far later than the Third Commandment, to which moreover, it makes no direct reference. But the story in Leviticus appears to have coloured and intensified subsequent Jewish ideas on the subject. In after generations an awful sanctity gathered round the ineffable "Name." According to the Rabbis it was the essence of blasphemy when the syllables of the "Name" were pronounced with disrespect. By an easy transition, men at last ascribed magical potency to the very

sound of the Hebrew word by which the Most High had been known on the lips of His ancient people.

Superstitions like these are alien from the Gospel. They wither away in the atmosphere of the New Testament. Christians have received a far different spirit, whereby they say Abba, that is Father. And the Father, who discerns the thoughts and intents of His children's hearts, is not an earthly sultan, swift to take offence at some "indignity" done to Himself by foolish or reckless speech. To credit such a libel on the God and Father of our Lord Jesus Christ would be blasphemy indeed.

At the present time it is more than ever important to think clearly on this subject, and to clear our minds of cant. For unquestionably we shall have to face an epidemic of profane talk when our soldiers come back after the war. Camps and battlefields always prove a hot-bed to produce lurid language. When Shakespeare depicts the typical soldier, his first characteristic is "full of strange oaths." Corporal Trim testifies that our armies swore terribly in Flanders: and we may expect our armies to bring this evil habit home with them. Yet serious moralists will mix caution with condemnation, and try to judge not by conventions but by realities. Such a habit of speech may be deplorable, but it need not by any means indicate a corrupt character. To the common soldier or sailor his profane words, like his coarse and indecent words, do not mean anything like what they sound to ears polite. The truth is, such words become practically a kind of rude and debased dialect. From the ethical standpoint they often amount to little more than bad grammar.

The Decalogue, at any rate, is concerned with deadly sins. Indeed, the solemn warning of the Third Commandment—"Jahveh will not hold him innocent" who commits

this crime—warns us that it must be some most grave and heinous offence which is here forbidden, something blacker than any vulgar profanity.

Among primitive peoples no important transaction took place without formal religious sanctions. Men called upon their Deity to be a witness of their promises: they invoked Him, by an oath or a curse, to seal their compacts and to ratify their vows. We may quote an example of this custom in a Semitic race, recorded by the Father of history:—

"The Arabs keep such pledges more religiously than almost any other people. They plight faith with the forms following. When two men would swear a friendship, they stand on each side of a third: he with a sharp stone makes a cut on the inside of the hand of each near the middle finger, and, taking a piece from their dress, dips it in the blood of each, and moistens therewith seven stones lying in the midst, *calling the while on Dionysus and Urania.* After this, the man who makes the pledge commends the stranger (or the citizen, if citizen he be) to all his friends, and they deem themselves bound to stand to the engagement. They have but these two gods, to wit, Dionysus and Urania." [1]

In the Old Testament we notice how often a pledge or treaty or sacred promise was ratified by calling upon the Name of Jahveh, one common formula being, "as the Lord liveth!"

The Third Commandment has been rendered thus: "Thou shalt not speak the Name of Jahveh thy God without result"—that is, without performing what is vowed in His Name. This gives force to the next sentence, which otherwise appears redundant: "For Jahveh will not deem innocent him who speaks His Name without result." No obligation was more imperious in ancient Israel than to carry out a vow made in the Name of Jahveh. And the reason is manifest. Civilised life becomes impossible when men break their covenants with one another. Human laws exist to enforce the sacredness of

[1] Herodotus, iii. 8, Rawlinson's translation.

covenants, and this sacredness is naturally affirmed by the primitive code of Divine law. In the morning of the world men ratified their covenants by invoking the awful Name of God. And to take that Name in vain meant to tear up the covenant which the Name had consecrated. The Lord will not hold men guiltless—or nations guiltless—who repudiate their solemn pledges. To-day the world is at war because of covenants, signed and sealed and basely broken. This Third Commandment condemns what is far worse than profanity: it condemns the poisonous crime of treachery, a crime which deserves and inherits the doom of the wrath of God.

Finally we note how the root-idea of this Commandment—that sincerity is a priceless virtue and that treachery is a deadly sin—conveys one other present-day warning.

Whenever a Christian minister recites a Christian creed in public worship, or subscribes to a confession of faith as the condition of his entrance upon his ministry, he does in a peculiarly solemn fashion call upon God to endorse his words. He is invoking the Unseen and Eternal Witness to attest his honesty and truthfulness. And for such a man, in such an act, it must needs be unspeakably dreadful to take God's Name in vain.

The ethics of subscribing and reciting a confession of faith have been obscured by controversy. Probably there is no earthly question on which so much casuistry has been wasted. Yet nothing in modern Christianity appears to laymen more immoral than the habit of treating creeds and confessions as mere scraps of paper—which are interesting as ancient historical documents, but which cannot be supposed to bind the consciences of the officials who repeat them. After all, plain people agree with the Archbishop of Canterbury that "words must be taken to mean what they are generally understood to mean."

And public insincerity eats out the heart of any Church.

We cannot search other men's consciences. We dare not sit in judgment on other men's veracity and fidelity. But this one thing is certain. When our soldiers come home from confronting the naked facts of life and death, they will demand that the words of a Christian teacher and preacher shall at any rate be simply and utterly sincere. The men who have gone in jeopardy of their lives will have no patience with casuistry. They will tolerate neither priest nor parson who palters in a double sense with the creed which he affirms. They can make allowance for each other's profanity in the trenches: but they will declare with the old Homeric hero, "I hate as the gates of hell the man who says one thing with his lips and hides another in his heart."

T. H. Darlow.

ST. PAUL AND THE ANGELS.

A VERY determined attempt has been made in recent years by the advanced wing of New Testament criticism to establish a radical cleavage between the gospel of Jesus Christ as recorded in the Gospels and the gospel as it was preached by St. Paul, and on the ground of this assumed cleavage to find in the Apostle a second founder of historical Christianity. Differences there are, unquestionably and inevitably, between the teaching of the Master and that of His Apostle, but that there exists a fundamental distinction between the gospel of Jesus Christ and the gospel of St. Paul can only be proved by ignoring what is inherent and implicit in the Evangelistic record, and by reading into the Apostle's language considerably more than it actually connotes. I do not propose, however, to add another item to the literature of the "Jesus and Paul" controversy, which is already voluminous enough, and my object in this paper is to discuss one factor in the Pauline teaching in which he does appear to follow a line of his own and to hold views which seem to mark a striking departure from those enunciated by Christ Himself and from the ideas on the subject which were current among the earliest Christian disciples. Angelology, though it looms large both in the Old and New Testaments, does not belong to the essence of Christian truth nor is it one of the eternal verities of the faith, so that should we, in the course of our enquiry, discover that the Apostle is in this particular matter working on somewhat independent lines and following his own bent, a difference at this point would not affect his whole-hearted loyalty to the essential truths of the gospel as taught by Jesus Christ or his absolute dependence upon and debt to the Master in all that concerned the depths of

his spiritual life and doctrine. His belief in angels and all that arises from it are, after all, only by-products in St. Paul and are not fundamental constituents of his faith and teaching.

In order that we may be able to see the Apostle's angelology in the right perspective and appreciate what is peculiar and specific in it, we must first of all give a brief survey of what the Old Testament has to say concerning angels and of what was the attitude of the early Christians towards them as we find it described in the Gospels and the Acts.

Angels in the Old Testament.

The angelology of the Old Testament is marked by a strongly anthropomorphic character. Angels, so far as they are delineated, appear in human form, and human terminology is invariably associated with them. In Old Testament language they are "men" and not "spirits," and actions attributable to man are constantly assigned to them. They speak, walk, eat, touch, take men by the hand, and in their actual intercourse with man they seldom appear to rise above the purely human plane. There is, however, one striking exception, viz., "the Angel of Jehovah," who is not to be confused with angels as generally conceived. In the "Angel of Jehovah" we seem to be dealing with a manifestation of Jehovah Himself, a faint adumbration of the Christ who became Incarnate, "God so expressing Himself that when the "Angel of the Lord" spoke or acted among men, they had the assurance that Jehovah Himself was speaking or acting." In point of function angels are regarded as occupying a definite position both in relation to God and man. With respect to God, they form the court surrounding His heavenly throne, and are privileged to be spectators of His heavenly Glory. They also generally, but not invariably, form the link between God and man (because God can reveal Himself

to His own without the intervention of angelic mediators), and in numberless hosts they execute the commands of Jehovah. In point of moral character they would appear to be neutral, at least, in the earlier books of the Old Testament, and there is as yet no moral distinction drawn between angel and angel. They are good or evil, not in virtue of intrinsic character, but in accordance with the particular kind of mission upon which they are engaged. They are the messengers of God and the medium of His intercourse with man, and an angel becomes an "evil spirit" not because he is essentially evil, but because he executes the judgment of God and produces effects which are deleterious to man. That this is so is illustrated by the fact that in 1 Kings xxii. 21, 22, the "spirit of prophecy" becomes a "lying spirit." The conception of a grade of spiritual beings, evil in essence and antagonistic to God and man, is a later development. We observe marks of the earlier stages in the growth of this belief in evil angels or spirits in the Book of Job, where Satan, who is still the servant of God and not His declared enemy, seems to set himself in opposition to His merciful purposes towards mankind. In Zechariah we reach a further stage in the development of this conception, which when it reached its furthest limits saw in Satan the relentless opponent of God and the prince of the power of evil. In Zechariah iii. 1, 2 Satan is "the adversary" standing against the "Angel of the Lord" and is rebuked for his opposition. Again in the Wisdom of Solomon ii 24 he has become the "devil," and is positively identified with the "serpent" of Genesis iii, "By the envy of the devil, death entered into the world." There are traces also even in the Old Testament of a malignant type of being who is not to be confused with the angels, and is generally associated with the primitive orgiastic beliefs and worships of the nations by whom Israel was

surrounded. Thus in Psalm cvi. 37, "They sacrificed their sons and daughters unto devils," and Deuteronomy xxxii. 17, "They sacrificed unto devils and not unto God." Here the *δαίμων*, or more generally *δαιμόνιον*, is the false god to whom idolatrous worship was offered by the heathen. In the popular imagination the wilderness and the waste places of the earth were filled with daimonical beings. Cf. Isaiah xiii. 22, "And demons shall dance there" (LXX), and xxxiv. 14, where the Hebrew Ziim and Ijim are rendered in the LXX *δαιμόνια* and *ὀνοκενταύροι*. But the thought of the existence of evil spirits and their power in the world plays only a very subordinate part in the Old Testament, and we are far removed from the later pessimistic outlook which regarded the world and man as in subjection and servitude to the unseen hosts of spiritual beings who exercised a relentless tyranny over them.

Angels in the Gospels and the Acts.

In no part of the Holy Scripture do angels occupy the position of dignity and honour that they do in the Gospels and the Acts, and nowhere do they command such reverence as they do in the teaching of our Lord and His immediate followers. In the matter of the angels there seems to be no substantial distinction between our Lord's own view and that of the Evangelists and Apostles. It is possible that our Lord lays more stress upon their relation to God, with the emphasis on "the angels in heaven," while His followers concentrate their attention more upon their ministrations on the earth, but apart from this there is no real difference in their respective attitudes towards them. In the drama of the Incarnation they assume a prominent and essential part. The chief of them descends to earth from the heavenly sphere to announce the coming birth of the Baptist, and later to reveal to the Virgin of Nazareth the honour that awaits her when from her womb shall be born Jesus the

Saviour. An angel proclaims to the shepherds that the promise vouchsafed to the Virgin is now an accomplished fact, and it is a choir of the heavenly host that chants the anthem of the Nativity. Angels watch over the safety of the young Child and shield Him from the deadly purposes of Herod, and they make their presence felt at every stage of His earthly life. When the temptation has been successfully withstood, it is the angels that comfort and strengthen Him who is weary with the strain of the conflict, and when the agony is at its deepest in Gethsemane it is to an angel that He is indebted for the sympathetic ministrations that He so greatly needed. (This, however, may be only a later tradition, as St. Luke xxii. 43 is lacking in many important MSS.) Angels are present at the tomb to announce His Resurrection and form the escort at His Ascension.

In our Lord's teaching their position and functions are on the same exalted plane as they occupy in the Evangelistic narrative. They are for Him "the angels in heaven," standing above man while he is still a denizen of earth, and supremely interested in his spiritual and moral welfare. For Him, too, they are God's messengers and ministers to men, and it is in their arms that the faithful departed are carried into Paradise. They are also the army of the Lord to execute judgment upon His disobedient and ungrateful subjects (St. Matthew xxii. 7). But our Lord's language concerning angels reaches its climax in His description of the Second Coming to Judgment. They are the reapers "who shall gather out of his kingdom all them that cause stumbling, and all that do iniquity, and shall cast them into the furnace of fire" and "shall gather together his elect from the four winds." They too are to share in the glory of the Parousia and to be His assessors when He sits on the throne of Judgment.

In the whole Gospel narrative there is only one reference

which detracts from the attitude of supreme reverence and, one might almost say, of adoration which pervades it, and that is the allusion to their lack of complete knowledge of the purposes of God in St. Matthew xxiv. 36. "Of that day and hour knoweth no one, not even the angels of heaven," and even in this matter they are placed on an equality with the Son. In the Acts the interest in the angels is mainly a practical one, and they appear generally in their character of the ministers of God to the saints. They attend upon them at critical periods in their lives, (Philip, Peter, and Cornelius), rescue them from prisons (Peter) and comfort and strengthen them in moments of danger and depression (Paul).

St. Paul and the Angels.

When we come to the Pauline Epistles and study St. Paul's language concerning angels and the spirit world generally we find ourselves in an atmosphere which is sharply differentiated from that which prevailed in other and earlier Christian circles. It may not be strictly true, as we shall show later, that the Apostle makes the angel, as a type, antagonistic to God and man, but his general outlook in this connexion is such as to justify us in assuming a very substantial departure from the view held in common by our Lord and the primitive Christian Church.

We shall commence our enquiry by an examination of the passages in the Pauline Epistles in which the word "angel" in its most familiar sense occurs.

Rom. viii. 38. "Neither death, nor life, nor *angels*, nor principalities, nor things present, nor things to come, nor powers, nor height, nor depth, nor any other creature, shall be able to separate us from the love of God."

1 Cor. iv. 9. "For we are made a spectacle to the world, to *angels*, and to men."

vi. 3. "Know ye not that we shall judge *angels?*"

xi. 10. "For this cause ought the woman to have a sign of authority on her head because of the *angels*."

xiii. 1. "If I speak with the tongues of men and of *angels*."

2 Cor. xi. 14. "For even Satan fashioneth himself as an *angel* of light."

Gal. i. 8. "But though we, or an *angel* from heaven, should preach unto you any gospel other than that we preached unto you, let him be anathema."

iii. 19. "It (the Law) was ordained through *angels* by the hand of a mediator."

iv. 14. "Ye received me as an *angel* of God, even as Christ Jesus."

Col. ii. 18. "Let no man rob you of your prize by a voluntary humility and worship of *angels*."

2 Thess. i. 7. "At the revelation of the Lord Jesus from heaven with the *angels* of his power."

Now if this *cento* of passages, in all of which the actual term "angels" is to be found, gave us a complete outlook upon the Apostle's attitude and position in this matter it would fully establish the fact that we are far removed from that atmosphere of awe and reverence which surrounds the language of the Gospels concerning angels. St. Paul's language at its loftiest certainly shows some affinities with that of the Gospels. Here, as there, they attend the Lord at His Parousia: here also, as in the Parable of the Lost Sheep, they exhibit an interest in the Apostle's work and sufferings, and in Galatians iv. 14 the "angel of God" is placed high above man and close to Christ Jesus. But the Apostle's tone at its lowest manifests a complete cleavage between him and his Christian predecessors in their respective estimates of the angels, their character, and their functions. In Romans viii. 38 they are placed among

forces which may, at the least, prove to be possible hindrances to the work of grace, if not definitely hostile to it. In Galatians i. 8 the preaching of a false Gospel by an angel and his consequent anathematisation are regarded as being not beyond the bounds of possibility. St. Paul's low estimate of the angelic world is, moreover, quite explicit in Galatians iii. 19, where the intervention of angels at the giving of the Law is cited to prove its inferiority and transiency. Again in 1 Corinthians vi. 3, where they are made subject to the judgment of the saints, and in Colossians ii. 18, where the prevailing tendency to angel worship meets with severe condemnation, his attitude is unmistakable. It is difficult to decide whether the reference in 1 Corinthians xi. 10 is a mark of respect or otherwise. The passage has been interpreted as being based on the idea that angels are present at Christian worship and that decorum and reverence are, therefore, demanded. But if, as is more probable, the Apostle has in mind here the legend of Genesis vi. 3, 4, which was elaborated in later Jewish literature, the allusion is not meant as a compliment.

But the passages in question do not present us with anything approaching an exhaustive conception of St. Paul's angelology, and our enquiry will, therefore, have to be pushed several stages further.

(2) In Romans viii. 38 "angels" are set side by side with ἀρχαὶ and δυνάμεις, and this implies the introduction of another factor into the Apostle's doctrine of angels. The following passages elucidate the meaning attached by him to these two terms and their cognates.

1 Cor. xv. 24. "When he shall have abolished all rule (ἀρχὴν) and all authority (ἐξουσίαν) and power (δύναμιν).

Ephes. i. 21. "Far above all rule (ἀρχῆς) and authority (ἐξουσίας) and power (δυνάμεως) and dominion (κυριότητος).

iii. 10. "To the intent that now unto the principalities (ἀρχαῖς) and the powers (ἐξουσίαις) in the heavenly places might be made known through the Church the manifold wisdom of God."

vi. 12. "For our wrestling is not against flesh and blood, but against the principalities (ἀρχάς), against the powers (ἐξουσίας), against the world-rulers (κοσμοκράτορας) of this darkness, against the spiritual hosts of wickedness (τὰ πνευματικὰ πονηρίας τ. σκότους) in the heavenly places."

Col. i. 16. "For in him were all things created, in the heaven and upon the earth, things visible and invisible, whether thrones (θρόνοι) or dominions (κυριότητες) or principalities (ἀρχαὶ) or powers (ἐξουσίαι)."

ii. 10. "Who is the head of all principality (ἀρχῆς) and power (ἐξουσίας)."

ii. 13. "Having put off from himself the principalities (ἀρχὰς) and powers (ἐξουσίας) he made a show of them openly, triumphing over them (αὐτοὺς) in it."

(3) Further, the combination of ἀρχαὶ and κοσμοκράτορες in Ephesians vi. 12 brings within range another set of passages which have to be considered.

1. Cor. ii. 6. "A wisdom not of this world, nor of the rulers of this world (τ. ἀρχόντων τοῦ αἰῶνος τούτου), which are coming to nought."

ii. 8. "Which none of the rulers of this world (τ. ἀρχόντων τ. α. τ.) knoweth: for had they known it they would not have crucified the Lord of glory."

Now the emphatic term in the phrase τ. ἀρχόντων τ. α. τ. is οὗτος αἰών (the present age), and what this term meant for St. Paul is made clear by the following citations.

Rom. xii. 2. "Be not fashioned according to this world" (τ. αἰῶνι τούτῳ).

1 Cor. i. 20. "Where is the disputer of this world?" (τ. αἰῶνος τούτου).

x. 11. "Upon whom the ends of the ages (τ. τέλη τ. αἰώνιων) are come."

2 Cor. iv. 4. "In whom the god of this world (ὁ Θεός τ. αἰῶνος τούτου) hath blinded the minds of the unbelieving."

Gal. i. 4. "That he might deliver us out of the present evil world" (ἐκ αἰῶνος ἐνεστῶτος πονηροῦ).

Ephes. i. 21. "Above every name that is named not only in this world (τ. αἰῶνι τούτῳ) but also in that which is to come."

ii. 7. "That in the ages to come (ἐν τ. αἰῶσι ἐπερχομένοις) he might show the exceeding riches of his grace."

It is also quite clear that in Pauline usage κόσμος is frequently a synonym of αἰών, and consequently the following passages must be added to those already adduced.

1 Cor. i. 27. "God chose the foolish things of the world (τ. κόσμου) and the weak things of the world" (τ. κ.).

iii. 19. "For the wisdom of this world (τ. κ.) is foolishness with God."

v. 10. "Not altogether with the fornicators of this world" (τ. κ.).

vii. 31. "For the fashion of this world (τ. κ.) passeth away."

In Ephes. ii. 2 both words are found together. "According to the course of this world" (κατὰ αἰῶνα τ. κ.).

(4) The word κόσμος gives us a further clue and brings within the range of St. Paul's angelology a very significant phrase, τ. στοιχεῖα τ. κόσμου.

Cf. Gal. iv. 3. "So we also, when we were children, were held in bondage under the rudiments of the world" (ὑπὸ τ. στοιχεῖα τ. κ.).

iv. 9. "How turn ye back again to the weak and beg-

garly rudiments (*ἐπὶ τ. ἀσθενῆ καὶ πτωχὰ στοιχεῖα*) wherein ye desire to be in bondage over again ? "

Col. ii. 8. " After the tradition of men, after the rudiments of the world (*κατὰ τ. στ. τ. κ.*), and not after Christ."

ii. 20. " If ye died with Christ from the rudiments of the world (*ἀπὸ τ. στοιχείων τ. κ.*)."

It is to be noted that in Galatians iv. 3, 9, the context seems to connect the *στοιχεῖα τ. κ.* very closely with the " law given by angels " of Galatians iii. 19, and in Colossians ii. 8 with the " principalities and powers " over which Christ triumphed on the Cross.

(5) We have to proceed a stage further in order to complete our enquiry into St. Paul's conception of the world of spirits and its general character.

In Ephesians ii. 2 the phrase " according to the course of this world " is equated with the expression " according to the prince of the power of the air," and he is again identical with the " son of perdition," " the man of sin," " the lawless one " of 2 Thessalonians ii., whose name is Satan or Beliar. Again the satellites and subjects of this " prince of the power of the air " come before us as *τ. δαιμόνια* in 1 Corinthians x. 20, 21. " The things which the Gentiles sacrifice they sacrifice to *devils*." The Apostle, therefore, seems to include within his purview forces which are malignant, definitely hostile to God, holding the present world in bondage, and in some sense or degree places the angels in line with them.

(6) One more reference to the world of spirits still remains to be noted, Colossians i. 20. " Through him to reconcile all things unto himself, having made peace through the blood of his cross ; through him, I say, whether things upon the earth or *things in heaven*," where the concluding phrase has obviously the same connotation as the " thrones, principalities, dominions, and powers " of i. 16.

Our enquiry into the Pauline usage of the term "angels" and its many synonyms and cognates has led us far afield and reveals how wide and comprehensive are the ramifications of his angelology. Viewing the evidence as a whole, it is difficult to avoid the conclusion that St. Paul's thought in this direction was coloured by the dualism which was prevalent in his day both in Jewish and Hellenistic circles. Advanced criticism has for many a day charged the Apostle with having been a thorough-going dualist on Hellenistic lines and with having taught dualism both in its metaphysical and cosmic aspects. We are told that he held the view that matter was essentially evil, that flesh and spirit are in fundamental antagonism to each other, and also that in a sense the world was not God's world at all, but a world entirely abandoned to the power of evil. To my mind neither of these conclusions appears tenable and can only be arrived at by a perversion of the Apostle's language. That he does teach an ethical dualism of flesh and spirit, which is the outcome of his own unique spiritual experience, seems clear, but he nowhere holds that flesh and spirit are essentially antagonistic, and, in spite of expressions which frequently seem to point in the opposite direction, the world is still for him fundamentally God's world. But there is unquestionably a dualistic element in his teaching and thought, if by dualism we mean "the recognition of power or powers other than God and external to man, exercising influence over human affairs, and in some sense and degree independent of God." (C. Anderson Scott, *Expos. Times*, xxii. p. 488).

A study of the series of passages we have quoted enables us to detect the presence of the following factors in St. Paul's conception of the world of spirits and its relation to man.

1. He holds firmly to the doctrine of the two ages. The

passages cited in which the terms *αἰών* and *κόσμος* occur are very significant and far-reaching. The Apostle, in common with the world of his day, divided the course of the world's history into two periods, or in New Testament language, into two aeons or ages, "the present evil world" of Galatians i. 4 and "the world to come" of Ephesians i. 21. He is dealing with the same idea when he introduces the antithesis, *darkness and light*, which is found in 2 Corinthians vi. 14, "What communion hath light with darkness?" and Ephesians v. 8, "For ye were once darkness but are now light in the Lord"; and in another form in Colossians i. 13, "Who delivered us out of the power of darkness and translated us into the kingdom of the Son of his love." Cf. also Ephesians vi. 12, "The world-rulers of this darkness"; Ephesians v. 8, "Children of light": 2 Thessalonians v. 5, "Sons of light."

In the matter of *the two ages* the Apostle vacillates between two ideas. In one sense the new age has already arrived and they that are in Christ have been translated out of the evil world of darkness into the kingdom of light. Christians are now, in virtue of their union with Christ, "children of light." This is much the more frequent idea in the Epistles. At other times St. Paul pictures the new age as still in the future when Christ shall appear in glory and "when he shall have abolished all rule, and all authority and power." This seems to be the view that he takes in Romans viii. 18. "For I reckon that the sufferings of the present time (*τ. νῦν καιροῦ*) are not to be compared with the glory which shall be revealed to us-ward."

2. The present age is in its general aspect an age in subjection to the power of the world of evil spirits, whose dominion is hostile to God and man. This thought finds its clearest expression in Ephesians vi. 12, "We wrestle against the principalities, against the powers, against the

world-rulers of this darkness, against the spiritual hosts of wickedness in the heavenly places"; and in 1 Corinthians xv. 24 ff., where the End, the consummation of all things, and the absolute reign of God are to be preceded by the final victory of Christ over every power and force arrayed against Him.

And further, the evil hosts that hold the present world in bondage are represented as being under the leadership of one central malignant figure, in whose hands are concentrated all their power and dominion. He appears under various designations, such as Satan, Beliar, the Tempter, the Evil One, and the range of his authority and the character of his rule are described in two telling phrases, "the prince of the power of the air" (Ephesians ii. 2), where "power" is probably a collective form of "powers," and in 2 Corinthians iv. 4, "the god of this world." In both expressions there is implied the very real and substantial existence, authority, and initiative of this Prince of Darkness.

Again the Apostle recognises that "the powers of the air" form a definite hierarchy and that there are grades and ranks among them. There are several passages in which the Apostle's recognition of ascending or descending grades of rank is expressed.

Rom. viii. 38. *ἄγγελοι, ἀρχαὶ, δυνάμεις.*

1 Corinthians xv. 24. *ἀρχή, ἐξουσία, δύναμις.*

Ephes. i. 21. *ἀρχή, ἐξουσία, δύναμις, κυριότης.*

Ephes. vi. 12. *ἀρχαὶ, ἐξουσίαι, κοσμοκράτορες τ. σκότους τούτου, πνευματικὰ τῆς πονηρίας.*

Col. i. 10. *θρόνοι, κυριότητες, ἀρχαὶ, ἐξουσίαι.*

Many attempts have been made to show that he had a well-defined and formulated gradation of ranks in his mind and to form out of these passages a specific hierarchical succession, but none of them is very convincing. All that we can claim with safety is that he recognised a hierarchy

as such, but the various lists that he produces are probably nothing more than mere echoes or repetitions of the descriptions of the world of spirits current in the language of the day. Now in the doctrine of the two ages and of the subjection of the present age to the dominion of evil spirits St. Paul cannot be said to show any substantial advance upon the teaching of our Lord and the Evangelists, or upon the belief of the primitive Christian community. The Gospels abound in evidence of the belief in the existence and activity of evil spirits and their hostility to God and man. They are the cause of the majority of the misfortunes that afflict man, and the ministry of Jesus Christ is represented as one continual and ceaseless triumph over them. The power of exorcism, which is a commonplace in the activity of Christ, seems to be spasmodically shared by His disciples (St. Mark vi. 13), and in the primitive Church is the normal and regular prerogative of the Apostles. The striking testimony of Christ Himself in Luke x. 18, "I beheld Satan falling as lightning from heaven," implies that He also regarded the coming of the Kingdom of God, which He was to usher in, as the end of the reign of the powers of evil, and His language concerning Beelzebub, "the strong man armed," points in the same direction.

For the primitive Apostolic Church redemption also meant fundamentally the deliverance of the last days, when the Messiah, with His holy angels, would descend from heaven, destroy the enemies of God with the blast of His breath, and establish the Kingdom. It was this Messianic expectation of the coming of God's Son to conquer finally the forces of evil and to reign in glory that constituted the warp and woof of their faith. And for them the End, the consummation of all things, was near at hand, at the very door.

MAURICE JONES.

(*To be continued.*)

THE MULTITUDES AND JESUS CHRIST.

So rich is the Gospel record, that each generation of students can find in it some truth which has been largely forgotten, or the significance of which has never been discerned aright. Each generation acclaims a new discovery, applies it to doctrine and conduct, is eager to show how thorough a revision of prevalent ideas it demands. This is no matter for blame. Indeed, to gain fresh truth is much ; to use it for the enlightenment and guidance of mankind is more. Yet there is a concomitant danger. There is a risk to the sense of just proportion. There is a chance that the new idea may so dazzle the eyes which perceive it as to blind them to other truths, not less valuable because more familiar. The day comes when a scholar, or group of scholars, is able to illumine for us phases of the Gospel record that had been obscure. Taught of the Spirit, they reveal a purpose of the Master or a reason for His methods we had missed. So far, they earn and gain our thanks. But the gratitude is lessened if, magnifying their discovery, they belittle all that counterbalances it, if they exalt an occasional factor into a supreme principle, dominating the whole story of the Gospels.

It was the good fortune of theologians in the later years of the nineteenth century to rediscover the import of Discipleship. In a sense, this was no new truth ; it had been patent to some of the Fathers, it had never been quite forgotten. Yet these later writers and preachers helped the average Bible-reader to interpret the work of Jesus Christ with a clearer understanding of His aims. They showed that the selection of the Twelve was far more than a casual choice of friends, that our Lord framed an enduring Society of which these were to be the earliest members. The seasons spent apart with them were no mere interludes

in work, bringing the solace of close companionship; they were a main part of the work, deliberately wrought for the future of mankind. As this was understood, the relationship between Jesus and the Twelve gained new meaning. The imagined Preacher flinging His seed broadcast gave way to a Teacher bent on training His disciples. Not otherwise could they be equipped to proclaim His Gospel when His visible presence had been withdrawn.

A number of thoughtful books—*Pastor Pastorum* may be cited as a good example—helped to popularise this view. To-day, indeed, there are few Christians who question its consonance with the Gospel narrative. But they who set it forth were not all content to restrict it within these limits. They were on sure ground in showing that our Lord reserved much time and much teaching for His disciples. They strayed from it when they presented this frequent choice of His as an almost unbroken rule. There were days when Jesus resolutely withdrew from the throng, because He would be alone with the Father, or, again, because He would impart teaching which His disciples only were able to receive. Yet it is untrue that to shun the multitudes was His normal habit. We gain by the picture of loving intercourse between the Master and His chosen few. We lose—how much we lose !—if we allow the care of Jesus for the Twelve to conceal His relationship with the mass of His fellow-countrymen. Yet this mistake was freely made; partly in order to emphasise the discipleship-doctrine, partly to give the Church a fancied support of which it had no need. Soon the process was carried a stage further. To allege that Jesus shunned the multitudes were to disparage His character unless it could be shown that the temper of the multitudes compelled Him to that course. Therefore attempts were made to interpret the Gospel narrative in this sense. A summary of the version which gains wide credence to-day may stand

thus : " The Jews of Palestine rejected Jesus Christ. For a season He made His appeal to them, and made it in vain. True, crowds gathered when He spoke, but they were drawn by mere curiosity or by eagerness to see miracles. They were quite indifferent to His spiritual teaching. Soon He was driven to mask it in parables, the meaning of which was disclosed to the disciples alone. He held Himself as remote as possible from the multitudes. They but hampered His real work, which was to instruct the disciples and so to build His Church. With the others He could do nothing. From indifference they passed into hostility. They would, indeed, have accepted Him as the leader of a political movement. When He refused to take that part, their ' Hosannas ' changed to ' Crucify.' The Jewish populace doomed our Lord to die."

That seems a not unfair paraphrase of a view still widely held—a view strengthened by its frequent reappearance in sermons. Few have championed it more consistently than a great preacher of whose loss our sense is still acute. Dr. Scott Holland's brilliant rhetoric was often used to depict our Lord as concerned solely with the founding of the Church, while the crowd was merely " a block of blind and heedless ignorance." [1] " After the great confession of Peter," he said, " the care of our Lord for the Apostles intensifies. With ever increasing anxiety He devotes Himself *to the single task* "—the italics are ours—" of preparing them. The Gospels become little else than the story of their training." [2] Do not such phrases show the peril of over-emphasis ? Peter's profession of faith was made during a temporary withdrawal of our Lord and His companions. It is recorded in the ninth chapter of St. Mark. And the first sentence of the tenth relates that, this temporary seclusion ended, " the

[1] Sermon on " The Secret of the Church " in the volume *Creed and Character*.

[2] *Ibid.*

multitudes came unto Him again, and, as He was wont, He taught them again."

We may admit that on this point, as on many others, the Fourth Gospel seems often to differ sharply from the synoptic record. Written for the Church at a later stage of its development, it magnifies discipleship and lays stress on the frequent hostility to our Lord of "the Jews." But the writer seems to limit this term to the people of Judaea and Jerusalem,[1] where the influence of the Sadducean priesthood was dominant. The most of the public ministry was done in Galilee, and of this the Fourth Gospel tells little. When we wish to discern the true relations between Jesus and the multitudes, it is to the synoptic pictures of the Galilean ministry that we must turn for the earliest and most complete evidence. We must beware, too, of thinking the method of some occasions to be the method of all. There were times when our Lord taught by parables so phrased that their meaning was hidden from the crowd, parables which He expounded privately to the disciples. Yet to imagine this His unbroken practice is a double error. By no means all His public teaching was parabolic; by no means all the parables needed explanation. Often Jesus taught not merely the disciples but the multitudes by direct statements of the plainest kind; often He used parables (such as that of the Prodigal Son) which assuredly needed no private explanation to make them intelligible.

But the point needing reconsideration is less the attitude of Jesus to the people than the attitude of the people to

[1] E.g. St. John vii. 1. "Jesus walked in Galilee; for He would not walk in Judea, because the Jews sought to kill him." Cf. xi. 7, 8, and other passages. Westcott (*Commentary on St. John*, Introd. p. xiii.) holds that the writer of this Gospel "uses the name 'the Jews' to mark an anti-Christian body." Anyhow, he does not mean by it the Palestinian Jews as a whole.

Jesus. How, setting aside all preconceptions, do we find it depicted by the synoptists ?

They relate that swiftly from village to village the news of this amazing rabbi spread. At His approach men and women left their tasks for days together, heedless of hunger or other discomfort if they might but listen to Him. Marvellous as were His miracles of deed, we may believe that they were subservient to, and wrought an impression less deep than, His miracle of doctrine. There were many sick folk in need of healing, and its bestowal meant much to them and to their friends. But the spiritual need was vaster and its satisfaction more lasting. Those whom He cured of sickness were given no immunity from its recurrence. Again must the grave close upon Lazarus ; thereafter no compelling word should open it before the Last Day. But they who received the teaching had gained an imperishable possession. From their very frequency the outward miracles lost something of their power to astound the senses ; from its very reiteration the doctrine gained in power to convince the heart. We may not forget that the outward miracles were more than works of mercy, were " signs " and illustrations of the teaching. Yet we are prone to exaggerate their influence. Doubtless it brought many to Jesus ; it did not keep them at His side. As " Teacher," not as " Healer " or " Wonder-worker," the people addressed Him. Joshua, they believed, had held the sun in thrall, Elisha had revived the dead, many an exorcist among them still claimed power to cast out devils. What were such things beside the boon this Teacher gave ? None other, they confessed, spoke as He.

How should they not welcome His doctrine ? We must revise all we know of human nature if we suppose them to have heard it unmoved. The one official religion of the day was legalism, sterile in its nature, unattainable by the masses in its " righteousness." Doubtless the people listened with

deference to the rabbis, for these were the authorised exponents of religion. But its code remained a baffling ideal for the average man or woman; none but the Pharisees might hope to comply with its requirements. Yet, if half-forgotten, the timeless aspirations survived. A sense of personal relation with God, light upon human sorrow and the valley of the shadow of death, comfort for aching hearts, motive which might transform routine into a coherent and ennobling scheme of life—for these they yearned, and yearned in vain till Jesus taught. What then must have been the bewilderment and joy surging in their hearts! This, to all outward seeming, was a rabbi; His themes and methods were a rabbi's. Yet this was a rabbi whose teaching did more than amend or transcend the rabbinical system. It ended it. The God whom He revealed as Father was another than the Deity who, as the rabbis gravely affirmed, spent three hours daily in studying the Law. Man as Jesus described him was different not merely from what His hearers were but from what they had ever dreamed of becoming. A new set of values replaced that which orthodoxy recognised. Observances accounted primary were put aside as negligible or even mischievous; qualities hitherto disparaged were set forward as the very basis of character. For the first time God became real, for the first time religion became practicable, for the first time moral goodness seemed worth while.

And He who brought this message of hope was so wise that He read the secrets of the heart, so strong that He feared neither Herod nor muttering scribes and priests, so tender that mothers craved His benediction for their children. Can we wonder that both the Teacher and His teaching were welcomed eagerly? Yes, it is right to insist that increasingly towards the end He concentrated His care upon His disciples; this was needful to ensure the transmission of His message and the perpetuation of His Society. But it

is wrong, and a perversion of the Gospel record, to speak as if He cared for them alone. Nor may we imagine that the multitudes followed Him for a short time only, or from mere curiosity. We slander them if we fancy that they turned against Him and even connived at His death. True, Jesus had His bitter enemies, few in number but strong in influence. The Pharisaic scribes hated Him, because, in the guise of a scribe, He assailed with merciless irony the legalism they championed. The Sadducean priests hated Him, because by act and word He denounced their misuse of the Temple in the Temple itself. Pharisees and Sadducees joined for once in this unlovely fellowship of hate, and by subtle craft achieved their end. Yet those of the people whom they cajoled into asking for Barabbas or those who mocked Jesus on the cross were but a handful. And a nation is not to be judged by the rabble which hastens to a criminal trial or a public execution.

Very different from a capricious mob are "the multitudes" as we find them in the synoptic Gospels. St. Luke in particular seems to delight in emphasising the happy relationship between Jesus and the mass of his fellow-countrymen. Commentators who specify the "characteristics" of the Third Gospel do not seem to mention this, yet throughout it this note is sustained. "He taught in their synagogues, being glorified of all" (iv. 15). "The multitudes sought after Him, and came to Him, and would have stayed Him, that He should not go from them" (iv. 42). "As Jesus returned, the multitudes welcomed Him, for they were all waiting for Him" (viii. 40). "The multitudes followed Him, and He welcomed them" (ix. 40). How beautiful is the picture of mutual welcome drawn by these last two verses! "The many thousands of the multitude were gathered together, insomuch that they trode one upon another" (xii. 1). "As He said these things, all His

adversaries were put to shame, and all the multitude rejoiced for all the glorious things that were done by Him " (xiii. 17). It was His vindication of the Sabbath that they welcomed; openly they ranged themselves on His side against the scribes. So the tale goes on, bringing us to the triumphal entry into Jerusalem, five days before the crucifixion. Then our Lord's silent refusal to lead a national movement is thought by some to have forfeited the people's love. That view is remote from truth. Humanly speaking, the one fact which delayed His death from the Monday to the Friday and gained for us the marvellous teaching of that period was the unchanged fidelity of the multitude. For that length of time, at least, it shielded Him from the fury of His enemies—a fury intensified by the fact of His unbroken influence. " He was teaching daily in the Temple," while they sought to destroy Him, but " could not find what they might do, for all the people hung upon Him, listening " (xix. 47, 48). This was after Palm Sunday, this was after He had deliberately crushed the hopes of those who thought to acclaim Him as the national Messiah, this was after He had ceased to work miracles in public. But, because He taught, " all the people hung upon Him, listening." St. Luke reiterates the point, so anxious is he to show that it was not the popular voice which condemned Jesus. " The scribes and chief priests sought to lay hands on Him in that very hour, and they feared the people " (xxii. 2). A little later again, " the chief priests and scribes sought how they might put Him to death, for they feared the people " (xxii. 2). At last they gained their end, aided by the weakness of Pilate and the bought clamour of the Pretorium. Even then " there followed Him a great multitude of the people, and of women who bewailed and lamented Him " (xxiii. 27).

Such is some of the evidence, drawn from one Gospel alone.

Surely we do well to keep in mind its cumulative witness. For we seem to belittle Christ's greatness as a teacher if we conceive Him to have alienated those He taught. We impugn the fulness of His love if we suppose that He must withdraw it from the multitudes in order to lavish it increasingly upon the disciples. And we dishonour a loyal and affectionate people if we imagine them ungrateful for the matchless boon of His teaching—those simple folk who followed Him with an increasing veneration to the end. Dull of apprehension they were, perverse, lacking in imagination and enterprise, unable to receive much that He longed to impart. But their hearts were not cold when Jesus stood among them. For the sake of no theory can we afford to lose the Jesus of the Gospels, who, spending Himself upon the disciples, had compassion on the multitudes also, who loved the people, whom the people loved.

Anthony C. Deane.

THE LORD'S TABLE.

II.

So far as our discussion has proceeded, few or none of the passages quoted from the Old Testament have been found to bear directly—or are alleged by early Christian writers to bear directly—on any words of Jesus Himself about a "table"; but we now come to one that is alleged by Origen to have a bearing of this kind on the words of Jesus to the Twelve uttered at the Eucharist: "That ye may eat and drink at my table in my kingdom; and ye shall sit on thrones judging the twelve tribes of Israel." [1] It is in the Psalms, and the Psalmist curiously combines a picture of a "table" with a picture of opposing enemies: "Thou preparest a table before my face in the presence of mine enemies." [2]

The Midrash on the Psalm gives several interpretations, in which the "table" means (1) the manna and the quails provided for Israel to the dismay of the kings of the earth, or (2) the kingdom of David established in despite of Doeg and Ahitophel, or (3) a far-off feast of the faithful on Leviathan and Behemoth.[3] Another tradition introduces God as saying to Israel, "You bring before me the shewbread and offerings, and I, in the world to come, will set before you a great table which the kings of the earth shall behold

[1] Luke xxii. 30.

[2] Ps. xxiii. 5. The word rendered "prepare" is more exactly "*arrange*" (comp. Ps. lxxviii. 19, "Can God *arrange* a table in the wilderness?"). The noun "arrangement," or "row," is regularly used about the "rows" of the shewbread. The word rendered "in the presence" differs from the word used in "Presence-bread" and is sometimes, as here, used (Gesen. 617) hostilely.

[3] See *Tehillim* on Ps. xxiii. 5 (Wü. pp. 213–4). Rashi's comment is "I (i.e. David) believe that thou wilt arrange before me a table, that is, kingdom; already have I been anointed to be king according to thy word."

with shame and dismay." [1] Many other traditions take the same view.[2] One says that it is "a kind of table of gold"—i.e., like the golden shewbread-table—"and the manna descended on it." [3]

Origen shows how the Psalm might be interpreted, so as to imply opposition, not from actual kings of the earth, but from the spirit of earthly kingship, "the ruler of this world," Satan, or sin. The Hebrew here rendered "enemies" includes the meaning "distress" or "afflict," and is rendered "those that afflict me" by LXX, which also renders "in the presence of" by "over against." Quoting from LXX, Origen appeals thus to the imagination of his readers: "What is the meaning of 'over against them that afflict me'? Imagine—even as in the great [Olympian] contests there are prizes laid out for each kind of contest, even so, for every affliction, whenever there is at hand the afflicting [thing] and the afflicting powers that are 'against' us—imagine [I say] a 'prepared table,' spiritual and mental, [prepared for thee] because of this affliction. Of a truth, as often as thou art 'afflicted,' so often is a 'table prepared' for thee of a spiritual nature. Only have eyes to see thy 'tables,' [4] that in eucharistic thankfulness thou mayest say with the Apostle, 'And not only so, but also glorying in [our] afflictions.'" [5]

Then, loosely quoting from Luke, he asserts that this promise of a spiritual table is in accordance with the words, "I will appoint for you a covenant, to eat and drink at the table of the Father, in truth." [6] The Christian may

[1] *Numb. r.* on Num. xxviii. 7 (Wü. p. 519).

[2] *Joma* 76*a*, *Exod. r.* on Exod. xvi. 4 (Wü. p. 193).

[3] *Mechilt.* on Exod. xvi. 13 (Wü. pp. 157–8).

[4] Origen on Ps. xxiii. 5, Lomm. xii. 92–4. The text has τραπέζας μου, which, if correct, would require God to be the speaker ("my tables"), but μου seems an error for σου.

[5] Rom. v. 3.

[6] Κατὰ τό Κἀγὼ θήσομαι ὑμῖν διαθήκην, ἐσθίειν καὶ πίνειν ἐπὶ τῆς τραπέζης τοῦ

say, "The Lord, by means of those who afflict me, endeavouring to stir me up strongly against them, has prepared before me a table on which lies solid food—that being filled with it like an athlete I may be able to stand manfully against them that afflict."

It will be observed that Origen, in quoting Luke thus, alters the first "kingdom" into "covenant" and omits the second "kingdom" altogether. Apparently he did not accept Rashi's interpretation, that the "anointing" mentioned by the Psalmist in the context was a royal anointing ("unctus sum in regem"). Perhaps Origen incidentally alludes to the anointing from a Greek point of view as part of the athletic diet and training ("like an athlete"). If not, he omits it altogether. Nevertheless Origen's remarks on the uses of "affliction," and on God's employment of it to strengthen the afflicted in endurance and virtue, are in agreement with Christ's fundamental doctrine. And there is an interesting accordance with the Jerusalem Targum on the Fall of Adam in Origen's remark that the man passes from a lower stage where he is a "sheep led under a [controlling] shepherd" to a higher stage where he is a man at the "table." For this implies an ascent from the food painlessly received by cattle to the bread painfully earned by man at the cost of toil and the sweat of his brow.[1]

As to affliction, or tribulation, the Epistles agree with the Gospels, even where the word is not mentioned, in teaching that the thing is essential for entering into the

πατρὸς ἐν τῇ ἀληθείᾳ. This is a loose quotation of Luke xxii. 29–30, κἀγὼ διατίθεμαι ὑμῖν καθὼς διέθετό μοι ὁ πατήρ μου βασιλείαν, ἵνα ἔσθητε καὶ πίνητε ἐπὶ τῆς τραπέζης μου ἐν τῇ βασιλείᾳ μου.

[1] See the prayer of Adam in Jer. Targ. on Gen. iii. 18–19: "I pray, through mercies from before thee, O Lord, that we may not be accounted as the cattle, to eat the herb of the face of the field. Let us stand up and labour with the labour of the hands. . . ." This prayer God grants.

kingdom of God. To produce food for men, man's effort is needed. So long as the food is to be for the body, and the effort is to be expended on the mere earth, that effort is merely toil. But when the food is to be for the soul, and when the need arises to "break the clods," [1] either in our own souls or in the souls of others, or in both, then the effort becomes a contest. Souls are stubborn, resist, become sometimes aggressive. The lover of light suffers affliction from the powers of darkness in himself or in others. The Leader of such sufferers is Jesus, wearing, as their King, a crown of thorns, and destined, as their King, to affliction. We plainly see the affliction. Origen bids us also "have eyes to see" the "table prepared over against the powers that afflict."

The context of the Lucan passage under consideration favours this mystical view of the kingdom and of the table. It regards the "kingdom" as pre-eminence in giving and serving, and it regards the family seated round the "table" near the host as destined to serve the guests. "Whether is greater?" Jesus asks, "he that sitteth at meat, or he that serveth? . . . But I am in the midst of you as he that serveth. . . . And I appoint unto you a kingdom, even as my Father appointed unto me, that ye may eat and drink at my table in my kingdom; and ye shall sit on thrones judging the twelve tribes of Israel." [2]

Jesus had been warning His disciples, a few moments before, against imitating the greediness of the kings of the Gentiles, who, instead of being "as he that serveth" at their royal tables, crushed down their subjects with their "lordship" while called "benefactors" by their courtiers ("Ye shall not be so"). Now therefore our minds naturally turn back to the occasion when Jesus Himself might be said

[1] Hos. x. 11, "Jacob shall break his clods."
[2] Luke xxii. 27–30.

to have entertained others at a table of His own. In the feeding of the five thousand "*in a desert place*" there appears to be an allusion to that passage in the Psalms where Israel incredulously asks, "Can God prepare a table *in the wilderness?*"[1] At all events, all the Synoptists imply that the disciples showed a somewhat similar incredulity—or rather an assumption of impossibility—as to Christ's power to prepare such a table when they "came unto him and said, *The place is desert* . . . send them away, that they may buy themselves somewhat to eat."[2] Tertullian, doubtless referring to this allusion, legitimately describes the feeding of the five thousand as being "*after the original fashion*," and Cyril says, "He rained the manna *in the desert* on Israel . . . behold, *again in the desert* to them that needed he gave abundance."[3]

How then does Jesus act "after the original fashion" when He prepares His table? He does not feed Himself or the Twelve first and then the multitude. He puts the multitude first. And yet in some sense He puts the Twelve first by making them "give." For, as an ancient writer points out, He does not say to the Twelve, "*I will give* the multitude bread," but "*Give ye* them to eat."[4] It was their bread—the bread of the Twelve. The Twelve lay it first before their Master. Then He arranges the guests—as Mark tells us in quaint detail—by fifties and hundreds, that they may sit in files, or rows, called "garden-rows" or "feast-tables." Then He gives the bread back to the Twelve that they may impart it to the multitude, from

[1] Ps. lxxviii. 19. The A.V. "furnish" conceals from the reader that the Heb. is the same as in Ps. xxiii. 5. It means "set in order." And a derived noun, "order" or "row," means a "row [of shrewbread]" arranged on "the table."

[2] Mark vi. 35–6, Matt. xiv. 15, Luke ix. 12.

[3] Tertull. *Adv. Marc.* (on Luke ix. 10–17), and Cramer on Luke ix. 12.

[4] See Cramer on Matt. xiv. 14.

whom it returns in fragments with such increase that each of the Twelve receives a basketful. Thus they serve, as twelve princes, at the table of God, and their Master serves first as the King.[1]

Commenting on this, Origen says, "I think that the twelve baskets accrued to the disciples to whom it is said, Ye shall sit on twelve thrones judging the twelve tribes of Israel."[2] He means that it is the business of Christ's rulers or judges to teach and dispense the truth; and—in accordance with the law, "Give and it shall be given to you, good measure . . ."—truth not only "accrues" to those who teach the truth, but also accrues with interest.[3] According to Origen, Jesus prepared the Twelve for the task of "judging" the people by teaching them how to feed the people, obeying the precept, "Give ye them to eat." A "judge" in Israel corresponded to a prince or king in the West; and in the poetry of Homer, as in that of the Psalms, a judge or king is to be the shepherd of his people. Jesus extended this doctrine from kings to fathers and mothers and to all full-grown human beings. God is the Provider of bread, and that man is most like God who, while partaking of bread at God's table, does his best also to provide it for others. This is metaphor, and perhaps poetry. But instead of ignoring it on that account, we should be prepared not only to accept it, when patent, because Jesus spoke as a poet, but also to recognise it as possibly latent in traditions about a "table" that appear to have been reduced to prose or otherwise misunderstood.

For example, the Apostolic Constitutions quotes a saying of Jesus not found in our Gospels: "To the priests alone was

[1] Yet the sign was only an elementary one. John vi. 9 indicates this by saying that the loaves were of "barley."

[2] Origen on Matt. xiv. 20–21 (Lomm. iii. 73).

[3] Luke vi. 38, comp. Mark iv. 20, etc.

judging entrusted, for it is said to them, 'Judge righteous judgment,' and again, 'Become ye approved *table-managers*.'" [1] There is perhaps no apocryphal saying of Jesus more frequently quoted by early writers than this. And, before asking whether Jesus actually uttered it, we have to ask what it meant. For it is ambiguous. The words "table" and "table-manager" are used both in late Hebrew and in Greek for (1) the table of a banker, (2) the table of a shopman and, more particularly, a money-changer.[2] And both these meanings are found in the Gospel.[3]

In one of many quotations of this saying, Origen combines it with the Pauline precept, "Prove all things, hold fast to that which is good." [4] And—in consequence, perhaps, of this precept—almost all early quoters of the apocryphal saying assume that it used "approved" actively, implying *money-changers able to "prove coin,"* that is, to test and distinguish false statements from true. But in the Thesaurus *no instance is alleged where the Greek adjective "approved" has this active meaning.* It means "tried, true, and trusty," and is very appropriate to a banker, who holds in trust what is deposited with him, and faithfully gives it back with interest to the owner.[5]

The Apostolic Constitutions, besides asserting that this precept to "judge" is addressed to priests alone, adds that a non-priest is commanded *not* to judge: "Lay up

[1] *Const. Apost.* ii. 36, Γίνεσθε τραπεζῖται δόκιμοι. The quotation, "Judge righteous judgment" might perhaps be drawn from John vii. 24, though "priests" are not there mentioned. Others refer it to Zech. vii. 9 or Deut. i. 16.

[2] See Levy iv. 560 and Steph. *Thes.* vii. 2354–9.

[3] Τράπεζα is "table" (*a*) for food (Matt. xv. 27 and freq.); (*b*) for money-changers (Matt. xxi. 12, etc.), (*c*) for bankers (Luke xix. 23, where the parall. Matt. xxv. 27 has "bankers").

[4] Origen on John viii. 20 (Lomm. ii. 153) quoting 1 Thess. v. 21, τὴν ἐντολὴν Ἰησοῦ . . . καὶ τὴν Παύλου διδαχήν.

[5] Comp. 1 Cor. xvi. 3; 1 Thess. ii. 4.

to thyself heavenly treasure, . . . and in doing this *do not judge* thy bishop. . . ." The writer appears to interpret the saying as meaning that the offertory of the Church is to be regarded as a kind of "bank" for the poor. Of this "bank" the bishop and the priests are to be "approved bankers," and the Lord alone is to "judge" them as to their distribution of the deposits: "For to you [i.e., the laity] this is not entrusted, for on the contrary it is said to those who are outside the judicial dignity, 'Judge not, and ye shall surely not be judged.'" [1]

It is safer to pronounce this interpretation to be quite wrong than to pronounce any other to be quite right. But not improbably the saying originally meant, like the parable of the talents or pounds, that every man is to be in some sense a banker or merchant—in either case a debtor—for God. A man is to hold his wealth, as a deposit, from God. If a man cannot bank (or trade) sufficiently, in the way of private benevolence, he is to put the money into the public or common bank, the offertory for the poor. In any case he is bound to repay to God with interest the deposit entrusted to him by God. If he does this, he will be welcomed to the "joy"—that is, to the banquet—of the Lord.[2]

The conclusion of this parable of the talents, introducing the metaphor of the banquet under the name of "joy," may seem to us rather abrupt. But it resembles the conclusion of a tradition of great antiquity in the Aboth, attributed to the celebrated R. Akiba, who was martyred early in the second century: "Everything is given on pledge . . . and the ledger is open, and the hand writes, and who-

[1] *Const. Apost.* ii. 36. The clause τοῖς ἔξω τοῦ ἀξιώματος τοῦ δικαστικοῦ supplemented by ἢ διδασκαλικοῦ is marked as doubtful. The next chapter adds a new form of the precept γίνεσθε οὖν ὡς ἀργυρονόμοι ἐπιστήμονες in a new sense ("reject false coins").

[2] Matt. xxv. 21–3, "the joy of thy Lord." On "joy" meaning "feast," see Dalman, *Words*, p. 117.

soever will borrow comes and borrows, and the bailiffs go round continually every day . . . and the judgment is a judgment of truth, and everything is prepared for the BANQUET." [1] This begins with a broker or banker, giving credit; and it ends with "judgment" and "banquet." "Banquet" implies "table," and the editor of Aboth appropriately quotes as an illustration from the Psalms, "Thou wilt prepare a table before me in the presence of mine enemies." [2] We may, therefore, fairly say that, in effect, Akiba's tradition begins with table in the sense of bank and ends with table in the sense of banquet.

The various meanings of some of these metaphors of the "table"—now meaning God's banquet, now God's bank, but capable of meaning literally table of money-changers—may explain some remarkable divergences and omissions in the Synoptists. For example, Mark and Matthew insert a petition of James and John, the sons of Zebedee, that they may sit at the Saviour's right hand and left in His kingdom.[3] Luke omits it. The reply of Jesus, "Ye know not what ye ask," indicates that there was some meaning, deeper than the petitioners supposed, in this privileged "sitting," and that the receivers of this privilege would by no means sit in state doing nothing.

In Mark and Matthew, Jesus proceeds to speak about a "cup" (Mark also adds baptism), and afterwards about the Son of Man as having come "to serve [at the table],[4]

[1] *Aboth*, iii. 25. Taylor says: "The *tabernarius* or *nummularius*, the Lord of the world, gives credit, but records the obligations incurred." In the Parable, the servants of the Lord of the world are regarded rather as receivers, than as borrowers, of money on "credit," but "the obligations" are the same.

[2] Ps. xxiii. 5, quoted above.

[3] Mark x. 35–45, Matt. xx. 20–28. Luke xxii. 25–27 is parall. to nothing but the final words.

[4] Διακονῆσαι. R.V. renders this "minister" here but "serve" in the parall. Luke xxii. 27 (twice). See next note.

and to give his life a ransom for many." This seems a mysterious mixture of metaphors. "Serve [at table]" suggests a table, but "cup" (in the Marcan context which mentions "baptism") suggests also martyrdom. But was John martyred? This question, besides the obscure metaphors, might cause the omission of the story by some, including Luke. There is at all events no mixture of metaphor in Luke. He fastens on the moral lesson about the table implied in Christ's reply, omitting the introductory dialogue and narrowing down the lesson, in effect, to this: "At the table in my kingdom the host waits on the guests as I have waited on you." This, though true, is only part of the truth, if the chief places at the table are reserved by divine impartial ordinance for those who endure, and who ascend through endurance, rising upward toward the throne of the Supreme.

Here and elsewhere in our English Versions of the New Testament, we are in danger of missing allusions to a table because our translators have not attempted to give the exact meaning of the Greek word *diaconein* (from which the English word "deacon" is derived). They render it mostly "minister," and it has that meaning often in the Epistles. But in the Gospels—as in Greek literature generally—the verb means more exactly "wait at table" [1] or "lay the table." Relating Christ's temptation in the wilderness, whereas our English Gospels say that angels "*ministered*" to Jesus, Milton says that they

> "set before him, spread,
> A *table* of celestial food." [2]

This expresses the meaning of the Greek word, besides

[1] See Steph. *Thes.* ii. 1181, and Wetstein on Matt. iv. 11, διηκόνουν, "proprie dicitur de servis qui cibum potumque ministrant." L.S. inadequately recognises this meaning. The verb does not occur in LXX.

[2] Milton, *P. R.*, iv. 588.

conveying an allusion to the Psalmist's phrases "prepare a table in the wilderness" and "prepare a table before me in the presence of mine enemies." [1] Christian writers gave the Greek verb new meanings, sometimes using it in a spiritual sense, and sometimes in a technical sense ("serving as deacons"). But the full phrase in the Acts "serve tables" [2]—though not very intelligible to modern readers—implies the regular meaning of the word, namely supplying food to guests at a table.

John uses the word rarely but perhaps with deliberate significance. Beginning with a literal use of it, he says that Martha, at the supper in Bethany, "*was waiting* [*at table*]" or "*setting the table.*" [3] On the morrow, he introduces Jesus as saying, "If any one will *wait on me*, let him follow me," i.e., "follow my example," and "If any one will *wait on me*, him will the Father honour." [4] Then, in the next chapter, he shows us the Saviour actually "waiting at table" in deed, though not in word, when He rises from the supper table and girds Himself as a waiter to wash the feet of the Twelve.[5]

At an earlier period in his Gospel John gives us, in effect, a version of the Synoptic "ransom for many" (omitted by Luke). He depicts the Shepherd of souls in a new attitude, not exactly represented in Scripture elsewhere, but suggested, by the above-quoted Psalm that begins with "The Lord is my shepherd" and rises to "Thou preparest a table before me in the presence of mine enemies." The "enemies" in the Psalm are represented by the "wolf" in the Fourth Gospel. And by "laying down his life for the sheep" in

[1] Ps. xxiii. 5, lxxviii. 19, comp. Milton, *P. R.* ii. 384, "*command* a table in this wilderness."

[2] Acts vi. 2. [3] John xii. 2.

[4] John xii. 26, διακονῇ lit. "is for waiting, or disposed to wait."

[5] John xiii. 5. Διακονεῖν would include any service of attendants connected with a meal; but washing the feet during, instead of before, the meal, would be quite exceptional.

a contest against "the wolf," [1] the Good Shepherd performs the action attributed by Mark and Matthew to the Son of Man who came "to give his life a ransom for many." Some may be disposed to put aside these Johannine traditions as being merely Targums on the Synoptic texts. But internal evidence favours the conclusion that John is here expressing poetic doctrine actually taught by Jesus (though not in the Johannine words) but almost entirely omitted in Mark's Gospel of bare fact, and misunderstood or too narrowly interpreted in Luke's attempt to represent Christ's doctrine.

If this is so, what are we to say about another previous Lucan mention of "the table," attributed to Jesus by Luke alone, in his account of the Eucharist? It is parallel to sayings in Mark, Matthew, and John about one that "dippeth in the dish" or "eateth my bread." But Luke alone mentions table, thus: "The *hand* of him that delivereth me up is *with me* on the table." [2] Origen, who thrice quotes this in his comment on the Johannine account of the Lord's Supper, seems to refer to earlier discussions about it when he says, "Now the true discourse (logos) about this might be found in those who are wiser than I am." Then he goes on to conjecture that it may refer to Judas obtrusively dipping "his hand," not along with the other disciples but "with Jesus Himself," in the bowl that was "on the table." [3] But he has previously used language implying something more than this. He has said that "to deliver Jesus up was the work of one who had seen and understood Him"—one who was "not of the many [and ordinary] disciples, but of those who were by special selection honoured apostles," according to the words of the Psalmist,

[1] John x. 15.
[2] Luke xxii. 21, parall. to Mark xiv. 20, Matt. xxvi. 23, John xiii. 18.
[3] Origen, *Comm. Joann.* xxxii. 14 (Lomm. ii. 454).

"But thou, O partner in soul, and my leader, and my familiar friend." [1]

Perhaps Origen felt, though he does not mention, a difficulty arising out of the words "hand . . . with me." In Scripture, when the "*hand*" of one person is said to be "*with*" another, the meaning is that the former is supporting or helping the latter,[2] and Luke himself uses the phrase thus.[3] Also, in the Epistle to the Romans the Father is described as "delivering up" the Son for "us all." [4] Luke therefore might be following a tradition according to which the words meant "*The hand* of the Father, who is delivering me up for the sons of men, is *with me*, and supporting me, even at this table, which, besides being the Lord's table, is also His altar." Some authorities omit "*with me*" so as to avoid this interpretation. It is natural that they should do so. But their omission testifies only to the difficulty of the ordinary interpretation and strengthens the suspicion that what Origen calls "the true discourse" would explain "the table" in a double sense, mystical as well as literal—as Ezekiel says about "*the altar*" of wood, "This is *the table that is before the Lord.*" [5]

It is true that in idiomatic Greek "a friend at the table" might mean a mere trencher friend or parasite, such as John might imply by "he that eateth my bread." [6] But it is not idiomatic Greek to say in this sense (or perhaps in

[1] Origen, *ib.* 11 (Lomm. ii. 437) and 12 (Lomm. ii. 441) quoting Ps. lv. 13, *σὺ δὲ, ἄνθρωπε ἰσόψυχε, καὶ ἡγεμών μου, καὶ γνωστέ μου.*

[2] See the author's *Son of Man*, 3371 (i) *e–m.*

[3] Luke i. 66, Acts xi. 21.

[4] Rom. viii. 32, where the marg. adds *ib.* iv. 25, "who was delivered up for our trespasses."

[5] Ezek. xli. 22.

[6] See Steph. *Thes.* vii. 2356 quoting Lucian, *Tim.* 48, *τοὺς μιαροὺς τούτους κόλακας φυλάξῃ τοὺς ἐπὶ τῆς τραπέζης μόνον*, and John xiii 18, quoting Ps. xli. 9.

any sense), "The *hand* of such a one is *with* me." It is Hebrew. And antecedently it is more likely that Hebrew idiom would be misinterpreted here as Greek than Greek as Hebrew. Also, if we are convinced that Luke alone has preserved, later on, a genuine tradition about the "table" in connexion with "the twelve tribes of Israel," the evidence on that passage must be added to the evidence on this passage, cumulatively indicating that in both passages "table" is to be interpreted as a Jewish metaphor.

Historically, this doctrine about a mystical connexion between "table" and "twelve tribes" became futile long before the first century, since most of the tribes did not return from the Captivity. Yet it appears not to have become practically futile. Paul was a practical man, as Pliny and Trajan and the Roman Empire, in due course, could have attested by experience. Yet Paul is represented as saying publicly to king Agrippa, "I stand [here] to be judged for the hope of the promise made of God unto our fathers; unto which [promise] *our twelve tribes*, earnestly doing [ritual] service [to God] night and day, hope to attain." [1] How could it be said even symbolically that the "twelve tribes" were continuing to serve God ritually —for that is what "service" means here—"night and day"? For an answer, the margin refers us to a passage in Ezra describing the offering of "twelve he-goats according to the number of the tribes of Israel." [2] "Twelve tribes" had not returned with Ezra, but "twelve" apparently continued to be their number in the Jewish mind.

But this, though it explains "twelve" in Ezra, does not explain the combination of "twelve tribes" and "night and day" in the Acts. Ezra's sacrifice was for a special occasion, offered (says the Talmud) for the sin of idolatry

[1] Acts xxvi. 6–7. *Λατρεύειν* implies religious service or worship.
[2] Ezra vi. 17, comp. viii. 35.

in a preceding generation.[1] It is true that "night and day" might be used with allusion to the fire on the altar on which the burnt offering was regularly consumed, which fire was to be kept up all night.[2] But that did not represent in any special way "the twelve tribes." For such a representation we must rather look to the twelve cakes of the shewbread, always lying as an offering, night and day, on the "pure table" of the Lord in the temple in Jerusalem, and always representing, not only the tribes that had returned, but also those that had not returned and, as it seemed, would never return—dispersed in the East, together with those other Jews who subsequently were dispersed in the West, so as to be called in the first century "the Dispersion among the Greeks."

"Dispersion," in any discussion of Jewish traditions about the Twelve Tribes, is a word that demands some notice. The phrases "sojourners of the Dispersion," and "the twelve tribes that are of the Dispersion," at the beginning of two of the Epistles,[3] should be contrasted with the narrower spirit attributed by John to the Jewish opponents of Jesus, when they mocked at the notion of His appealing with a Messianic Gospel to those inferior creatures whom they hardly knew whether to call half Jews or wholly Greeks: "Will he go to the Dispersion among the Greeks and teach the Greeks?"[4]

The Revelation of St. John shows that in the mind of a Christian seer toward the end of the first century there was still room for the thought of "the names of the twelve tribes of the children of Israel" written on the "twelve gates" of the New Jerusalem.[5] So, too, the Similitudes

[1] Bab. *Horaioth* 6*a* and Jer. *Horaioth* i. 8.
[2] Lev. vi. 8–13.
[3] 1 Pet. i. 1, Jas. i. 1.
[4] John vii. 35.
[5] Rev. xxi. 12.

of Hermas records a vision of "mountains" that are "the twelve tribes that inhabit the whole world." [1] Even in the earliest of the prophets there is a glimpse of some divine purpose underlying this dispersion. Hosea represents the Lord as saying that He will "sow" (or, disperse) Israel in the earth [2]; and this is explained in Pesachim as meaning that Israel will be "sown" in order to produce a harvest of "proselytes." [3]

In a bad and narrow sense this "sowing" for "proselytes" is recognised by Jesus when He condemns the Pharisees for "compassing sea and land to make one proselyte," whom, when made, they convert into "a son of hell." [4] But the disciples of Jesus recognised it also in a good sense, regarding the Dispersion, and the sowing of the Law throughout the Empire, as a divinely ordained preparation for the sowing of the Gospel, which was to gather together the scattered children of Israel and unite them with all the children of God.[5] This is not a late thought among Christians. It pervades the Pauline Epistles. Paul cannot give up the belief in the ideal twelve tribes of Israel. "All Israel shall be saved," he says, for "the gifts and the calling of God are without repentance." [6]

Among non-Christian Jews this perpetuity of the twelve tribes seems to have been taken for granted. The belief might be illustrated by many poetic traditions. One of these describes the Tribes as on a level with the Law, the Sabbath, and Circumcision—all of which are causes of the world's salvation.[7] Another declares that the earth can no more exist without the twelve tribes than the heaven without the planets.[8] These, although late records, testify

[1] Hermas, *Sim.* ix. 17.
[2] Hos. ii. 23, "I will sow her unto me in the earth."
[3] *Pesach.* 87*b*. [4] Matt. xxiii. 15.
[5] Comp. John xi. 52. [6] Rom. xi. 25–9.
[7] *Pesikt.* Wü. p. 257. [8] *Exod. r.* on Exod. xii. 1–2 (Wü. p. 106).

to a very early national assumption. We found it in the speech before Agrippa attributed to Paul by Luke, and we may find it also in Josephus' legendary account of the origin of the translation of the Old Testament into Greek under the patronage of Ptolemy Philadelphus.[1]

In this narrative the important points for us are two :— (1) Although the translators are called seventy, they are said to be "six out of each tribe," (2) Ptolemy sends to the Temple a "table," to the description of which Josephus devotes extraordinary pains and space—more space than to the passage of Israel across the Red Sea. Whiston calls it "the table for the shewbread." This is an error of translation. But Josephus says that the dimensions of "the table" were made to accord exactly with those of the original, and there can be no doubt (in spite of some corruption in the text) that the original was "the table for the shewbread." The king and his artists (we are told) while retaining the dimensions, added such an elaboration of costly splendour that the new table far surpassed the old one.

We cannot suppose that Ptolemy thought very deeply —or was regarded by Josephus as thinking very deeply— about the twelve tribes of Israel for their own sake. But the story may be accepted as showing that educated Greeks and Romans, before and during the first century, might well be impressed by the thought of a "table" containing a continual and bloodless offering of bread, and frankincense, and perhaps of salt[2]—offered up in Jerusalem by the remnant

[1] Joseph. *Ant.* xii. 2. 4–9, mostly taken by him from the earlier *Letter of Aristeas*, on which see Schürer II. iii. 306–312. See also *Enoch* lxxxix. 50, 73, "a table," possibly alluding to the table of the shewbread.

[2] "Salt." So Philo, following LXX of Levit. xxiv. 7. Comp. Hor. *Carm.* iii. 23, 17–20 on the acceptableness of a pious offering of meal and salt, which the context declares to be not inferior to the sacrifice of a costly victim.

of a nation that was now no longer the ancient nation of Palestine's twelve tribes, but for the most part a scattered sprinkling of exiles over the whole world, yet still obstinately preserving the symbolism of that obsolete tribal individuality, and still obstinately adhering to the worship of One invisible and unsculpturable Being whom they called indifferently sometimes the Eternal but sometimes the God of Israel.

The shewbread itself is mentioned but once in the Gospels. There, however, it occurs in all the Synoptists, where Jesus (according to Mark's version) tells how David "entered into the house of God when Abiathar was high priest, and did eat the shewbread, which it is not lawful to eat, save for the priests, and gave also to them that were with him." [1] This contains a technical error, since Abiathar was not high priest till afterwards. But Abiathar was proverbially known as the possessor of the ephod, the oracle of God, and the original probably meant, "It was with divine permission that the high priest gave David the bread." [2] "When Abiathar was high priest" is omitted by Matthew and Luke. Their omission testifies to the difficulty, but does not impugn the antiquity, of the Marcan tradition.

The story represents Jesus as fastening, so to speak, on what was literally a flagrant contravention of the Law. David was only a layman. The bread was consecrated, and reserved for Aaron and his sons by "a covenant of salt." But we have seen that the kingdom was also given "to David for ever, even to him and to his sons by a covenant of salt." [3] Some might find a kind of providential fitness in the fact that the only Biblical instance where the twelve cakes that represented the twelve tribes are given to one outside the circle of the priests, is one where the shewbread

[1] Mark ii. 26, Matt. xii. 4, Luke vi. 4.
[2] See *Hor. Heb.* on Mark ii. 26.
[3] 2 Chron. xiii. 5

is given to the future king of the whole nation about whom the Lord said, "I will set up one shepherd over them and he shall feed them, even my servant David."[1] The Marcan context says, "The sabbath was made for man," but it seems also to teach us tacitly that "The shewbread was made for man." It was made for the twelve tribes, and the twelve tribes are Israel, the righteous nation that always looks towards God and feeds on the light of His countenance.

Our reason for taking so much pains about the place of the table of the shewbread in Jewish thought is that it may help us to a more adequate conception of what Jesus thought about the Temple as a whole. Along with this question comes another of supreme importance, whether He changed His mind about it, and whether the Temple and its destiny belonged to those subjects about which He is said to have "learned obedience by the things that he suffered."[2] Let us put ourselves in the position of Andrew, who is said to have been a disciple of John the Baptist before he became a disciple of Jesus. Would not Andrew be struck by the contrast between his two Masters in their attitude toward the Temple? "My first Master," he might say, "never went up to Jerusalem, much less made any attempt to remove the abuses in the Temple. My second Master did both these things and risked His life in them, and in the end was killed for doing them. Why was this?"

We cannot answer the question as to John the Baptist, for we do not know enough about his character, circumstances, and views—and, in particular, his relation to Essenism. But we may safely say about Jesus that He would not have done what He did if He had not, at first, honoured and loved the Temple—yes, even the visible structure of Herodian stone defiled by Herod's dedicatory

[1] Ezek. xxxiv. 23. [2] Heb. v. 8.

offerings—trying to do His best to save it, until at last the conviction was forced upon Him that "the wrath of the Lord had arisen against his people" and that "there was no remedy." [1]

The beautiful story about the child Jesus concluding with the question to His parents, "Knew ye not that I must be in my Father's house?" [2] might be fairly doubted if it claimed to be historical in every detail; but it must not be doubted as evidence pointing to a historical fact—expressed more definitely in the Fourth Gospel—namely, that Jesus was "eaten up" by a "zeal" for that "house." [3] Mark supports that inference by telling us that Jesus desired, and attempted, to make it "a house of prayer for all the nations." [4] That this was not to be done in the way in which He attempted to do it Jesus learned by experience. But we can hardly doubt that not only in the moment when He was making the attempt, but also long before it, He had thoughts, aspirations, and visions concerning the symbolism of the Sanctuary and its sacred contents—the Candlestick that was the Light of the World, the Altar of the incense of Prayer, the "pure" Table on which there always rested the perpetual offering of the Twelve Tribes, the Bread of the divine Face.

The last of these symbols has been obscured in the Gentile mind by its Jewish idealism. But it ought to be clearly and fully recognised because of its bearing on our daily prayer for bread. For it is difficult to believe that, on the night before His death, Jesus could have promised to the Twelve that they should *eat and drink at His "table"* and "sit on thrones judging the twelve tribes of Israel" unless He had retained to the last the thought of the connexion between the perpetuity of the twelve tribes and the

[1] 2 Chron. xxxvi. 16. [2] Luke ii. 49.
[3] John ii. 17. [4] Mark xi. 17.

perpetual offering of the twelve loaves on *the table* of the shewbread in the Sanctuary. And it is more than difficult, it is hardly possible, to believe that He could have taught His disciples to pray for bread to their Father day by day, unless He had also taught, or assumed, that the true bread of those whom He called "the little ones" of the Kingdom of heaven was that which comes to those whose angels "always behold the face" of the Father in heaven.[1]

If this be so, we may say that the shewbread of the Table of the Law has served as a rudimentary introduction to the Eucharistic bread of the table of Jesus Christ in the Gospels. That the bread of the twelve tribes of Israel was the Bread of the Face of Jehovah, the God of Israel, was the lesson of the ancient Hebrew symbol and the implied doctrine of the Law of Moses. In another form, transfigured by the Incarnation and its sequel, the lesson of the Law has been so widened, deepened, and quickened, as to become the Promise of the Gospel:—namely, that in all the nations of the earth, the bread of every human being that will receive the Spirit of the Lord Jesus Christ will be the living and lifegiving Bread of the Face of the Father in heaven.

EDWIN A. ABBOTT.

[1] Matt. xviii. 10.

SCRIBES AND SADDUCEES IN THE NEW TESTAMENT.

In a former article, published in the pages of this Magazine [1] under the title *Who were the Sadducees?* I suggested that though the Sadducees are referred to specifically as such but rarely in the New Testament writings, there are probably some allusions to them or their teaching in passages which have not hitherto been commonly recognised as containing elements of this kind. I propose in this article to examine some such passages which, it seems to me, may be illuminated from this point of view. It will be necessary also, in this connexion, to discuss the character and composition of the scribes. It must be premised that I assume the soundness of the conclusions which I have endeavoured to demonstrate in my former article regarding the essential character of the Sadducean Party, viz., that it had its stronghold among the ranks of the conservative priesthood, and upheld, against Pharisaic tradition, the old simple Halakah, as deduced from the literal exegesis of the Pentateuch; and that it championed, as against the democratic Pharisees, priestly rights and privileges, especially in connexion with the Temple.

I.

What was the exact relation of the Scribes to the Pharisees as depicted in the Gospels? This is no easy question to answer with precision. That there was a close and intimate relation is certain. But we must be on our guard

[1] In the Expositor for January 1918, pp. 19–38.

against confusing the two bodies as if they were identical. A scribe might be—and often, no doubt, actually was—a member of the Pharisaic Party. But this was not necessarily the case, and, as we shall see, some scribes were undoubtedly Sadducees, or adherents of the Sadducean Party, while others may have taken up a neutral or intermediate position. The Greek term for "scribe," is, of course, γραμματεύς = Heb. סוֹפֵר, i.e. "Bookman," one who taught out of the "Book" (Heb. *Sēfer*) of the Law. It was the original name given to the successors of Ezra—the Soferīm—who were the guardians and transmitters of the "Book of the Law" (the Pentateuch), and were also its official interpreters and administrators. As Professor Lauterbach says, the term "Soferīm" designated "a class of people who occupied themselves with the Book of the Law," who interpreted it and who "based all their teachings upon this book exclusively." [1] These Soferīm were originally priests; "scribe and priest" was a combination that persisted long after Ezra, in fact down to about 280 B.C., the time of Simon the Just. The latter was himself both High Priest and head of the Soferīm. But at his death there came a break. The organisation of the priestly Soferīm seems to have broken down, and their activities, as an official and authoritative body, ceased. The reasons for this state of affairs need not be discussed here. Suffice it to say that the safeguarding and transmitting of Scripture became, during the century 280–190 B.C., a matter of individual piety. Now during this interval pious laymen arose who became students and teachers of the Law, and whose influence became established over the people. Doubtless pious priests also assisted. But the important point to notice is the emergence of lay-teachers. These men were the founders of what became later the Party of the Phari-

[1] *Jewish Quarterly Review* [new series], v. p. 505 f. [April, 1915].

sees and the Rabbinical Schools. About 190 B.C. or a little later an authoritative body was once again set up, consisting of priests and *laymen* (the latter recruited from the new class of lay-teachers), and known as the Sanhedrin. At the head of this body, as its President was the High Priest, and there was, of course, a considerable number of priests who were official members besides. It seems probable that the parties known respectively as Pharisees and Sadducees owed their origin to a split in the earlier Sanhedrin between the lay and priestly elements.[1] The great Sanhedrin, through many vicissitudes, persisted as the highest authoritative body in Judaism down to New Testament times, and the High Priest still remained its official head.

At the time when the events described in the Gospels and the *Acts* took place it is clear that the Sanhedrin was a mixed body consisting of Sadducees and Pharisees. The story of the Apostle Paul's arrest in Jerusalem and appearance before a specially summoned meeting of the "council," as described in Acts xxii. and xxiii., is especially illuminating in this connexion. The dissension that arose between the Pharisaic and Sadducean members after the Apostle's declaration about the doctrine of the resurrection is graphically described. We are told *there arose a great clamour: and some of the scribes of the Pharisees' part* (τινὲς τῶν γραμματεων τοῦ μέρους τῶν Φαρισαίων) *stood up, and strove, saying: "We find no evil in this man: and what if a spirit hath spoken to him, or an angel?"* At the time to which this narrative refers (A.D. 54) it is probable that the Pharisees possessed more power in the Sanhedrin than twenty or more years earlier. It must be remembered that the Sanhedrin and the Temple were the last strongholds of the aristocratic priesthood to fall under the undisputed influ-

[1] See more fully on these prints my article *Pharisees* in Hastings' *Encyclop. of Rel. and Ethics*, vol. 9.

ence of the Pharisaic Party. The latter had long been all-powerful outside the Temple, and exercised a dominating influence both in the synagogues and in the communal life generally. But the High priestly families, with the official High Priest at their head, though compelled by public opinion to accept certain Pharisaic demands, still controlled the Temple and Sanhedrin till the last decade before the destruction of Jerusalem by Titus.

Unfortunately the evidence on which we can rely to determine the exact composition and character of the Sanhedrin in the time of our Lord's ministry is not precise on certain points, and is complicated by discrepancies, apparent or real, with the earliest Rabbinical tradition embodied in the Mishnah. The matter is fully discussed by Schürer and other scholars,[1] and need not be pursued here in all its details. Our present purpose is to discuss one or two questions that emerge in this connexion concerning the scribes. What was the exact relation of the Scribes *as a class* to the official Sanhedrin ? And what was their relation to the two opposed parties of the Pharisees and Sadducees ? The answers which can be made to these questions must depend primarily upon the evidence of the New Testament writings and Josephus. But this can be supplemented, to some slight extent, by a cautious use of the earliest Rabbinical tradition dealing with these subjects.

II.

There is every reason to believe that at all times, when it was organised as an official body, the normal number of the members comprising the Sanhedrin proper was seventy, or (including its President, the High Priest) 71. This number was fixed in accordance with the tradition which looked

[1] Cf. Schürer, *H.J.P.* [E.T.] div. ii., vol. i. pp. 165 ff. ; Bacher in Hastings' *D.B.* iv. (art. *Sanhedrin*).

to the appointment by Moses of 70 elders (cf. Num. xi.) as the prototype of the later institution. How powerful this tradition was is seen from the fact that this number was accepted as the norm, as a matter of course, not only by the Rabbinical teachers when they modelled a new body to take the place of the earlier Sanhedrin, but also by the revolutionary zealots when they set up a tribunal of their own to act as a supreme court (Josephus, *B.J.*, iv. v. 4), and also by Josephus himself when, in his capacity as governor of Galilee, he felt it necessary to constitute a supreme authority in the province (*B.J.* ii. xx. v.). In accordance with the earlier Mosaic model also the official designation of members of this body was "elders" (πρεσβύτεροι, Heb. זְקֵנִים). Thus every member of the Sanhedrin would officially be an "elder." It is true that the members of the High priestly families are usually spoken of as a class by themselves (ἀρχιερεῖς or ἄρχοντε) who act *together with* the "elders"; this may be explained, however by the fact that they occupied a privileged position as leaders in virtue of their priestly rank, and the greater dignity included the lesser. As Bacher points out[1] the term "elder" has this technical sense when it is applied to certain of the most prominent of the earlier Pharisaic teachers, viz. Hillel, Shammai, and Hillel's grandson, Gamaliel I. (the Gamaliel of Acts v. 34; xxii. 3), who are thus described as official members of the Sanhedrin in Rabbinical tradition. In the New Testament these "elders" (or "the elders of the people") are often mentioned side by side with the ἀρχιερεῖς and the "*scribes*" (γραμματεῖς) in such a way as to suggest that the three classes so described made up the membership of the whole official body. Now how are we to explain the relation of the "scribes" to the "elders" in this combina-

[1] In Hastings' *D.B.*, iv. 399 (art. *Sanhedrin*).

tion ? Are the "scribes" to be regarded as a distinct body of experts, forming a class of members in addition to the "elders," or are we to suppose that they were included in the latter class ? Schürer says categorically : [1]

> Such other members [of the Sanhedrin] as did not belong to one or other of the two special classes just referred to [viz. the ἀρχιερεῖς and γραμματεῖς] were known simply as πρεσβύτεροι, under which general designation both priests and laymen alike might be included.

This statement is difficult to accept as it stands. For if the Sanhedrin consisted of seventy "elders," as the employment of the term "elders" based on Numbers xi. suggests, it is clear that all the members were "elders" in this technical sense. A "scribe" might become an "elder"—Gamaliel who was a noted Pharisaic doctor of the law (cf. Acts v. 34) and also an "elder" is a case in point. How are we, then, to explain the passages which speak of the "elders" *and scribes* in this connexion ?

It is to be noticed that the New Testament statements on this point vary in detail. Thus Acts iv. 5 f. runs : *And it came to pass on the morrow that their rulers* [i.e. the "high priests"] *and elders and scribes were gathered together in Jerusalem* : [then follows a detailed statement as to who the "rulers" were] *And Annas, the high priest, was there, and John, and Alexander, and as many as were of the kindred of the high priest.* Now at the end of this account the Apostles, after their release, are said to have *reported all that the chief priests and elders had done unto them.* There is here no mention of "scribes" though these are coupled with the "elders" in verse 5. A similar inconsistency of statement meets us in the Gospels ; and this is the case even in parallel passages : thus Mark xv. 1 states that *in the morning the chief priests with the elders and scribes and* (= *even* ?) *the whole council held a consultation and bound*

[1] *H.J.P.* (E.T.), div. ii. vol. i. p. 178.

Jesus, while Matthew (xxvii. 1) has: *Now when morning was come all the chief priests and the elders of the people took counsel*, and Luke (xxii. 66): *And as soon as it was day, the assembly of the elders of the people was gathered together, both chief priests and scribes.* This last statement is interesting as it gives, in apparently precise and accurate detail, the exact constitution of the Sanhedrin: all its members are described as constituting the body of "elders," and these are subdivided into "chief priests and scribes."

In view of the fact that we meet with the combination "chief priests, elders, scribes" (Mark xi. 27; xiv. 43, 53; xv. 1; Matt xxvii. 41) interchanging with "chief priests and elders" (Matt. xxi. 23; xxvi. 3, 47; xxvii. 1, 3, 12, 20; Acts iv. 23; xxiii. 14; xxv. 15), and also with "chief priests and scribes" (Matt. ii. 4; xx. 18; xxi. 15; Mark x. 33; xi. 18; xiv. 1; xv. 31; Luke xxii. 2, 66; xxiii. 10), it is a natural inference to suppose that "elders" and "scribes" form a single class, viz., scribal elders, or those scribes who were members of the Sanhedrin. Nevertheless, it would be unsafe to make this deduction. A certain number of the official members of the Sanhedrin, apart from the high-priestly families, were recruited from the "scribes" (e.g. Gamaliel), but not necessarily all. The most reasonable hypothesis is to suppose that a distinct proportion of the "elders" was, in the time of our Lord's ministry, recruited from the learned class, who were experts in the interpretation of the Law, and who formed the powerful guild of the scribes. How large the proportion was, we cannot say. At the time of St. Paul's arrest (Acts xxii.–xxiii.) it seems to have been fairly considerable. Technically, of course, these "scribes" were "elders"; but as they were primarily "scribes," and as such formed a close and distinct body of experts within the Sanhedrin, it is not unnatural (though not strictly accurate) to speak of them as a class

distinct from the "elders," i.e. those official members who did not belong to the high priestly families, and were not primarily "scribes." Of course it is possible that some of the "scribes" who are mentioned in conjunction with the High Priest may not have been official members of the Sanhedrin at all. In some of the passages cited above, where no formal meeting of the "council" is in question, this may well have been the case; and even where formal meetings are referred to it is possible that scribes who were not official members of the Sanhedrin were present. This was certainly the case in fhe later Rabbinical assembly which was modelled on the earlier body. Here we are told (*Sanh.* iv. 4; *Tosef. Sanh.* viii. 2) in front of the assembled official members sat three rows of the pupils of the Rabbis; and it was from these that new members for the official body were selected.

III.

It is usual to speak of the scribes as having formed a close and powerful guild. This is true, in a sense. But it must be remembered that the scribes, though forming a distinct professional class, were yet confined to no one party. The common ground on which they all stood was the Law. Ability to interpret authoritatively and to administer its enactments was universally conceded to the scribal class. Though certain points—especially the doctrine of the resurrection—were subjects of controversy between the opposed Parties, there was thus a large amount of common ground. Nevertheless it is clear from the New Testament evidence that, as we should expect, all the scribes did not belong to one party. From those passages which speak of "the scribes of the Pharisees" (Mark ii. 16) or "the Pharisees and their scribes" (Luke v. 30; cf. also Acts xxiii. 9) it may safely be inferred, as Schürer points out,[1] that there

[1] *Op. cit.* p. 320.

also existed Sadducean scribes. These latter may well have belonged to the priestly class, and have perpetuated, to some extent, the old priestly order of "Soferīm," Does this account for the fact that the Rabbinical Teachers of the Law never refer to themselves as *Soferīm*? Their own designation for themselves is "the wise (or learned) of Israel" (חַכְמֵי יִשְׂרָאֵל), and their disciples are called "pupils of the learned" (תַּלְמִידֵי חֲכָמִים). It is true, they sometimes refer to "the words of the *Soferīm*"; but this only means the body of tradition which had been handed down from the earlier *Soferīm* (who flourished before the rise of the Rabbinical schools), and which was accepted as authoritative.[1] As is pointed out in the note below, the term סוֹפֵר in Rabbinic usage had acquired a distinctly lower sense. The Rabbinic term for the lower or elementary school attached to the synagogue was *Beth Sefer* or "House of the Book," as opposed to the *Beth Talmud* where the more advanced teaching was conducted. According to the *Yalḳut* (*Jes.* § 257) the synagogues in Jerusalem had each a *Beth Sefer* and a *Beth Talmud*. The teacher in the elementary school was called סַפְרָא, which is the Aramaic equivalent of סוֹפֵר, and in a passage which is contained in the received text of the Mishnah, but is probably a later addition and refers to a comparatively late time (*Soba* ix. 15) the teaching profession is graded as follows:

R. Eliezer the Great used to say: "Since the destruction of the Temple the sages (חכמיא) have begun to be like the scribes (ספריא) and the scribes like the *ḥazzān* (? usher of the school), and the *ḥazzān* like the uneducated."

[1] The term סוֹפֵר, as applied to contemporaries, is used in the Mishnah in the sense of a professional copyist, or writer (*Shabb.* xii. 5; *Sanh.* iv. 3, v. 5), or clerk; it also has the sense of *bookbinder* (*Pesaḥ.* iii. 1); the term לִבְלָר (*libellarius*), is also used in the same sense. These professional scriveners were a subordinate and rather despised class. According to *Aboth de R. Nathan* (ch. xxxvi. p. 108) the לבלר וסופר were among those who had no share in the world to come.

It is also to be noted that in the thirteenth Benediction of the "Eighteen Blessings" (*Shĕmōnēh 'Esrēh*) there is a reference to the *Soferīm*. The opening of this Benediction runs as follows (Singers' Heb.-English Prayer Book p. 48): *Towards the righteous and the pious and towards the elders of thy people the House of Israel, towards the remnant of their scribes* (פְּלֵיטַת סוֹפְרֵיהֶם), *towards the proselytes of righteousness and towards us also may Thy tender mercies be stirred . . .*

Dr. I. Abrahams, in his commentary on the passage, remarks: "The terms *ṣaddikim* ['Righteous'], *ḥassidim* ['Pious'] and *sopherīm* ['scribes'] have an antique colour," and he suggests that "*the remnant of their scribes* might refer to the Pharisaic leaders who escaped the persecution of Alexander Jannaeus (103–76 B.C.E)." But it seems more likely that the expression refers to those "remnants" of the earlier priestly Soferīm who took part in the movement for teaching the Law and building up the tradition which was initiated by the lay-teachers, after the earlier system, over which the priestly Soferīm presided, had broken down. In any case it seems clear that there is no reference to the scribes of the Gospels. We are thus confronted with the curious fact that whereas the Rabbinical teachers never refer to themselves as *Soferīm*, the New Testament writers constantly speak of the scribes *as a class* under this designation (*γραμματεῖς* = סוֹפְרִים). It might be urged in explanation that in the Hebrew of the Rabbis סוֹפֵר had acquired a secondary and inferior connotation, as we have seen. But this fact in itself requires explanation. The only hypothesis, it seems to me, that will explain the phenomena is to suppose that the Sadducees who controlled the Sanhedrin still retained the old priestly designation for those members of the Sanhedrin who belonged to the scribal class. Some of these were

still priests and belonged to the Sadducean Party. But the Rabbinical teachers took care to reinforce this class from the ranks of their own scholars. And outside the Sanhedrin, among the circles who constituted the unofficial members of the scribal order, the vast majority belonged to one or other section of the Pharisees. Many of these Rabbinical scholars, of course, exercised full scribal functions not only as teachers of the Law, but as judges; but they were not official members of the Sanhedrin. While the Sanhedrin existed (before 70 A.D.) it would be natural for the various members of the scribal class (whether Pharisees or Sadducees) to be designated generally in popular speech *Soferīm*, because the most highly placed scribes had this as their official designation in the Sanhedrin.

G. H. Box.

(*To be concluded.*)

ST. PAUL AND THE ANGELS.

But there are in St. Paul's conception of the world of spirits, and in this world angels have a definite place, certain factors wherein he enters upon a radical departure from anything previously taught either in the Gospels or by the earliest Christian preachers. These specific Pauline factors may be formulated as follows :—

1. The denizens of the world of spirits are brought into intimate association with the Law, and that in such a way as to imply its inferiority and transitoriness.

2. Their rule and dominion are brought to a close in the Death of Christ on the Cross.

3. They are included within the scope of the redemption wrought in Christ.

4. Angels are apparently not clearly differentiated from the inhabitants of the spirit world as a whole.

5. In consequence angels are in some sense antagonistic to God and man.

In his general outlook St. Paul seems to view the world of spirits as a unity and as occupying, from a moral standpoint, a position comparable to that of the unregenerate world of men. In this matter angels stand on precisely the same footing as every other rank in the invisible hierarchy and are regarded as forces which are not invariably or necessarily on the side of God.

The specific Pauline factors we have enumerated call for further elucidation.

1. The most characteristic feature of the Pauline angelology is the way in which he associates the angels with the Law, and that in such a manner as to imply from this association the inferiority and transiency of the legal system and the principles underlying it. This view of the

Law is enunciated in two passages, viz., Galatians iii. 19, "It was ordained by angels in the hand of a mediator," and Colossians ii. 15, "Having put off from himself the principalities and powers," where the preceding verse which reads, "Having blotted out the bond written in ordinances against us; and he hath taken it out of the way, nailing it to the cross" makes it perfectly obvious that "the principalities and powers" over which Christ triumphed in His death are the angels which presided over the Law. In bringing the angels into close connexion with the death on the Cross the Apostle is breaking entirely new ground. As we have already seen, redemption in the primitive Christian community was strongly apocalyptic in character, and looked to a deliverance in the future, a victory over the powers of evil at the Last Day. St. Paul, although he still shares in this apocalyptic expectation and sees in the Second Coming the final and absolute subversion of the enemies of God, looks on the whole to the past and not to the future in his thought of redemption, and regards the deliverance of them that are in Christ as already accomplished on the Cross, when the angels and the spirits who had hitherto held the world in bondage had their power broken and their dominion brought to a close. It is not quite easy to follow the train of thought by which he comes to associate the angels so intimately with the death of the Cross, but his course of reasoning seems to be somewhat as follows:—

It starts from his peculiar view of the Law and its function. For St. Paul, the Cross had brought the reign of the Law to a definite close, and consequently the angels who, according to tradition, had presided over its introduction and were its guardians and the administrators of its decrees, share in this dethronement, and had now ceased to exercise power or to possess rights over men. So the abolition of

the Law meant *ipso facto* the abolition of angels and the end of their dominion, and freedom from the Law meant freedom at the same time from the angelic powers which had held man in thraldom. Thus, in the Apostle's mind, angels were definitely connected with the first age. This was essentially the age of mediators, but with the coming of the Son, all mediation, save His own, was done away with, and the functions and religious significance of angels ceased. Cf. Hebrews ii. 5, "Not unto angels did he subject the world to come." But in the Epistle in which St. Paul speaks of the connexion of the angels with the Law he seems to widen the reference, and to bring the whole pre-Christian world, whether Jewish or Gentile, within the category of inferiority and subjection which he had associated more especially with the condition of the Jews under the reign of Law. In Galatians iv. 3 he writes, "So we also, when we were children, were held in bondage under the rudiments of the world (ὑπὸ τ. στοιχεῖα τ. κόσμου), and again in iv. 9, "How turn ye back again to the weak and beggarly rudiments (ἐπὶ τ. ἀσθενῆ κ. πτωχὰ στ.) whereunto ye desire to be in bondage over again?"

That στοιχεῖα is a more comprehensive term than the "angels" of the Law seems clear from Colossians ii. 8, where the phrase τ. στ. τ. κ. is equated with "philosophy and vain deceit," as well as from the history of the word itself. The exact meaning of the term has given rise to considerable discussion. Various meanings have been attached to it by scholars from time to time, such as, the physical elements, rudimentary teaching, or the heavenly bodies, but St. Paul's use of the term seems to demand the idea of personality in connexion with it. In Galatians iv. 3 the bondage "under the rudiments of the world" is obviously only another way of expressing the subjection under "guardians and stewards" of iv. 2, and again in Colossians ii. 8, "the rudiments of the

world" are contrasted with Christ. In both cases, therefore, the idea of personal beings seems to be present. And further, the close association in Galatians iv. 8, 9 of the two expressions "ye were in bondage to them which by nature are no gods" and "the weak and beggarly rudiments whereunto ye desire to be in bondage over again" confirms the impression that the Apostle is dealing with beings to whom he ascribes a personality of some kind. It is fairly obvious, therefore, that the meaning of στοιχεῖα in St. Paul cannot be confined to the physical elements or the heavenly bodies. From the fact that in Galatians iv. 10 the Apostle goes on to speak of "days and months and seasons and years" it has been inferred that he had in view personalities such as the astral spirits or the angels of the heavenly bodies, according to a tradition which was common enough in his day. But a study of later Jewish theology shows that it was not only the heavenly bodies and the stars in particular that were supposed to have their special angels, but that behind all the phenomena of the material universe there stood the elemental spirits animating them and guiding their movements. It is probable, then, that this is what St. Paul had in view when he speaks of the first age being in bondage to "the rudiments of the world." For him the whole world, the Jewish with its Law and its angels, and the Gentile with its astral religions, is a world in bondage, and can only attain to freedom and life through the victory accomplished in the death of Christ on the Cross.

2. The angels, according to St. Paul, are created beings and created by Christ (Colossians i. 16).

3. The knowledge of the angels is limited, and they are in need of enlightenment by means of the Christian revelation (Ephesians iii. 10). Cf. 1 St. Peter i. 12, "Which things angels desire to look into."

4. Angels are brought within the scope of the reconciliation effected in Christ (Colossians i. 20).

At this point there arises an important question. "Does St. Paul regard angels as being on the whole antagonistic to God and man?" It is not an easy question to answer, and the solution depends in some degree upon our interpretation of certain passages in the Epistles. If we equate the *ἀρχαὶ κ. ἐξουσίαι* of Colossians ii. 15, which were reduced to impotence by the death of the Cross, with the *ἄρχοντες τ. αἰῶνος τούτου* of 1 Corinthians ii. 8, where *ἄρχοντες* is apparently only a concrete form of *ἀρχαὶ*, there would seem to be but a slight distinction in the Apostle's mind between the angels associated with the Law and the spirit powers that rule the existing age and are brought to nought. It is true that the expression *ἄρχοντες τ. α. τ.* is interpreted by many scholars of standing as referring to human rulers, such as the High Priest, Pilate, and Herod, who were instrumental in the death of Christ, but it is more in accordance with St. Paul's language generally to see in them spiritual powers. The use of the verb *καταργεῖσθα* in 1 Corinthians ii. 6 (*τ. ἀρχόντων τ. α. τ. καταργουμένων*) strongly confirms this view. In the following passages in which the same verb is found the context clearly implies the destruction of spiritual personalities or of personified forces, and not of human authorities.

1 Cor. xv. 24. *ὅταν καταργήσῃ πᾶσαν ἀρχὴν κ. π. ἐξουσίαν κ. δύναμιν.*

xv. 26. *ἔσχατος ἐχθρὸς καταργεῖται ὁ θάνατος.*

Ephes. ii. 15. *τ. νόμον τ. ἐντολῶν ἐν δόγμασι καταργήσας.*

2 Thess. ii. 8. *ὃν ὁ Κύριος Ἰησοῦς καταργήσει τ. ἐπιφανείᾳ τ. παρουσίας αὐτοῦ.*

And in further support of this interpretation may be adduced the fact that in contemporary literature *ὁ ἄρχων τ. α. τ.* is definitely used in this sense. Cf. Ascension of

Isaiah x. 11, where "principes istius mundi" obviously means "angels." Epist. Barnabas xviii. *ἄρχων καιροῦ τοῦ νῦν τῆς ἀνομίας* and Ign. ad Ephes. xix. *καὶ ἔλαθεν τὸν ἄρχοντα τ. α. τ. ἡ παρθενία Μαριας.*

It would appear, therefore, that in Colossians ii. 15, and 1 Corinthians ii. 6 St. Paul is merely regarding the effect of the Cross upon the powers of the spiritual world from two different standpoints. In one case, it was the manifestation of the *triumph of God* upon "the world-rulers of this darkness," in the other the same powers are represented as having accomplished *their own discomfiture* through their ignorance of what the Cross would effect in relation to themselves. The powers destroyed are substantially identical in the two references.

A study of the Apostle's classification of these world-powers leads to the same conclusion.

In Romans viii. 38 we have "Angels, principalities, powers."

Ephes. vi. 12. "Principalities, powers, world-rulers of this darkness, spiritual hosts of wickedness in the heavenly places."

1 Cor. xv. 24. "Principalities and powers" triumphed over and reduced to impotence.

Col. i. 16. "Thrones, dominions, principalities, powers."

It is difficult to perceive any real distinction between the various spiritual forces enumerated in these lists. It is true that the term "angels" is found only in one of them, but it is there placed in line with forces which elsewhere, and especially in Ephesians vi. 12, are represented as being definitely antagonistic to God, and in the very passage where "angels" occurs it ranks as a power that is at the very least a hindrance to the believer's approach to God.

And yet there is a line of cleavage even in St. Paul's outlook upon the world of spirits. He distinguishes between

the "angel of light" of 2 Corinthians xi. 14 and the "angel of Satan" of 2 Corinthians xii. 17, and demons (or devils) are especially marked out as constituting the most extreme antithesis to Christ and all that relates to Him. Cf. 1 Corinthians x. 20 ff. Satan again stands out as the very embodiment of evil, malignant and sinister, "the prince of the power of the air," "the god of this world." There is also this further difference between the "principalities and powers" and Satan and his specifically evil host. The former, although set aside by Christ from the authority they formerly exercised, are represented as being within the sweep of the reconciling love of Christ and in some way to be brought within the unity and harmony of all things with God, which it was the purpose of the redemption of the Eternal Son to achieve"; that God may be all in all." The prince of evil and his satellites are to be slain by the breath of the mouth of the Heavenly Christ and to be brought to nought by the manifestation of His coming (2 Thessalonians ii. 8, 9).

The "principalities and powers," and among them we must include the angels, then, stand on a higher footing than Satan and his hosts, and are regarded not as being originally and fundamentally evil, but as having become by the force of circumstances hostile to God and man. The bondage to which the present age is subjected is a general condition affecting the whole pre-Christian world, whether we think of the Jews under the dominion of the Law and its angels, or of the Gentiles under the rule of the elemental spirits. The Apostle's view of angels was undoubtedly coloured by his attitude towards the Law. For him the Law in itself had become a curse, an incitement to sin, and an instrument of bondage, and quite naturally the angels had to be clothed with similar qualities. But it is noteworthy that for St. Paul the pre-Christian world is

not so much a world that is essentially evil as a world in tutelage. It is the inadequacy of every pre-Christian religion that looms largest in his mind, its preparatory character, and it is against the view that either Jewish or Gentile religion is final that his polemic is chiefly directed.

Two further questions have to be answered before we bring this paper to a close.

(1) What is the origin of St. Paul's doctrine of angels? and

(2) How are we to explain the palpable difference between his doctrine and that contained in the Gospels and Acts?

(1) *The origin of St. Paul's angelology.*

The doctrine of the two ages was widely prevalent in the Hellenistic world, and later Judaism had been very substantially influenced by the prevailing mood. We find traces of it in Jewish literature as far back as the Book of Daniel, where the course of the world's history is rent into two great periods, the period of the world-Kingdoms (the vision of the Beasts), and the age of the Kingdom of the Saints (Daniel vii.), where the judgment and destruction of the former is immediately followed by the introduction of the latter. This idea was developed considerably in later Apocalyptic literature, and with a significant modification, for the first age is now no longer subject to earthly tyrants but is in bondage to spiritual powers. In Enoch, Book of Jubilees, 4 Ezra, and Assumption of Moses, a definite period of years is assigned to the present age, ranging from 5,000 to 10,000 years, according as its origin was made to coincide with the fall of the angels or with the fall of man (Adam). Later Messianic doctrine was also very materially influenced by this theory. The misfortunes and ceaseless sufferings of God's people brought in their train a powerful pessimistic movement. The world in which the righteous

were subjected to oppression, tyranny, and persecution could only be explained as a world under the dominion of evil, and in bondage to evil spirits.

It was natural, therefore, that the future hope of the nation should be concentrated upon the coming of the Kingdom of God, in which the central figure should be that of the Messiah, who as God's representative on earth would give battle to and destroy the powers of evil. In I Enoch the thought of the destruction of the spirits of evil is a prominent one, and among these powers to be destroyed are included angels who had intercourse with the daughters of men and in consequence brought misery into the world. In the Book of Jubilees, and Testaments of the XII. Patriarchs the "prince of the evil world" and the conflict of God with Satan are familiar features.

In his doctrine of the two ages and of its associations the Apostle is, therefore, in line with Jewish Apocalyptic thought and literature. There are several other factors in the Pauline angelology which can be traced to the same source, as e.g.:

The angelic hierarchy with its ranks.

Every individual designation found in the Epistles and the different orders in which they are placed by the Apostle have their parallels in later Jewish writings. Cf. I Enoch lxi. 10, II Enoch xx., Tests. XII. Patr. *passim.*

The subordination of angels.

That angels were created beings had always been taught by the Jews. What was new in St. Paul was the attributing of the act of creation to Christ.

Angels neither perfect nor sinless.

The teaching of the Book of Job on this point is very definite and significant. Cf. Job xv. 15, "Behold, he putteth no trust in his holy ones; yea, the heavens are not clean in his sight," and iv. 18, "Behold, he putteth no trust in his

servants, and his angels he charged with folly." To these citations we may also add Isaiah xxiv. 21 and Psalm lxxxii. 1.

Angels to be judged by men.

There is only one isolated statement to this effect in St. Paul, viz., 1 Corinthians vi. 3, "Know ye not that we shall judge angels?" I Enoch has much to say concerning this particular aspect of the judgment in chapters xiii.–xvi., and the idea was doubtless familiar enough to the Jews of St. Paul's day. That the saints were to be Christ's assessors at the final judgment, St. Paul declares in 1 Thessalonians iii. 13, following Wisdom Sol. iii. 8, "They (the souls of the righteous) shall judge nations and have dominion over peoples :.and the Lord shall reign over them for evermore," and Daniel vii. 22, "And judgment was given to the saints of the most High.

The knowledge possessed by the angels is not complete.

This is explicitly stated in I Enoch xvi. 3, II Enoch xxiv. 3, xl. 3, and the Apostle's language has its parallels elsewhere in the New Testament. Cf. St. Matthew xxiv. 36, 1 St. Peter i. 12. The passage quoted from Ignatius ad Ephes. earlier in the paper is also to the same effect.

The presence of angels at the giving of the Law.

The mention of angels as presiding over the giving of the Law is first found in Deuteronomy xxxiii. 2, and the reference is elaborated in the Book of Jubilees i., ii. St. Stephen in Acts vii. 53 utilises the story, not as St. Paul does to prove the inferiority of the Law, but to enhance its dignity. In Hebrews ii. 2 the connection of angels with the Law is cited to show the superiority of the salvation spoken by the Lord over the word spoken by angels, and the writer is, therefore, in accord with St. Paul's attitude in this matter. Similarly the idea that the heavenly bodies and, indeed, all natural phenomena, had their angels or spirits

is found frequently in later Jewish literature. Cf. Wisdom Sol. xiii. 2, where we have a striking instance of this type of thought. "But either fire or wind or swift air, or circling stars, or raging water, or luminaries of heaven, they thought to be gods that rule the world."

St. Paul's doctrine of angels in its general features, therefore, grew out of the thought and literature of later Judaism, whether on its Palestinian or Hellenistic sides, and is in most respects the direct outcome of his religious environment. There is only one factor in his angelology where he appears to have been creative, viz., in the effect that he assumes the death of Christ on the Cross to have had on the world of spirits, and here it is the Christian Apostle with his unique experience and with his wide comprehension of the place of the Cross in the eternal purpose of God that is at work.

(2) How are we to explain the palpable differences between St. Paul's view of the angels and that of the Evangelists ?

An apparently simple and obvious solution of the difficulty would be to attribute the glaring differences in this particular matter to the fact that the Apostle was a Hellenistic and not a Palestinian Jew. Unfortunately, however, this solution, in this case as in so many others, breaks down at the very outset. We have seen that the Pauline angelology is based fundamentally on the Jewish Apocalyptic writings, but many, if not most of these, belong to Palestinian, and not to Hellenistic Judaism, so that the specific ideas concerning angels which find favour with the Apostle were not confined to the Jews of the Diaspora, but were the common possession of all Jews. That these ideas were cherished by the Palestinian Jew is confirmed by the fact that in the later Rabbinical literature, which is in a direct line of continuity with Palestinian Judaism, the doctrine

of angels was further elaborated by the introduction of grotesque and fantastic speculations far in advance of anything we find in St. Paul. The solution of our difficulty is then not to be found in his Hellenistic proclivities.

My own opinion is, that the explanation of the manifest contrast between the attitude of St. Paul towards the angels and that of the Evangelists is to be sought in his own experience, and by experience here I mean not only the course of his spiritual life in Christ but also the manifold situations with which he was confronted during his missionary activity. He found a system of angelology ready to hand which was more in accord with the conception of the pre-Christian world that was gradually forming in his mind than the more favourable and eulogistic doctrine of angels which was current in the earliest Christian community. For him the existing world was a world in bondage, and every spiritual force associated with it, whether angels, principalities, or powers, whether the Law or the spirits animating the elements of nature, was responsible for the thraldrom in which the world was held. Freedom, the watchword of his gospel and the fruit of his experience in Christ, was only attainable through the removal and dethronement of the enslaving authorities, and this he saw accomplished in Christ and more specifically in His death. There were also other conditions which helped to accentuate his depreciatory attitude towards the angels. The Epistle to the Colossians shows that he was face to face with a dangerous tendency towards angel-worship. Belief in the transcendent God of the Hellenistic-Jewish world and in the consequent need of mediators between God and the universe was again becoming ascendant at Colossæ, and man's proneness to worship what is near and accessible as against the distant and inaccessible was leading to the worship of angels in place of the worship of God. That the peril arising from angel-

worship was a reality is proved by the repeated injunction against such adoration in Revelation xix. 10, xxii. 8, and its prevalence in later days is attested by the *Preaching of Peter* and by the accusations of Celsus against the Jews. That his attitude in this matter was influenced by his missionary experience is also confirmed by a comparison of his earlier with his later letters. In his early Epistles, angels are still closely associated with the glory of Christ's Second Coming; in the later they are placed among the "principalities and powers" whose dominion was abolished on the Cross.

The value of St. Paul's doctrine of angels.

It is evident that, taking his angelology as a whole, the Apostle was essentially the child of his age. He is dealing with categories which for us have largely lost their meaning, but even in this matter of angels, as in everything else that he touched, he rendered noble service to the cause of pure religion. Closely as he adhered to conceptions which were the commonplaces of his religious environment, he did not leave them where he found them, but was careful to dispossess them of the tyranny they had hitherto exercised over men's minds. He found a world upon which the thought of the power and relentless oppression of invisible spirits lay like a ceaseless nightmare, and he delivered it from a burden that had become unendurable. He believed in angels and the dominion they wielded over the lives of men was a stern reality to him, but he set himself with all the force at his command to show that they possessed no shadow of right to the religious regard of men, and that whatever power they may have had was completely broken in the face of Christ. Their functions, whether as mediators or in connection with the Law, were definitely abolished in Christ. The Christian believer had no further need of them as mediators to link him up with God, for God was no longer

transcendent and inaccessible, but was brought very near in Christ Jesus.

We notice also a remarkable sobriety in the language of the Apostle concerning angels and a striking absence of the fantastic speculations concerning their numbers, their ranks and their character which are so common in Jewish apocalyptic literature. In Ephesians i. 21 the phrase "and every name that is named not only in this world but in that which is to come" might be taken as implying a certain amount of impatience on his part with the elaborate angelology formulated earlier in the verse. He is not interested fundamentally in angels, and wherever they are introduced in the Epistles it is always with a religious motive. Once he has firmly established the truth that the world is freed from their dominion, that the soul of the Christian has direct access to God in Christ without their mediation, and that Christ is supreme over all, the angels have little or no further interest for him. MAURICE JONES.

A FORGOTTEN CONCEPTION OF PRAYER.

IT is a convention of History that where crisis is there prayer awakens. The present crisis in the world's history has reset this convention so as to make it appear new. Here, as in all else that has significance for life and institution, it has not only aroused the need to seize more clearly the substantive matter, it has also determined that examination should be made into the reasons and energies of the same. Some notable books have been written of late to explore the significances of this most profoundly energetic function in the life of man. Other evidences of its work are being collected, for instance, by the observers who have had the opportunity of going to the trenches or into the hospitals. And these may add appendices to such a book as *Concerning*

Prayer when their filaments of psychical relation have been traced out. Meanwhile, it is worthy of attention that our formulated views have lost, for the history of Prayer both as a concept and a dynamic, the mode of conceiving it in the Early Church which can lead us to its ultimate definition. Moreover, by its recovery, light can be thrown on some difficult Pauline passages. For this purpose, old material must be reviewed freshly, and fresh material given its due place.

In the Syriac *Acta Theclae*, it will be remembered, occurs the incident of how she was taken from the hands of Queen Tryphaena and thrown to the beasts in the theatre. And when a leopard and a lioness came against her, Thecla stood " with her arms spread out in the fashion of the Cross " as she prayed. The early Armenian version of this incident reads for the quoted phrase : " and kept her arms stretched out in the likeness of one crucified on a tree." Again, when many beasts were let in upon her she stood praying in the same manner. After that she had finished her prayer she looked back and saw a tank full of water ; and it came to her that she must baptize herself for her death. " And she lifted up her hands and said : ' In the name of Jesus the Messiah, lo, to-day, the last day, I am baptized '." Or, as the Armenian has the exclamation : " Behold, this day am I baptized for the last." This is not a time to enter upon a discussion of the relations of the *Acta Theclae* to the *Acta Pauli*, of the historicity of the Theklean document or of its non-historical character. The small pieces from the story which bears her name are brought forward as a primitive Christian actualisation of the concept of prayer we are seeking. Those pieces could be given the name of any first or second century Christian, since their data is authentic at least for that period. It is the data that matter, not the name.

The earliest commentators upon this Cross-wise attitude in prayer are Barnabas and Justin Martyr. By their help the first literary inspirations of this matter can be found; and thus also its initial value as religion. The comment from Barnabas is as follows : [1] " Likewise again concerning the cross He defines in another prophet, who says : And when shall these things be accomplished ? Whenever a tree shall be bent and set up, and whenever blood shall drop from a tree. Again you have the cross and Him that was to be crucified. And again He says in Moses, when war was made against Israel by other peoples, and that He might remind them beleaguered that on account of their sins they were delivered unto death ; the Spirit says unto the heart of Moses, that he *should make a type of the cross and of Him who should suffer*, that unless, He says, they should hope on Him, they shall do battle unto the ages. Therefore Moses heaps arms on one another in the midst of the fray, *and standing high over all he stretched out* (ἐξέτεινεν) *his hands*, and so again Israel overcame. Then, when he lowered them, they were put to death. Wherefore this ? *That they might know that they cannot be saved unless they hope in Him.*" All that is necessary for the exposition of the first excerpt from the *Acta Theclae* is in this passage. But because Justin etches in the necessary expository factors with firmer line than Barnabas, for he uses the same literary source as the first century writer, he should supplement him. Then he is found writing : [2] " When the people, I say, fought Amalek and the son of Nave whose other name is Jesus led the fight, *Moses himself prayed to God with hands extended laterally* ; Or and Aaron sustained them all day, lest his fatigue should bring them down. For if he should give way somewhat from this *fashion of miming the Cross* (τοῦ σχήματος τούτου τοῦ τὸν σταυρὸν μιμουμένου), as it is written in the

[1] *Ep.* xii. 1–3. [2] *Trypho*, xc. 4–5 ; cf. xcvii. 1 ; cxi. 1.

writings of Moses, the people were overcome; but if he remained in that attitude, Amalek then was vanquished, and by the overcoming of the Cross he was overcome. For it was not because *Moses thus prayed* that the people gained the victory, but because in *the forefront of the fight was the name of Jesus, and that He Himself was the token of the Cross.*"

The italicised portions in the citations agree in describing a mode of prayer which was an *Imitatio Crucis*. This simple deduction has been made already by other scholars. The late Professor Theodor Zahn,[1] for example, had remarked it; and also he had inferred from it a ritual act. Plooij [2] made it after him, though not with Zahn's touch of certainty. Then that this cross-wise attitude was beyond question an attitude in prayer is shown if the commentary and the Theklean posture are placed side by side. But before we go on to comment on the second piece from the *Acta*, we may draw some fresh conclusions from the first piece and its exegetical notes.

Now as to the literary source or inspiration of this mode of prayer, both Barnabas and Justin lead us to the *Testimony Book* [3]—to the document that lies behind the Gospels and Paul and Peter. Not content with being the chief instrument in shaping Christology, the primitive book will be found to be behind a *Devotion* which has for its chief aim the vital realisation of that Christology. The proof of the presence of the *Testimonia* does not lie in its general use by our two writers; for it will be noticed that the Barnabas passage depends on some verses from a lost Ezra-book.[4] Whatever its original context may have been, it is manifest

[1] *Neue Kirchliche Zeitschrift*, 1910, 694 sq.
[2] *Expository Times*, 1912, 199 f.; *Theologisch Tijdschrift*, 1911, 450.
[3] Rendel Harris and Vacher Burch, *Testimonies*, Part I.
[4] The marginal reference, IV. Ezra, v. 5 is not close enough; cf. Box in Charles' *Apoc. & Pseud.* ii. 569, n. 5.

from Gregory of Nyssa's *Adversus Judaeos*, vii., that it was included in early *Testimony* texts. This same Ezra-book appears to be the source for the quotation which forms the introductory formula in Justin, *Trypho*, lxxii. 1, καὶ εἶπεν Ἔσδρας τῷ λαῷ, and which quotation is in Lactantius, *Div. Inst.* iv. 18, 22; for it is made certain by comparison that Gregory is drawing upon a like *Testimonia* text and context in the seventh chapter of his writing, and in which there is another citation from an Ezra that has not come down to us. Then, from two sides, it is shown that the use by Barnabas of a lost and Christian apocryphon bearing the name of Ezra was consequent upon its place in the early *Testimony* texts. The *Testimony Book* is the significant influential quality in the Barnabas passage. This conclusion is strengthened when we turn to our exegetical note from Justin. The two writers agree in using the incident of Moses at the battle against Amalek. It was inevitable that it should be so, and because of the influence that already has been singled out. In the twenty-first chapter of the second Cyprianic *Testimonia adversus Judaeos* and under the heading *Quod in Passione Crucis et Signo virtus omnis sit et potestas*, the incident is mentioned after the two standard testimonies for this division of the book. The filiation of the incident with Barnabas explains that the editor of the Cyprianic *Testimonia* has preserved an authentic note of thought as primitive as the testimonies themselves. It is true that he did not keep the Ezra-passage which figures in Barnabas.[1] But that was his way with apocryphal testimonies; he simply excised them. Moreover, the passages which have been said to be "standard testimonies" are shown to be such by their place, for instance, in Firmicus Maternus, *De Errore Profanarum Religionum*, 21, 4–6,

[1] Perhaps there is another snip from this Ezra-book in Evagrius, *Altercatio*, iv. 17.

where again they lead to the Amalek incident. Thus we reach our first conclusion that the Crosswise attitude in prayer had its literary and religious inspirations from the *Testimony Book*.

Our second conclusion has to do with the inner significance of this conjunction of book and attitude. Is there any connexion between an intercessory mode and the primitive *Anti-Judaica ?* If reference is made again to the Barnabas and Justin passages, it will be seen that according to their intellectual sensitiveness each has seized the point of the deed of Moses. In Barnabas it seems to be allowed to remain static and exemplary of the divine ; in Justin it is dynamic and exemplary for the human. The first appears to be concerned that the σχῆμα should recall to Israel their only source of hope ; the second conceives the σχῆμα as a method of prayer which involves a profound evangelical experience. For Justin's language surely admits of one interpretation ; and it may be put into the phrase which closes the rhetorical handling of the intercessory act of Moses by Firmicus Maternus, where he says of it that thus : "et sepulturae Christi participes sitis et vitae." [1] The deed, then, is not unique ; rather it is monitory. Its rise by inspiration from the literary source of the first Christian message aids the view that it was an attainment for the commonweal of Christ's "new people." Where Moses reached in prayer, the new Israel also might reach. Since this interpretation of the Old Testament episode is a result of the primitive *Anti-Judaica*—those gatherings of Old Testament citations which were chosen and threaded together by the selective or interpretative influence of the primal Christology ; and its resultant mode of prayer was the active realisation of the central ideas of that Christology, or in other words which better describe the earliest Christian

[1] See also the meaning preserved in Tertullian, *Adv. Jud.* x.

message, of the primary Anti-Judaic Gospel. Another first century document will help to make clear our lost conception of Prayer.

In the delightful *Odes of Solomon* there are five distinct references to this act of prayer. On the surface they can be divided into two sorts. These two classes of reference may be called the Barnabas order and the Justin order,[1] so that a unity shall run through this present investigation. The first order is represented by Ode xxvii.

> I stretched out my hands and sanctified my Lord : for the extension of my hands is His sign : and my expansion is the upright tree (or cross).

These words are reproduced almost literally in verses 1–3 of Ode xlii. They can be said to agree with what seems to be the view of Barnabas. The second order has the act and its connotation.

Ode xxi. 1.

> My arms I lifted up on high, even to the grace of the Lord : because He had cast off my bonds from me : and my Helper had lifted me up to His grace and to His salvation.

xxxv. 8

> And I spread out my hands in the lifting up of my soul : and I was made right with the most High, and I was redeemed with Him.

xxxvii.

> I stretched out my hands to the Lord, and to the Most High I raised my voice : and I spake with the lips of my heart; and He heard me when my voice reached Him : His answer came to me and gave me the fruits of my labours ; and it gave me rest by the grace of the Lord.

The mode as represented in these *Odes* and its connotation are in harmony with the above interpretation of the Justin view. In them the act had a redemptive significance.

[1] Gregory of Nyssa reflects these two orders ; the first in his *Oratio in Sanctum Pascha* i. (P.G. 46, 601 D) ; and the second in the *De Vita Moysis* (*P.G.* 44, 373 A.B) : *ἡ ἔκτασις τῶν χειρῶν τοῦ νομοθέτου γίνεται, ἡ τὸ μύστηριον τοῦ σταυροῦ προδεικνύουσα τότε προσάγεται τῇ τῆς ὑπερκειμένης φύσεως θεωρίᾳ*, κ.τ.λ.

There is an inward grace to the Cross-wise attitude in prayer; a spiritual *Imitatio Crucis* within the outward act. And this is not because of a static pose of the spirit which shall be analogous to a static pose of the body. The man has not been inhibited into the semblance of a crucifix. But rather does it mean that the "Helper" has freed him into new experience in and knowledge of Redemption. There is, then, a profound conception and attainment in Prayer, and which perhaps embodies its most profound meaning, that can be phrased in the following terms: *Prayer is education in and experience of Redemption.*

We are now in a position to examine from a new standpoint a passage in Paul's writings which, though it is well known, is difficult to be understood. The reference is to the apostles' ambition as it is expressed in the Letter to the Philippians, iii. 10: "to know Him and the power of His resurrection and the communion with His sufferings, the making of himself to experience (*συμμορφιζόμενος*) His death, if somehow he might reach the resurrection from the dead." Paul cannot yet claim to have attained these things; but his vision is gathered into a vivid and absorbing attitude (14th v.): "one thing, stretching out (*ἐπεκτεινόμενος*) to the things before, forgetting the things behind, pressing to the ultimate of the upward calling of God in Christ Jesus." Many of the difficulties of interpreting this passage have arisen from not seeing that its parts throw light upon one another. And the division which has been made in it has been hardened by the endeavour to read the fourteenth verse according to tropes from the races; when the third member of the verse should have been read with values borrowed from its other members. Take the most important word *ἐπεκτεινόμενος*. Modern commentators from Olshausen onwards, see in it the tense forward extension of the runner's body; and thus make schism

among Paul's figures of speech, because the τῆς ἄνω κλήσεως can hardly be harmonised with the furniture of a flat-race. But let us invite, for instance, the help of Justin, *Trypho*, cxi. 1, with his ἐκτείνας and its use to describe the intercessory act of Moses, and correlate the word in Barnabas, xii. 2 : ἐξέτεινεν, which describes the same deed. Then Paul is writing, as it were, a companion to the Odes which are according to the Justin order. By this way of interpreting that important term, the rare word συμμορφιζόμενος, and as it is related to the death of Jesus Christ, gains a veritable first-century Christian meaning ; since the two words are to be regarded as synonyms. The same art in prayer is setting forth the same evangelical idea ; the physical attitude is the garment of the psychical attainment. Moreover, the power of this exegesis to interpret the immediately adjacent phrases to that containing the second term should not be overlooked. For they express the ideas and impulses of the attitudes described in the phrases adjacent to the other chief term. Again Paul's language finds its exact parallel in the *Odes of Solomon*. A portion of the twenty-first Ode has already been quoted, and where it is the actual exposition of the two terms we have examined. But from the intercessory act which leads to the knowledge of the Lord and the inner " miming " [1] of His death, the Odist goes on to chant that " His fellowship in incorruption " is their consequent achievement, which surely is what Paul meant when he wrote Philippians iii. 10. Again, if we consider that Philippians iii. 14 is another way of expressing the thought and ambition of the tenth verse, then there is no clash, even of figure, in Paul's statement ; for the extended arms of prayer would most naturally be accompanied

[1] Cf. Theodoret, *Interp. Ep. ad Phil.* (*P.G.* 82, 581 B) iii. 10 : καὶ τὸν σωτήριον αὐτοῦ μιμήσασθαι θάνατον, ἵνα μετάσχω καὶ τῆς ἀναστάσεως and Justin's μιμουμένου.

with the upward-looking rapt face. The union of Calvary and Eastertide in the thought which created the attitude of prayer is only finding other forceful literary expression in Paul. Just as the Odist brings together the arms stretched out, which is Christ's tree set deep in the way He took, and its direct opposite in the phrase "I was lifted up in His light," which is Easter with the Immortal Lord. Thus the lifted face is the symbol of the "upward calling."

It looks as if Origen had seized these matters in some measure when he penned his comment on Psalm xxiii. (xxiv.) 3 :[1] *ὀπίσω γὲ κυρίου πορευόμενος ἀναβαίνει, τῶν ὄπισθεν ἐπιλανθανόμενος, τοῖς δὲ ἔμπροσθεν ἐπεκτεινόμενος, τέλος ἔχων ἀγαθὸν, τὸ στῆναι μετὰ θεὸν ἐν τόπῳ ἁγίῳ αὐτοῦ.* In this passage it will be seen that Origen has quoted Philippians iii. 14 to bear the weight of a view of the worshipper who is standing still and yet advancing, who is on the earth and yet is in the holy place—one whose arms are stretched out and whose face is upraised. He is surely saying that there is a Shekinah attitude for the soul in prayer if the covering wings of the Shekinah are to be reached, as there is an intercessory mode by which we pass into the energies of the Christ of Calvary and the Resurrection.

The second little piece from the alleged Thekla story points out that in the early Christian practice there was a baptismal relation to this view and method of Prayer. The relation is a curious one. For it is not of the kind that hitherto has been thought to be that which is involved in the mode. Now baptism here is not that of initiation into a Christian Society ; it is an individual act of preparation for the passing of the Christian from this world. It is quite clear that there is no baptismal connotation, either institutional or personal, in the intercessory act itself. Whether Paul or the Odist, each is free from that implication.

[1] Origen, *Selecta in Psalmos*, xxiii. 3.

This is an important conclusion, for Dr. Bernard [1] has argued back from late ritual practices, so that the references in the Odes to the outstretched hands are made to carry their late baptismal significances. Thus the whole fabric of the Ode-book has become ritualised. But its thought, as we have already shown, is of a simpler and earlier order. It does not even reflect the early individual practice of baptism against death, though that appears to be at least as early as Paul. Does not the Apostle's curiously passionate cry "that somehow he might attain resurrection from the dead," indicate that he has in mind the primitive and social act of baptism? The feeling of anticlimax goes, for instance, if the phrase is regarded as representing a phase of the actualisation, for the individual, of the energies and values of Christ by prayer. There was a need to realize the powers of the "Dayspring" against the hour of life's last crisis. Again, this view may shed some light on the cognate passage in 1 Corinthians xv. 29: *ἐπεὶ τὶ ποιήσουσιν οἱ βαπτιζόμενοι ὑπὲρ τῶν νεκρῶν; εἰ ὅλως νεκροὶ οὐκ ἐγείρονται, τί καὶ βαπτίζονται ὑπὲρ αὐτῶν* (or perhaps with Leicester Cod. 20 read *τῶν νεκρῶν*); "And the baptised regarding (the assembly of) [2] the dead what will they do? If so be the dead rise not, why then are they baptized regarding (the assembly of) the dead?" The intriguing phrase *ὑπὲρ τῶν νεκρῶν* has the same value as Thekla's phrase, "baptized for the last." It conveys no vicarious meaning; it is only another way of expressing a personal anxiety to escape what a modern poetess has described, with almost first century feeling, as "the terrible mob of the dead." Something of this feeling was in Paul when he wrote the closing phrase of his great hope

[1] *Texts and Studies*, viii. 3, 90, etc. Plooij has followed Bernard.

[2] Taking *νεκρῶν* as, for example, in John xii. 1 and 9, Acts iii. 15, etc. For summary of other exegetical attempts in this passage, see Robertson and Plummer, *I Cor.*, 359–60.

as it is recorded in Philippians iii. 11 : *εἴπως καταντήσω εἰς τὴν ἐξανάστασιν τὴν ἐκ νεκρῶν.* The reason why it should follow the benefits of passing into the energies of the dying and rising again of the Lord Jesus through Cross-wise prayer, is that such intercession was related in the primitive Christian mind with a baptism in the hour of mortal trial. When the hands were failing to the sides, and the head could no more be held erect ; then the spirit yielded itself to a burial which could only issue in life. Or, as in the case of Thekla, when the knowledge of death came to one who was in the possession of strength ; then the eyes were closed and the hands folded into the portrayal of the conquest of death. The *Imitatio Crucis* had become the *Imitatio Resurrectionis ;* and to such simple and great prayer the answer had come.

This intercessory attitude has gone ; its idea remains. We stretch out no more those arms of prayer ; but still the spirit seeks the blessings it symbolised. And another folds our hands when the spirit has gone on into life. Yet by recalling this ancient and lost conception of Prayer, we may become abler to make and to have made vivid in us the sense of and the values of Him whose work is everywhen and everywhere that of the Redeemer of men ; for where these are, there Calvary and Eastertide mingle their tireless creative energies.

Vacher Burch.

THE JOHANNINE ELEMENT IN THE THIRD GOSPEL.

Probably no portion of the New Testament has received more attention from modern criticism than the Fourth Gospel. Whilst it is unnecessary to enter into any of the various theories that have been held as to its authorship, date, structure and historicity, it is fairly safe to say that no view which has yet been put forward has succeeded in commanding the general assent of scholarship. Nor is it likely that any such view will appear till it is recognised that the question must be approached along lines similar to those which have met with so large a measure of success in dealing with the Synoptic problem. There is no particular reason to believe that this document represents an isolated phenomenon in Gospel writing. It may however be admitted that it has a general uniformity, due in the main to its style and theological outlook. It presents a picture of Jesus widely at variance with that which is drawn in the other Gospels, it lays stress on dogmas which find in Mark, for instance, only the faintest reference, and it is, above all, in the main consistent with itself. Hence the difficulty which has faced those who, like Wendt, have sought to dissect the book and to treat it as the Old Testament critic treats the Hexateuch.

The book is self-consistent, not only in outlook, but also in style, and this has proved a stumbling-block to the analyst. But, as a matter of fact, the style of a book is a feature which is very readily susceptible of misinterpretation. It does in this case argue a certain unity of authorship, but it does not follow that this unity goes further back than the writer to whom the book owes its present form. Sometimes very slight changes are necessary to

produce a distinctive colour. Thus it is generally agreed that Mark, at any rate, was in the hands of the writer to whom we owe the Fourth Gospel in its present form. One of the passages in which the latter betrays the use of the former is the narrative of the feeding of the five thousand. Yet, as the story appears in John, it is quite characteristic, and could not be distinguished from the rest of the book by any external sign. There is the personal touch in the introduction of Philip and Andrew into the dialogue. There is the theological discourse which is made to depend on the miracle. There is the normal type of sentence in vi. 10, "Now there was plenty of grass at the spot," [1] which corresponds to the Marcan phrase "on the green grass." This, as clearly as any reference, shews how the writer has adapted his traceable authorities to his own style. The same feature may be observed in the Third Gospel, though it is less obvious there, partly because the style of the writer is not so peculiar, and partly because the process has not been carried through with the same thoroughness, especially where the words of Jesus or others are in question.

It is open to us, then, to suggest that any sound criticism of the Fourth Gospel will tend to leave on one side for the moment the appearance which the book in its present form wears, and to look further to the documents and traditions which may be assumed to lie behind it. If this method gives no immediate clue to its date or authorship, it will at least afford some indication of the history of its characteristic thought. If we cannot tell who "wrote" it, we may be able to conjecture what spheres of thought, in some cases what actual writings, lie behind it.

Amongst the latter Mark is clearly prominent. It is not impossible also that Matthew and Luke were familiar to the final compiler of the book. The question of the

[1] So Moffatt's translation, which is followed throughout this paper.

presence of "Q" may be more disputable, especially as it cannot be held to be certain that there was a single document answering to this symbol. Beyond that any suggestions as to actual books must be still more largely a matter of conjecture. Even comparative certainty is only to be attained in cases where we have the supposed source in a more or less tangible form elsewhere. But it is not impossible that there circulated in the primitive Church a document known as "The Testimony of John," which may be responsible for a large part of the first chapter.

But even these documents will only account for a comparatively small portion of the book. There are still important elements which cannot be ascribed to any such source. These are those which may be regarded as the most characteristic features of the book, its peculiar presentation of the history, and its stress on certain dogmas. Whilst the former shews itself in many ways, the most striking illustrations are to be seen in the narratives of the earlier portion of the ministry, especially the record of the activity of Jesus in Judæa previous to His appearance in Galilee, and that of His presence in Samaria. Other details which may be mentioned are the part played by Mary and Martha of Bethany, and the narrative of the events of the Resurrection morning. On the dogmatic side the Fourth Gospel is distinguished by its insistence on Trinitarian theology (in the strict sense of the term), including Christology and the doctrine of the Holy Spirit. Whilst no early document presents us to the same degree with either of these characteristic elements, there are tendencies [1] observable in the Third Gospel which suggest that they were not wholly strange to Luke.

[1] Noticed already by Baur (cf. *Kritische Untersuchungen über die kanonischen Evangelien*, pp. 484–501), but inadequately emphasised by later scholars.

Tendencies of this kind may be detected in two ways. The first of these will be a critical comparison between Mark and Lucan passages clearly derived from Mark (the original form of passages may be open to some dispute), and the second a consideration of the peculiar elements in Luke with a view to the discovery of the principles on which these elements were selected by the writer. In the first case we may find Mark's words altered by Luke, as though there were a special purpose in view, in the second we may find incidents and sayings included in the text because they represented or illustrated opinions on history or dogma which the Evangelist endorsed.

As far as verbal form goes, Luke is far freer in dealing with Mark than Matthew is. A large number of the variations can only be regarded (on the usual supposition that Luke had our present Mark before him, and not an earlier draft) as being made in the interests of literary elegance. But there are undoubtedly cases in which the alteration has another origin. Thus :—

Mark i. 10.	Luke iii. 22.
. . . and the Spirit coming down upon him like a dove.	. . . the Holy Spirit descended in bodily form like a dove . . .

The Lucan variations here are certainly not stylistic. The insertion of an adjective with " Spirit " suggests at once a Trinitarian formula, which is, to say the least, less explicit in the phrase which Mark employs. Further, the insertion of the " bodily form " would seem to point to a desire to insist on the reality of the Holy Spirit's appearance. It was actual, not merely metaphorical, nor was it a phantasm without a basis in fact.

Mark i. 12.	Luke iv. 1.
Then the Spirit drove him immediately into the desert.	. . . Jesus came back full of the Holy Spirit, and for forty days he was led by the Spirit in the desert,

Luke has eliminated the suggestion of violence even more completely than Matthew, who substitutes "led" for "drove" (iv. 1). Here again the word "holy" appears. And still more noticeable is the evident intention to indicate the right relation between Jesus and the Holy Spirit. It is not a matter of externally imposed compulsion as in Matthew and Mark, but of actual possession. A similar variation may be traced in Luke iv. 14:—

Mark i. 14.	Luke iv. 14.
. . . Jesus went to Galilee.	. . . Jesus came back in the power of the Spirit to Galilee.

A theological attitude of a more strictly Christological type is to be seen in the alteration which Luke makes in iv. 43, 44:—

Mark i. 38, 39.	Luke iv. 43, 44.
Let us go somewhere else, to the adjoining country towns, so that I may preach there as well; that is why I came out here. And he went preaching in their synagogues throughout the whole of Galilee. . . .	I must preach the glad news of the Reign of God to the other towns as well, for that is what I was sent to do. So he went preaching through the synagogues of Judæa.

There has always been a tendency amongst theologians to see in the "came out" of Mark, a reference to the Procession of the Son. Yet, apart from the presence of such a doctrine, nine readers out of ten would have seen in the language of the Second Gospel a statement of the reason why Jesus had left Capernaum. The crowds who had gathered round Him on the previous evening made His work as a preacher difficult, and involved the danger that the evangelical side of His ministry would be overshadowed by the thaumaturgic. He therefore decided to escape from the multitude and carry His message into outlying districts where His fame as a healer had not penetrated. But Luke saw a deep theological import in the words, nothing less than the whole

purpose and mystery of the Incarnation, and altered the words of Jesus so as to make this clear. The change is the more striking as Luke is generally careful to reproduce the words of Jesus as he found them in his sources with some exactitude. The second variation may be left till we can touch on the historical outlook of the third evangelist.

Mark xiii. 11.	Luke xii. 12.
. . . for he who speaks is not you but the Holy Spirit.	. . . for the Holy Spirit will teach you at that hour what you should say.

In actual meaning the two statements do not greatly differ, but there is surely no doubt that the phrase is varied in order to lay stress on the teaching function of the Holy Spirit, that function which is described in such passages as John xiv. 26.

Let it further suffice to mention one or two instances from the narrative of the arrest and trial of Jesus. Mark (xiv. 49) tells us that when Jesus was seized, He said to His captors, ". . . Day by day I was beside you in the Temple teaching, and you never seized me." In Luke (xxii. 53) we have the further addition, "But this is your hour, and the dark Power has its way." This last phrase strikes the reader of the Synoptic Gospels as a surprise. Few of us would hesitate to ascribe it to the Johannine writings if we were unaware of its actual position. Again, in the account of the trial before the Sanhedrin (a much shorter narrative than that of Mark) Jesus is asked, "Tell us if you are the Christ." He replies (Luke xxii. 67), "You will not believe me if I tell you, and you will not answer me when I put a question to you." The first part of this sentence has a distinct Johannine ring, cf. especially John x. 24, 25. And in the trial before Pilate, whilst there are many differences between Luke and the other Synoptists, one may perhaps have a theological tendency. In all the Gospels Pilate declares Jesus to be

innocent, but neither in Mark nor in Matthew is the insistence on this point so strong as in Luke. Matthew, indeed, seems to stand between Mark and Luke in this respect and was possibly actuated to a lesser degree by the same motives as the latter. The intention seems to be to lay stress on the sinlessness of Jesus, testified even by the heathen judge who actually condemned Him to death.

It might be open to us to argue that these and similar evidences of theological tendency can be attributed to some other influence than that which we recognise in the Fourth Gospel. They might be Pauline. Or the Fourth evangelist might be drawing on Luke and developing suggestions which he found there. But an examination of the passages in question will readily convince a reader that they are more closely allied in thought and in expression to the Johannine writings than to any others which have come down to us. And the real strength of the position is only clear when we come to look at those passages which affect the history of the life of Jesus.

One of these occurs in a passage which has already been mentioned, Luke iv. 44. Luke not only makes an alteration which seems to have a definite dogmatic tendency, but he changes Galilee into Judæa. So unexpected was this change that the great majority of our MSS. have reverted to the word in Mark, and even the Revised Version keeps "Galilee." But the textual evidence is too strong to be disputed, and the discovery of the Sinaitic Syriac has made it clear that the reading here was certainly "Judæa." This appears to be the only hint in the Synoptic Gospels of an early ministry in the South. There is certainly not the faintest suggestion of such a thing in Mark, and it is hardly possible that this one verse should be responsible for the whole of the Johannine tradition on this point. There is only one explanation—that the writers of the last two

Gospels had in their hands some tradition which alluded to or described a ministry in Judæa which preceded the Galilean one, a tradition, moreover, which was not used by the writers of the first two Gospels.

One other case may be mentioned, in which we have reason to suspect that Luke diverged from the Marcan historical presentation in order to bring his narrative more closely into line with another story, now more completely represented by the Fourth Gospel. In Mark x. 42–45 Jesus utters the amazing paradox on the relations between service and lordship, saying that the greatest and the first must be the servant and the slave. The passage has no exact parallel in Luke, but the idea appears in a modified form in the narrative of the Last Supper, Luke xxii. 25–27. Why this transposition? It is surely not unreasonable to suggest that it is due to some form of tradition which placed a discourse of this kind on that occasion. Such a tradition is to be seen in John xiii. 12–17, where the discourse is appended to the narrative of the washing of the disciples' feet. Possibly Luke's slight alterations in language may point in the same direction. Where Mark has "for the Son of man himself has not come to be served but to serve," Luke gives "but I am amongst you as a servant," which may give a clue to the incident of the washing of the feet, and is certainly nearer to the point of view of the Fourth Gospel than is the presentation of Mark. Indeed, it is not impossible that the whole of this short discourse at the table (which Luke alone of the Synoptists mentions) is a reminiscence of some remarks which underlie the utterances ascribed to Jesus in John xiii.–xvi. Thus "It is you who have been with me through my trials" may be compared in thought with "I call you no longer servants . . . I call you friends" (John xv. 15), "even as my Father has assigned me royal power" with "As the Father has loved

me, so I have loved you" (John xv. 9), "I assign you the right of eating and drinking at my table in my realm" with "In my Father's house are many abodes" (John xiv. 2). The language and tone of the two passages are very different, but there is sufficient similarity to suggest a common origin.

Luke begins the last journey to Jerusalem in ix. 51. The next verse makes it clear that His original intention was to pass through Samaria. The other Synoptists have no reference whatever to any dealings of Jesus with Samaria. In John iv. Jesus is in Samaria, though this time He is travelling in the other direction, that is from Judæa to Galilee. Yet the two traditions again may have a common basis if traced far enough back. A similar remark may be made of the mention of Mary and Martha, whose names appear in the Third and Fourth Gospels, but not in the Second or First. And it is, perhaps, not wholly fanciful to find the same kind of contrast drawn between their characters in John xi. as appears in Luke x. 38–42.

The narratives of the appearances of Jesus after His resurrection given in Luke differ widely from those of the other Synoptic Gospels. (The close of Mark is, of course, no longer extant, but it is not improbable that the Gospel lay before Matthew in its complete form, and that its last verses are in the main represented by the concluding paragraphs of the first Gospel.) The most striking point of difference lies in the fact that in Matthew there is no mention of any appearance of Jesus to His disciples (apart from the women) in Judæa. They are to meet Him in Galilee, and actually do so in Matthew's narrative. Luke, on the other hand, has no mention of Galilee. The disciples see Jesus in Jerusalem and the neighbourhood, and He disappears from them at Bethany. A further point of difference lies in the fact that in Mark and Matthew the women alone go to the tomb. Luke (xxiv. 12) brings Peter there also.

This verse used to be regarded with some suspicion as being one of the "non-Western interpolations," but the evidence of the Sinaitic Syriac is decisive in its favour.[1]

In both these points, the Third Gospel and the Fourth are in general agreement. As we have had occasion to notice elsewhere, the Johannine narrative is longer and shews a wealth of detail which is lacking in Luke. The visit of Peter to the tomb needs no comment, but it may be worth while to note the fairly close similarity between Luke xxiv. 36–39 and John xx. 19–29. In both cases Jesus is suddenly with them, greeting them with Peace. In both cases there is some uncertainty, though here there is a difference. In Luke all the disciples are affected, and their emotion is fear. In the Johannine narrative it is Thomas alone who finds himself in difficulty, and he does not fear, but doubts. It will often have been noticed how the fourth Evangelist stands apart from the rest in differentiating between the disciples. This is merely another illustration of characteristic treatment of matter. In both cases Jesus shews His wounds (Luke xxiv. 40 may be an insertion based on John xx. 20, but the point is secured by *v.* 39), and invites the actual handling of His body to remove the uncertainty. The two narratives can hardly have an independent origin.

We may, then, sum up. Amongst the sources which Luke employed, and to which he refers in his preface, was

[1] It has sometimes been asserted that the Sinaitic Syriac belongs to the Western group of texts. This is not strictly the case. It agrees with B against D rather more than one hundred times, with D against B rather more than 150 times, and disagrees with both about 250 times. Its closest ally is the Old Latin version, especially as represented in the African MSS. It thus represents *a third line of textual tradition*. It is our earliest witness to the text of the Gospels, and while it cannot always be held to be right when it stands alone, it may be safely used as a criterion in enabling us to decide between the Western and the Alexandrian readings. Thus, of the "non-Western interpolations" in Luke xxiv., Syr ^{Sin} includes the doubtful words in *vv.* 12 and 36, and omits those in *vv.* 40, 51 and 52.

certainly Mark. Equally clearly there was some non-Marcan matter which he shared with Matthew. The rest cannot be so easily traced, but there are indications of matter both of a dogmatic and of a historical type which he shared, not with either of the other Synoptists, but with the writer of the Fourth Gospel. He either had this in a fragmentary or a primitive form or else he found it so much at variance with his main authorities that he made comparatively little use of it. The Johannine writer, on the other hand, found this type of material more suited to his purpose than any other. Possibly the dogmatic element appealed to him, and in that case we may conjecture that he had before him a document in which the dogmatic and the historical peculiarities were combined. This he employed with other matter, working over the whole in his own style and allowing his own characteristic point of view to dominate his narrative. The Gospel according to Matthew, not improbably owes its name to the free use of a collection of "Logia" or "Testimonies" compiled by the Apostle Matthew. May we not conjecture that this Lucan-Johannine matter, so characteristic of the Fourth Gospel, had its birth in the reminiscences of the Apostle John?

T. H. Robinson.

ETERNITY.

III.

The subject of eternity will probably be of greater interest to the majority of theological readers than those of infinity and perfection, which have been treated in previous articles, and which were found to lead up to the question of the relation of eternity to time. For 'eternal' is a term of frequent occurrence in the New Testament; it is concerned

in important Christian doctrines of practical significance; and eternal life is one of the conceptions most characteristic of the teaching of St. John. The relation of the eternal God to the time-process and to human history, again, is a matter of fundamental importance to Christian faith. It is hoped therefore that views relevant to such matters expressed in the distant past and also in more or less recent discussions of the problem of eternity, by philosophical writers, may be not without interest to theological students in general.

Perhaps what is here to be said will gain in clearness of exposition if the method adopted in preceding articles be followed, and an attempt be made to distinguish the different senses which 'eternity' has borne in theological literature.

The first meaning of 'eternity,' then, which calls for notice is that which the word most frequently bears in ordinary discourse and popular Christian belief: namely, everlastingness.[1] 'Eternity' is often used to signify infinite or unending duration in time, and it is implied that the relation of time to eternity is simply that of part to whole. Whether the *αἰώνιος* of New Testament Greek ever connote, as a secondary or derived meaning, eternal in this sense of temporally unending, appears to be a matter of diversity of opinion, although *αἰώνιος* does not always seem, in the New Testament, to suggest reference to a particular *αἰών* implied in the context. But, however this may be, infinite duration is what is generally understood by Christians innocent of philosophical sophistication, when they speak of eternity. Kant too regards immor-

[1] This quantitative meaning is met with in Daniel xii. 2, Ecclesiasticus xviii. 1; also in Wisdom v. 45 and Pss. of Solomon xii. 11. Our Lord's relevant utterances never suggest the view that the eternal—the life of God, the Kingdom of Heaven—is timeless.

tality as endless duration of personal existence, when he argues from the categorical imperative to realise the highest good to the immortality of the soul as the necessary precondition of such realisation.[1] And duration, as hitherto spoken of, means duration with succession.

Unending duration has also been conceived as not involving succession, and has in this second form been identified with eternity. Eternity is then regarded as a *nunc stans*, a *totum simul*, an everlasting present with no before and after. Boethius defined eternity in this way as " the whole and perfect simultaneous possession of interminable life " ; and his definition is adopted, and defended against various objections, by Aquinas.[2] But this definition is worthless, because the sense which it endeavours to give to duration is impossible. For time-duration or interminable life, without succession is a contradiction.

As this is a point of some importance to theology, it will be well to pursue the question further, and at the same time to recall a few facts which it will be useful to keep in mind throughout the present discussion. In the first place, we need to distinguish between perceptual time, or the concrete time of perceptual experience, and conceptual time—clock-time, or the abstract time of physical science. By the latter kind of time, which is represented by a line composed of successive points or instants, and is conceived as uniformly flowing and measurable, duration proper and change are excluded. There is simply succession of discrete instants and of discrete events which occupy them, no event enduring while others alter—which is what duration proper means, and what change implies. In conceptual time, duration merely means a series of instants ; and in this kind of time there is the distinction between earlier

[1] *Critique of Practical Reason*, Part I, Bk. ii, ch. 2, § 4.
[2] *Summa*, Part I, Q. x, Art. I.

and later, but not the distinction between present, past, and future, which indeed can only exist for percipients to whom present, past, and future are relative. Now if we contemplate time in this conceptual or abstract way, we can speak of time as infinite, because it contains parts. It is only to what is measurable, or to what contains parts, that the concept of infinity, in the mathematical sense, can apply. But precisely because infinite or endless time involves parts, i.e., successive instants, duration of conceptual time involves succession ; therefore endless duration of time, of this kind, without succession, is a plain contradiction, as was previously asserted.

On the other hand there is perceptual time, our apprehension of which consists in making explicit what is implicit in experience of change. Here we are dealing with the presentation of succession ; just now, in touching on abstract time, we could only be concerned with succession of presentations—which, as we shall see shortly, is not change, but alteration or substitution. Perceptual time, then, is a relation between changes ; and though there can be experience of change without consciousness of time-transience, it is from experience of change that all our perception of time is derived ; the concept of change is found to presuppose the concept of perceptual time. In such experience, duration proper—the living duration of the subject—does enter. But it is known so to enter solely because what is perceived as simultaneous, or in one single present moment, is found through reflexion to include the very recent past and the very near future : in other words, any act of perception involves both retention and anticipation, and simultaneity is not contemporaneousness. Duration, then, implies both simultaneity and succession ; without them, it is a mere abstraction, and nothing actual. Thus, whether we refer to concrete or to abstract, to perceptual or to

conceptual, time, we cannot speak of actual duration without implicating succession. Further, a "now" in time is relative to other "nows"; it cannot be absolute, as the definition of Boethius assumes. The phrase 'eternal present' is but a metaphor. 'Present' is meaningless save relatively to past and future; it refers to time, and is inapplicable to the timeless.

One may cite Augustine as well as Boethius, as having held the view that eternity is an unending present, the endless "specious present" of God.[1] Our specious or psychic present, i.e., the "duration-block" of one shortest whole experience, the irreducible minimum of duration necessary to constitute a concrete present moment as contrasted with a mathematical instant, is of very small duration as measured by clock-time; but, as has already been hinted, it includes more or less of the recent past (as memory-image) and anticipates the immediate future, owing to our inability to discriminate to an indefinite extent the parts of duration. Augustine ascribes to God such a specious present, but one of indefinitely great span; so that the remotest past and future are contained within it. This view, while crediting God with freedom from one of our human limitations, viz., the shortness of the moment in which past and future are blended for us in one *simul*, attributes to Him another human limitation—inability to discriminate indefinitely the moments of experience as earlier and later. And, however long be the span of the Divine consciousness conceived as an enduring present, it must yet be in time, and time must be contained in it.

Thus the endeavour to conceive eternity as endless duration *with* succession involves the difficulties which beset the old mathematical infinite; and the conception of endless simultaneity *without* succession is untenable because

[1] *Confessions*, Book XI, c. xiii.

self-contradictory. It is not surprising, therefore, that reflexion has generally ended in abandonment of endless duration, with or without succession, and in the substitution of timelessness as the meaning of 'eternity.' We now pass to the discussion of this second sense of the term.

Several alternatives present themselves. In the first place both time and eternity may be real. Eternal existents may be actual, and the temporal order may be other than illusion. Time will then be not merely a part of eternity. It may be either truly, ultimately, noumenally real, or it may be an appearance of some non-temporal order, so that while ultimate reality pertains only to the eternal, phenomenal reality—if we may distinguish degrees of reality—will be characteristic of time. Secondly, there is the view (temporalism) that time alone is real, and that timelessness is an impossible conception to apply to anything existent or actual. And thirdly, all reality may be eternal or timeless, time being unreal or illusory. On the first of these theories, eternity does not annul time; there can be a functional relation between the eternal and the temporal: the eternal is simply supra-temporal, not limited by the form of time. On the last theory, eternity does involve the annulment of time and of change; the eternal is the immutable, since, without time, change is unthinkable.

We may adopt first the supposition that time is real, while the timeless is also actual and not merely possible; and we have to ask how any relation of time to eternity is conceivable on this view.

One particular case of this relation, if such relation there be, is that of the beginning of time to eternity. If time be taken to mean an order of concrete events and be not considered in abstraction from actuality, or as empty time, the beginning of time will necessarily be the beginning of change; for perceptual time is the form of change. *Non*

in tempore, sed cum tempore, finxit Deus mundum, said Augustine, with recollection perhaps of the Timaeus or the Theaetetus of Plato. Augustine also followed Plato, as we have already seen, in regarding the consciousness of God as an eternal present. But whereas time and becoming were unreal for Plato,[1] Augustine would fain look upon them as real. For the Greek philosopher, time was a shadow of the eternal which ever is; for the western Father, time and eternity are alike real, and the difficulty of relating them, serious enough from Plato's standpoint, is at least as great from that of Augustine. When the beginning of time is concerned, Augustine and Schoolmen rely rather on revelation than on philosophy. Their difficulty, indeed, was with the causal rather than the strictly temporal aspect of the problem. One can perfectly well conceive time as beginning. Certainly time would then not be infinite *a parte post*, and to speak of empty time preceding actual or filled time would be but to resort to a concept of nothing. It is the beginning of change, of which time is the form, that is the real difficulty. A timeless First Cause of a temporal order, an absolutely unchangeable ground of a changeful world, is not easily conceivable. However, our concern here is only with the relation of *time* to eternity; and to this, apart from the question of change, the beginning of time presents no special difficulty.

Turning now to this relation in general, we may distinguish between the view that the eternal is wholly non-temporal, 'out of' time,[2] or absolutely timeless, and the view that the eternal is, rather, the supra-temporal, or such that, while itself free from the time form, it can be

[1] *Theaetetus*, 37: 'Is' alone is properly attributed to Him; 'was' and 'will be' only refer to becoming in time.

[2] To be 'in time,' means to be before, after, or contemporaneous with, something else; or to be related only to a particular part of time.

actual in time, and related to one portion of time in a way which it is not related to another.

On the former view of eternity, it is, I think one may say, *admittedly* impossible to conceive of any relation of the eternal to the temporal. Absolute, or formal, timelessness is a mere negative, and no determination of the eternal can be derived by contrasting it with the temporal. The only entities we know of which can be said to be absolutely timeless, i.e., to have no relation to one particular time rather than another, are the eternal truths of reason ; and these, in the belief of most philosophers, have validity only but no existence. A God who was eternal in this sense could then be only an Idea, not a Spirit [1] ; idea and reality are not to be confused. The only relation of the eternity of truth to time, is the relation which subsists between the truth and its temporal subject-matter, which is strictly not a relation between the timeless and time. And if the endeavour be made, as it often has been made, to relate a timeless *existent* (such as God regarded as timeless, or Plato's world of ideas or immutable essences) to the temporal order or to change, it cannot succeed. For the temporal is the changing ; and it would seem that for the eternal to be related to the changing, it is necessary that the relations of the eternal should change ; and so the eternal ceases to be eternal or timeless. Further, an absolutely timeless God, if such a Being were possible, could have no relation of efficient or final causality to the temporal world ; there could be no activity on His part, no intercourse between Him and us. The world also must then be timeless, perfect, changeless. And that is the outcome of speculation on these lines, such as is met with in Spinoza and Hegel.

We proceed then to consider the less rigorous and formal

[1] See Ward, *The Realm of Ends*, p. 469, where the clearest discussion of eternity by a recent philosopher is to be found.

signification which 'eternal' or 'timeless,' as applied to God, has borne in theological discussion: one which renders more possible the conception of relations between the eternal and time. It is the sense of the noumenal, as contrasted with the phenomenality of things temporal. The eternal, thus understood as the noumenal or as reality as it is in itself apart from our apprehension of it, is functionally relatable to the time-process. For, at any rate from the point of view of spiritualism, all subjects of experience are noumenal and 'out of' time; because it is due to activity on the part of some of them, and perception on the part of others of them, that a mere succession of events, or a substitution of one event for another, constitutes change, of which time is the form. "Time is in us, though we are not in time." [1] Whatever changes, as Kant observed, is permanent; because change is not substitution or re-creation, but involves permanence of substance through alteration of states. The world-process, the content of filled time, the phenomenal, from the point of view of spiritualism, is due to the activities of the subjects which effect the filling. It is due, that is, both to God and His creatures. Their experience is not resolvable into a succession of phenomenal happenings, nor His into "the timeless content of an Absolute Idea." [2] The latter doctrine is obsolescent: at least its practical and religious value are admitted to be *nil*. The former view disappeared with sensationism. It has, however, been revived of late by American Neo-realists. But their philosophy would seem to be founded on what is called 'the psychologist's fallacy,' i.e., on the confusion of the standpoint of psychology (individual experience) with that of epistemology (universal experience). The Neo-realist indeed will not recognise the noumenal subject; but it is really presupposed in his substitutes for it.

[1] Ward, *op. cit.*, p. 306. [2] *Ibid.*, p. 471.

We may say then that time—i.e., perceptual time—is as real as change, and change is implied in experience; while experients are noumenal. Physical, Newtonian, or conceptual, time, which is generally in view when the relation of eternity to time is under discussion, is a construction, valid indeed of experience, and epistemologically *a priori;* but whether it be real in the sense of independent of all experience, i.e., self-subsistent, or whether it have no reality but is only an abstraction, apart from the noumenal agents which, themselves out of time, are the source of the changes of which time is the form, is a question upon which realism of a certain kind and idealism of a certain kind are at issue. In either case, however, time will be neither subjective nor illusory, while the relation of the eternal (in the sense of the noumenal) to the temporal (in the sense of the phenomenal) will be capable of being stated without difficulty: it will be a relation of noumenal agents to the order of the world-process resulting from the activity and experience of God and His creatures. Only if the noumenal and the phenomenal be identified, as by some new realists, will the distinction between that which is in time and that which is out of time (though functionally related to it) fall to the ground.

The eternal, then, in this sense of the noumenal, is capable of sustaining relations with time, whereas the eternal in the sense of the absolutely timeless (i.e., as conceived by Spinoza and Hegel) is not. And such relations must be sustained, if the idea of the eternal is to have any place in theology, or indeed is not to be subversive of all theology except pantheism. An absolutely timeless God can only think timeless verities: and, as Aristotle taught, His activity is exhausted in *νόησις νοήσεως*. A God who is out of time only in the sense that He is a noumenal subject of experience, and therefore not necessarily immutable or perfect

in the most formal sense, can, however, have the world-process as an object of knowledge and a sphere of activity. The temporal can have meaning for Him, and He can have spiritual and practical value for finite creatures living in time. But the 'eternity' of God, if time be real, can only have meaning, if it signify that He is the ultimate source of all reality other than Himself, or that He is supra-temporal, the Ground of the time-process rather than an element in it.

So far we have dealt with two of the chief meanings of 'eternal' on the supposition that time is real, not illusory. But the idea of eternity has figured most prominently in systems of philosophy and theology in which the reality of time is denied. Into the difficult question as to whether time be real or unreal, it would not be fitting here to enter. It must suffice to say that arguments for the unreality of time are based on alleged contradictions involved in the conception of time; and that unless the real must necessarily be wholly rational—which is but a dogma—such arguments have no force. If dialectic does not accord with concrete facts of experience, it does not follow that the facts are illusory; for the dialectic may be inadequate or erroneous. At the bottom of most of the philosophical objections to the reality of time, lies the ancient rationalistic prejudice against the sense-given, against all 'becoming' as contrasted with 'being,' and the equally persistent prejudice that the truly real must be rational through and through. In Dr. McTaggart's fairly recent attack upon the view that time is real,[1] there seems to me to be a confusion of perceptual with conceptual time, in spite of the fact that he draws the distinction which exists between them; and also a tendency to deal with abstractions as if they were real, which leads to curious paradoxes; as, e.g.,

[1] *Mind*, No. 68.

the assertion that future events exist before we experience them, and that change is from future to present and past. However, it would be irrelevant to the purpose of the present article to undertake a refutation of arguments to the effect that time is unreal. We have rather to inquire what, on the assumption that time is illusion, is the relation of the eternal to the temporal.

It is generally admitted, and indeed seems patent, that to an illusion or an appearance there must correspond some non-subjective reality. And if time be an illusion occasioned by our subjectivity ; if it arise from our illegitimate reading of differences between our conscious processes as differences between objective events, there must nevertheless be some real order of which the time-order is a misreading. Plato called time a moving shadow or image of eternity ; but why there is an image, and why a moving one, he did not explain. Some philosophers—Plato and Kant for instance—have ignored the something in the eternal or noumenal which corresponds to temporal order in the phenomenal ; but something there must be, unless we finite percipients not merely distort reality in apprehending it, but also create illusion without cause. Dr. McTaggart has endeavoured to make good this omission on the part of eternalists [1] ; and as he at the same time pleads that his theory is implicit in the Christian idea of eternal life, and also is essential to any melioristic theodicy, his view will have some interest for theologians.

His suggestion is that states of cognitive consciousness, as we pass from earlier to later, tend to become more adequate representations of the timeless reality. The time-order is determined by the degree of adequacy with which our states of mind represent the eternal reality, and it shows a steady process of change of adequacy. The time-series, though a series which gives us the illusion of time, is not

[1] *Mind*, No. 71.

itself in time; the series of adequacy is the noumenon or eternal reality of which the temporal series is the distortion or illusion. On this hypothesis, the inadequacy of our representations will finally become infinitesmal, and the eternal is the last stage in a series of which the other stages are those which we perceive as the time-series; or (from the temporal point of view) the eternal is the final stage in the time-process. Time runs up to eternity, and ceases in eternity. Of course, Dr. McTaggart says, eternity is not really future, for time is unreal; nor does eternity begin. But to say that eternity is future (provided that adequacy of representation increases, not decreases, as we pass from earlier to later) is as near the truth as any statement by temporal beings can be.

This hypothesis of Dr. McTaggart assumes that, if adequacy of representation of the noumenal and timeless be the reality which underlies the illusoriness of temporal experience, the adequacy increases, not decreases, as time proceeds; in other words, that eternity is 'future' and not 'past,' to speak in temporal figure. For this part of his hypothesis, however, he has not as yet published any argument. But with regard to his theory as a whole, it may be said that while it appears plausible so long as we contemplate the earlier conceptions of the universe entertained by mankind with later conceptions, it does not seem to offer any explanation of the time-process in its details. It does not explain, for instance, why one trivial event, or one word in a sentence, should precede, rather than succeed, another; or why the progress of truth, regarded as apprehension of the noumenal, should be halting and subject to relapse, even if steady on the whole; or why some people, as time goes on, lose rather than gain their "hold" on eternal life. The view that greater adequacy of representation is the reality corresponding to futurity,

thus seems to conflict with actual experience when we look away from the whole to the details or parts; though the same theory ought to explain both. Further, the theory seems to put eternity in time, though time is assumed to be unreal; at any rate it postulates change in experience —from less to more adequate representation—and change of course implies real time. Lastly, the arrival of eternity would seem to involve the extinction of temporal reality—or, as one should rather say, of the temporal order. This, considering the importance with which the hypothesis invests the time-order in spite of its illusoriness, is another difficulty.

It would appear that any form of eternalism which regards time as unreal involves the doctrine of *maya*, as conceived by the Brahman.

But assuming that Dr. McTaggart's hypothesis be sound, it is interesting to observe that he finds in it an explicit statement of what Christianity has commonly taught, without full realisation of the consequences and the difficulties involved. He considers that Christianity has grasped the truth, without seeing its philosophical basis; and what we have ignorantly believed in, that he would declare unto us. Christianity, he says, has accepted the view that the series which appears to us as the time-series is a series of representations arranged according to adequacy —presumably in the idea of progressive revelation; also the view that in the final stages of the series, appearance differs only infinitesimally from the reality represented, and that the more adequate representations appear latest, in that Christianity puts heaven in the future and believes it to be attained gradually, by advancing stages which get higher until we are led at last without breach of continuity into the timeless perfection. Christianity, Dr. McTaggart thinks, has only to incorporate with these tenets that of

the unreality of time, and it can then be philosophically entitled to its belief in a timeless heaven in the future.

As to the Christian idea of eternity, there can be no doubt that *αἰώνιος* sometimes refers to the life *to come*; that our Lord Himself places the realisation of the kingdom in the future; that St. Paul contrasts the things seen, which are temporal, with the things which are not seen but are eternal—thus distinguishing the eternal as noumenal and the temporal as appearance; while in 1 Timothy vi. 19 we meet with the phrase *ἡ ὄντως ζωή*. In St. John, eternal life is represented, as Westcott states, as a present reality, a striving after growing knowledge rather than an already perfected knowledge, though a knowledge which is to be perfected in the future, when faith passes into sight. Eternal life, in short, is in the fourth Gospel conceived as an increasing power to see things *sub specie aeternitatis*, a knowledge of eternal or timeless values as God knows them; and comprehension of historical fact is regarded as symbolical apprehension of eternal truths and ideals, as if temporal sequence were an appearance of logical order or of serial adequacy. In all these respects there is close correspondence between New Testament thought and Dr. McTaggart's speculative theory. But whether the unreality of time be implicit or logically involved in the Christian view, or be an essential condition of its validity, is a question. We must bear in mind that there is such a thing as the timeless apprehension of things in time, as well as the possibility of temporal apprehension of things timeless. Psychologists tell us that there can be experience of change, the concept of which presupposes (epistemologically) the concept of time, without any explicit awareness of time or succession: such experience is timeless from the point of view of the individual experient at the moment, though not from the point of view of universal experience,

or science. Indeed some writers, failing to observe this important distinction between the 'psychic' and 'psychological' standpoints, as they have been termed,[1] have confused the individual and 'psychically' timeless apprehension with apprehension of what is 'psychologically' —or 'objectively'—eternal. Thus Baron von Hügel, in his work *Eternal Life* (p. 27), emphasises the fact that "all states of trance, or indeed of rapt attention, notoriously appear to the experiencing soul, in proportion to their concentration, as timeless; i.e., as non-successive, simultaneous, hence as *eternal*"; and, he adds, this eternity "is the very centre of the experience itself, and is the chief inducement to the soul for holding itself to be divine." Such phenomena, of course, are irrelevant to objective or real timelessness; they but indicate the conditions of a subject's attention during a given experience. Again, science arrives at timeless laws concerning the course of Nature, which have validity when applied to the world-order; but they certainly do not imply that science regards the world as timeless. And, as it seems to me, no more need the Johannine teaching as to life eternal imply that God, or that heaven, is timeless, though there may be timeless apprehension of things unseen, and a gradual advance therein, and though events in time may possess eternal significance. If this be so, Christianity may perfectly well retain its doctrine of eternal life and of a future heaven, without resorting to the view that time is unreal.

But Dr. McTaggart's own theory, as well as his claim that Christianity should commit itself to the doctrine that time is unreal, seems to be motived by his dissatisfaction with eternalist attempts to solve the problem of evil. If

[1] For a discussion of this distinction, and its application to certain ethical problems, I may be allowed to refer to my book *The Concept of Sin*, ch. vii.

evil be illusion, the illusion is evil; and so the Hegelian optimism is found unsatisfactory. The perfection of the world 'out of' the time-process, in other words, gives but cold comfort to beings who necessarily perceive *sub specie temporis*. Dr, McTaggart would fain be a meliorist, or indulge the hope that evolution is progress. And he objects, as against theism of the usual type, that we have no ground for our hope that evil will ever be overcome, if God be non-omnipotent in the sense in which, as we saw in the previous article, he interprets 'omnipotence.' Hence his resort to the view that time is illusion. I have elsewhere maintained that, although we cannot inductively prove that the world will certainly improve with time, there are reasons (such as that evil is in the long run self-destructive, and that God can control or overrule, without coercing, human volitions) for believing that good must triumph though God be self-limited; and if such contentions have force, it will again be unnecessary to postulate the unreality of time as the only foundation of melioristic hope, as does Dr. McTaggart.

The Christian theologian may well pause, therefore, before committing himself to the view that eternal life involves timelessness, or to the more particular tenet that time is unreal or illusory rather than phenomenal. The view does not seem essential. If the concept of time involve difficulties or even contradictions for dialectic, it may well be that reality contains an alogical factor, irreducible to the conceptual; that succession and duration are unique modes of reality which cannot be translated into terms of any other type of serial order; that becoming, not static perfection, is the fundamental nature of the real. Certainly it would seem, after what was said earlier, that experience and life, whether Divine or human, are utterly inconceivable to us unless change, and therefore, time, be real.

Further, Eternalism, Absolutism, and Perfectionism, have proved practically useless for the purposes of theology and religion; they leave finite souls and the world process both inherently inexplicable and also matters of indifference to the life of God; and God, as conceived in such systems, a matter of indifference to finite souls perceiving under the form of time.

It now remains to observe that there is yet a third sense of the word 'eternal,' besides those of absolutely timeless and noumenal, respectively. 'Eternal' is also used as a term of *value*, or has an axiological meaning. Its connotation is then determined quite otherwise than by antithesis to either time or the phenomenal. Thus, with St. John, 'eternal' is neither a negative nor a quantitative, but a qualitative term. Some commentators find the best rendering in popular language of *αἰώνιος* in the word 'spiritual': a term from which all reference to time is absent. St. John identifies progressive development in the knowledge of God with eternal life; and eternal life is often said to be 'enduring' or 'abiding' in a non-temporal sense. The contrast between the eternal and the temporal, in the New Testament, is sometimes but a contrast of values [1]: it is the contrast between what is worthy, and consequently satisfying, on the one hand, and the disappointing because unworthy, on the other hand. In this sense, eternity and perfection do not involve static inactivity, as does mere timelessness, but rather the peace of God which is compatible with active energising: not changelessness, but constancy and stability or abidingness. It is therefore not quantitative lapse of time, but the quality of the filling of time, and beatific absorption in the fulness of each successive present, that are the marks of eternal life in this third sense. There is simply no question of

[1] e.g., 1 John ii. 17.

lapse of time or of the impossible idea of duration without succession, which many theologians have accepted from Boethius and the Schoolmen.

Dr. Ward,[1] in his discussion of the axiological meaning of 'eternity,' emphasises the reference of the word to satisfyingness. But here we need once more to draw the distinction between the 'psychical' and 'psychological' standpoints. The bad man is 'psychically' satisfied with his unworthy pursuit; were it not, from his point of view at the time, a means of self-realisation, he would not pursue it. And it is perhaps from the 'psychological' standpoint alone that the wicked can with universality be described as "like the troubled sea," which "cannot rest." The 'eternal' is not ('psychically') satisfying to the wicked man, nor the 'temporal' unsatisfying; while if we pass to the 'psychological' standpoint, the denotation of 'satisfying' coincides with that of the 'worthy.' And to the Christian, the worthy is not of highest value because it satisfies the higher nature, but rather is satisfying because it is of highest value. Hence the axiological meaning of 'eternal' has reference to objective value, not to subjective, or rather 'psychical,' appreciation. And possibly at bottom the axiological and noumenal meanings of 'eternity' can be identified; that is, what is of highest worth may be so because it is most real, or noumenal. Certainly this identification would seem to be implied in the phrase "conservation of values," which with some is taken to describe the essence of religious belief and hope. In that case, the valuable will be identical with the real or noumenal. But the further identification of the real with the rational or the timeless is here rejected on the plea that the timeless, in the field

[1] *Loc. cit.*

of theology as in that of the natural sciences, is but what is valid of the actual and temporal.

However this may be, to Christianity the world is a realm of ends and values ; and this, as Dr. Ward says,[1] "it cannot be, if the temporal is reduced from the phenomenal to the illusory ; nor if the eternal is raised from the noumenal to the logical, cut off from living activity by apotheosis in the firmament of ideas." We conclude that the eternal, when the word denotes the existent as distinguished from the subsistent, or actual subject-matter as distinguished from valid truth about it, must be conceived as in time, or at least as not out of all relation to time ; and this would seem to be possible whether the eternal be identified with the noumenal, or with the valuable and spiritually satisfying, or whether it be taken to include or to identify both these meanings, each of which has been read into it by Christian writers.

F. R. Tennant.

THE LOST CONCLUSION OF ST. MARK'S GOSPEL.

At the present day it is generally agreed that we no longer possess the conclusion of St. Mark's Gospel. On the one hand it is certain that the Evangelist could not have intended to end his book with the bald statement that the women "said nothing to any one, for they were afraid." On the other hand it is practically undisputed that neither the Longer nor the Shorter Conclusion is the work of St. Mark.

The question then arises whether it is still possible to recover, if not St. Mark's actual words, yet substantially the missing narrative. Nor is the problem merely one of literary interest. St. Mark's is the earliest, the most vivid

[1] *Op. cit.*, p. 477.

and in some respects—as representing the Petrine tradition—the most authoritative of the Synoptic Gospels. Nor is the problem of recovering the missing verses absolutely hopeless. In attempting it we must be guided by two considerations, (*a*) external evidence, (*b*) internal probability. Fortunately neither fails us. It will be our task in the present article to collect the external testimony, to test it by its intrinsic probability and to accept the conclusion which several lines of evidence appear to indicate.

Whoever was the author of the so-called Longer Conclusion (xvi. 9–20), he does not appear to have possessed any sources of information besides our present Gospels and his work is a mere cento of quotations from them.

xvi. 9	is based on St John and St Luke.
10–14	on St. Luke.
15–18	on St. Mark, or failing him, on St. Matthew.
19	on St. Luke.
20	on St. Mark or St. Matthew.

The narrative, then, which may possibly be based on St. Mark, is, "And he said unto them, Go ye into all the world, and preach the Gospel to every creature. He that believeth and is baptized shall be saved; but he that believeth not shall be damned.

"And these signs shall follow them that believe: In My name shall they cast our devils; they shall speak with new tongues; they shall take up serpents; and if they drink any deadly thing, it shall not hurt them; they shall lay hands on the sick and they shall recover.

"And they went forth, and preached everywhere, the Lord working with them, and confirming the word with signs following."

Our first task is to test this by examining the earlier

part of the Gospel to see if it contains any statements which would lead us to suppose that St. Mark might have concluded his Gospel in this way. It will be noticed that there are three main statements in the narrative, (*a*) the command to preach the gospel to the whole world; (*b*) the demand for faith in the gospel preached; (*c*) the declaration that signs would form the confirmation of their message. All three statements are thoroughly Marcan in character, and the first is mentioned in such a way as to render it nearly certain that St. Mark would refer to it again at the end of his Gospel. (*a*) In xiii. 10 we are told that the disciples must preach the gospel unto all nations before our Lord can return. Nothing could be more natural than that the Evangelist should conclude his work with the declaration that the command was fulfilled. (*b*) In i. 15 we learn that the sum of our Lord's preaching was that men should repent and believe in the gospel. (*c*) In vi. 7 we are told that our Lord gave his Apostles power over unclean spirits. In vi. 13, precisely after the fashion of the Longer Conclusion, we learn that our Lord fulfilled his promise, that "they cast out many devils, and anointed with oil many that were sick, and healed them."

The only claim of the so-called Shorter Conclusion to be Marcan must be that it presents that Evangelist's conclusion in an extremely abbreviated form. It will be noticed in the sequel that it does fairly summarise what may reasonably be supposed to have been the conclusion of St. Mark, but that it would not adequately do so in the case of any other Gospel. It runs as follows: "And they briefly related all these things to the disciples and Peter; and after these things Jesus himself also sent forth by their means from the east to the west the holy and incorruptible message of eternal salvation." This account contains two statements: (*a*) that the women did after all carry our Lord's message

to the disciples, (*b*) that our Lord personally charged His disciples to carry the gospel into all the world. The latter statement is an additional confirmation of the Longer Conclusion. The former statement meets us for the first time and must be examined.

It is well known that the Gospels of St. Matthew and St. Luke are to a large extent based on that of St. Mark. In the concluding section St. Luke has another source which he prefers to St. Mark, but St. Matthew follows the author of the Second Gospel very closely indeed.

St. Matthew's narrative falls into three sections,

(*a*) *vv.* 9, 10. Our Lord's appearance to the women.

(*b*) *vv.* 11–15. The plot of the elders.

(*c*) *vv.* 16–20. Our Lord's last commission to the disciples.

Of these three sections (*b*) may at once be left out of account. It is based on xxvii. 64–66, which is an insertion by St. Matthew in the narrative given in the Second Gospel. But verses 9, 10, 16–20 may well be Marcan and deserve a little further consideration. Verses 9, 10, 16, 17 run as follows: "And behold, Jesus met them, saying, All hail! And they came and held him by the feet and worshipped him.

"Then said Jesus unto them, Be not afraid: go tell My brethen that they go into Galilee, and there shall they see me.

"Then the eleven disciples went away into Galilee, into a mountain where Jesus had appointed them. And when they saw him, they worshipped him: but some doubted."

It is almost certain that St. Matthew has derived this account from St. Mark. That evangelist must have proceeded to narrate how the women, in spite of their fear, did ultimately deliver the angel's message to the disciples. This is confirmed—whatever weight we give to its authority

—by the Shorter Conclusion. The obvious, perhaps the only, way in which their fears could be removed, was by an appearance of the risen Lord. Moreover our Lord's message, "Be not afraid, go tell my brethren," accords admirably with the statement in St. Mark that "they said nothing to any one, for they were afraid," but not with St. Matthew's own account that they "did run to bring the disciples word." In other words, St. Mark's narrative necessitates our Lord's appearance while St. Matthew's renders it superfluous. In addition no reader can fail to notice how thoroughly verse 9, with its vivid details, is in the manner of St. Mark: "And they came to Him, and held Him by the feet, and worshipped Him."

The visit to Galilee is rendered certain by the message to the women in Mark xvi. 7. Finally the statement in Matthew xxviii. 17 that "some doubted" is certainly taken from St. Mark; for St. Matthew never willingly mentions anything to the discredit of the disciples, but often softens statements of this character.

St. Matthew (xxviii. 18–20) gives an account of the last commission which is parallel to that of the Longer Conclusion (xvi. 15–18, 20). St. Matthew's account runs: "And Jesus came and spake unto them, saying, All power is given unto me in heaven and in earth.

"Go ye, therefore, and teach all nations, baptizing them in the name of the Father, and of the Son, and of the Holy Ghost; teaching them to observe all things whatsoever I have commanded you; and lo, I am with you alway, even unto the end of the world."

The three narratives, St. Matthew, the Longer and the Shorter Conclusion, confirm one another in the main statement of these verses—the last commission to the disciples—and are in their turn confirmed by the earlier chapters of the Gospel of St. Mark. Moreover St. Matthew reproduces the

very phrase " all the nations " used earlier in this connexion by St. Mark. Of the two, the Longer Conclusion is probably nearer the Marcan original than the narrative in St. Matthew. (*a*) The account in St. Matthew seems to show clear traces of that Evangelist's preference for our Lord's Sayings ; (*b*) verse 18 has every appearance of being a Matthæan insertion ; (*c*) " Teach " (R.V. make disciples of) is not a Marcan word, and yet it dominates the last two verses in St. Matthew ; (*d*) verse 16 in St. Mark might well be modified on account of its seeming harshness ; but (*e*) it has left its traces on St. Matthew's narrative. The simple command to baptize might well be the source of the elaborate baptismal formula in the First Gospel, while the supposition that verse 16 of St. Mark is derived from St. Matthew is most improbable. In either case St. Matthew confirms the statement that the command to baptize formed part of our Lord's last charge to His disciples. (*f*) As we have seen, the statements in St. Mark xvi. 16–18, 20 can be paralleled by statements in earlier chapters in the Gospel.

We may thus feel some certainty in our attempted restoration of the Lost Conclusion of St. Mark.

We are justified by a combination of evidence in assigning to it (*a*) the appearance of our Lord to the women ; (*b*) the visit to Galilee ; (*c*) the appearance in Galilee ; (*d*) the commission to preach to all nations ; and (*e*) its accomplishment. (*f*) The promise of power to work miracles is more doubtful, but is probably covered by Mark vi. 7, 13.

We must not expect to recover the exact words of St. Mark. Both St. Matthew and the author of the Longer Conclusion have worked over their source too carefully for that. It is probable that St. Matthew has omitted some explanatory words in verse 9, because his narrative represented the women as going without hesitation to bring the disciples word. In xvi. 15 neither account has the Marcan

word for "go," which may have been the one used in Mark vi.12. In the same verse, while St. Matthew has the Marcan phrase "to all nations," the Longer Recension has the Marcan word "preach." We must therefore be content to have the substance of what St. Mark wrote rather than the actual words he used.

9 "And behold, Jesus met them, saying, All hail! And they came and held him by the feet and worshipped him.

10. "Then said Jesus unto them, Be not afraid: go tell the disciples that they go into Galilee, and there shall they see me.

11. "Then the eleven disciples went away into Galilee, into a mountain where Jesus had appointed them.

12. "And when they saw him, they worshipped him, but some doubted.

13. "Then came Jesus and spake unto them, saying, Go ye forth and preach the Gospel to all nations.

14. "He that believeth and is baptized shall be saved; but he that believeth not shall be damned.

15, 16. "In my name shall ye cast out devils (and if ye drink any deadly thing, it shall not hurt you); ye shall lay hands on the sick and they shall recover.

17. "And they went forth and preached everywhere, the Lord working with them and confirming the word (by the signs that followed)."

H. H. B. Ayles.

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